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SUMMARY 
This thesis is concerned with the possible inter-relationships between mass rape in 
war, the representation of rape in the Balkan conflict in major British broadsheet 
newspapers, and feminist thought. The empirical focus of the thesis consists of a 
critical analysis of the j ournalists'reports of the occurrence of mass rape in the Balkan 
conflict as published in The Guardian, The Times, The Observer and The Sunda 
Times. Part One contextualises the thesis by providing an extensive discussion of 
rape, the history of mass rape in war, and the historical build-up to the Balkan 
conflict. Part Two contains the bulk of the empirical research: this is a critical 
examination of press representations of incidents of mass rape in the Balkans 1991- 
1995. Part Three investigales in more detail the relationship between feminist thoqght 
and the press representations of rape in war as highlighted in Part Two. Moreover, it 
examines some feminist 'solutions'to mass rape in war: those ideas were prompted by 
press interest in the subject, and its subsequent influence on particular feminist 
scholars. There are four main conclusions from the thesis. First, it shows that there is 
a complex relationship between feminist thought and press representations. Second, it 
argues that the relationship has positive results for both feminist theorising (providing 
information and ideas) and in terms of raising awareness of previously 'silenced' 
*issues in the public domain. Third, it suggests that the media in general has played an 
important role in placing the issue of mass rape in war on the international political 
agenda. Finally, the thesis vindicates the claim in the Introduction that the academic 
discipline of International Relations should be more attentive to this violent 
phenomenon, which has been such a regular feature of the history of war, and 
consider it a legitimate area of study. 
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PART ONE 
CONTEXTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
As early as 1992, articles reporting the systematic rape of Bosnian Muslim women 
and the existence of 'rape camps'in Bosnia-Herzegovina were appearing in the British 
press. ' In 1993/4 journalists were publishing books describing accounts of the mass 
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raping of Muslim girls and women. Yef, despite this media/public discourse, by late 
1995 there was still little attempt by scholars of International Relations (IR) to openly 
discuss mass rape in war as a historic and political problem. Where debates did take 
place, they were primarily published in law revieWS3, medical journals' and feminist 
publications. ' Given that this was a phenomenon occurring in war and given also that 
for the academic discipline of International Relations ivar has been a defining issue, ' 
the silence from these quarters was deafening. 
*Note on referencing. The first time a reference is used in a ch4pter the source will be given in full; 
thereafter, in that chapter only, the name and date of th6 source (book/article) will be given. 
'Maggie O'Kane in Zenica and Mark Tran in New York, "UN Security Council condemns Serb 'policy' 
of rape, " The Guardian, 19 December 1992, sec. HOM, p. 1; also, Maggie OKane, "Bosnia Crisis: 
Forgotten women of Serb rape camps, " The Guardiag, 19 December 1992, see. HOM, p. 9. 
2 Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element, 1993); also, Alexandra 
Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Ral2e: The War Against Women in Bosnia Herzegovin (London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1994). 
3 Elizabeth Kohn, "Rape as a Weapon of War: Women's Human Rights During the Dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, " Golden Gate University Law Review Vol. 24, no. 169 (1994): pp. 199-221; also, Danise 
Aydelott, "Mass Rape During War: Prosecuting Bosnian Rapists Under International Law, " Emor C, International Law Review Vol. 7, no. 2 (Fall 1993): pp. 585-63 1. 
4 Shana Swiss and Joan Giller, "Rape as a Crime of War, " JAMA Vol. 270, no. 5 (4 August 1993): pp. 
612-615. 
5Catharine Mackinnon, "Rape in War, " Ms. January/February and July/August 1993, p. 15. 
6 See, for example: Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to C, International Relations (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 74-75; Steve Smith, "Paradiam V Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social 
Science, " Millennium Vol. 16, no. 2 (1997): pp. 186-206; John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power 
Politics: A Critiqu (London: Francis Pinter, 1983), Ch. 2. 
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Moreover, I would suggest that until mass rape in war is analysed as a political 
phenomenon - not merely a sexual act that is commonly accepted as a 'natural' 
wartime event - an understanding of the strategic role it plays in the discourse of war 
and the effects it may have on women, society, and society's attitudes to women, will 
not be forthcoming. This is not to suggest that IR scholars are responsible for 
changing society's 'norms' and values: the point is that they are responsible for setting 
the academic IR agenda. As Robin May Schott has suggested, it is academics who 
contribute to the moral and political environment which either accepts the type of 
violence that has been witnessed in the Balkans, or opposes it, and can therefore 
create both a climate and a critical discourse that informs political decision-making. ' 
Therefore, it is suggested throughout the thesis, that scholars of IR should be attentive 
to the issue of mass rape in war. 
Mass rape in war, then, remains an under-theorised phenomenon of war, with the 
discipline of International Relations having failed to engage with this recurring aspect 
of wartime activities. This neglect, combined with the advent of the Balkan conflict 
and the ensuing reports in the British press of rape and mass rape, presented an ideal 
opportunity to research this new, yet very ancient, topic. 
As mentioned, prior to the Balkan conflict, very little academic work had been 
undertaken on the subject, with the most oft-cited work being a single chapter in 
Susan Brownmiller's seminal work Against Our Will: Men, Women and a e'. This 
was based on oral and documentary empirical research into the general theme of 'rape 
in war'. This thesis, grounded as it is in feminist thought, rape theory and Balkan 
history, attempts to do something to fill this gap, by starting a research project that is 
both sufficiently large in terms of data and sufficiently accessible and focused to 
enable completion within the necessary time constraints. However, while this thesis 
offers the first part of a larger on-going research project, it also presents us with an 
interesting project in its own right. Moreover, this comprehensive analysis of the 
7 Throughout the thesis the word 'natural' is enclosed within quotation marks. This is used simply as a 
way of questioning gendered assumptions that deem certain social practices to be predestined and not 
socially constructed. 
8 Robin May Schott, "Gender and ? ostmodern War, " Hypati Vol. 11, no. 4 (Fall 1996): p. 27. 9Susan Brownmiller, Aaainst Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975). 
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wartime phenomenon of mass rape in war will enable other researchers to take this 
thesis as a starting point in their efforts to further theorise the problem. 
Aims 
Given the paucity of research into the issue of mass rape in war, the primary aims of 
this thesis are three-fold: to investigate the occurrence of mass rape in war 
historically; to gauge current attitudes in Britain to the phenomenon through an 
analysis of the press representations of mass rape in the Balkans; and to discuss future 
possibilities for creating a series of strategies for its dernise, or at least its control. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that although Teminism' is a central theme running 
through the thesis - due to the fact that rape is an issue which is of interest to all 
strands of feminism - this research project is not about fem inist theory per se, but is 
concerned with 'feminist thought'. This notion of 'feminist thought'is utilised within 
the thesis in the following manner: in Part One it is identifying rape as being on the 
'feminist agenda; in Part Two it is offering an analysis of the press reports of rape 
through a 'feminist lens'. and in Part Three it is suggesting 'feminist solutions'. Thus, it 
is not concerned with different 'ferninisms'. but with rape as an agenda that they all 
share. 
The first objective (to investigate the occurrence of mass rape in war historically) is 
pursued by researching archival material - such as legislative documents, ancient 
religious texts, United Nations and war documentation, as well as secondary sources. 
The second objective (to gauge current attitudes to the phenomenon) is pursued by 
researching and analysing one of the most prolific cont--mporary sources of 
information available on mass rape in war, namely the reports in the British press of 
the alleged incidents of mass rape in the Balkan conflict. Indeed, during the initial 
stages of this research project, the media was the only source of information on the 
reported rapes. One could even argue that due to the reporting from the Balkans the 
media placed mass rape in war on the agenda, which eventually led to its recognition 
as an international political issue. Not only did the British press offer a rich source of 
material for this project, but it also revealed a great deal about the current social 
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attitudes to wards the phenomenon of mass rape in war itself, and the most commonly 
cited explanations for its occurrence. The thesis will illustrate how the press has 
adopted many ideas that originated from feminist thought, and how the British press 
has used those ideas when constructing their explanations for mass rape in war. 
The third objective (to discuss future possibilities for creating strategies for change) is 
pursued by researching the responses of feminist scholars to the reports of mass rape 
in war in the Balkans, and noting how new feminist theories have been developed 
with an acknowledged input from the media - either in terms of press reports 
providing the motivation for feminists to contribute to the literature on the issue, or by 
using the reports as terms of reference for their theorising. Furthermore, many 
feminists have written in diredt response to the press reports in an attempt to find 
possible solutions to this long-standing international problem. Their aim has been to 
try to stop, or at least curtail, its occurrence. 
In these different ways the thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of the 
phenomenon of mass rape in war, a phenomenon that appears to have been present 
throughout history, yet one which has failed to attract the curiosity of academic 
scholars and politicians alike. It is my intention to show that the subject of 'rape in 
war' matters for both international relations as practice and International Relations 
(IR) as an academic discipline. " Given the lack of IR literature relating to this subject 
it is difficult to gauge exactly the potential impact mass rape in war has in war 
situations - on the recipient population, the military strategists, the soldiers, 
governments, and so on - or the potential impact the creation of such a discourse 
might have on the conceptual landscape of IR as an academic discipline. 
Nevertheless, this thesis will suggest that it is a phenomenon of war that does have 
significant immediate and far-reaching repercussions. The mass raping of a section of 0 
the enemy's population, particularly when that section is traditionally regarded as non- 
combatants, could not only alter the course of a war - fuelling public opinion and/or 
strategies of retaliation - but, even after the war it could contribute to the continuation 
"3'rhroughout the thesis international relations, as it relates to the practice, is referred to in lower case. 
The academic discipline of International Relations, however, is capitalised. 
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of underlying national antipathy, thus possibly affecting future conflicts, or attempts 
at reconciliation. The thesis will argue, then, that mass rape in war has wide-ranging 
consequences for relations between political groups and should, therefore, be a 
legitimate subject to study within the academic discipline of International Relations. 
Case Study 
The press reports of rape from the war in the former-Yugoslavia were chosen as a 
case study because although the situation of mass rape in wartime is certainly not 
unique to the Balkans, it was the first instance in which the British public were 
simultaneously witnessing the repoAs of rapes as they were taking place, and 
recognising and condemning the abhorrence of the acts. 
The analysis of the reporting of these experiences and in particular the language used, 
forms the core of the primary research upon which the arguments contained within the 
thesis are based. This analysis will be conducted by an examination of the press 
reports , 
through a 'feminist lens' that will serve to highlight the gendered language, 
assumptions, and the misconceptions surrounding the issue of mass rape in war. 
Given the rich source of ferninist theorising on the subjects of war and rape - but little 
on their simultaneous occurrence - there are many explanations that further our 
understanding of the issues and through which comparisons can be made with the 
often gendered and biologic ally-b ased explanations offered by the journalists. 
Furthermore, this investigation is also an interesting one as an analysis of these press 
representations will highlight the ways in which journalists have used some main- 
stream feminist theories to understand and explain the occurrences of mass rape in 
war. And it also reveals how, in turn, feminist theorists have been motivated into 
extending and developing their theories on war and rape by examining contemporary 
social theories of war and rape within press reports. 
The thesis, therefore, attempts to offer a new analysis of the phenomenon of mass 
rape in war through a study of some British press reports of mass rape, with respect to 
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the war in the Balkans. The resulting evaluation is then discussed in relation to 
feminist thought with the suggestion that particular insights advanced by particular 
feminist theories since the 'second wave of ferninism', " have contributed to the way in 
which mass rape in war is now reported. Moreover, that the press reports have, in 
some way, encouraged the expansion of existing theories, and the development of 
new ideas, within feminist thought. The thesis could also be seen to extend some of 
the 'Gender in Warguments into an underdeveloped area while making the point that 
mass rape in war is an important issue for IR scholars to address. 
The case study, by analysing the press reports of mass rape in war, will provide a 
unique picture of an important aspect of British opinion on this international wartime 
problem in the 1990s, and will provide som6 thought-provoking explanations for this 
ancient phenomenon. As such, it will also highlight some interesting relationships 
between men and women, between the press and feminist theorising, and between 
human rights issues and the influence of the media. 
The Importance of the Media 
I, 
The post-Cold War conflict in the Balkans placed 'mass rape in war' on the media's 
agenda. This is not the first time that wartime rapes and sexual assaults by soldiers 
have made 'headline news'. " However, because the stories ran concurrently with the 
mass rapes and were not prior events, it could be argued that this made the conflict in 
the former-Yugoslavia unique. Indeed, as already mentioned, the phenomenon of 
mass rape in wartime was not peculiar to the Balkans. However, it was nevertheless 
the first instance in which the 'international community' had been simultaneously 
witnessing, and condemning, the rapes and atrocities as they were taking place. This 
highlights the particular importance of the media in the case of the Balkan conflict: 
moreover, the importance of the media in representing all 'distant'wars should also be 
noted. 
"The second-wave of feminism is generally acknowledged as the emergence of the modem Women's 
Movement'in the 1960s and 1970s. See, for example: Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New 
York: Dell, 1974) originally published in 1963. 
12 Brownmiller (1974), Intro. 
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The media representations of rape analysed here are the primary source of information 
for our understanding of this phenomenon at this point in time. Furthermore, I would 
suggest that they are somewhat influential in creating and altering social attitudes in 
their readership. " For example, within the Western world" it is virtually impossible to 
remain detached and unaffected by the media in some form or other. Although some 
people. may have succeeded in effectively insulating themselves from its influence, for 
the majority of society the media permeates our lives, consciously and 
subconsciously, through newspapers, magazines, television, radio, advertising, video, 
the Internet, and so on. The media, in its various fonns makes increasing denzands on 
our lives, and to some extent it could be argued that it even plays a part in defining 
our lives - our patterns of leisure, our preferenc&s as consumers, and what is of 
political, economic or cultural interest to. us. Similarly, it also helps mould our 
attitudes, values and beliefs, be it politically, ' economically, and/or culturally. In fact it 
is now widely accepted that we live in a 'global media culture', with the collective 
media fon-ning the 'world's central nervous system'. " 
Therefore, given the influence that the media has over the lives of even the most 
critically-aware of us, studying the media's representations of rape in war is an 
important research project, particularly in determining whether these reports either 
support or challenge existing theories of mass rape in war. This rationale does not 
mean that the thesis is concerned with studying the media's influence on society; that 
is another thesis. Here I am simply highlighting its influence in order to make the 
point that the ideas put forward in the British press, and as purveyors of the most 
popular social attitudes of the moment, are worthy of serious consideration. 
Moreover, I would argue that the study of journalism is in fact a forrn of social 
research: there are many similarities between classic social research and the way in 
13 Sandra Jovchelovitch, "In Defence of Representations, " Journal for The Theory of Social Behaviour 
vol. 26, no. 2 (June 1996): pp. 121-133. 
14 1 am using a fairly wide definition of the term; i. e. the group of highly advanced industrial states. 
15john Downing, Ali Mohammadi and Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, eds., Questioning the Media: 
A Critical Introduction (London: Sage Publications, 1995), p. xvi; Martin Shaw, Civil Society and 
Media in Global Crisis (London: Pinter, 1996); Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and 
Persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). 
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which journalists represent social life. " For example, journalists not only report on 
current events, but they also offer historical perspectives and in-depth interpretations. 
They also address major trends and social problems and these reports can be likened 
to the research projects of social scientists. Furthermore, like social researchers, 
journalists develop specific areas of expertise: some focus on political events; some 
on economic trends; some on women's issues; some offer analysis of major 
international events; and so on. However, regardless of topic, journalists all face the 
same problem regarding 'evidence'or 'facts'and this problem could be seen to parallel 
that of the social researcher facing 'data'. Both collect information that could become 
evidence for a report, and they also both have to be selective in identifying which bits 
of information are pertinent to the report, they have to analyse that data and arrange it 
in la presentable order, thus developing a focus for the investigation and the 
subsequent report. In this selection process much potential evidence and many 
potential stories are left out. 
While the timescale of this process may differ between the journalist and social 
researcher, nevertheless, the above is an accurate reflection of social research. Social 
scientists, have to select from a vast amount of information that social life offers and 
then construct their representations from carefully chosen pieces of data: a process 
which is necessarily selective and becomes more so as the investigation progresses. 
Therefore, both journalists and social researchers find at the end of their reports that 
much of the information which they initially thought was relevant turns out to be 
either false or superfluous. 
This issue of possibly disseminating false information is also a problem for both 
journalists and social researchers. Stf. -mming from the need to be selective in 
gathering information, both have to be aware of 'false leads'and also that they may 
not recognise them as such. On one hand, false leads may be issues that have been 
biased by accepted knowledge, stereotypes, and common, every-day understandings 
of social life. Using potentially biased' starting points could lead to false 
representations and/or the perpetuation of erroneous stereotypical images. On the 
other hand, false leads may be either an unconscious or a deliberate act of deception 
16 Charles C. Ragin, Constructing Social Research (London: Pine Forge Press, 1994), ch. 1. r, 
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on the. part of an interviewee. While this problem is mostly one that journalists have to 
remain vigilant of, social researchers also have to deal with bias, distortion and cover- 
up: 'social-facts'can be as elusive as bias-free journalism. 
The point of this discussion has been to highlight the siryfflarities between the work of 
journalists and the work of social scientists, thus arguing that journalism is a valid 
means of studying a social phenomenon, indeed, some of the parallels between the 
two are striking. Of necessity, both selectively gather evidence, analyse it, discard 
bits, and construct a report: which is arranged and surnmarised in a way that illustrates 
the investigator's conclusions. Therefore, in both social research and in journalism the 
representations of social life are condensed descriptions that have been structured 
according "to the author's own subjectivities. Even some of the results of both 
journalism and social research are similar: they both work to construct rep resentations 
of social life that fulfil many functions, from documenting broad social patterns and 
changes in those patterns, to giving voice to some of society's marginalised groups, 
and even influencing social change. This point will be argued further in the 
Conclusion. 
Source Material 
The decision to use the media as the focus of the research project was the result of 
recognising that it was the only medium through which the general public came to be 
aware of the alleged occurrences of mass rape in war in the Balkans. However, during 
the research process it came to light that it was not only the general public who were 
informed of the rapes through the media, but the media was also used by NGOs, EC" 
Commissioners, political elites, academics and feminist theorists as a research tool. 
Therefore, the analysis of an important section of the media as a basis for a research 
project within an International Politics Department seemed pertinent and justified. 
17 This thesis covers articles written between 1991 and 1995, during which time the Maastricht Treaty 
on European Union replaced the European Conummity (EQ with the European Union (EU): this took 
place on I November 1993 follow-ing ratification of the Treaty by all member states. Therefore, both 
acronyms are used depending on the date of the article in question. 
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Researching the media as a whole was initially considered, however, the researching, 
gathering and analysing of all the reports concerning rape during the Balkan conflict 
which were disseminated through the media would have proved to be too great a task 
to complete within the time parameters allowed for the thesis. Therefore, while the 
media as a whole offered an excellent source of research material, the formidable 
amount of potential raw data had to be narrowed down in order to select the data 
which would prove to be the most relevant to the thesis question. 
The section of the media that was finally chosen for analysis was the British press, 
and within that section four British broadsheet newspapers were identified as a focus 
for the study: The Times, The Sunday Times, The Guardian and The Observer. These 
were selected, ahd other forms of the media rejected, for thre e main reaýons. First, not 
only. did they purport to offer more 'factual' data than other areas of the media, for 
example British 'tabloid'newsPapers, but they also appeared to offer the most in-depth 
analysis of the reports of rape in war in the Balkan conflict. The other two main 
British broadsheets, The Independent and The Telegraph were not looked at in full 
due to their lack of indexing facilities, however, key dates were researched and 
incorporai6`d-into the press analysis in Part Two. In comparison, the British tabloid 
newspapers offered little in the way of either 'facts'or analysis, and although research 
of The Sun and The Mirror was carried out for key dates, little in the way of either 
social or political analysis was evident. Which is, of course, an interesting issue in 
itself, although not one which will be explored within the remit of the thesis. 
Second, over the period covered by the research (1991-1995) feminist theorists" 
within academia began to comment on the rapes in the Balkans in the form of articles 
and eventually books. After studying this growing body of literature it became 
apparent that much of the empirical data on which this work was based was, in fact, 
taken from articles and reports from British, North American, and to a lesser extent, 
German and Italian broadsheet newspapers. These reports, then, were used as a basic 
18See, for example: Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape: 'Be War Against Women in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); Miranda Davies, ed., Women and 
Violence: Realities and Responses Worldwide (London: Zed Books, 1994); Jeanne Vickers, Women 
and War (London, Zed Books, 1993); Chris Corrin, ed., Women in a Violent World: Feminist Analyse 
and Resistance Across Europ (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996). 
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source of empirical data, particularly as they were published before the information 
was available anywhere else. Therefore, although this form of data can be critiqued as 
being subjective and lacking in verifiability, in the absence of any other more 
authenticated information, it nevertheless was used to form the basis of a growing 
body of theoretical work and political opinion on the subject. It should be noted that 
even in the Western world in the late twentieth century, when the visual media is 
often regarded as the dominant form of media, no television coverage was referred to 
by any of the feminist scholars researched for the final chapters of the thesis. Nor, as 
it happens, were any reports from either radio broadcasts or tabloid newspapers. 
Third, although television reports on the subject and, to a lesser extent radio reports, 
did occasionally offer' some analysis- of Ihe rapes' in the form of reporis and 
documentaries, early research indicated that they were not sufficiently indexed: 
therefore it would have proved impossibly time-consuming and extremely expensive 
(a not insignificant factor) to purchase transcripts and video copies of all the relevant 
infon-nation required. " Therefore, given the time and financial restrictions under 
which this research had to be carried out, this section of the media was rejected. 
Another explanalion for the lack of analysis of television reports for use in this 
research project and the preferred use of broadsheet newspapers was that there was 
very little visual material available for television reports to use and therefore for 
research. The now well known images of Muslim men being held in a 'detention 
centre' was shown widely on television due to the television footage which 
accompanied the report. However, to my knowledge there has been no filming of 
incidents of rape (apart from uncorroborated reports that some Serbian soldiers made 
videos of rape for propaganda and/or pornographic purposes, which will be discussed W 
in Chapter Four). As a result of the paucity of material, television was not a promising 
medium through which to analyse the problem (while at the same time being very 
time-consuming and expensive). 
19NVhen this research was begun in 1994, the cost to access the ITN archives was E3 1+ VAT for every 
five news items viewed, only three of which can be transferred onto VHS tape. The BBC Newsline 
service charged E15 per. news item. WTN (Worldwide Television News) charged E25 per/hr for access 
to the public research room plus F-10 per item retrieved from the archives for viewing. 
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Structure 
The ma ority of explanations for rape in war, stemming from both journalists and 
feminist scholars, use basic theories of rape as their starting point. Therefore, in order 
to understand the differing explanations for rape in war more fully, Chapter One 
attempts to set out various definitions and theories of 'rape'. These sometimes 
controversial definitions and theories stem from sociological, anthropological, 
medical, legal and feminist perspectives; the complexity and multiplicity of rape 
theories will be illustrated as well. This chapter also attempts to review and evaluate 
how the 'crime'of rape has been defined and controlled, both historically and within 
contemporary legislation - which in itself is an indicator of the prevailing social 
attitudes towards the phenomenon. ' 
Chapter One, then, looks at the single issue of Yape' and seeks to identify whether 
attitudes and beliefs about rape in 'peacetime" have any bearing on the way mass rape 
in ivar is thought about and theorised - theorised in terms of the press representations 
which make up Part Two and also in terms of the most recent feminist theorising on 
mass rape in war which is discussed in Part Three. 
Chapter Two charts accounts of rape in war throughout history and suggests that it has 
formed an important, yet neglected, wartime phenomenon. In analysing the historic 
occurrences of mass rape in war, this chapter attempts to question some main-stream 
but superficial explanations for rape in war and also to explore other lines of enquiry, 
customarily disregarded or ignored, which could further develop our understanding of 
why mass rape in war occurs. Chapter Two begins by looking at the role that rape has 
played in the accounts and causes of ancient 'mythical' wars. However remote and 
shrouded in mythology those ancient times and civilisations may appear, we need 
only compare them with today's 'rape myths' - as reviewed in Chapter One - to 
2OThe term 'peacetime' is enclosed within quotation marks throughout the thesis to suggest that 
although there are specific times when a state is not engaged in war with another state and these are Zý ZIP 
recognised as periods of peace, in feminist circles, however, it has been suggested that there is always C14D 
an ongoing war against women. Therefore, 'peacetime'is an elusive concept for many women. 
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appreciate the importance and value in understanding what these ancient myths and 
stories portray. " 
The chapter then moves from ancient Greek mythology and Machiavelli's warning 
about the practical dangers of rape in war, through eighteenth century conflicts in the 
Scottish Highlands, to discuss some twentieth century wars. The leap from occasional 
eighteenth century reports to the twentieth century is a large one. This is due in no 
small part to the lack of information or documentation available on Yape in war' 
during the intervening period. Moreover, when rape has been reported, it is usually 
bound up within a domestic legal discourse, and not directly related to war. However, 
there is the occasional mention of rape during that time and these instances are also 
discussed in Chapter Two. 
Given the complex history of the Balkans, Chapter Three is important background. 
Not only does it 'set the scene' for the ensuing case study, but it also attempts to 
simplify some of the possible causes of the war which may have a direct bearing on 
the occurrence of mass rape in the conflict. The chapter identifies various factors 
which worked together to trigger the collapse of the former-Yugoslavia, such as the 
region's ideological heritage, its pre-war economic crisis, the re-emergence of the 
'national question'and the reactions of the Western powers. 
The last decade has seen tumultuous changes on a global scale, much of which has 
been welcomed, particularly by Western democratic governments. However, the 
negative side of those monumental upheavals is now apparent. The effect of the 
collapse of the Soviet empire and the accompanying political economic insecurity was 
felt throughout the Eastern bloc and, it is argued by many commentators that this has 
fuelled 'ancient feuds'throughout the former Eastern bloc and the Bajkans (or so reads 
the 'official' and some 'unofficial' stories). In reviewing these events I attempt to 
contextualise some of the historical, societal and political factors in which the mass 
raping of women in the Balkans took place. This will allow an appreciation of the 
2 'Gerd Bohner et al, "Salience of Rape Affects Self-esteem: The moderating role of gender and rape 
myth acceptance, " European Journal of Personality Vol. 23 (1993): pp. 561-579. 
14 
cultural forces and tensions operating on both the individual and collective level, 
which resulted in such devastation, both materially and emotionally. 
Chapters Four, Five and Six (Part Two) form the heart of the thesis. Now armed with 
an understanding of some basic theories of rape, of the history of mass rape in war 
and some knowledge of the background to the Balkan conflict, Part Two offers a 
critical examination of the reports of mass rape as published in the 'chosen British 
broadsheet newspapers. In analysing the 200-plus newspaper articles that deal with 
the rapes, the reports are categorised depending on the context in which the rapes 
were represented. As such, the subject categories in which they were placed often 
depended on the emphasis placed on the report by the journalists. For example, 
Chapter Four analyses articles which claim that natiorialism was at the root of the 
mass raping of women in the Balkans and these reports have been categorised 
depending on the way in which this nationalism has been expressed. Some reports 
claim that the alleged rapes in the Balkans were due to 'nationalistic' ethnic cleansing, 
some suggest religious manifestations of nationalism, and yet more claim that 
nationalistic propaganda has been the spur. 
In Chapter Five, the articles analysed have War games' as their focus, suggesting that 
the rapes were either part of a pre-planned strategy of intimidation and terror by the 
military elites. Some articles suggest that, as in most wars, the rapes simply formed a 
part of the soldier's R&R (rest and relaxation) - part of the 'garne'of war. Moreover, 
other articles state that the rapes were the result of either a 'natural' in-built misogyny 
or a misogyny that is derived from militarisation and in particular military training. 
This chapter also gives details of a section of reports that deal with the subject of male 
rape and mutilation, of which there are a surprising number, given that this is 
generally regarded as an even more taboo subject than the raping of women in war. " 
Finally, Chapter Six looks at articles that are primarily forms of response by Western 
political elites, feminists, and other commentators on the reports of mass rape in the 
22 See, for example: Claire Armitstead, "Sentenced to silence, " The Guardian, 21 July 1994, sec. G2T, 
p. 15; Sarah Boseley, "End to silence on male rape, " The Guardian, 24 April 1991, sec. FEA, p. 23; 
Madeleine Bunting, "Confronting last taboo of male rape, " The Guardian, 24 August 1992, see. HOM, Cý 
p. 2; Clare Dyer, "Rape law helps male victims, " The Guardian, 12 July 1994, sec. HOM, p. 2; Val 
Sampson, "Against their will, " The Guardian, 23 July 1991, sec. FEA, p. 17; Alan Travis, "Male rape 
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Balkans. For example, these are articles by journalists who have concentrated on one 
or more aspect of the Western response' to the rep orts of rape. These responses have 
been as varied as EC (as it was known then) or NGO investigations, the adoption of 
'rape babies'. comments on women's human rights, and the setting up of the War 
Crimes Tribunal. 
The analysis of the newspaper articles contained within Chapters Four, Five and Six, 
then, not only give us a rich source of information on the mass r aping of 
(predominantly) women in war, but are crucial to our understanding of the current 
social attitudes toward the occurrence of rape in war. 
Having analys6d and discussed in Part Two the press representations bf the rapes in 
the Balkan conflict, Part Three begins with Chapter Seven, in which a closer look is 
taken at the contemporary social attitudes towards rape in war which the journalists 
portray. Through the analysis of the press reports in Part Two, it became apparent that 
the journalists have utilised some feminist ideas in attempting to explain mass rape in 
war. In this chapter 1 illustrate how some of the ideas championed by feminist 
scholars over the past three decades have gradually permeated the social 
consciousness and have become part of mainstream social discourse. 
Likewise, Chapter Eight briefly examines how feminist scholars, who have written on 
mass rape in war recently, and as a response to the reporting of the phenomenon from 
the Balkans, have used some ideas to develop their theories that stem from the press 
and their explanations for mass rape in waK. Overall, then, Chapters Seven and Eight 
demonstrate the complex relationship that exists between feminist theorising and the 
press: indeed, between feminist theorising and the social world in toto. 
As already mentioned, many of the feminists who have commented recently on mass 
rape in war have taken broadsheet newspaper reports as one primary source of 
infonnation, and have developed novel ideas in response to this information. Chapter 
Nine identifies some feminists who claim to have been motivated into theorising the 
recognised in law, " The Guardian, 12 July 1994, sec. HOM, p. 1; Stephen Ward, "Crime that strikes at 
the heart of masculinity, " The Guardian, 9 November 1994, sec. G2T, p. 27. 
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issue by reading the press representations of mass rape in war. Indeed, they have all 
developed theories that look to the future and envisage what changes are possible 
regarding the way in which mass rape in war is dealt with, both theoretically and 
practically. 
The chapter identifies four feminists who, following their own analysis of the press 
reports of the mass raping of women in the Balkans, have devised new thought- 
provoking ideas and theories on rape in war, which all offer 'solutions' involving 
social analysis, political action and agendas for change. Given their common belief 
that unless some form of either theoretical and/or practical 'action'is taken mass rape 
in war will re-occur, these feminists have each suggested ways in which the problem 
of rape in war can be sol'Ved, or at least controlled, by taking some relativelý 
unconventional approaches to the problem. Although their solutions are very 
different, they all agree that acknowledging the problem and dealing with it in, a more 
open forum will go some way to end the silence that has characteristically surrounded 
this issue in the past. ' Therefore, within this chapter these new ideas are analysed and 
challenged and their possibility for adoption discussed, and moreover, whether these 
new feminist perspectives can, in fact, move forward the debate on mass rape in war. 
The primary aim of the thesis, then, is to investigate the occurrence of mass rape in 
war historically, the attitudes toward it currently, and some future possibilities for its 
control or elimination. This aim is pursued through a critical examination of selected 
British press representations of mass rape in war and an analysis of the role that 
ferninist thought plays in informing those representations and the role that the press 
plays in motivating and informing feminist theorising. As such it provides new 
knowledge on mass rape in war with respect to the Balkans, it situates this in feminist 
23As an example of the traditional silence which surrounds the issue of rape in war, while researching 
the newspaper articles which made reference to 'rape in the Balkan conflict'for Part Two of the thesis, 
it was interesting to note the differences in indexing methods used by the broadsheet newspapers. 
Researching The Guardia , for example, was reasonably straightforward. By using the key words Yape' 
and 'war, the majority of appropriate articles were forthcoming. However, when using the same two 
key words for researching articles from The Times and The Sunday Times only one or two articles 
were accessed and those articles were not concerned with war in a standard IR sense, but were about 
ýape' in general combined with either the %var between the sexes' and/or the feminist war' against 
inequitable legislation. After using various combinations of key words, it was the use of the phrase Nvar 
crimes' that finally allowed me access to the required information. What does this tell us about how 
rape in war in represented in Western society? 
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and IR literature, and offers the starting point for what must be a much larger project 
aimed at trying to understand all aspects of mass rape in the Balkan conflict in the 
first half of the 1990s. Moreover, this research project seeks to identify how the 
interplay between the press representations analysed and feminist theorising might aid 
the reconceptualisation of current thinking - indedd, in the Conclusion I draw 
attention to the potential political significance of these representations - with a view to 
aid the development of feminist theory and praxis which seeks to eliminate mass rape 
in war. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE 
The primary role of Part One is to contextualise the thesis by providing an extensive 
discussion of three specific issues: the phenomenon of rape, the history of mass rape 
in war, and the historical build-up to the Balkan conflict. It is important for the thesis 
that these issues be considered at the start in order that the reader might be provided 
with sufficient background knowledge to enable a fuller appreciation and 
understanding of the main elements in the conflict, and the phenomenon of mass rape 
in war: which in turn will allow a fuller understanding of the case study - British 
press representations of mass rape in the Balkan conflict - in Part Two. 
It is important to discuss the basic theories of rape at the outset because, for the most 
part, the theories of mass rape in war, used by both feminists and journalists in Parts 
Two and Three, are based on these long-standing explanations of the occurrence and 
the motivations for rape. Theories of rape in contemporary social discourse are 
examined, as is the legal status of rape. This discussion helps to indicate developing 
social attitudes towards the phenomenon: for example, national. legislation regarding 
rape is a significant indicator of its social acceptability, or not, at a particular moment 
in history. 
One of the central arguments of the thesis is the belief that mass rape in war has been 
a regular feature of war, one that spans both time and culture. Chapter Two illustrates 
this by detailing reported occurrences of mass rape in war at different times and in 
different regions of the world. This picture of the prevalence of rape underlined the 
difficulties facing those who seek to eradicate it. 
As mentioned previously, the case study in Part Two focuses on mass rape during the 
Balkan conflict following the break up of the former-Yugoslavia. Given the complex 
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history of the area, Chapter Three is necessary to provide a context in which to situate 
the mass rapes. The chapter attempts to identify the main political, economic, and 
cultural features of the war, which have been said to have had a direct bearing on the 
incidence of mass rape in the conflict. 
In summary, the function of Part One of the thesis is to put the subsequent arguments 
in context, both theoretically and historically. It offers an account of the phenomenon, 
the history and the circumstances in which the mass raping of (predominantly) 
women in the Balkans occurred, and the environment in which British press 
representations of the incidents were written. 
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DEFINITIONS OF RAPE 
Misunderstood crime' , 'motiveless crime', lust-MUrder'. Yecreational murder'. 'sexual 
murder'. 'crime of passion', Tunctional phallic terrorism'. these are all emotive terms 
used regularly by the press to described the act of Yape, and rape/murder. ' These 
press representations and simplifications of Yape'have, arguably, led to the act of rape 
being misrepresented. In other words, represented in ways which do not challenge 
society's gendered foundations by suggesting that the occurrence of rape is just one 
manifestation of the inherent social domination and control of women by men, which 
in turn has encouraged the proliferation and dissemination of these Yape myths' 
throughout society. ' This chapter seeks to introduce the subject of rape by setting out 
various, often conflicting, social theories of rape in order to identify how these Yape 
myths' develop and also to. provide the context for later comparisons between rape 
during 'peacetime'and the phenomenon of 'mass rape in war'. 
Evidence emanating from anthropological, religious and literary sources, all attest to 
the influence of historical myths on Western culture? From primitive times to the 
present day, the 'myth' has influenced the evolution of Western thought, and thus, 
society's culturally accepted 'horms'. These historical myths, particularly those based 
on theories of origin, have been transformed through time into ethical, literary, and in 4-: ) 
the 'modem' period, scientific rationalisations for the gendered, hierarchically 
ordered, dichotomous relationship between men and women in the industrial Western 
world. Concepts of what constitutes the 'masculine' and the 'feminine' have passed 
'Jane Caputi, The Age of Sex Crime (London: Women's Press, 1987), p. 2. 
2 See, for example: M. Burt, "Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape" Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology Vol. 38 (1980): pp. 217-230. 
3 Alison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology, " in Ann Garry and 
Marilyn Pearsall, eds., Women, Knowledge and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy 
(London: Routledge, 1992), p. 141. 
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through these ethical, literary and scientific stages, to become a highly influential 
legitimate'justification for contemporary Western patriarchal society. This issue will 
also be raised throughout Part Two of the thesis and discussed more fully in Chapter 
Seven. Those 'myths'which surround rape play an important role in the normaliMng 
of the act of rape within Western culture and it is for this reason that it is appropriate 
that this chapter identifies some of these Yape myths' and examines their possible 
effects. 
The first section of this chapter, however, relates some interesting moments in the 
historical development of 'rape in la-%v' in Britain, as markers of British social 
development concerning what has traditionally been regarded as a 'Women's issue'. 
Moreove7r, this summary of the progress of rape as a legislative" issue in Britain will 
also highlight the way in which a woman's 'class'has traditionally affected her chance 
of being protected from rape by law. If it can be identified how rape has gradually 
been accepted and recognised as a crime in Britain then it may offer an insight into 
how rape has come to be recognised and regarded by contemporary British society as 
a whole. Linked to this, in the second section, the question of a consensual definition 
of rape is addressed, as is the need for a modem, just and ungendered definition of 
rape in law. Again, this section is relevant to the thesis due the need to understand 
society's current views on rape as a serious crime committed predominantly against 
women. 
In the third section, various theoretical explanations for rape will be introduced. 
These divergent attempts at explaining the general causes behind the act of rape, 
while theoretically conflictual, do attempt to gain some intellectual leverage on the 
subject of rape. However, while some, such as the 'feminist' and social learning 
theories of rape, try hard to dispel the 'myths' surrounding the issue of rape, others, in 
particular the 'evolutionary' theory of rape, appear to deepen them and even normalise 
their existence! As the second part of the thesis will be analysing press 
representations of rape in war, which will also include many j ournalists' explanations 
for rape, it is important to be able to relate their ideas back to some basic theories of 
4 For a further investigation into theories of rape see: Keith Burgess-Jackson, Rape: A Philosophical C, Investigation (Dartmouth: Aldershot and Brookfield VT, 1996). 
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rape and to gauge which theories, if any, have become mainstreamed and now form 
part of the current social discourse on rape. 
The fourth section will deal with the complexities that are inherent in any theoretical 
discussion that is primarily concerned with the investigation and interpretation of 
human behaviour. Primarily, this section attempts to look a little deeper into some 
established social theories regarding possible motives for rape, in order to develop 
further understanding of why rape occurs. For example, often cited as fundamental 
reasons for rape are issues such as 'childhood, 'social attitudes towards women, 
'power and domination'. 'aggressive tendencies'. and so on. These and other 
underlying stimuli for rape will be briefly analysed and conclusions drawn. 
Furthermore, an analysis of these theories of 'peacetime'rape will prove particlularly 
useful when, in Chapter Two, an attempt is made to identify theories of mass rape in 
war, many of which have the same basic underlying principles. 
The final section in this chapter deals with an interesting idea put forward by two 
sociologists, Larry May and Robert Strikwerda, called 'collective responsibility'. ' The 
suggestion is that all men should take responsibility for the occurrence of rape within 
their own society. The basic tenets of this theory are set out and briefly analysed as 
certain aspects of the idea are utilised in the final chapter of the thesis, when some 
feminists 'solutions'to the wartime phenomenon are offered. 
Rape in British Law 
In Britain, the punishment for the act of rape, given the evolving priorities and beliefs 
of any society, has varied over time, thus reflecting differing social and cultural 
attitudes towards its gravity. Moreover, a closer inspection of bygone British law also 
highlights who, and who could not, be legally classified as having been subjected to I. n 
rape. Pre-1066 (the Norman Conquest), the penalty for rape was 'death and 
dismemberment'. although this law was reserved exclusively for the rape of landed 
5 Larry May and Robert Strikwerda, " Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape, " Hypathi 
Vol. 9, no. 2 (1994): pp. 134-151. 
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virginal heiresses: ' no mention is made of 'other'women. Moreover, Sidney Painter's 
research in this area suggests that the chance of a man, and in particular a 'nobleman', 
being convicted of raping a 'commoner'w as very slight. ' By the time of William the 
Conqueror, 'virgins'of any class were still the only women defended in British law, 
although, the punishment had now been reduced to castration and the loss of both 
eyes. ' Henry of Bracton, who lived and wrote in the thirteenth century, detailed the 
law of the time: 
Let him lose his eyes which gave him sight of the virgin's 
beauty for which he coveted her. And let him lose as well the 
testicles which excited his hot lust. ' 
However, the punishment was reduced considerably during the reign of Edward I 
when the offence was reduced to a ýrespass'which carried a sentence of two year's 
imprisonment and a fine 'at the King's will. " This notion of Irespass'and the implicit 
assumption that the woman was a man's 'property'will be discussed at a number of 
junctures throughout the thesis. Nevertheless, the subsequent reforms instigated by 
King Edward I, enabled significant legislation to be passed which served to alter both 
public and state perception of the crime of rape. The reformation of the law allowed 
for married, old, young, and ignoble women all to be recognised under the law as 
being worthy of defence, which could, arguably, be cited as the first piece of 
legislation avowing women's rights. Moreover, in 1285 rape once again became a 
capital felony" and it remained so until the nineteenth century. 12 
6William Blackstone, -Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books: IV (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 1859), p. 211. 
7 Sidney Painter, History of the Middle Ages (New York: Knopf, 1960), p. 120. 
8"The Laws of William the Conqueror, " Ancient Laws and Institutes of England 1840 XII ed.: XVIII. 
9SamuaI Thorne, Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England Vol. II (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap 
Press of Harvard, 1968), pp. 414-415. 
10Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, in Statutes of Westminster 
Vol. I (London: W. Clarke, 1809), pp. 179-181. 
"Edward Coke (1809, Vol. 11. ), pp. 432-436. 
12The following Acts covered the crime of rape through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: 
Offences against the Person Act 1861 
Sexual Offences Act 1956 
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 
Further amendments covering the sentencing of attempted rape were set out in the Sexual Offences Act 
1985. 
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Rape today remains an illegal act during peacetime and has also been outlawed as a 
criminal act under the international rules of war. " However, there appear to be 
profound disagreements about what rape is and what it is not - or at least over the 
differing ways in which it is conceptualised. " The conservative theory suggests that 
rape is still a trespass upon the property of the man, the 'wrong'being done to the inall 
who owns the violated woman. (This notion of woman as 'property'will be discussed 
in Chapter Seven. ) The liberal theory regards rape as unconsented sexual violence, 
the wrong being done to the individual woman whose own choices with regard to her 
bodily integrity are denied. While the radical theory regards rape as just one more 
instance of the subordination of women by men, the wrong being done to the female 
gender as a whole whose entitlement to equal respect and consideration is 
dishonoured. Miranda Davies, however, writing fif Women and Violence, contends 
that twentieth century law, and in particular the possibility of obtaining adequate and 
timely justice for a raped woman from the existing legal system, regardless of the 
conceptualisation, remains wholly unsatisfactory. Indeed, she states that '[e]very 
aspect of the law - its definition of rape, due process, the law of evidence, the burden 
of proof and, not least, the evident prejudices of the judiciary - militated against 
victims of rape'. " 
Writing in her latest book Carnal Knowledge: Rave on Trial, Sue Lees comes to a 
similar conclusion as Davies following her attempts to monitor the British judicial 
service. She claims to have discovered a dangerous combination of bad legal practice 
and general, misogynistic attitudes, where testimony regarding the behaviour, 
lifestyle, clothing, character and past sexual conduct of women is not only admitted in 
court, but is seen as having a direct bearing on the question of whether a rape 
occurred. " The notion that consent is the central issue in qu estion, and th; g the 
complainant is no more than a witness within an adversarial hearing which requires 
proof beyond reasonable doubt and tolerates the admission of certain kinds of 
evidence, according to Davies and Lees is justice at its most gendered and 
inequitable. Thus, the stage is set for a display of prejudicial attitudes and procedures 
USee for example: Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 2nd. ed. (London: Harper Collins, 1977), 
chap. 4. 
14 Keith Burgess-Jackson, Rape: A Philosophical InvestiZation (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996). 
15Miranda Davies, ed., Women and Violence (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1994), p. 74. 
16Sue Lees, Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1996). 
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that favour the defendant at the cost of humiliating the accuser. This is a significant 
point and will be returned to again in Chapter Seven within the context of rape in war. 
Definitions 
The word rape is derived from the Latin rapere, meaning to steal. " The etymological 
status of the word rape is manifest in traditional sentences that focused solely on the 
marital status of the victim, or more explicitly, her status as property. Consequently, 
throughout history, the rape of a woman has been viewed, and remains so in many 
cultures, as an attack on the property-owning men of the family and community and 
not as'a physical or psychological attack on the woman. Howeýver, taking this analysis 
one step further, feminist Catharine MacKinnon argues that for women, To be 
property would be an improvement'. " MacKinnon agrees that rape, as legally defined, 
is centred upon a male-defined loss, but she qualifies that loss as a loss of exclusive 
access', the loss of the sexual exclusivity of a woman for a man. Rape, according to 
MacKinnon, is construed in legal terms as an attack on female monogamy, rather than 
an attack on women's sexual and personal integrity. Indeed, MacKinnon takes issue 
with those who analyse rape in terms of 'property', stating that 'to analyse sexuality as 
property short-circuits analysis of rape as male sexuality and presumes rather than 
develops links between sex and class'. " 
While appreciating MacKinnon's point, this rejection requires some reassessment 
when one considers the role played by social class in the findings of the brief study 
into the origins of British 'rape'law above, for example, the applicability of the law to 
only 'propertied heiresses'. Rape, therefore, undoubtedly began its passage through 
the legal system as a 'class issue'. Nevertheless, MacKinnon does make an interesting 
general observation. She comments that through societal and cultural structures, 
17SYlvana Tomaselli and Roy Porter, eds., Rape (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 10. 
18 Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), p. 172. 
19ibid., p. 295, n. 3. 
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women's sexuality is traded, bought and sold by men, but never treated with the 
respect and regard for which men have for property. " 
Just, ungendered working legal definitions appear to be difficult to achieve and yet 
they are extremely important when dealing with such a sensitive and emotive issue. 
This is highlighted when examining the influence that particular legal tem-iinology 
can exert: this will become particularly pertinent when the setting up of the War 
Crimes Tribunal in The Hague is discussed in Chapter Six. The definition of rape 
employed by the contemporary legal system is obviously crucial to the outcome of 
rape trials. However, given the fact that all legal definitions are products of the values 
and 'norms' of the lawmakers who create them and the cultures in which they live, 
one must, thekefore, while appreciating the difficulty of the task, a&nowledge the 
need for a gender-neutral, unambiguous definition. This is a crucial point and one that 
will be raised again in Chapter Eight. 
In Britain until 1976, there was no statutory definition of rape. It was simply defined 
in common law as 'unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent, by 
force, fear orfiraud" It could be argued, however, that this definition is ambiguous 
and potentially misleading. The essence of rape as a crime is the absence of tile 
wonzan's consqnt, and therefore, it is rape to have non-consensual intercourse with a 
woman whether or not she resists, is in fear, or deceived. Following public, media, 
and parliamentary concern, the obvious ambiguity in the law was eventually rectified 
and the opportunity taken to declare in statutory forin a consensual definition of rape. 
Thus, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 provides that '[a] man cominits 
rape if (a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a women who at the time of the 
intercourse does not consent to it; and (b) at the time he knows that she does not 
consent to the intercourse or he is reckless as to whether she has consented to it. 22 
Consistent with this legal definition, rape today is defined in the Chambers 
Dictionary, compiled by Cambridge University Press, as 'Unlawful sexual intercourse 
(usually by force) with another person without that person's consent: violation, 
20 ibid., p. 172. 
21S 
. Edwards, "Rook & Ward on Sexual Offences, " British Journal of Criminology Vol. 32, no. 2 (1992): pp. 245-246. (emphasis added) 22 ibid. 
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despoliation. " Therefore, in some sense there does appear to be a consensus of 
opinion in Britain on what precisely constitutes 'rape'. 
Theories 
The standard 'common-sensical' arguments used in many attempted explanations of 
the motivations for 'rape'. are generally based on the inevitability of actions due to 
male 'human nature'. These biological determinist and naturalisation arguments, are 
generally found to be not only cyclical and unproductive, but also intellectually 
closed. They rely on a very simplistic view of male 'nature'which suggests that the 
rampant male sex drive is 'only tempered and reigned in by social and cultural forces 
and that women play a stereo-typically subservient role; it is even suggested by some 
theorists that women enjoy being violated and/or dominated, and are in fact 'asking 
for it'. ' However, the following quotations, all by US politicians, are classic examples 
of how these naturalisation theories (or rape 'myths) are perpetuated. ' Moreover, 
they suggest that even in political circles, where one could be forgiven for thinking 
that 'gender lenses' are more frequently utilised, " these 'myths' remain influential in 
forn-fing attitudes towards rape. Consider the following statements: 
I 
Rainy weather is like a woman being raped; if it's inevitable just 
relax and enjoy it. " 
The only difference between rape and seduction is 
salesmanship. " 
23 Chambers Dictionary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 823. 0 24jill Radford, "Womanslaughter: A License to Kill? The Killing of Jane Asher" in Jill Radford and C, Diana Russell, cds., Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killin (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1992), p. 260. 
25 For an in-depth analysis of the influence of 'myths'sce, Roland Barthes, Mythologie , trans., Annette 
Lavers (London: Vintage 1993). 
26 David Robertson, Dictionary of Politics (London: Penguin, 1993), pp. 387-388. 
27 As quoted by Julie Allison and Lawrence Wrightsman, Rape: The Misunderstood Crime (London: 
Sage Publications, 1993), p. 1. 
28As quoted by M. Cambell, "Mayor assailed over rape joke'. " Kansas City Star, 3 July 1990: pp. B I- 
B2. 
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You canl get pregnant if you're truly raped, because if the 
woman is not a willing sex partner the juices won't flow and it's 
impossible for her to get pregnant. " 
These beliefs, based on masculinist tradition and/or hearsay, and with almost a banal 
acceptance of rape as inevitable due to 'natural' forces, are typically circulated within 
a patriarchal Yape society' , as defined by anthropologist Peggy Sanday (see below), 
and serve only to provide a safe harbourage for rapists, precisely as it serves to 
exempt individuals from ultimate responsibility for their "involuntary' actions. These 
ideas have been become ingrained in Western society's standard discourse of rape as 
will become evident throughout the thesis. 
To contest the 'myth'that rape is a 'natural'human action and to highlight that these 
notions are irrational and invalid, a comprehensive study by Peggy Sanday has 
revealed that many societies throughout the world are, to attach Sanday's official 
label, 'free-of-rape'. that is, 1he act of rape is either very infrequent or non-existent. " 
This fact would indicate that theories based on human nature cannot adequately, or 
solely, explain the motivations for 'rape'. therefore, further understanding of why rape 
occurs should be sought within a societal/cultural context. For example, a closer 
inspection of, and a comparison between, 'rape-free' and 'rape-prone' societies has 
indicated that in rape-free societies, women, and in particular their reproductive roles, 
are given a high status within the societal framework. Moreover, according to 
Sanday, women are 'respected and influential members of the community. ". 
Incidentally, Sanday also noted that in societies where rape was almost unknown, 
violence of any kind was also minimal and the population regarded the natural 
environment in a reverential manner. In contrast, Sanday found that the structural 
framework of a 'rape-prone' society, was based on a dominant - form of- patriarchy, 
including interpersonal violence, and the ostracisation of the female sex. Furthermore, 
29This statement was allegedly made by a state representative, called Aldridge, during a live debate on 
the repealing of state funding for abortions in the instance of rape, in the state capital of North 
Carolina, in November 1995. The broadcast was taped and relayed by Chuck Johnson to the Minerva 
International Feminist Discussion Group on 15 November 1995 via E-mail. 
30AIlison and Wrightsman (1993), p. 13. ID 31 Peggy Reeves Sanday, "Rape and the Silencing of the Feminine, " in Tomaselli and Porter, eds., Rq e gp 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 84-85. 
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the attitude towards nature was one of dominance and exploitation. " Sanday's study 
also concludes that although the traditional social roles played by each sex in both 
societies are similar, of importance is not what the sex-roles are of whether men and 
women's roles are different or not, but whether the sexes 'have access to balanced 
power spheres'. " 
Most Western industrial countries, according to Sanday.. 's study, are officially 
classified in the middle category, that is, 'possessing rape but not frequent enough to 
be considered rape-prone". As both Britain and the former Yugoslavia are included 
in this category, the analysis can be restricted to the examination of the motivations 
for rape solely within this middle group. American psychologist, L. Ellis, identifies 
three possible theoretical explanations for rhpe within Western society: the 'feminist' 
theory, the 'social learning' approach and the 'evolutionary' theory. " Each of these 
explanations will be considered in isolation. 
Feminist Theories of Rape 
Rape, according to Ellis's first theory, it is 'the result of long and deep-rooted social 
traditions in which males have dominated nearly all important political and economic 
activities'. " She suggests that the prevalence and societal acceptance of prostitution 
and pornography allows women to be portrayed in humiliating and subservient ways, 
thus normalising male dominance over women. The key term for Ellis in this 
explanation is the 'powerlessness of women'. " One feminist who would no doubt 
support this theory is Andrea Dworkin who has commented that 'all men benefit from 
rape, because all men benefit from the fact that women are not free in this society'. " 
In addition, one particular quotation from ferninist Susan Brownmiller that has come 
32 ibid., p. 85. 
33 ibid., p. 93. 
34 Sanday's three categories are as follows: (1) 'rape-prone' - where rape is an accepted part of the 
cultural framework; (2) 'possessing rape but not frequently enough to be considered rape-prone', (3) 
'rape-free' - wheye the act of rape is either very infrequent or non-existent. See Peggy Reeves Sanday, 
"The Socio-Cultural Context of Rape: A Cross-Cultural Study, " Journal of Social Issues Vol. 37, No. 4 
(1981): pp. 5-27. 
35 L. Ellis, Theories of Rape: Inquires into the Causes of Sexual Aggression (New York: Hemisphere, 
1989). 
36 ibid. p. 10. 
37 ibid. 
38Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (New York: Plume, 1989). 
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to characterise the radical feminist standpoint surrounding rape also reiterates this 
position. Brownmiller states that '[flrom prehistoric times to the present, I believe, 
rape has played a critical function. It is nothing more or less than a conscious process 
of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear'. " Brownmiller is 
suggesting that due to the interminable threat of rape and sexual abuse, women are 
kept in a constant 'state of fear'. which constitutes one form of social control of 
women by men. This notion, indeed this quotation, will be alluded -to throughout the 
thesis. 
However, Ellis's ferninist approach does not consider male sexual frustration and the 
need for sexual gratification to be a prime motive for rape, rather, sexuality is viewed 
as ft method by which men establish and maintain their d6minance and control over 
women. " Nevertheless, a brief analysis of this theory does raise certain questions 
surrounding the basic loaded statement, the 'powerlessness of women'. For example, 
are all women simply helpless victims, merely pawns in a man's game? Have women 
only marginal control over their lives and their bodies? If so, can this argument, based 
on the notion of women as victims, be viewed as equally cyclical and unproductive as 
those based on naturalisation? However, legally women do have the right to 'consent' 
or not, at least within our Western society. In response to these questions one could 
argue that consent is indeed the women's method of control over wanted/unwanted 
intercourse. However, this legislative issue of consent presupposes that men and 
women stand on level terrain, that they possess equality of power and that when a 
woman says 'ho'it will be heard, respected and acted upon. Consent, as stated in the 
law of rape, assumes itself to be the exercise of free sexual choice, while denying, or 
at least ignoring, the pressures of underlying patriarchal structures: structures of male 
dominance and violence resulting in female subordination and the 'powerlessness of 
women'. According to Catharine MacKinnon this interminable patriarchal culture of 
intimidation and disparity have indeed rendered women 'powerless' under the law of 
rape. For example, she states that: 
Fundamentally, desirability to men is supposed a woman's form 
of power because she can both arouse it and deny its fulfilment. 
39Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rap2 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1975), p. 5. 
40L. Effis (1989), p. 11. 
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To woman is attributed both the cause of man's initiative and 
the denial of his satisfaction. This rationalises force. Consent in 
this model becomes more a metaphysical quality of a woman's 
being than a choice she makes and communicates. Exercise of 
women's so-called power presupposes more fiazdamental social 
powerlessness. " 
Catherine MacKinnon, in fact, offers a host of possibly explanations for why men 
rape: all of which are alluded to by the journalists whose reports are analysed in Part 
Two as possible explanations for the occurrence of mass rape in war. They include 
the following (they = men): because 'they want to', because they 'enjoy it'. because the 
act, particularly the dominance, is 'sexually arousing' and 'sexually affirming', 
because it increases the rapist's self-esteem; because it is an 'exciting' form of sex; 
because ýt is an 'adventure'; because it is a means of revenge pr punishment; and, 
because it is 'rewarding'for the rapist. " MacKinnon's point here is that all the above 
could equally be used to describe the reasons why men want sex, as well as being 
used to describe some men's motives for rape. However, MacKinnon claims that no 
matter what the motive for rape, once the act has been labelled 'rape' there is an 
epistemological problem with seeing it as 'sex'. " Rape is generally recognised in our 
society as something that a rapist does, as if he were a separate species. Sex is what 
'normal'men do and rape is what 'psychopathic' men do. But in reality, no personality 
disorder distinguishes most rapists from normal men: psychopaths do rape, but only 
in about five percent of cases are the rapists diagnosed as such. ' Despite the number 
of rape victims and the apparent 'normality' of the majority of the offenders, rape is 
still considered, within Western society, to be psychopathological and therefore not 
about sexuality. 
As a classic feminist analysis of rape this explanation suggests that rape is not, as 
common mythology insists, a crime of frustrated attraction, victim provocation, or 
uncontrollable biological urges: nor is rape perpetrated only by a psychopathic 
aberrant fringe. Rather, rape is a direct expression of sexual politics, an act of 
conformity to masculinist sexual norms and a form of terrorism that serves to 
preserve the hierarchically gendered status quo. 
4'Catharine MacKinnon (1989), p. 175. (emphasis added) 
42ibid., p. 145. 
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A Social Learning Theory of Rape 
The 'social learning'theory dates back to the work of psychologist Albert Bandura in 
the 1970s" who suggests that 'aggression is learned primarily through imitation 
(modelling), and thereafter sustained largely through various fonns of intermittent 
reinforcement'. " In using this hypothesis to further elucidate the act of rapej this 
social learning theory proposes that 'rape' , as a form of aggressive behaviour, is 
learned from observing similar acts in 'real life', through the mass media, or 
'observing'rapes that have gone unpunished. 
Superficially, social learning theory appears to be closely related to the suggested 
'feminist' theory of rape-in the previous section, in that social and cultural factors are 
considered primarily responsible for the motivations initiating rape. The main 
difference between these two standpoints, however, lies in the role given to sexuality 
in cultural traditions, with social learning theory giving more precedence to those 
cultural traditions that are directly linked to interpersonal aggression and sexuality. 
Moreover, the social learning theory of rape concludes that rape could be sexually 
motivated. This is not to deny the 'feminist theory' link between rape and sexuality, 
but Ellis's 'feminist' theory connects sexuality with the more complex dynamics of 
power and control, whereas the social learning theory accords primacy to the more 
apparent notions of aggression and lust: this theory accords with some journalistic 
and feminist thinking on the causal factors for mass rape in war, and in particular the 
aggression which stems from military training. This will be discussed further in 
Chapters Five and Eight respectively. However, as Ellis points out: 
Social learning theorists see rape as resulting from the joint 
influýýnces of cultural and experimental factors mediated by 
attitudes, sex role scripts, and other thought processes that link 
physical aggression and sexuality in the minds of males. " Zý 
One example of the differing views of the suggested Teminist'theory of rape outlined 
above by Ellis and the social learning theory is the relative link and evaluation 
45A. Bandura, Aggression: A Social Learning Process (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
1973); and "Social Learning Theory of Aggression, " Journal of Communication Vol. 28 (1978): pp. 12- 
29. 
46L 
. 
Ellis (1989), p. 12. 
47 ibid., p. 14. 
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between pornography and rape. The social leaming theorists have claimed that it 'is 
sexually violent material, rather than sexually explicit material, that results in harmful 
effects'. " Challenging this view - that non-violent pornography has no detrimental or 
harmful effects for women - feminist Diana Russell claims that '[m]y reading of the 
research conducted on pornography in the last decade is that for the most part it 
strongly supports the causative link between pornography and violence against 
women ... In many instances the actual making of pornography involves or even 
requires violence and sexual assault'. " The debate concerning the causal link, if one 
exists, between pornography and rape is set to continue, as both positions appear to 
have substantial amounts of data gleaned from in-depth empirical research to support 
their opposing standpoints. However, I would argue that their conclusions are 
incongruous. As Linz 'et al suggest, methodological limitations resulting Irom 
research in laboratory settings and the use of 'artificial' measures of aggression 
'prohibit direct extrapolation of experimental findings to situations outside the 
laboratory'. " This is a difficult and controversial issue that requires more research. 
An Evolutionary Theory of Rape 
The proponents of the evolutionary (or socio-biological) theory of rape propose that 
social behaviour has evolved for the sole purpose of propagating the human species. " 
Basically, as mammals, men and women have evolved different proclivities in 
ordering their time and energy in direct relation to their respective tasks of 
reproduction. For example, females retain guardianship and nurturance of the 
offspring while the priority for men is to secure as many sex partners as possible, 
thereby propagating their genes as far and wide as possible. " As a consequence of the 
lack of knowledge that males subsequently have about their own offspring once they 
are bom - for example, the inability to identify their own progeny, or, the lack of 
48D. Linz, S. Penrod and E. Donnerstein, "The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography: The 
gaps between "findings" and facts, " American Bar Foundation Research Journal Vol. 23 (1987): p. 
713. 
49Diana Russell, "Pornography and Rape: A Causal Model, " Political Psychglogy Vol. 9, no. 1 (1988): 
pp. 44-73. 
(0, D. Linz et al (1987), p. 714. 
51See, for example: Mark Ridley, Evolution (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); and Animal Behaviour: An 
Introduction to Behavioural Mechanisms, Development and Ecology (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995). 
52 L. Ellis (1989), p. 14. 
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certainty of parenthood - evolutionary theorists contest that 'males have a stronger 4D 
tendency for evolving traits (behavioural and otherwise) that increase their chances of 
inseminating large numbers of females, rather than fastidiously taking care of a few 
offspring'. " Thus, the next sequential step along this line of inquiry is that forced 
copulation, or rape, is an extreme response to the rules of 'natural selection'. 
Leading the field in this area of theoretical research are the 'socio-biological 
conservatives' who base their research on a certain set of assumptions. Firstly, they 
contend that the hitinan male is no different from males of other species in that he is 
subject to the evolutionary process of natural selection. Also, as David Barash, a 
proponent of the socio-biological thesis, has stated: The central principle of socio- 
biology ... [is] that individuals *ill tend to behave in a manner that maximises [both] 
their inclusive fitness [and] their success in projecting copies of their genes into 
succeeding generations. ' Thus, socio-biologists also believe that males have the 
'natural' power to initiate and maintain sexual partnerships and they even describe 
rape as a reproductive strategy among the male's bag of dirty tricks'. " In short, 
biological conservatives do not question the universality and 'natural' state of male 
dominance in contemporary society. 
Secondly, socio-biology attempts to explain behaviours such as rape, war, male 
dominance, homosexuality, and so on, by referring to similar behaviours in non- 
human species. They consider these factors to be universal within human society and 
prevalent dmong non-human animals as well; contending that if a particular 
behaviour is found in both human and non-human societies then there is strong 
evidence that it contributes to biological success'per se. However, all these factors 
have a political, legal and consensual content that precludes their application to the 
non-human animal world. In the case of rape, socio-biologists seem to ignore the fact 
that in the majority of human societies rape is a criine that occurs when a women is 
unable or unwilling to give her consent. Some socio-biologists fail to offer rigorous 
definitions of terms such as 'rape'. perhaps if they did they would lose many, if not 
53 L. Ellis (1989), p. 15. 
54David Barash, Sociobiology and Behaviour (New York: Elsevier, 1982), pp. 45-46. 
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all, of the universals between humans and animals on which the very crux of their 
theories depend. 
However, if the socio-biological theory is correct it raises some further interesting 
although speculative questions, which again, only serve to refute the very core of its 
conceptual framework. For example, if men have evolved such aggressive copulating 
tactics, should/have women evolve(d) strong tendencies to resist such forced 
copulation, inasmuch as it is in their best interests to have a sex partner who is 
prepared to make a long-term comn-fitment and to share the division of labour in the 
raising of their offspring? Or, perhaps there are other proclivities that have developed 
over time for women that are being suppressed by the pressures or 'norms' of our 
current social structures. Alternatively, pethaps women have been socialised into 
passive receptivity, believing there to be (or actually having) no other choice of action 
available to them, but acquiescence: submission being preferable to further injury or 
death. 
While appearing superficially feasible, another of the implications of the socio- 
biological/evolutionary theory of rape is also rather alarming. In suggesting that a 
man rapes due to some biological or genetic tendency, it almost presupposes that rape 
is inevitable, and furthermore, that all men are potential rapists. It could be argued 
that Brownmiller, writing two decades ago from her own distinctive feminist 
standpoint, supports this view. She states that 'man's discovery that his genitalia could 
serve as a weapon to generate fear must rank as one of the most important discoveries 
of prehistoric times'. " Although in the contemporary ferninist climate this view may 
be viewed by many feminists as too reductionist to be viewed as mainstream. 
However, would socio-biologists not take this one step further in claiming that these 
potential rapists could not be held responsible for their 'natural' actions should they 
chose to rape? Socio-biologists, defending the main premise on which their thesis 
rests, which is an extension of Darwinian theory (survival of the fittest), claim that 
on a fundamental level, all of humankind is motivated to produce offspring and this is 
56Susan Brownmiller (1975), p. 5. 
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the basis for having both consensual and non-consensual intercourse. " Affirming this 
position, biological determinist Donald Symons, states that the process of natural 
selection predisposes males to copulate with fertile females whenever this potential 
can be realised. " However, little empirical evidence has been accumulated to support 
this theory. As Julie Allison has observed, '[a]lthough young women in their fertile 
years are most susceptible to rape, many individuals who are not fertile, including 
children, post-menopausal women, and men, are also raped'. " Moreover, the socio- 
biological position also fails to account for why many rape victims are also killed. 
However, for the thesis the key point is not whether one theory of rape is 'correct' or 
not: it is what implications and effects are a consequence of the various theories and 
beliefs about rape within society? 
Complexities 
Interlinked with the motivations for the rape, are the characteristics of the rapist. Can 
researchers predict who may have the propensity to rape and who may not? 
Unfortunately and potentially dangerously, when reading or hearing of a rape often a 
stereotypical image of the rapist habitually comes to mind; a perverted, obsessed, 
psychopathic monster is envisaged. This instinctive and commonplace notion has its 
roots in the traditional Psychiatric View' of the rapist, which is premised on three 
basic psycho-analytical assumptions: (1) rape is the product of great psychological 
disturbance; (2) the act of rape is primarily sexual in nature; and (3) the behaviours 
associated with the act of rape are both strange and abnormal. ' M. L. Cohen supports C) 
this view, stating that 'every act of rape is expressive of psychopathology: of a 
disturbance, moderate or severe, in the developmental history. of the offender and his 
current efforts'. " This perspective implies that rape occurs infrequently and by 
57 Matt Ridley, The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature (London: Penguin, 1994), pp. 
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atypical individuals. However, by segregating Yapists' from 'normal' men in this 
manner, we are allowing ourselves to preserve the illusion that we live in a secure 
environment and that we could easily recognise and avoid rapists if we simply use the. 
appropriate caution. 
Yet, contrary to this view, Ted Bundy, a serial rapist and murderer in the US, has 
stated in an interview that rapists '[a]re not some kind of inherent monsters. We are 
your husbands, and we grew up in regular families'. " Rapists, according to this 
statement are just Yegular guys'. Carolyn Craven, a rape victim, was left with the 
same impression. In an in-depth interview she explained how she was startled by the 
normality of her attacker: 'He felt so common, he felt so ordinary, he felt so familiar, 
and it Was maybe that what frightened me the most was that hdw similar to other men 
he seemed. They don't come from Mars, folks'. " This point will be reiterated in 
Chapter Five, as many of the Rape victims in the Balkan conflict reported that some 
of their attackers were former friends and neighbours - ordinary men. 
Despite initial acceptance of the 'dysfunctional psychiatric model' approach as being 
a useful method of understanding rape, attempts to identify rape as an uncommon or 
atypical act, perpetrated by easily identifiable psychiatric dysfunctional 'men'. have 
proved to be unproductive and, therefore, the majority of research has now moved on 
to explore other, potentially more fruitful lines of inquiry, although opinions within 
the medical profession, as in most academic disciplines, appear divided. This is 
reflected in conflicting medical research, some of which supports the idea that the 
majority of rapists are not pathological individuals. As one key medical textbook 
states, 'psychiatric disorders are raze among rapists'. " While, in contrast, the 
Dictionary of Modem Medicine suggests that rape is 2an aggressive act that is 
considered to be sadistic rather than sexual in nature'. " Moreover, studies within the 
medical profession have resulted in four main behavioural types' of rapist being 
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defined, which, while attempting to move away from the assumption that all rapists 
are suffering from psychiatric illness, tend to obscure more than they enlighten. They 
are as follows: 
(1) aggressive antisocial men who have a history of general 
criminal behaviour, but do not have a formal psychiatric 
disorder; (2) aggressive and sadistic men who wish to humiliate 
and hurt women; (3) 'explosive' rapists who are often timid and 
inhibited, and who carry out the act as a deliberate plan to 
relieve their frustration; (4) mentally-ill rapists, who most often 
suffer from 'mania'- this is the least common group. " 
Again, counter to the 'psychiatric dysfunctional model' of rape, neither the feminist 
nor the social psychological viewpoints consider rape to be an abnormal or perverted 
act, but rather, they suggest it is an accordant response to veiled cultural borms'. They 
propose that the broad ideology of Western values and beliefs serve only to enhance 
the inherent dichotomy of the male/dominance and female/passivity roles, and in 
doing so encourage the general acceptance of illusory assumptions about rape. 
There is an additional 'myth' which has emerged from psychoanalysis, and the ideas 
of Sigmund Freud in particular, which needs to be addressed before moving on to 
outline the possible social/cultural factors involved. While Freud himself wrote very 
little about rape and why it occurs, neo-Freudians have presented their own 
explanations centred partially around the rapist's 'irresistible impulses' or 'diseased 
mind', but, primarily their model has been built on the proposition that within the 
-subject Woman' lies a site of unresolved conflict. This contention is between the 
conscious wish to resist the rapist and the unconscious desire for violence, the latter 
disabling the victim's ability to resist. To quote two neo-Freudians: What the woman 
secretly desires in intercourse is rape and violence, or in the mental sphere, 
humiliation'. " Therefore, because of such urges, they 'unwittingly co-operate with the 
rapist in terms of covertly making themselves available to the rapist'. " Here is an 
67 T. Gibbens, C. Way and K. Soothill, "Behavioural Types of Rape, " British Journal of Psychiatry Vol. 
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example of a possible origin of one of the most dangerous rape myths at large in 
Western society - that all women secretly wish to be raped. 
SociallCultural Factors 
The 'reductive' explanations outlined thus far, focusing as they have on mono-causal 
factors in attempting to explain rape, are perhaps too narrow and theoretically 
restricting to enable more useful research. Whatever the merits of these accounts they 
may require supplementing with a range of other factors in order to adequately deal 
with the complex issues which are raised when dealing with an issue such as rape. 
Perhaps by incorporating social and cultural factors into our understanding of 'rape', 
research could prove to be more productive. Furthermore, many studies, some 
conflicting 4nd some corroborating, have revealed that no single variable in the 
social, environmental, or personal make-up of an individual can be used as a reliable 
indicator for predicting the propensity to rape. Although the following 'characteristics' 
have been suggested by researchers as being possible contributory factors: 
(1) Sex/Gender: most rapists are male. This point may seem obvious, yet because 
so, its significance is often disregarded. A study by Wilson and Hermstein has 
verified that the consistency across societies is impressive. When taking gender as 
a correlate of criminal behaviour, throughout all countries where records are kept, 
men are arrested up to 50 times more often than women are. " Moreover, it should 
be noted, that during this research project these has been no evidence unearthed 
that suggests that any women have raped or sexually abused men or women in the 
Balkan conflict. 
(2) Childhood: profound impact on adult behaviour. It has been suggested that 
children living with violence, sexual or physical abuse are more likely to become 
offenders themselves in later life. However, there are conflicting results from 
research in this area. Two studies which illustrate this point are, first, A. Groth, 
who reported that 90% of the offenders he studied claimed to be victims of 
childhood sexual abuse and 34% of physical abuse" compared with D. Scully's 
inter-views with convicted rapists which revealed that only 9% had been sexually 
70j. Wilson and R. Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985). 
71A. Nicholas Groth, Men who Rape: The Psychology of the Offender (New York: Plenum, 1980). 
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abused as children. " In addition, 50% of offenders in Scully's report claimed to 
have grown up in non-violent homes. Moreover, if, as current research shows, the 
majority of abused children are girls, then one would expect the majority of 
abusers to also be women, but this is not the case. Therefore, while it can be 
concluded that childhood 'violence' is a related factor in raping as an adult, it 
cannot be claimed that there is a necessary causal relationship. As will become 
evident in Part Two, this is also an explanation utilised by some journalists in 
explaining the behaviour of those men who have raped in war. 
(3) Attitudes and beliefs about women. Possibly the most damaging findings in the 
literature on rape is the role played by adversarial attitudes toward women, and the 
unquestioning acceptance of rape 'myths'. on the propensity to rape. Again, 
detailed in Sciilly's study is evidence that convicted rapists 'approve' of violence 
against women; with 45 percent believing that hitting a women proves a man 
'cares'. Such attitudes serve not only as a justification for the rapist, but also 
contribute to a denial of individual responsibility. Moreover, a study by Sussman 
and Bordwell found that rapists frequently blamed their actions on the behaviour' 
or 'dress'of the woman. " These attitudes, as well as being used as a rationalisation 
for rape, also involve the creation and perpetuation of an inequitable power 
division which confers on men 'authority' and 'domination' over women, which in 
turn perpetuates the type of society which, while not condoning rape, nevertheless 
appears to maintain an atmosphere of acquiescence. Feminists such as' Ruth 
Seifert, ' Alexandra Stiglmayer" and Catharine MacKinnon" have all suggested 
that social 'peacetime' attitudes toward women have contributed to rape in war: this 
will be outlined in Part Three. 
(4) Power and domination. In Groth's study, the desire for power is identified as 
the most common motivation for rapists and subsequent studies by N. Malamuth 
have supported Groth's findings. Malamuth, 'in researching primarily US college 
students, concluded that for those men who displayed and engaged in sexually 
72 D. Scully, Understanding Sexual Violence: A Study of Convicted RqpLsts (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 
1990). 
73 Les Sussman and Sally Bordwell, The Rapist File (New York: Chelsea House, 1981). 
74 Ruth Seifert, "War and Rape, " Argumen Vol. 35, no. 1 (1993): pp. 81-90. 
75 Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (London: 4ý University of Nebraska Press, 1994). 
76 Catherine MacKinnon, "Turning Pornography into Rape: Postmodern Genocide, " in Stigimayer, C, Alexandra, ed., Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1994), pp. 75-76. 
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aggressive behaviour, dominance was indeed a principal sexual motivator. " B. 
Burkhart and A Fromoth, however, have taken this theory one step further, 
suggesting that sexually aggressive behaviour in men is linked to a more 
fundamental and enmeshed set of motives; including power, dominance, anger, 
and frustration, of which it may be impossible to entangled one from another. " 
This is one explanation for rape which feminist Claudia Card" has utilised and 
developed into a possible solution to the problem of mass rape in war. This will be 
discussed at length in Chapter Nine. 
(5) General aggression and hostility. It has also been suggested that for some men, 
rape is just another method by which they express violence. Research has indicated 
that men with 
, 
histories of 'sexually coercive behaviour' have a general tendency 
toward violence in general, this proclivity, combined with a deficiency in social 
skills - another characteristic often found in men who have raped - could lead to an 
increased likelihood of having the propensity to rape. " Following on along these 
lines, Allison and Branscombe's study" included assessments of 
Machiavellianism" and Hyper-masculinity", stating that men with these 
tendencies were more likely to use force to obtain sex. This issue is one- that 
feminists such as Cynthia Enloe" and Nancy Hartsock" have used, particularly in 
connection with military training, to explain male sexual aggression and rape in 
war and will be considered primarily in Chapter Eight. 
77N. Malamuth, "Predictors of Naturalistic Sexual Aggression, " Journal of Personality and Social 
Psycholog Vol. 50 (1986): pp. 953-962. 
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79Claudia Card, "Rape as a Terrorist Institution, " in R. G. Frey and C. W. Morris, eds., Violence, 
Terrorism. and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 296-319; and Claudia 
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Whether one, some or all of the above can be identified as being contributory factors 
in a 'man's' motivation to rape, and although taking the above factors en inasse one 
could use those particular mental and physical traits to make up a personal profile of a 
potential rapists, nevertheless, it would be a dangerous practice to attempt to then 
distinguish certain men as having the propensity to rape in 'peacetime'and even more 
so in war, with a myriad of other factors coming in to play. However, regardless of 
the individual's social and cultural background, it has been suggested that once a man 
rapes it is not only that particular rapist who should take responsibility for his actions 
but that all men are collectively responsible, and this possibility is discussed next. 
Collective Res'ponsibility 
Before concluding this chapter, it would be interesting to briefly look at some ideas 
on the 'collective responsibility' for rape introduced by Larry May and Robert 
Strikwerda in 1994, " as this notion of 'collective responsibility' is raised in the final 
chapter of the thesis (Chapter Eight) with regard to the suggestion that all soldiers 
should take responsibility for those who rape in war. Although the work of May and 
Strik,, verda is primarily dealing with rape in 'peacetime'. their theories concerning 
'men in groups'could also prove equally enlightening and useful when analysing rape 
in war in Chapter Two. Their work mainly revolves around the premise that in 
Western societies men are collectively responsible for rape in that most, if not all, 
men contribute in various ways to the prevalence of rape. For example, they suggest 
that most men do very little to actually oppose rape. The fact that most men do not 
speak out in open opposition to rape leads May and Strikwerda to ask whether this 
makes them co-conspirators with the men who do rape. Moreover, if they do speak 
out, is this symbolic act enough to diminish their responsibility? May and Strik,. verda 
would suggest that unless men speak out against the rapes in the Balkans they are 
collectively responsible for the continuation of the rapes. Basically, if men remain 
silent they are complicit with the rapists. They sum up their arguments in the 
following manner: 
We will argue that insofar as male bonding and socialisation in 
groups contributes to the prevalence of rape in western 
86Larry May and Robert Strikwerda, Hypati Vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring 1994). C, 
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societies, men in those societies should feel responsible for the 
prevalence of rape and should feel motivated to counteract such 
violence and rape. In addition, we will argue that rape should be 
seen as something that men, as a group, are collectively 
responsible for, in a way which parallels the collective 
responsibility of a society's crimes against humanity perpetrated 
by some members of their society. Rape is indeed a crime 
against humanity, not merely a crime against a particular 
woman. And rape is a crime perpetrated by men as a group, not 
merely by the individual rapist. " 
In expanding this theory May and Strikwerda set out four primary ways in which the 
responsibility for rape is generally understood. First, the rapist is seen as solely 
responsible for committing an intentional act of rape; second, and related to the socio- 
biological explanations discussed above, it is sometimes suggested that no-one can be 
held responsible since rape is merely a biologically motivated response to stimuli that 
men have no direct control over; the third notion of responsibility for rape suggests 
that both women and men should be held equally accountable for the prevalence of 
rape - not in the sense that the 'woman as victim' is blamed because of not taking 
adequate safety precautions, by dressing seductively, and so on, but in the sense that 
women, as well as men, contribute to the perpetuation of the violent environment in 
which we live; and fourth, rather than holding individual men, or groups of men, 
responsible for rape, the wider notion of 'patriarchy' is cited as being 'to blame'. 
Before summarising May and Strikwerda's final position on the subject, a brief 
elaboration of each of these stand-points is needed as they will prove to be useful 
analytical tools when analysing rape in war. 
Their first possibility for understanding the responsibility of rape is that the rapist 
should be held solely responsible. Following Mike Tyson's rape, trial journalist Joyce 
Carol Oates wrote an article in which she stated that 'no one is to blame except the 
perpetrator himself. " She. absolves society at large of any blame for Tyson's 
behaviour. Oates even labels Tyson a 'sadist' and a 'sociopath' suggesting that he is 
different from other men. However, as mentioned above, studies have revealed that 
87 Larry May and Robert Strikwerda, "Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape, " in Karen 
Warren and Duane Cady, eds., Bringing Peace Home: Feminism, Violence and Nature (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 176. 
"Joyce Carol Oates, "Rape and the boxing ring, " Newswee , 24 February 1992, pp. 60-61. 
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most rapists are not psychologically 'abnorrnal', " and while most men who engage in 
rape are undoubtedly at least partially responsible for those rapes, the main question 
posed by May and Strikwerda is are those who perpetrate rape the only ones who are 
responsible for rape? Contrary to Oates' view, May and Strikwerda believe that rape 
is not best understood in individualistic terms and that it is a serious mistake to think 
that only the perpetrators are responsible. They feel that the interactions of men, 
particularly in all-male groups, contribute to a pattern of socialisation that also plays a 
major role in the incidence of rape: this point will'be expanded on later. 
Their second suggestion is that the rapist merely a victim of biology. As this 
explanation has also been adequately covered above in the biological determinist 
arguments thefe is no need to repeat the analysis here, save to say thht this theory is 
generally promoted on the premise that, like it or not, these are the hard facts of 
biological life and we are unable to control what is biologically 'natural' and that 
those feminist theorists who take a socio-cultural view should 'get real about rape'. ' 
Under this explanation, no-one is responsible for rape, after all, if rape is a 
biologically predetermined response to different sexual development in males and 
females, those human beings who engage in rape are powerless to fight against their 
'hatural'urges which are inextricably linked to the natural evolution process. 
The third option in May and Strikwerda's analysis of the 'responsibility for rape' 
suggests that the rapist could be a victim of a violent society, of which both men and 
women must take responsibility. As well as a sex crime, rape is also a crime of 
violence, and many factors within our society have increased the prevalence of 
violence. It is this increased level of violence that May and Strikwerda suggest is a 
result of the patterns of male socialisation which in turn creates collective male 
responsibility. However, they point out that socialisation patterns are created by both 
men and women. They cite the work of Sam Keen, for example, who also regards 
men and women as equally to blame by working together to perpetuate the system of 
violence, especially in the way in which they transmit to their male children an 
89Susan Griffin, "Rape: The all-American Crime" in Marilyn Pearsall, cd., Women and Values: 
Readings in Feminist Philoýoýhv (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1986), p. 178. 
9OSee for example: Thornhill and Thornhill cited in May and Strikwerda (1996), pp. 180-18 1. 
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acceptance of violence. " For instance, boys'bad behaviour is more often condoned, 
or even expected, than bad behaviour in girls. As such, boys are often given mixed 
signals about misbehaviour. Among peers at school bad behaviour is frequently 
regarded as 'macho'or 'cool' and boys soon learn that they are ostracised for being too 
'goody-goody'. It is as if the message being sent to boys is that they have a tacit 
license to misbehave and in as much as women take a part in the socialisation of men, 
and their sons in particular, Keen contends that they should accept their share of the 
responsibility for the creation of a violent society. " 
While this view- does take account of the fact that the socialisation of men is the 
responsibility of both men and women, and that rape is indeed part of a larger set of 
violent practices that hbLnn both men and women, Keen fails to recognise thdt it is 
men, and not women, who are the vast majority of rapists in Western society. 
Moreover, as May and Strikwerda maintain, 'even if some women do act in ways 
which trigger violent reactions in men, nevertheless, in our opinion this pales in 
comparison with the way that men socialise each other to be open to violence'. " 
The last suggestion is that the rapist a victim of 'patriarchy'. One way of explaining 
the notion that all men are collectively responsible for the prevalence of rape in 
Western societies is to suggest that men, as a group, are responsible because they 
form some sort of intangible super-entity that causes, or at least supports, the 
prevalence of rape. Feminists, of course, would suggest that this entity is 'patriarchy, 
which on this reading can be conceived as a social structure which exists only in 
virtue of the practices of men (or, indeed, any social agent, but for the purposes of 
this argument I am dealing solely with 'men); although those same men, of course, 
need not be aware of the manner in which their practices are sustaining and/or 
transforming such a structure. Therefore, if we accept that patriarchy is the oppressive 
practices of men, which are co-ordinated by their common interests, but not 
intentionally organised, and that rape is one violent practice which results from 
patriarchy, then how does this affect our understanding of whether men are 
collectively responsible for rape? For, if patriarchy is supporting or even creating the 
9'Cited in May and StrikNverda (1996), ibid. 
92 ibid. 
93 ibid., p. 184. (emphasis added) 
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prevalence of rape in Western societies it cannot be claimed that it intentionally plans 
the rape of women. However, the kind of oppression characterised by the prevalence 
of rape in most Western societies does appear to be systematic, though perhaps not 
organised. But this situation merel means, again, that men are collectively y 
responsible for the prevalence of rape and yet no men are held individually 
responsible. 
May and Strikwerda, however, have suggested a variation on this theme as a way in 
which collective and individual responsibility are not mutually exclusive. They 
suggest that if patriarchy is understood as something which is based on the common 
interests and benefits of all men within a particular society, then it may be that men 
are collectively responsible for the harms of patriarchy in a way which affects alf 
men, making each man in a particular society at least partially responsible for the 
harms attributable to patriarchy; including rape. May and Strikwerda elaborate on this 
theory by suggesting that their claim - that all men in Western societies are 
collectively responsible for the prevalence of rape in their culture - rests on five main 
points. They are as follows: 
(1) Insofar as most perpetrators of rape are men, then these men 
are responsible, in most cases, for the rapes they committed. (2) 
Insofar as some men, by the way they interact with other 
(especially younger) men, contribute to a climate in our society 
where rape is made more prevalent, then they are collaborators 
in the rape culture and for this reason share in responsibility for 
rapes committed in that culture. (3) Also, insofar as some men 
are not unlike the rapist, since they would be rapists if they had 
the opportunity to be placed into a situation where their 
inhibitions against rape were removed, then these men share the 
responsibility with actual rapists for the harms of rape. (4) In 
addition, insofar as many other men could have prevented 
fellow men from raping, but did not act to prevent these actual 
rapes, then these men also share responsibility along with the. 
rapists. (5) Finally, insofar as some men benefit from the 
existence of rape in our society, these men also share 
responsibility along with the rapists. ' C) 
May and Strikwerda claim that all men fit into at least one of the above categories; 
and even those men who would claim to be adamantly opposed to rape in every sense, 
94ibid., p. 186. 
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still fall into category (5) by directly, or indirectly, benefiting from living in a 'rape' 
culture. They cite some examples of these benefits on both a personal level and in a 
wider context. On a personal level May and Strikwerda claim that they benefit by 
being able to walk relatively fearlessly through their university grounds at night, an 
activity avoided by most women. They suggest that another comparative benefit 
which they enjoy as a result of this 'travel' advantage is their 'ability to gain 
academically by being able to use the library at any hour [they] chose'. " The fear of 
rape and violence, therefore, limits women's freedom of movement. It constrains what 
they can do, where they can go, and perhaps even with whom they can socialise. In 
other words, both the reality and the fear of violence, as Susan Brownmiller stated 
earlier, act as a form of social control. 
Within a wider context May and Strikwerda claim that men benefit from the 
prevalence of rape because many women are made to feel dependent on men for 
protection against potential rapists. They explain this claim in the following way: 
It is hard to overestimate the benefit here for it potentially 
effects all aspects of one's life. One study found that 87% of 
women in a borough of London felt that they had to take 
precautions against potential rapists, with a large number 
reporting that they never went out at night alone. Whenever one 
group is made to feel dependent on another group, and this 
dependency is not reciprocal, then there is a strong comparative 
benefit to the group that is not in the dependent position. " 
This benefit, combined with the benefits mentioned above, support the view that men 
as a group have a vested interest in the perpetuation of the rape culture in ways that 
most women do not. Consequently, as the benefits to men as a group are dispersed 
throughout the male population in any given society, according to May and 
Strikwerda, so the responsibility should be dispersed as Welff This is not to say that 
all men everywhere are responsible for rape, but that in Western societies where rape 
is deeply embedded in a wider culture of male socialisation, then those who act to 
sustain that culture must also recognise that they are in some way responsible for the 
95 ibid., p. 188. 
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harmful aspects of that culture. Moreover, these 'acts of maintenance' men make to 
the rape culture do not necessarily have to be a direct contribution, negligence, 
similarity of disposition, or by simply keeping silent is enough to suggest complicity 
in the prevalence of rape and to thereby become responsible. 
While May and Strikwerda offer some interesting suggestions for raising awareness 
of how society's 'norms'and values directly affect the incidence of rape and how men, 
in particular, should move towards taking responsibility for that occurrence, in their 
analysis, however, they fail to recognise that the majority of women are also silent on 
the issue. For the most part, unless directly involved in direct action against rape or 
working with the victims of rape, women also fail to protest as vocally and as 
concertedly as one might expect. Moreover, ag Sam Keen mentioned above, women 
are often complicit in generating the appropriate social discourses that allow boys to 
receive messages that condone their aggressive behaviour and promote the continued 
domination of men over women. Therefore, while helpful in making those links 
between rape and society and in acknowledging the overall problem, May and 
Strikwerda's theory of 'collective responsibility' offers little in the way of an agenda 
for change - i. e. what can non-raping men do in order to alter the cultural discourse? 
However, in the final chapter of the thesis some feminists do offer possible 'solutions', 
some of which indirectly draw on the notion of 'collective responsibility'. 
Conclusion 
The standard explanations for the occurrence of rape as analysed within this chapter 
can be grouped into five areas: sex/gender, psychological/ psychiatric, social/cultural, 
power/domination, and violence/aggressiveness. While, of course, these factors are 
not mutually exclusive, research does tend to suggest that when rape does take place, 
these factors, or some combination of them, can be identified. This also suggests that 
no sole variable can be singled out and used as a reliable predictor for rape, indeed, it 
would be dangerous to do so. Research is currently focusing on multi-dimensional 
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approaches in order to develop more productive theories for understanding %vhy'rape 
occurs in 'peacetime'. " 
It is possible that some of the theories referred to in this chapter have contributed to 
the contemporary social ideas that surround the issue of rape. While some of the 
explanations, such as the 'ferninist'and 'social leaming' theories, attempt to invalidate 
those based on biological' factors, those based on evolutionary and biological 
determinist arguments have been gradually formed and perpetuated throughout 
history and are consequently a stronger force within mainstream social discourse. 
This has not only affected the way in which women have been viewed by society, but 
has also led to the lack of women's rights historically. The issue of biological 
deti, -rminism and the way in which women are representdd within society are both 
issues will be addressed at length in Chapter Seven. It has also been illustrated that 
this historical gendering of the issue of rape and the perpetuation of rape 'myths'has, 
in addition, led to the construction of unsatisfactory 'rape' legislation, based, in part, 
on the fact that the legal definitions which surround the issue of rape have been based 
on historically gendered 'norms'and values. 
This chapter also identified possible motives for rape, for example, an abusive 
childhood, misogynistic attitudes towards women, the need to exert power and 
doniination, 'and so on. This is not to suggest that this is one of the primary questions 
for the thesis, however, a limited understanding of current explanations for 'why men 
rape' will enable some comparisons to be drawn between these contemporary 
'peacetime' theories and the explanations offered by both feminists in Chapter Two 
and journalists in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Moreover, unless some consideration 
is given to the rapist's motives, it would be difficult to suggest any solutions to the 
problem, or indeed analyse and critique those solutions that have already been 
offered, as in Chapter Eight. Furthermore, it could also be argued that during wartime 
some of the possible motivational factors mentioned above could also play a greater 
role than might be expected in a non-war situation, or at least some particular 
characteristics may find the 'anarchy of war'aids their emergence and the opportunity 
to rape. These additional factors which are prevalent in war will discussed in the next 
98AIlison and Wrightsman (1993), p. 45. 
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chapter, and combined with the analysis of rape in this chapter will serve to aid and 
further our understanding of mass rape in war. 
May and Strikwerda's theory of 'collective responsibility' was also discussed within 
this chapter. Although not without flaws, this theory is at least attempting to stem the 
silence surrounding rape and to widen the sphere of responsibility to include all men 
who directly, or indirectly, benefit from living within a patriarchal society and one 
that has rape as a feature. While the possibility of practical application is, no doubt, 
remote, in war the theory might prove to be more applicable with the military unit 
being a classic 'male bonding group'. " Moreover, the 'collective responsibility' theme 
is one that has indirectly influences one of the 'solutions' discussed in Chapter Eight. 
The next chapter si-ý, ts out the historical and theoretical context for the pheriomenon of 
mass rape in war. 
99Susan Brownmiller (1975), p. 187. 
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2 
MASS RAPE IN WAR 
Rape seems to have accompanied most wars, whether categorised as 'wars of gain, 
wars of fear or wars of doctrine", or regarded as a just'or an 'unjust'war within the 
international political sphere. It has been stated by a famous World War Two general 
that during war there will 'unquestionably be some raping'. ' Moreover, writing on the 
laws of war, sixteenth century commentator on political ethics, Francisco de Vitoria 
suggested that rape in war was 'necessary for the conduct of war [and] as a spur to the 
courage of the troops'. ' Viewed from this 'traditional'perspective, rape in war appears 
to be an inescapable side effect of war. It also seems to be regarded with the same 
regret, but resignation, as a missile which missed its target, as civilian casualties, as 
the loss of ancient buildings, the loss of homes, bridges, or next year's harvest - an 
unfortunate, but unavoidable, consequence of war. 
t The intention of this chapter is to discuss the persistence of 'mass rape' as a 
phenomenon of war historically, and to question the traditional notion that rape in war 
is simply evidence of war's violent 'nature'. Although there is relatively little written 
on mass rape in war historically, this chapter will use what exists - such as legislative 
documents, ancient religious texts, United Nations and war documentation, as well as 
secondary sources - to discuss the persistence of the phenomenon. 
Therefore, the chapter begins with a brief chronological survey of the historical 
evidence of mass rape in war, which also includes some ancient accounts where the 
'Martin Wight, cited in Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, eds., Power Politics (Harmondswor-th: C, Penguin, 1979), p. 138. 
2 General George S. Patton, War As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947), p. 23. 0 3 Francisco de Vitoria, On the Law of War, trans., John Pawley Bate (Washington, D. C., 1917), p. 176; 
also see, Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance, eds., Political Writings: Francisco de Vitoria 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199 1). 
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'evidence' is unverifiable and shrouded in myth. However, as discussed in Chapter 
One, historical myth permeates our culture and its influence can be felt throughout 
Western culture. For this reason it is appropriate to include within this chapter 
mythical accounts of rape in war, which, while no 'truth'can be attached to them or 
original documentation verified, have nevertheless become an accepted part of 
Western cultural history. 
The Ancient World 
Within the Western tradition, Greek myth is a reservoir of powerful archetypal images 
that lay claim to privileged 'truths'about iiuman nature'; they invoke with convincing 
authority a sense of incontrovertible 'reality. As a product of a male-dominated 
society, Greek myths overtly use the aggressive exercise of phallic power as the ZD 
physical sign of male supremacy, which could explain the overwhelming presence of 
rape in the birthplace of Western civilisation. Froma Zeitlin suggests that the ultimate 
exemplar of this patriarchal figure is Zeus, father of gods and men. For example, she 
states: 
Enthroned on Olympus, he augments his political and cosmic 
power, symbolised by his sceptre and thunderbolt, with a sexual 
energy of seemingly unlimited desire by which he pursues and 
mates unstintingly with both gods and mortals. ' 
The ritual raping of ancient goddesses is traceable throughout Greek mythology, and 
has played a crucial role in accounts and explanations of the rise and fall of cities, the 
causes of wars and revolution. Helen of Troy, Lucretia, and the Sabine women, all 
illustrate this point. ' 
The 'story' of the rape of the Sabine women begins only four months after the 
foundation of Rome. During this post-war period, Rome was suffering from a lack of 
manpower, so much so that Romulus, the Roman Emperor, had encouraged asylum- 
seekers, outlawed by neighbouring states, to take refuge within the city. This measure, 
4 Froma Zeitlin, "Configurations of Rape in Greek Myth, " in S. Tomaselli and R. Porter, eds., Rape 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 124. 
5 Robert Graves, The Greek Myths (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1960). 0 
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while increasing the male population, was insufficient for Rome's needs; Rome 
needed to multiply and replenish the populace. Romulus, therefore, sent delegations 
into the surrounding communities to invite the neighbouring people to give their 
daughters to Romans in marriage. Faced with complete refusal, Romulus turned to 
more desperate measures. A festival of games in honour of Neptune was organised, 
with families invited and accommodation provided -a particularly warm welcome 
was extended to the neighbouring Sabine people. During the games at a pre-arranged 
signal, the Romans seized the marriageable Sabine women; the Sabine men fled for 
their lives. Some years later, having waited until certain of success, a Sabine force 
seeking revenge entered Rome by stealth at night and engaged the Romans in battle. 
The Sabine women, however, who had since bome Roman children, intervened, and 
the Romans and Sabines duly made peace, becafne equals within Rome, with Tatius, 
the Sabine leader, and Romulus jointly ruling the city. ' That the resulting political 
solution was peace in this instance does not detract from the way in which the Sabine 
women were used as pawns in a political game. The consequences could equally have 
been continuous ethnic hatreds, retaliation, and war, as witnessed in the former- 
Yugoslavia. 
The rape of the Sabine women, in contrast to the rape of Lucretia, ' which is 
commonly viewed as an individual sexual act, can be viewed as a fundamentally 
political act. ' The fonner were not merely a cluster of individual acts of sexual 
violence perpetrated against individual women, but were an integral part of a 
premeditated plan with political ends. This issue, raised as one of the potential 
explanations for the mass raping of women in the Balkans will be discussed in Cý 
Chapters Five and Seven. As evidence of the political nature of the raping of the 
Sabine women, note the following: 
6S. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquay (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1975). 
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. 
Donaldson, The Rapes of Lucretia: A Myth and its Transformation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). 
8Mary Hutcheon, "Stories of Lucretia: Rape to Justify the Nation-State, " Paper given at International 
Studies Association Conference Minneapolis, Minnesota (March 1998). 
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0 Romulus ordered that no married women be taken. Plutarch interpreted this 
fact as showing 'that they did not commit this rape wantonly, but with the design of 
forming alliance with their neighbours by the greatest and surest bonds'. ' 
0 The women were not raped on the spot. The Roman men were not allocated a 
'wife'until the next day. 
0 Note the word 'wife'. The women were not kept as concubines, but were 
married and become 'legitimate' Roman citizens. 
0 The women were not kept, or treated, as slaves, but had an 'honourable' place 
within the household. Plutarch expanded on this point, stating that the Romans 
promised the Sabines that the women would 'not carry out any servile work in the 
house, but only spin'. " 
The 'rape' of the Sabine women is one illustration of the all-encompassing nature of 
ancient patriarchal rationale. This 'crime', for it is undoubtedly a crime if analysed 
through our contemporary perception of rape, when viewed from the perspective of 
ancient Rome, dissolves simply into a lack of parental consent - hardly a crime at all 
by the 'norms' of the day. Sanctioned and devised by the Emperor himself, there was 
no contravention of Roman State law. On the contrary, the taking of the women 
culminated in marriage and the birth of 'legitimate' offspring, all that is missing is the 
bestowal of the Sabine daughters on their new husbands by their"Sabine fathers. If one 
analyses the 'myths' surrounding the building of Rome, of which this narrative 
containing the rape of the Sabine women is a part, its function does appear to be 
primarily political rather than sexual, both in defining relations between nations and 
between the sexes. In other words, th-- soldiers were under orders to take the women 
as part of a political strategy (as some commentators have suggested was the case in 
the Balkan conflict) rather than simply to satisfy their own sexual desires and 
fantasies (as other commentators have suggested was the case in Vietnam). This 
question will be raised a' ain later in this chapter. 9 
Throughout ancient history rape during 'wartime' - which would have to be very 
loosely defined given the events outlined above - was not only regarded as legitimate 
9C. P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome: Life of Romulas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 89-94. 
10ibid. 
55 
action, but was openly condoned and encouraged by heads of state. This advocating 
of rape in war was also prevalent throughout ancient Near East history. In Babylonian 
society, the acceptance of rape within their culture can be traced back to their own 
'creation myth', which was based primarily on the rape and murder of woman by man. 
The 'myth' states that the male-god Marduk slays the primordial female-creator 
Tiamat in order to reform the world, which he then accomplishes by using her 
dismembered body. Consequently, Marduk declares himself creator of the world. " 
The potency of these myths is evident throughout the Hebrew Bible where women are 
depicted as mere objects of male possession and control. Women were. defined in 
relation to their sexuality, and because the basic social structure was built on the value 
and significafice of legitimate heirs, a woman's identity, her life, her Very 'being'. was 
instruniental not proactive within Hebrew patriarchal society. Biblical references 
clearly illustrate this point in relation to the treatment of women in wartime, where 
they were regarded as 'spoils of war'. as property. The notion will be discussed further 
in Chapter Seven. Old Testament Law lays down precise rules for the plunder and - 
capture of enemy cities. In Deuteronomy it states that the Lord God will deliver into 
the male warriors'hands, 'the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is 
in the city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt thou take unto thyself. "' 
It is interesting, however, that the word for rape is never actually employed in the 
texts in Deuteronomy, which describe the conduct of war, but neither is rape 
forbidden. However, due to the position of women within Hebrew society, when the 
male warriors are instructed to 'en oy the use of the spoil of your enemies which the 
Lord your God gives you'it is accepted that women are included in this category. " To 
reiterate this point, Moses in the book of Numbers instructs the. Israelite men to 'kill 
every male among the little ones, and kill every woman that hath known man by lying 
with him. But all the women children, who have not known a man by lying with him, 
keep alive for yourselves'. " When contextualised within a modem discourse of rape, 
"Charles Long, Alpha: The Myths of Creation (New York: Brazillar, 1963), pp. 88-93. 
12The Bible, Deuteronomy 20: 14 (King James Version). 
13 Susan Brooks-Thistlethwaite, "'You May Enjoy the Spoil of Your Enemies. Rape as a Biblical 
Metaphor for War, " Semeia Vol. 61 (1993): pp. 59-75. (emphasis added) 
"The Bible, Numbers 31: 17-18 (King James Version). C, 
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the Women children'. referred to by Moses, were no-one's 'property' - their fathers, 
brothers, uncles had been killed - they did not fall into the category of females who 
could be violated by rape since there is no male to offend. 
In analysing these examples of rape in war in the ancient world, I would suggest that 
there are two main points of comparison with contemporary notions of rape in war. 
First, again, the act of rape itself was not seen in antiquity as a sexual attack on the 
woman, but as a theft of male sexual property. Second, and inextricably linked with 
the first point, is how women's identity was defined. Perhaps our contemporary 
perception of rape is now so conditioned by the historically specific discourses of our 
own period that those of ancient times, which consider women booty'or 'spoil'to be 
'enjoyed'as 'property'. appehr alien. However, a feminist reading of reports of rape'in 
war in contemporary Europe would analyse the events and the attitudes towards 
women and their identity in surprisingly similar ways. 
Twentieth Century Wars 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the leap from Greek mythology to reports of mass 
rape in war duriný twentieth century wars is a large one. This is due to the lack of 
information or documentation available on 'rape in war'during the intervening period, 
although there is the occasional reference to rape during that time. For example, the 
French chronicler. Monstrelet noted that when the French Army captured Soissons in 
1414, 'noblemen joined the ordinary soldiers in 'indiscriminately raping women of all Z) 
ranks". " Also writing in the fifteenth century Machiavelli, concerned for the stability 
and maintenance of power, was eager to emphasise the political danger that rape in 
war represented. In The Discourses he gives the following advice: 
First, we see how women have been the cause of many troubles, 
have done great harm to those who govern cities, and have 
caused in them many divisions ... we read in Livy's history that 
the outrage done to Lucretia deprived the Tarquins of their rule, 
and that done to Virginia deprived the Decemviri of their power. 
15Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men. Women and Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1975), p. 37. 
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Among the primary causes of the downfall of tyrants, Aristotle 
puts the injuries they do on account, whether by rape, violation 
or the breaking up of marriages ... absolute princes and rulers of 
republics should not treat such matters as of small moment, but 
should bear in mind the disorders such events may occasion and 
look to the matter in good time, so that the remedy applied may 
not be accompanied by damage done. to, or revolts against, their 
state or their republic. " 
An raiseworthy suggestion, although as one can see there has been so little written 
concerning the incidence of rape in war that it is impossible to gauge whether to not 
his advice was heeded. However, if Machiavelli saw fit to write conceming the issue, 
one can assume that it was a regular feature of war in his time. 
Another reference, which is unusually 'detailed in its recording of the raping of women 
in war, is that of the raping of Scottish highland women, both during and after the 
Battle of Culloden in 1746. The modem British historian, John Prebble, has collated 
the information from old tribal records scrupulously kept by the Scottish clansmen, in 
which they claim that the raping of their 'clanswomen'was a deliberate act of tyranny 
by the EnglisO' However, this appears to be unusual, and it was not until World War 
I that the occurrence of rape in war was documented with more interest and-concem, 
although the motives for this concern are questionable, as shall be demonstrated. 
As the following quotation illustrates, even twentieth century historians have been 
unwilling to research the subject of rape, whether in war or in 'peace'. Historian N. 
Basher commented that, '[I]t seems that rape is too risky, too political a subject to be 
dealt with comfortably by the present day male historian'. " This observation 
highlights the relative lack of documentation, or bard' evidence available to 
historians, and therefore, the lack of research within this area. Even in important 
historical studies such as Vem Bullough's, Sex, Society and Histo1y" and J. Week's 
Sex, Politics and Society' rape is absent from all discussion. By the same token, war 
historians have also failed to consider rape in war noteworthy. For example, 
16 Bernard Crick, ed., N. Machiavelli: The Discourses (London: Harmondsworth, 1970), pp. 477-8. 
17 ibid., pp. 38-40. 
8N. Bashar - London Feminist History Group, "Rape in England between 1550 and 1700, " The Sexual 
Dynamics of Histor (London: Pluto Press, 1983): pp. 28-46. 
19Vern LeRoy Bullough, Sex. Society and Histor (New York: Science History Publications, 1976). 
20j. Weeks, Sex, Politics and Society (New York: Longman, 1981). 
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approximately 94% of academic books analysing war do not mention rape and/or 
violence against women in war. " This leads one to the conclusion that rape has been 
considered unmentionable, even in wartime, where violence abounds. Violence 
against women remains taboo within mainstream academia. However, during the two 
World Wars in the twentieth century, the mass raping of women has been increasingly 
documented, yet only selectively reported to the general public. This fact, particularly 
relevant in the case of World War 1, raises a particular issue that this section will 
attempt to examine, namely the use of 'rape in war' as propaganda. lt should, 
therefore, be noted that the eyewitness accounts, particularly those contained within 
the World War I and II sections, should be read with care. 
World War I 
Integral to the history of rape in war and its representations are the reports of German 
soldiers' rapacity in World War 1. These were often held to be the fabrications of 
desperate allied, governments seeking to enlist support from powerful neutral states. 
First World War historiography ap pears to be clouded with stereotypes, images and 
fantasies, made increasingly complex by the inter-war pacifist reaction against the 
exaggerations of wartime propaganda. " Throughout the war various 'official 
'Commissions of Inquiry' were set up in France, Belgium and Britain in order to 
gather information, document atrocities, and ascertain damage to civilians. The 
commissioners went to great lengths to discard evidence that was 'too full of rumour 
to be reliable' and they 'did their best to include in the published reports only direct 
testimony from victims and crimes witnessed by more than one person'. " Despite the 
efforts of the allied Commissions to record only direct testimony and to recognise the 
violence and pain endured by the victims, women's narratives appear to have been lost 
as the discourse of rape was transformed from the suffering and victimisation of 
individual women into an international metaphor for French and Belgian humiliation. 
The testimony of witnesses and soldiers appeared more dramatic and sensational than 
the accounts from the raped women themselves. The male narrative again emerges as 
210f the thirty general academic books on war consulted, twenty-eight did not make any reference to 
rape in war, or violence against women in war. 
22James Morgan Read, Atrocity Propaganda (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972 - original 1941). 23M. L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda During the First World War (London: 
MacMillan, 1982). 
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the dominant account used in newspapers, posters, and pamphlets; it was 'male' 
anxiety and even fantasy, much more than the tragedy of the women's experience that 
shaped the discussion of rape in war. " 
Consider, for example, this eyewitness account given to the French commission by a 
soldier: 
The Bavarians came into the village of Nomery, after chasing 
the French and the inhabitants away, they abducted a young 
pregnant woman, opened her belly and threw the child on the 
dung heap; since the mother was still living, they finished her 
off. Then they took another woman; after having raped her, they 
opened her legs and they singed her pubic hair ... they cut the breasts off and they played palet (quoits) with therp. " 
In contrast, many women when interviewed by the commissioners were reluctant to 
speak freely, perhaps aware of the double standard of sexual morality which operated 
within their patriýirchal society. Whilst willing to tell of their experiences in order to 
pursue the enemy, they nevertheless wished to retain their sexual honour and did not 
want to further dishonour themselves by discussing incidents in detail. Women often 
told as little as possible. For example, R. Harris quotes from the French records: 
A seventy-one-year-old, unmarried woman from the Meuse was 
unable to find words: 'One of them turned me over, threw up my 
petticoats and... ' One woman who told an investigator, 'I don't 
need to tell you the rest, you can guess it without trouble'. struck 
a common note. Others merely stated that they were subject to 
'odious violence', which they refused to speak about or specify. " 
Women's narratives, then, were generally unembellished and reticent, and as will 
became apparent, so are the related experiences of the raped Bosnian Muslim women 
in the recent Balkan conflict. These individual women, stoical and proud even while 
suffering, were transformed by propagandists, who preferred a more dramatic image 
to adorn their publications, into frail and ravished jeline filles, the perfect allegorical 
image of France and Belgium being raped by the German barbarian. For allied forces 
24 See, for example: Arthur Ponsonby, False-hood in Wartime (London: Methuen, 1928); and Harold D. 
Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (London: Knopf, 1927). 
25Testimony of a brigadier in the 20th Artillery Regiment, 16 October 1914. Cited in R. Harris, "The 
'Child of the Barbarian. Rape, Race and Nationalism in France during the First World War, " Past and 
Present No. 141 (1993): p. 188. 
26Testimony of Yvonne G., 23 October 1914, ibid. 
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and civilians alike, these gendered personifications of France, Belgium and Germany 
were convincing, and they tapped into a rich vein of existing cultural stereotypes, 
stemming from the relatively recent French experience of defeat and occupation 
(1870-71). Therefore, in 1914 psychological structures were already in place for the 
further development of the images and caricatures representing the barbarian'and the 
2victim? 
. 
27 It was in this context that the victims of rape described their experiences. 
These accounts differ considerably in tone and emphasis from the rape 'stories' 
relayed by the witnesses and soldiers and expropriated by the propagandists, which 
appear to stress the relations between men, and even establish new relations of power 
between allied and enemy forces. As Lasswell noted in his pioneering work of 
propaganda analysis, '[a] handy rule for arousing hate is, if at first they do not enrage, 
use an atrocity'. " *Speculating on the propaganda value of rape Lasswell continued, 
'[t]hese stories yield a crop of indignation against the fiendish perpetrators ... and 
satisfy certain powerful, hidden impulses. A young woman, ravished by the enemy, 
yields a secret satisfaction to a host of vicarious ravishers on the other side of the 
border'. " Contrary to my previous assertion, it appears to be the case that when it suits 
the ends of the political elites and propagandists, the raping of women in war can be 
elevated to the position of a serious national problem, which needs to be addressed. 
While acknowledging that. the propagandists undeniably played a role in the 
dramatisation and dissemination of rape 'stories' throughout World War 1, this should 
in no way detract from the violent rape and atrocities that women unquestionably 
suffered during the war. But unfortunately, it does. Once the raping and violation of 
French and Belgian women had been turned to allied advantage, the propaganda, and 
the rapes along with it, were promptly denied. " It is difficult to appreciate the trauma 
endured by women whose, violation was at first investigated with enthusiasm, 
enshrined in the mythologies of nationalist propaganda, then forgotten amidst the 
countless other horrors and atrocities of war and finally denied, as part of a 
27 Gerd Krumeich, "Joan of Arc between Right and Left, " in Robert Tombs, ed., Nationhood and 
Nationalism in France: From Boulaneism to the Great War 1889-1918 (London: Harper Collins, 1991), 
g t 63-73. 
, Lasswell (1927), p. 56. 
29ibid. 
30Susan Brownmiller (1975), p. 47. 
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manufactured 'atrocity hysteria'. in the aftermath of the war. This issue of 'rape as 
propaganda'will be raised again in Chapters Four and Seven. 
Yet, individual historians and feminists, who are concerned that the mass raping of 
women in World War I has disappeared without sufficient recognition or study, have 
rediscovered information which goes some way to substantiate the women's 
experiences of rape. Firstly, Susan Browniniller has brought to light the writings of 
two British academics, Arnold Joseph Toynbee and J. H. Morgan, a professor at 
Oxford and a Professor of constitutional law respectively, both of whom witnessed 
the raping of French/Belgian women at first hand and published their findings. " 
Professor Morgan, after examining thirty sworn statements, and medical certificates 
of injury, from the women of Bhilleul, was convinced that the German General Staff 
had mounted a deliberate campaign of rape and terror in the first three months of the 
war. This quotation from his report, although in tone orderly and constrained, still 
captures a sense of fear and outrage: 
Outrages upon the honour of women by German soldiers have 
been so frequent that it is impossible to escape the conviction 
that they have been condoned and indeed encouraged by 
German officers ... At least five officers were guilty of such 
offences, and where the officers set the example the men 
followed ... In one case, the facts of which are proved by 
evidence that would satisfy any court of law, a young girl of 
nineteen was violated by one officer while the other held her 
mother by the throat and pointed a revolver, after which the two 
officers exchanged their respective roles. " 
The second piece of substantial 'evidence' which undoubtedly bears witness to the 
'mass'raping of women, can be found in French Government and Catholic church 
documentation relating to the considerable number of women demanding abortions 
following rape by German soldiers. The implications of these rapes, and subsequent 
pregnancies, first. became public when a Catholic priest offered, in a newspaper 
article, 'absolution before God and before man' to women who aborted infants of 
German paternity. The priest, using patriotic and racist arguments, reportedly urged 
women to exterminate 'without scruple, the ignoble and criminal chaff which would 
31 Cited in Susan Brownmiller (1975), pp. 41-42. 
32 ibid., p. 42. 
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one day dishonour the pure wheat of our plains on which blows the wind of liberty'. " 
Predominantly Catholic, the French populace felt that if a Catholic priest was 
advocating abortion, then the German rapists must indeed carry morally debilitating 
genes, and fearing 'teratological offspring' demanded radical solutions. The public's 
attention, sustained by the media, remained stoically focused on the issue, note the 
development of the issue in the press at the time: 
Further reports of raped and pregnant women were emerging 
from other invaded department' of France, and they were 
preparing for abortion; " A spokesman for the Catholic church 
argued in the press that many Catholic women would not 
consider abortion; " The senator for the Var, Louis Martin, 
proposed the temporary suspension of penalties for abortion in 
the invaded territories, and me4ns by which mothers could 
abandon their babies safely and anonymously; " Maurice Barres, 
writing in a Catholic daily, urged the Government to allow 
women to implement anonymous abandonment of infants to 
'prevent the imminent wave of child murder'; " Compensation 
was also publicly demanded from the German officer corps, 
who Barres held collectively responsible for the financial 
maintenance of these infants. " Public discussions took place 
involving an eminent list of intellectual, political, religious and 
literary figures; " A Feminist newspaper and a popular medical 
journal, encouraged readers to join in the debate and 
controversy by airing their views. " 
The conclusion to this socially and politically damaging scenario for France came 
through Government intervention on 24 March 1915, in the form of a ministerial 
directive. Its aim was to avert the prospect of widespread abortion, and to spare 
women the 'shame and disgrace' of bearing Germanic children. This would be 
achieved by 
allowing them to give birth in Paris maternity hospitals or to 
bring ther-children to the capital after deliverý, whereupon they 
33 Jean d'Orsay, "Pour ]a race, " Le Matin 7 January 1915, cited in R. Harris (1993), p. 179. 
34Maurice Barres, "Une loi necessaire, " Lecho de Paris 10 February 1915, ibid., p. 192. 
35Jean de Bonnefon, "Le douloureux probleme: Fattentat et Venfant devant 1eglise, " Le Journal 26 
January 1915, ibid., p. 191. 
36"Pour les fenimes victimes de violences, " Informations Parlementaires 10 February 1915, ibid. 
37 Maurice Barres, Chronique de la Grande Guerre 1914-1920 (Paris: Plon, 1931-9), ibid., p. 192 
38Barres (1915), ibid. 
39The list included T. Ribot, P. Adam, Abbe Wetterle, Duchesse de Rohan and many others, 'Venfant 
du crime, doit-il naitre? " La Revue 15 February -I March 1915, pp. 397-404; and 15 March -1 April 
1915, pp. 53-76, ibid. 
40'La Francaise'(feminst newspsper) and Chronique Medicale (medical journal), ibid, pp. 192-193 
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would be given a falsified birth certificate and taken into public 
care. The only requirement was a statement from the local juge 
de paix, or mayor, testifying to the women's sexual 
respectability prior to the attack. " 
The governmental discussions surrounding this portentous bureaucratic decision are, 
to my knowledge, unknown at present, although any government documentation 
regarding the 'rape babies' of the Balkan conflict will not be forthcoming for some 
time yet. However, the enormity of the official administrative and practical measures 
taken here, confirms the seriousness with which the French government regarded the 
dilemma, as well as the magnitude of the problem. It will, no doubt, be years until 
official government documents are released and researchers are able to discover how 
seriously the Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian, and British governments took the issue of 
'rape babies'in the Balkan conflict. 
There is little documentation concerning the raping of women in war in the period 
between World War I and the reports concerning the Rape of Nanking. However, 
recent research concerning the raping of women during the Bolshevik Revolution" 
confirms the point that regardless of whether the conflict is a war of gain, a war of 
fear or a war of doctrine" rape appears to be a common feature. 
The Rape of Nanking 
In 1937, Japanese forces seized Nanking and held it until 1945; the capture of the city 
was accompanied by such atrocities that it became known as the 'rape of Nanking'. ' 
The full horror and magnitude of the events which transpired at Nanking in 1937, 
including the incalculable number of rapes that took place, were not fully realised 
until the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, after the end of the war in the Pacific . 
4' Although 
none of the defendants were tried for rape, a situation similar to that at Nuremberg, 
the prosecutors submitted evidence of mass rape in an effort to convict several 
4 'ibid. 
42 See, for example: Vladimir N. Brovkin, The Bolsheviks in Russian Society: The Revolution and the 
Civil Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press-, 1997), pp. 224-23 1. 
43 Mar-tin Wight, cited in Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, eds., Power Politics (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1979), p. 138. 
44Encarta, "Nanjing, " CD ROM Encyclopaedi (Microsoft Corporation, 1993). 
45C. MacDonald, "Japan and the Nanking Massacre, " Paper given at the Department of War Studies, 
London (Pacific Security Seminar Series) IS January 1996. 
64 
defendants of crimes against humanity. " The Chinese decision not to defend Nanking, 
and the army's subsequent withdrawal, had left the city - full of refugees, women, and 
children - defenceless against the Japanese advance. " The invading, Japanese army 
found minimal resistance; the scenario is now familiar, and the result, rape. Leon 
Friedman, writing on the laws of war, says of Nanking: 
There were many cases of rape. Death was a frequent penalty 
for the slightest resistance on the part of a civilian or the 
members of her family who sought to protect her. Even girls of 
tender years and old women were raped in large numbers 
throughout the city, and many cases of abnormal and sadistic 
behaviour in connection with these rapings occurred. Many 
women were killed after the act and their bodies mutilated. 
Approximately 20,000 cases of rape occurred within the city 
during the first month of the occupatibn. " 
Despite an official news blackout ordered by General Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese 
leader, countless reports of rape and unchecked violence leaked out of the besieged 
city. Yet, although the mass raping of women were reported alongside lootings,. 
beatings and murders, the Western press, keen to inform their readers of these 
atrocities, appeared reluctant to discuss rape. Arguably, the Rape of Nanking'could at 
that point, have been stifled, and effectively eliminated from history, relegated to 
hearsay, rumour, and wartime propaganda. However, the instigation of the War 
Crimes Tribunal held in Tokyo, enabled the previously excluded accounts of the mass 
raping of women to resurface. " Although no raped women were called to give 
evidence at the tribunal, a group of missionaries from the Nanking International 
Relief Committee, who had elected to remain in the city throughout the invasion, 
were asked to testify. A quotation from the diary of an American missionary in 
Nanking, James McCallum, was entered as evidence at the tribunal, and reads as 
follows: 
Never have I heard or read of such brutality. Rape! Rape! Rape! 
We estimate at least 1,000 cases a night, and many by day. In 
46C 
. Hosoya, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International SymposiuM (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1986). 47 Arnold C. Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial 
(London: Collins, 1987), p. 176. 
48Leon Friedman, ed., "The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on 
Enforcement of Penalties, " The Law of War: A Documentary HistoEy Vol. 2 (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1972), p. 842. 
49ibid., pp. 1060-1064. 
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case of resistance ... there is a bayonet stab or a bullet. We could 
write up hundreds of cases a day. " 
The eyewitness statements and the testimonies of rape appear endless, " and all seem 
to have a ritualistic similarity to them. " They all talk, not just of rape, but of horrific 
mutilations, of brutality beyond comprehension, of sadistic humiliating practices. " 
This evidence, presented to the Tokyo tribunal, was ultimately conclusive as General 
Iwane Matsui, the military commander of the Nanking invasion, was found guilty of 
crimes against humanity, and sentenced to death by hanging. ' It appeared that mass 
rape in war was at last being recognised as a crime against humanity. However, it was 
not until many years later that the full horror of the sexual slavery and rape committed 
by the Japanese army was brought to light through investigations into the fate of 
cotintless Asian 'comfort women'. " This issue will be discussed in the final chapter. 
Although it should be noted, that to date no one has stood trial for these other 
'atrocities' suffered by these women. " Moreover, recent historical revisionists from 
Japanese academic circles have denounced the reports of Japanese rape and atrocities 
at Nanking, and they have specifically singled out Iris Chang's book The Rave of 
Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War H for criticism, some even claiming 
that no massacre occurred. " 
World War II 
Nietzche has stated that '[m]an should be trained for war and woman for the recreation 
of the warrior: all else is folly'. " As Hitler and his am-lies marched over Europe in the 
early days of World War II, one could imagine that this provocative piece of advice 4D 
was the inspiration for both the motivations behind the German rapacity and brutality 
5013rownmiller (1975), p. 58. 
51ibid. 
52 Ian Buruma, Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 
131. 
53 Peter Karsten, Law, Soldiers and Combat (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 84. 
54The tribunal ruled that the behaviour of the Japanese army could not be considered the acts of a 
military group that had temporarily 'gotten out of hand', rather, rape, arson, and murder had continued 
to be committed on a large scale for at least six weeks after the initial invasion. Cited in Brownmiller 
(1975), p. 61. 
55Jeanne Vickers, Women and War (London: Zed Books, 1993), p. 21; Hester Lacey, "The Emperor's 
Forgotten Army, " The Independent on Sunday, 25 May 1997, pp. 40-41. 
56Associated Press, "Japan's Apology, " The Guardian, 15 August 1996, p. 11. 
57jriS Chang, "It's History, Not a 'Lie, " Newswee , 
20 July 1998, p. 29. 
58R. J. Hollingdale, trans., A Nietzsche Reader (London: Penguin, 1977), p. 275. C, 0 
66 
during World War H. There are reports of German soldiers raping women on a 
massive scale in Poland, Russia, France, Belgium, and Jewish women in Germany 
itself. Similar patriarchal sentiments could equally have been the source of motivation 
for the Japanese army's Rape of Nanking'. the enormity of which did not come to 
light until the Tokyo War Trials in 1946. " The documentation of wartime crimes 
against women, and in particular rape, has been improving throughout the twentieth 
century, as such, the scale of reported German violence toward enemy women during 
World War II is too great to cover adequately in this brief section. For this reason I 
will focus on the German advance through Russia and the retaliatory Rape of Berlin', 
as an example of Nazi and allied atrocities, and I will also briefly examine the Rape 
of Nanking'. The decision to concentrate on the reports of rape in war committed by 
both thý German and Japanese armies, is due primarily to the'lack of documentation 
and subsequent research on allied wartime raping: one example, perhaps, of the 
victors having written history. 
As Hitler's army advanced through Eastern Europe, the Jewish communities were the 
first to stiffer, even though technically it was forbidden for a German to rape a Jew, 
due to the prohibition against 'race defilement'and the 'contamination of Aryan blood' 
set out in the Nuremberg race laws of 1935. ' Captured German documents presented 
at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal in 1946 corroborate the routine use of rape as 
a weapon of terror. It was not Jewish women alone who suffered rape at the hands of 
the German army, from evidence submitted at the Nuremberg Tribunal it becomes 
clear that all women were 'prey. 61 Throughout World War II, the Soviets, who 
sustained the greatest allied losses, had collected a disturbing amount of data detailing 
Nazi atrocities. Exhibit No. 5 1, presented to the Tribunal, was prepared by the 
Russian foreign minister in January 1942. It contained a summary of 1', Iazi turpitude 
during the invasion of 1941, and was entered as evidence at Nuremberg as The 
Molotov Note'. Susan Brownmiller has summarised some of the evidence that it 
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contained and the following extract is one small list that illustrates some typical 
examples: 
In the village of Borodayevka the fascists violated every one of 
the women and girls; in Berezovka drunken German soldiers 
assaulted and carried off all the women and girls between the 
ages of sixteen and thirty; in the city of Smolensk the German 
command opened a brothel for officers in one of the hotels into 
which hundreds of women and girls were driven - they were 
dragged. down the street by their arms and hair; the lust- 
maddened German gangsters break into the houses, rape the 
women and girls under the very eyes of their kinfolk and 
children, jeer at the women they have violated, and then brutally 
murder their victims; in. Lvov, thirty-two women working in a 
garment factory were first violated and then murdered by 
Germ4n storm troopers. Drunken German soldiers dragged givIs 
and young women in Lvov into Kesciuszko Park, where they 
raped them; near Borissov seventy-five women and girls 
attempting to flee at the approach of the German troops fell into 
their hand, they raped and murdered thirty-six of them. By order 
of a German officer named Hummer, the soldiers marched L. 1. 
Melchukova, a sixteen-year-old girl, into the forest, where they 
raped her. A little later, some other women who had also been 
dragged into the forest saw some boards near the trees and the 
dying Melchukova nailed to the boards. The Germans had cut 
off her breasts in the presence of these women, among whom 
were V. 1. Alperenko and V. H. Bereznikova; in Tikhvin a 
slightly wounded fifteen-year-old girl named H. Koledetskaya. 
was taken to hospital, despite her injuries the girl was raped by a 
group of German soldiers and died as a result of the assault. " 
All these incidents are alleged to have occurred in the first few months of invasion, 
and although some of the language used, for example lust-maddened German 
gangsters'. can only be described as 'dramatic' and used to incite hatred of the German 
oppressors,. one can nevertheless see through the emotive language and appreciate the 
real scale of horror and 'crime of war'suffered by these women. 
Rape was not a 'weapon of war'used solely by the Axis forces during World War III. 
When the tide of war turned, the Red Army advanced through German territory with C) 
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an air of vengeance and retaliation. Many Red Army soldiers involved in the Rape of 
Berlin' were veterans of 'Stalingrad' and saw it as their duty to re-establish national 
pride through retribution. " Cornelius Ryan, a historian conducting research in Berlin 
in the 1960s, obtained firsthand accounts from the victims of rape, and commented 
that 'hordes of Russian troops coming up behind ... demanded the rights due the 
conquerors: the women of the conquered'. ' The following accounts suggest that they 
succeeded: 
Ursula Koster was sleeping in a basement shelter with her 
parents and her three children when six Russian soldiers raped 
her at gunpoint. Hannelore von Cmuda, a seventeen-year-old, 
was raped by a mob of drunken soldiers, after which they fired 
three shots into her body. She survived. Margarete Promeist, 
warden of ail air-raid shelter, watched for two days and nights 
as 'wave after wave of Russians came into my shelter 
plundering and raping. Women were killed if they refused. 
Some were shot and killed a" nyway... I found the bodies of six or 
seven women, all lying in the position in which they were raped, 
their heads battered in'. Frau Promeist herself was assaulted 
despite her appeals that she was too old for them. Mother 
Superior Cunegundes of Haus Dahlem, an orphanage and 
maternity hospital run by the Mission Sisters of the Sacred 
Heart, was shot by a soldier when she tried to interfere with the 
rape of the mission's Ukrainian cook, Lena. The mission was 
over-run with soldiers who entered maternity wards and raped 
pregnant women and those who had given birth. " 
At the end of World War Id, prosecutors at the Nuremberg Tribunal were attempting 
to establish that the rape of women by the German Army had been part of a pre- 
planned campaign of violence and terror, and in Tokyo the Allies were making a 
similar case against the Japanese, and Jewish women's charge of rape were also being 
heeded. But what of the defeated Gennan women? There were no international 
tribunals held to expose and judge allied atrocities and no incriminating governmental 
documents were revealed from allied sources. A German schoolteacher from Breslau 
(now Wroclaw) echoed the voices of countless silenced women, when she said, 
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'[w]here could one lodge a complaint? Everywhere one was chased away like a stray 
dog'. 66 
Given the evidence thus far regarding the dynamics between soldiers in war and 
violence against women, even if one sets aside the Russian experience, one would 
have to conclude that allied forces also committed rape: although it has been argued 
that British soldiers, at least in the First World War, had little or no casual sex during 
their service abroad. ' However, even if the numbers of victims may not be 
comparable, the nationality and ideology of a woman is insignificant when one 
considers the violence, pain, and humiliation suffered by all victims of rape. 
Furthermore, while the allied forces may not have used rape as a weapon of war to 
effect the total 'destruction of inf6rior peoples'. as it has been suggested the Axis 
forces did, " the motivations of the allied soldiers, whether retaliation, revenge, or 
'over-exuberance'. the result was still the same for the women. 
In 1951, to redress the balance and to document the retreat and expulsion of German 
nationals from Eastern and Central Europe following Red Army victories in the 
region in 1944-1945, a committee of anti-Communist German academics, under the 
direction of Dr. Theodor Schieder of the University of Cologne, compiled personal 
testimonies of refugees who allegedly suffered atrocities at the hands of Russian 
soldiers, many of which contained accounts of the mass raping of women. The 
German professors, in addition to documenting the reports of rape, attempted to 
assimilate and analyse the material they had been given, and they concluded with the 
following statement: 
The raping of German women and children by Soviet officers 
and men was systematic in the truest sense of the word: Apart 
from the physical and spiritual suffering inflicted upon the huge 
numbers of women raped, the brutality and shamelessness with 
which this was done increased the fear and terror of the German 
population. It is clear that these rapings were the result of a 
manner of conduct and mentality which are inconceivable and 
repulsive to the European mind. One must partially attribute 
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them to the traditions and notions in the Asiatic parts of Russia, 
according to which women are just as much the booty of the 
victors as jewellery, valuables, and property in dwellings and 
shops. The nature and the huge number of rapings would be 
inconceivable if there had not been a fundamental motive of 
such a kind at the back of the minds of the Soviet troops. " 
During World War 11, then, there were many incidents involving the raping of women 
by both the Axis and the allied forces, even if one could not define these incidents as 
inass rape. As General George S. Patton, Jr. stated in his memoirs of World War H, 'in 
spite of my most diligent efforts, there would unquestionably be some raping. " 
Recent Wars 
Compared with the estimated five percent civilian casualty rate in World War I, an 
estimated ninety percent of war casualties in 1990 were civilians. " The majority of 
whom were women and children. This dramatic increase is due in part to the 
deliberate and systematic violence against whole populations and in wars that are 
increasingly waged against specific ethnic groups. This section will attempt to 
illustrate that even after a significant increase in public awareness and, indeed, 
military awareness of the illegality of rape during wartime following the convictions 
at Nuremberg and Tokyo, rape in war has continued unabated. Moreover, in situations 
of ethnic conflict, rape appears to be used as a military strategy, a nationalistic policy 
and as an expressioiý of ethnic group hatred: all of the above points will be discussed 
in the context of both the press representations in Part Two and feminist thought in 
Part Three. Moreover, evidence points to the fact that the rape of 'enemy'women is 
often explicitly ordered, or, at least tacitly condoned by military authorities. One 
conflict that falls into this category is Bangladesh's nine-month war of independence 
in 1971, where reports of rape have reached the 400,000 mark7'. The Vietnam war 
will also be briefly examined as a 'recent' war and in particular the widely reported 
atrocities of Mai Lai'(My Lai). 
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Bangladesh 
In March 1971, with support from India, West Bengal -a region of seventy five 
million people - declared itself independent as the state of Bangladesh. Pakistan 
immediately sent soldiers to the region to quell the 'rebellion'. During the subsequent 
nine-month war, approximately three million people were killed, ten million fled 
across the Indian border as refugees, and it has been reported that up to 400,000 
women, eighty percent of whom were Muslims were raped. " It has been suggested 
that the Pakistani troops believed that they, themselves, were the 'true'Muslims and it 
was their 'official'duty to 'purify'Hindu converts to Islarn. ' This attitude - similar to 
what is now referred to as 'ethnic cleansing" - combined with the failure of the 
Pakistan government to convict those responsible, for the atrocities, could be 
considered official complicity. The location, the historical moment, the designers and 
actors may be different, but the discourse of mass rape in war now has a familiar 
'narrative'. The rapes of the women in Bangladesh are reminiscent of rapes during 
many other wars: women and children of all ages are raped; they are raped in their 
houses and on the streets; thousands are abducted and held in military barracks or 
makeshift brothels for 'nightly use'- a situation which mirrors the reports of mass rape 
in the Balkans. " 
Within nationalistic patriarchal structures, of which Bengali society is archetypal, 
women's traditionally prescribed sexual/gender roles are recognised as integral to the 
survival of the nation. As reproducers of the race, as preservers and transmitters of 
culture, as markers of the boundaries that define national groups, women have come 
to symbolise national honour. (Indeed, through the discourse of nationalism, the 
nation is often regarded as 'female'. ) It is these specifically described female roles that 
make women so indispensable to a patriarchally-defined nation and its nationalist 
cause, and by the same token, ensures women's vulnerability when their nation is 
under threat from another patriarchally-defined nation. This point will be raised again 
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in Chapter Eight and this same scenario, as will become apparent, was reported to 
have been replayed in the Balkan conflict. 
Vietnam 
Susan Brownmiller's seminal work on rape includes numerous accounts of rape and 
atrocities committed by US soldiers on Vietnamese civilian women throughout the 
Vietnam War. The majority of these accounts did not become known until the results 
of court-martials were made public. The Mai Lai massacre of 16 March 1968, 
arguably the most infamous atrocity of the Vietnam War, was one example. The full 
extent of the atrocities at Mai Lai were unknown until journalist, Seymour M. Hersh, 
broke the* story, which led to the Army investigation into thzý incident and the 
subsequent court-martial of Lieutenant William L. Calley. " The rapes and atrocities 
that occurred at Mai Lai were no more sadistic or ritualistic than have been suffered 
by some women in other wars and at other times during the Vietnam War. They 
included the wanton destruction of unarmed civilians, the raping of young girls and 
old women, and the unchecked brutal mutilation of women's bodies. Of the soldiers 
who took part in these atrocities - many of whom did not and made protestations to 
that effect" - two characteristics of soldiers' behaviour do stand out as being 
particularly prevalent in Vietnam. First, rather than take women hostage for 'nightly 
use'and/or impregnation, as has been characteristic of reports of rapes in other wars, 
the American GIs preferred to kill their victims, as though destroying evidence. " 
Second, the incidence of 'gang rape' appears to have been considerably higher than 
attacks on an individual basis. A war reporter named Peter Arnett, who was a New 
Zealander and, therefore, according to Brownmiller, more objective than US 
reporters, recalled that 'gang rapes'were so prevalent for the following reasons: 
It was so easy to rape on a squad level. Soldiers would enter a 
village without an interpreter. Nobody spoke Vietnamese. It was 
an anonymous situation. Any American could grab any women 
as a suspect and there was little or no recourse to the law by the 
people ... and because the Americans were trained 
in the buddy 
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system, for security. They were warned against the dangers of 
individual fratemising on operations. " 
Following the questioning of informant-soldiers, Hersh concluded that 'most of the 
company knew there were rapes that day in March, but remained reluctant to talk 
about them. One soldier Hersh interviewed, John Smail, when asked about the rapes, 
commented, Ihat's an everyday affair, you can nail just about anybody on that - at 
least once. These guys are human, man'. " Another Vietnam veteran, stated that rape 
was 'pretty SOP' (standard operating procedure). " Yet another veteran, George 
Phillips, when asked to comment on the reports of rape, stated, They only do it when 
there are lots of guys around. You know, it makes them feel good. They show each 
other what they can do ... they wonI 
do it by themselves'. " One "informer'. a 
helicopter door 'gunner, Ronald L. Ridenhour, emotionally recounted his first 
discovery of a rape victim as he and his helicopter crew spotted a dead body while 
flying low over a rice paddy. He recalled that '[i]t was a women, she was spread- 
eagled, as if on display. She had an 1 Ith Brigade patch between her legs - as if it were ZP 
some type of display, some badge of honour. ' 
i The next cases recalled by Vietnam veterans, are typical examples of 'rape' incidents. 
They are taken from a vast collection of data amassed by an organisation. called 
'Vietnam Veterans Against the War'. who in February 1971, attempted to record the 
atrocities witnessed and committed by GIs in Vietnam. " The first comment is by 
Vietnam deserter who used the name 'Jerry Samuels'. 
Me and one of the buck sergeants and two other guys took these 
four chicks into the elephant grass. We balled these chicks ... then 
one of the girls yelled some derogatory thing at the guy who'd 
balled her ... he just reached down for his weapon and blew her 
away. Well, right away the three other guys, including myself, 
picked up our weapons and blew away the other three chicks. " 
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This next incident is recalled by Sergeant Scott Camil, a forward observer with the lst 
Battalion, I Ith Marine Regiment, lst Marine Division. He had already explained that 
the raping of Vietnamese women was merely a form of 'searching'. suggesting that the 
justification for rape was that soldiers 'would use their penises to probe [the women] 
to make sure they didn't have anything hidden anywhere'. However, Nvhen asked about 
the company commander's view of the situation, he asserted the following: 
He never said not to or never said anything about it. The main 
thing was that if an operation was covered by the press there 
were certain things we weren't supposed to do, but if there was 
no press there, it was okay. I saw one case where a woman was 
shot by a sniper, one of our snipers. When we got to her she was 
asking for water. And the lieutenant said to kill her. So he 
ripped off her clothes, they stabbed her in both breasts, they 
spread-eagled her and shoved an E-tool up her vagina, an 
entrenching tool, and she was still asking for water. And then 
they took that out and they used a tree limb and then she was 
shot. " 
There have been many attempted explanations for why rape is a perpetual 
phenomenon of war. In the case of Vietnam, the most frequently cited justification for 
the rapes stems from the fact that the average age of conscripted US soldiers was only 
nineteen. Most of these young men were probably virgins, fighting in a war they did 
not understand, and faced with the daily threat of death. This scenario, journalist Peter 
Arnett suggests, induced the attitude, 'I'm gonna get screwed tonight - this may be my 
last'. " A similar defence has also been put forward for the 'older' soldier, who 
apparently found a one-year 'tour of duty' in Vietnam, too long to be Vithout a 
women'. " Rape for the sexually experienced soldier, therefore, was merely a way of 
releasing repressed sexual tension. This explanation is reminiscent of the biological 
determinist arguments for rape in Chapter One, and will be discussed at length in 
Chapter Seven. 'Yet, consider this account lifted from the testimony of a Vietnam 
veteran concerning war crimes he witnessed and participated in during the war. A 
squad of men have just raped, beaten, and shot Vietnamese woman to death. One of 
the group, a representative of USAID, approached the body: 
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He went over there, ripped her clothes off, and took a knife and 
cut from her vagina almost all the way up, just about to her 
breast and pulled her organs out, completely out of her cavity, 
and threw them out. Then he stooped and knelt over and 
commenced to peel every bit of skin off her body and left her 
there as a sign for something or other. ' 
This sadistic and ritualistic form of sexual atrocity is indistinguishable from the 
mutilations and sexual crimes of notorious 'peacetime' serial killers. " Although not 
characteristic of a 'typical' rapist's behaviour, neither is it characteristic of a young 
soldier's first sexual encounter, nor the kind of act one would expect an 'older' soldier 
to carry out if he was trying to Yelieve his sexual tension'. Moreover, the availability 
of virtually 'free' sex, courtesy of 'clean' (free from VD) military brothels on army 
base camps, does render these argilments, based on the need to satisfy biological 
urges, a little unconvincing. 9' 
Moreover, Brownmiller states categorically that, in her opinion, rape during war has 
nothing to do with biological 'necessities' or the availability of women's bodies. 
Brownmiller, has carried out research which shows that in war locations where 
brothels and prostitutes were readily available, and in some cases brought onto the 
army base by officers specifically for their soldiers R&R', men still preferred to rape 
civilians. " Ruth Seifert comes to a similar conclusion: 
A rape in the war zone has no relation to available women or 
prostitutes. That means that in the 'open space' of war, many 
men simply prefer to rape: it has nothing to do with sexuality, 
but rather reflects the exercise of sexual, gender-specific 
violence. " 
Furthermore, as one GI remarked upon his repatriation in February 1973: This stuff 
about not being able to live without sex is nonsense. What I dreamed about was food 
and medicine'. " 
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As this brief survey has illustrated, although many of the reported instances of mass 
rape in war are shrouded in ancient myth and hearsay, rape does, indeed, appear to be 
a regular phenomenon of war. And whatever the possible explanations for mass rape 
in war it remains an act of extreme violence, perpetrated by men against, for the most 
part, women. 
Conclusion 
The main concern in this chapter has been to transcend specific locations to 
demonstrate that that rape has been a regular accompaniment to war. Moreover, given 
the cultural differences among countries, it is *striking to note that rape and sexual 
violence have been common human rights abuses - even though they have not. always 
been recognised as such - in almost every documented war. However, just because 
rape and sexual torture are so prevalent in war, one should not assume that they are 
'hatural'to either humans or to wars. 
Many feminist scholars who have written in response to the press representations of 
mass rape in war in the Balkans, as detailed in Part Two, have questioned the notion 
that rape in war is 'natural' and simply evidence of war's violent excess. Moreover, 
they have argued that however prevalent rape in war has been historically, this in 
itself does not categorically 'prove'that it is a 'natural' phenomenon. On the contrary, 
the majority of feminists who have written on the issue since the onset of the Balkan 
conflict, as will be indicated in Part Three, have claimed that rape in war is a 
culturally-constructed practice grounded in various patriarchal 'norms' and values, 
which are also manifest in 'peacetime'and in war. 
Although rape occurs in most wars, as the earlier quotation from the repatriated GI 
suggested, it is evident that not all soldiers rape in war. Therefore, any attempt to Zý 
create an overarching theory which explains rape in war and which looks at either 
men or soldiers as a whole risks being fraught with contradictions and anomalies. 
Nevertheless, this simply indicates that more research is needed in order to shed more 
light on this complex and perplexing international problem. As mentioned above, this 
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exploration of how feminist theorists are attempting to gain some intellectual leverage ZP ZID 
on the subject will be addressed in Part Three. It will not be dealt with here primarily 
because the majority of feminist authors identified in Part Three have acknowledged 
that they were motivated to write about mass rape in war by reading and analysing the 
press reports concerning the mass raping of women in the Balkan conflict. Thus, this 
issue is best developed following the extensive analysis of the press representations in 
Part Two. We, therefore, now turn to the empirical heart of the thesis, namely, the 
Balkan conflict and first look at the background - historically, politically and 
culturally - in an effort to understand the contexts in which mass rape in war occurred. 
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THE BALKAN CONFLICT 
The war in the former Yugoslavia has sparked a great deal of interest in the Balkan 
region's interesting but turbulent history, as the observers and participants search for 
explanations for the eruption of the Balkan powder-keg'. ' Or, in Alexandra 
Stiglmayer's words, they try and find explanations for the recurrence-of 'genocide on 
European soil less than half a century after the Nazi holocaust and after three 
generations of Europeans and Americans have come of age accepting the motto 'never 
again". ' It is this war which is the empirical referent for the thesis. The present chapter 
provides essential background, both of historical and theoretical material. 
This chapter attempts to identify the various factors which analysts have argued have 
worked together to trigger the collapse of Yugoslavia. These include key historical 
events, the region's ideological heritage, its economic crisis, the re-emergence of the 
'national question' and the reactions of the Western powers. While the history and 
origins of the war in the Balkans are not the central themes of this thesis, they will 
nevertheless provide the necessary background and context for discussing the reports 
of mass rape in that war. Moreover, the further understanding of the historical, 
societal and political context in which the mass raping of women in the Balkans took 
place, will result in an added awareness of the cultural forces and tensions operating 
both on the individual and collective level which ended in such devastation. 
'For a detailed historical analysis, see Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short Histor (London: Macmillan, 
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History - Pre-1939 
The history of Yugoslavia is a complex one and as such it would be impossible to 
include a detailed breakdown of every possible conflictual event in the history of the 
region which might possibly be cited as a causal factor in the break-up of Yugoslavia 
and its descent into war, within the parameters of the thesis. Therefore, while there is 
no intention to trivialise any part of Yugoslavia's history or the conflict's 
development, either by making generalisations or by omitting certain events, it should 
be noted that this is merely an attempt at an general reflection of some of the 
divergent factors involved in the onset of the war, rather than a search for a precise 
chronological breakdown of events, any definitive answers, or ultimate Iruths'. 
In June 1991, a war erupted in Yugoslavia that helped to shatter many visions of the 
New World Order' and a peaceful, united Europe. Dominating the media with heart- 
rending images of misery and suffering, this war brought to the world stories of 
concentration camps reminiscent of a bygone era, of mass rapes and mutilation, and 
of atrocities committed by neighbour upon nei.: hbour. What triggered a war so 
barbaric, in Europe, where civilians are the ma or casualties, in the late twentieth 
century? Martin van Creveld might suggest that the low-intensity conflict'. of which 
the war in the Balkans could be described as an example, is the war of the future. He 
states that: 
War will become a much more direct experience for most 
civilians, even to the point where the term itself may be 
abolished, or its meaning altered. War will affect people of all 
ages and both sexes. They will be affected not just accidentally 
or incidentally or anonymously from afar, as in the case of 
strategic bombing, but as immediate. participants, targets and 
victims? 
In support of this argument, the Economist has also suggested that Yugoslavia may 
well portray an image of future wars - wars waged between 'different tribes, ZIP 
harbouring centuries-old grudges about language, religion and territory, and 
provoking bitterness for generations to come'. ' However, in order to explore this 
3 Martin van Creveld, On Future War (London: Brassey's, 1991), p. 203. 
4The Economist, 21 December 1991 -3 January 1992, p. 73. 
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possibility further we need to look back into Yugoslavia's history to try to unearth 
possible reasons for Yugoslavia's descent into war. 
The former Yugoslavia, like the ma ority of contemporary states, is not ethnically 
homogeneous. ' Since medieval times, the Balkan region has been colonised by, 
influenced by, or ruled over by, the Church, ' Islam, the Ottoman Empire, the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire, Jews, Gypsies, communism, and most of its European neighbours, 
notably Germany, Italy, Turkey, Hungary and Bulgaria. Therefore, there are probably 
few individuals in the entire Balkan Peninsula who could claim an ethnically pure 
ancestry for themselves. According to Noel Malcolm, the lineage of the Bosnian 
people is even more complex and heterogeneous than other states as settlers arrived 
from 'Italy, Africa, Spain, Gaul, *Germany, Greece, Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine and 
Egypt'. ' Yet, despite this claim, ethnic tensions and rivalries remain high on the list of 
causal factors, which ushered in the war. There appear to be as many variations of 
Yugoslav history as there are commentators on the subject and this is reflected in the 
contradictory versions of Yugoslav history on offer from historians, social scientists 
and political commentators. While Malcolm suggests that other ethnic groups were 
integrated into the region with the minimum of disharmony, Alexandra Stiglmayer 
claims that the Serbian people have always, since the Ottoman era, borne a grudge 
against the Bosnian Muslims, stating that it is bnderstandable that the Serbs have a 
deep-seated fear of Islam? This illustrates that the contradictions appear to be as 
prevalent as there are purveyors of Balkan history and which have given rise to 
seemingly incommensurable theories. 
In the aftermath of World War 1, which saw the disintegration of both the Habsburg 
and the Turkish empires, 9 political unification and statehood, for centuries a common 
'intermittent' objective of the South Slavs despite their profound religious and cultural 
differences, was finally achieved by the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In the preceding 
5William Pfaff, "Invitation to War, " Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993): pp. 97-109. 
6iMichael Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (London: University of 
California Press, 1996), ch. 2. 
7 Malcolm (1994), p. 3. 
8Stiglmayer (1994), p. 5. 
Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing' (College Station, Texas: Texas 
A&M University Press, 1995), p. 77. 
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centuries, as mentioned above, the region had been partitioned and re-partitioned by 
neighbouring powers, with the result being a patchwork of political units, some 
independent states, and some achieving semi-autonomous dependency. The 
unification of these seemingly disparate units resulted in the peoples of the region at 
last realising their long-sought emancipation from the imperial powers of both East 
and West, and ruled by King Peter I they were also joined by Montenegro, Kosovo 
and northern Macedonia. However, the reign of Alexander, who succeeded his father 
Peter I in 1921 when he died, was not without political strife. Serbian dominance of 
the government and the denial of autonomy to the Croats, Slovenes and other minority 
groups provoked feelings of hostility and discrimination within the opposition parties. 
In 1929, with the growing possibility of civil war, King Alexander, took some drastic 
measures in his attempt to impose nation4l unity. He dissolved parliament and all 
political parties, abolished the traditional provinces, assumed dictatorial control of the 
government, and changed the name of the state from the Kingdom of the Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, thus was created the 'first' 
Yugoslavia. " 
World War II 
Following the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the Yugoslav government initially 
declared its neutrality, but in March 1941, after succumbing to pressure from the Axis 
powers, the government agreed to adhere to the Tripartite Pact with Germany, Italy 
and Japan. " This politically unpopular move culminated in a bloodless coup detat 
after only two days, and with King Peter H's (son of Alexander) backing the 
insurgents formed. a government dedicated to the maintenance of neutrality. Axis 
retribution was swift. The German army, supported by Italian, Hungarian and 
Bulgarian forces invaded Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941, and incidentally, the date on 
loStephen Clissold, ed., A Short History of Yugoslavia: From Early Times to 1966 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968); Payam Akhavan, ed., Yugoslavia the Former and the Future: 
Reflections by Scholars from the Region (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995); William 
Pfaff, "Invitation to War, " Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): pp. 97-109; Ivo Banac, The 
National Ouestion in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, N. J.: Cornell University Press, 
1984). 
"Malcolm (1994), p. 173. 
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which the European Conu-nunity in 1992 chose to recognise Bosnia. Following the 
Nazi invasion, the government fled and the Yugoslav army, unable to offer much 
resistance, either surrendered or went into hiding, leaving the vanquishing powers to 4D 
dismember the remains of the 'first' Yugoslavia. Italy took the Dalmatian region, part 
of Slovenia and Montenegro. Germany took the remainder of Slovenia and Serbia, 
where they installed a puppet government. Hungary seized western Vojvodina, and 
Bulgaria gained most of Macedonia. A pro-fascist puppet state, fronted by the native 
nationalist Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic and under Italian protection, was formed in 
Croatia, to which Bosnia was annexed. " Thus, the stage was set for the massacres and 4P 
atrocities which fifty years later will be the most oft-cited cause of the recent Balkan 
conflict. " 
For more than two years after the partition of Yugoslavia, the Serbian nationalists or 
Chetniks - under the royalist general Draza Mihajlovic - waged guerrilla warfare 
against . the 
Croatian state leaders and their Nazi supporters. Consequently, the 
nationalist Croatians retaliated with'a campaign to exterminate the Serbian people. 
The situation was not as straightforward as it appears as it was not simply a conflict 
between a united Serbian guerrilla force and the nationalist Croatian government 
forces. There were also other guerrilla forces, and one group in particular led by Josip 
Broz Tito, a communist, half Croat, half Slovene, campaigned vigorously against the 
Croatian fascists and the 'invaders'. The two guerrilla camps differed widely, not only 
on political ideology, but also on tactics. One particular move, which further 
complicated domestic politics and whipped up nationalistic fervour and insecurities 
on all sides even further, was made in December 1941 by the exiled Yugoslav 
government; they recognised Mihajlovic as the commander in chief of the nationalist 
resistance movements. " The massacres and counter-massacres then began in earnest. 
Almost continuously from 1941-1945, massacres and counter-mass acres, mostly of 
civilians, took place throughout Yugoslavia. The worst of the massacres were 
reported to be those carried out by the Croat fascist Ustasha (Ustase) against the 
12Stevan Pawlowitch, The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its Problems 1918-1988 (London: 
Hurst, 1988). 
13 Malcolm (1994), p. 174. 
14Stiglmayer (1994), p. 11. 
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Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia, and against left-wing Croat sympathisers, Jews 
and Gypsies. Perhaps lesser in number, but no less brutal, were the massacres 
committed by the Serbian Chetniks against Muslim civilians in Bosnia, Montenegro, 
and in Serbia itself, as well as Croat villagers. " In addition to the above, Hungarians 
were massacring Serbs in Vojvodina, Albanians and Bulgarians were also killing 
Serbs, Italians were burning villages, and the Germans were massacring Jews and 
other civilians, mostly in Serbia, for showing resistance. Even after the Partisans and 
the Yugoslav National Army (YNA) who Tito had rallied under him had been 
victorious, the slaughtering continued. The YNA, initially consisting of Serbs from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegrins, w. ere joined in 1943 by Croatians from 
Dalmatia, Slovenes, Muslims, and Croats from Croatia. " Their acts of brutal revenge 
- possibly inspired in part by political ideology as well as nati6nalism - included the 
executions of tens of thousands of surrendered Ustasha, Croat Domobran (Home 
Guard) Army, and Serbian Chetniks, many of whom had escaped to Austria and had 
been returned to Yugoslavia by the British. " The Communists also massacred large 
numbers of civilian 'internal enemies'. both real and imagined, during and 
immediately after the war. " All in all, although figures vary, conservative estimates 
suggest that during the four years between 1941-1945, at least one million people died 
in Yugoslavia. " 
It is these massacres, committed half a century ago, that have formed the basis of the 
justifications used in the current conflict to try to absolve each warring faction of 
blame. As Bogdan Denitch has commented: 
The massacres committed during the Second World War have 
not become merely historical facts. They are part of the present- 
day political scene. They arepolitically almost as powerful as 
the history of the Holocaust is in Israeli politics today. They are 
also just as often misused for narrow political and partisan ends. 
They represent the basis for what appear to be wild charges and 
15 For a comprehensive account of the massacres and the Yugoslav war in general see, Jozo 
Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: The Chetniks (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University 
Press, 1975); and War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: The Ustashe (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University 
Press, 1978). 
16StigImayer (1994), p. 11. 
17 Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism- The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 31. 
"For sua-ested sources for numerical statistics, see Stiglmayer (1994), p. 30, n. 42. ýZý 19Malcolm (1994), p. 286, n. 1. 
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counter-charges of past attempts at genocide, charges that can 
be used in the present or future to justify new rounds of killing. " 
There is no doubt that the massacres briefly outlined above were indeed horrific. In 
fact, it is difficult to find appropriate words to continually express the revulsion and 
horror that these crimes conjure up, particularly given the scale of the death toll and 
its relatively recent occurrence. Nevertheless, it is also difficult, when looking back 
through history to find a country, a state, or a nation, which does not have either blood 
on its hands, or has been the victim of another state's self-interest, which has resulted 
in bloodshed. This fact leads one to question commonly held beliefs: Have the 'ethnic 
tensions' in former Yugoslavia always been just under the surface' as some 
commentators suggest? Did communism merely 'suppress' ancient hatreds? Did this 
animosity 'naturally' rise to the surface? Was it inevitable that one ddy these ethnic 
tensions would have to be 'worked out? If all hideous spectres of the past are destined 
to resurface and continuously haunt future generations on a global scale, what hope 
for other countries with a history of war and atrocities? " 
Answers to these questions will be suggested throughout this chapter, however, 
whether the people of Yugoslavia were used and manipulated as pawns in a game 
which was orchestrated by political elites, or whether they were part of a collective 
and popular upsurge of nationalistic hate rising from below, or possibly a combination 
of both, the causal factors were undoubtedly wider, more complex and more 
inextricably linked than narrow traditional analysis would have us believe. 
Tito 
In November 1945, following controversial elections, the Federal People's Republic 
of Yugoslavia (the 'second' Yugoslavia) was proclaimed, and duly recognised by both 
Eastern and Western powers, notably the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. 
By February 1946, the elected constituent assembly had reconstituted itself as the 
national parliament, complete with a new cabinet, with Marshal Tito - handpicked by 
Stalin to lead the Yugoslav communists - at the head, and with a substantially 
2 ýDenitch (1994), p. 3 1. 
2 'Donald Acheson, "Preventing Genocide: Episodes must be Exposed, Documented, and Punished, " C, British Medical Journal Vol. 313, no. 7070 (December 1996): pp. 1415-1418. 
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increased communist representation. Once in power the Tito government took steps to 
secure control under the banner of the communist ideology, thereby attempting to 
suppress, indeed to eradicate, the 'national' question. Various sectors of the economy 
were nationalised, restrictions were imposed on the Roman Catholic Church, and 
various uncooperative opposition groups were liquidated'. In addition, all newspapers 
critical of the Tito regime were suppressed, and Mihajlovic was captured, indicted for 
treason, convicted and executed, along with eight other Chetnik leaders. " Tito went 
on record as saying in 1948, '[o]ur national question has been ... solved, and solved 
very well indeed, to the all-round satisfaction of our nations. It has been solved in the 
manner taught to us by Lenin and Stalin'. ' 
The 'second' Yugoslavia wds a federation of South Slav nations and some nationýl 
minorities. When drawing the borders of the six component republics (Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia) Tito attempted to 
utilise historical boundaries, although Serbia had to accede to two sensitive losses as 
both Kosovo and Vojvodina were granted autonomous status. Tito's main aim in 
federalising Yugoslavia, as mentioned above, was to eradicate, or at least control, the 
'national' problem. However, the primary question when analysing Yugoslavia under 
Tito, in relation to the search for possible causal factors of war, is whether the ethnic 
groupings of the region retained an independent and distinct national consciousness 
and felt themselves to be nations in either the sociological or political sense, or 
whether they considered themselves to be a constituent part of an emerging unified 
Yugoslav nation. In the nineteenth century, the Yugoslav idea did not originate from 
the desire to live as a united community of nations, but principally as a common 
defence against the threat of assimilation from more powerful neighbours, notably 
Germany, Romania, Hungary and TuTkey. " But, what of the 'second' Yugoslavia? 
Was the cohesive power of the 'class' principle and the state apparatus assumed by the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia under Tito strong enough to dispel ethnic tensions 
22 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1992). 
23Cited in Stiglmayer (1994), p. 30, n. 44. 0 
24 Dusan Necak, "Historical Elements for Understanding the 'Yugoslav Question" in Payarn Akhavan, 
ed., Yueoslavia the Former and the Future: Reflections by scholars from the region (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 13-28. 
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and to bind these nations into a stable 'state? Or, are the forces of division and 
disintegration ultimately stronger than those of unity and consolidation? 
Opinion appears divided on the question of Yugoslavia's artificiality, or rather, some 
scholars feel that the perception of integration and like-mindedness, accrued over 
nearly five decades, is more important and had more influence on the populace than 
historical reality. Branka Magas has stated categorically that Yugoslavia was 'a far- 
from-artificial state, bom of a genuine revolution, a country that was not fated to 
disintegrate but which has nevertheless been destroyed'. ' Although in sympathy with 
Magas'view, Denitch, maintains that the artificiality of the state was immaterial, he 
suggests that in reality Yugoslavia, despite all nationalist propaganda to the contrary, 
made it possible for individual citizens io retain pride in their own national heritage, 
while also feeling comfortable with their broader Yugoslav identity. In the following 
rather lengthy quotation Denitch mourns the passing of 'his' Yugoslavia and the 
creation of a new 'ethnic'minority: 
For many - for the children of the more than one and one-half 
million mixed marriages and for all those who had identified 
only as Yugoslavs and not as members of constituting nations - 
the death of Yugoslavia is a great personal loss. They no longer 
have a country of their own. Those who identified as Yugoslavs 
in censuses, not to speak of those who might have chosen to do 
so if the choice was that identity or a narrower national one, 
were more numerous than two nations, the Macedonians and 
Slovenes, which did acquire separate national states. Their 
national rights have been totally overlooked in the gathering of 
the tribes because, according to the nationalist gospel, there is 
no such thing as a "Yugoslavia", and all who identify as such 
are suffering from false consciousness or are hidden Serbian 
hegemonists. " 
In contrast, psychologist Paul Parin argues that the peoples of Yugoslavia, while 
constrained within an artificial state and under an artificial ideology, did not feel 'at 
home'with either a national identity or a broader Yugoslav one, which led to feelings 
of anxiety and uncertainty. Therefore, the descent into war was according to Parin, a 
25 Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92 (London: Verso, 
1993), p. xii. 
26 Denitch (1994), p. 15. 
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search to 'confirm their identity through aggression', and they were prepared to suffer 
other disadvantages - for example, economic ones - to acquire it. " 
Whether regarded as an artificial, ignoble experiment, or a practical alternative to the 
options available in both 1918 or 1945, during Tito's 'reign' , due in part to the way in 
which the state and provincial boundaries had been drawn, he was able to protect the 
federation from the domination of the largest national group, the Serbs. Although Tito 
did not appear to be nationally minded, the fact that he was a Croat made the federal 
centre appear. more neutral. Indeed, Tito went to great lengths to ensure that all the 
organisations of state - the Army, the Political Police, cabinet posts, ambassadorships 
and other influential roles within government - were distributed proportionately 
among all the ethnic groups. This deliberate policy avoided claims by the ethnic 
minorities that one ethnic group was dominating the centre of power. This quotation 
by Denitch further explains the situation: 
Generally speaking, then, the leaders of the two largest 
republics, Serbia and Croatia, were for the most part kept from 
dominating the major federal posts. This is still Worth 
mentioning today because the current nationalist fairy tales 
repeatedly mention the supposed domination of the federal 
Yugoslav states as a major grievance of the Slovenes and Croats 
during the years of the Communist rule. It was simply not the 
case; the perfectly legithnate complaint was against the 
authoritarian Communist rule as such, but that rule was 
essentially equally hostile to all nationalism. " 
Zoran PaJic, writing of his experiences within the former Yugoslavia on a grass-roots 
level and discussing the pluralistic policies aimed at accommodating the republics, 
notes that the Yugoslav multi-lingual and multi-cultural policies were not simply a 
sham or a token concession. PaJic complains that many analysts emphasise the Serb 
domination of the higher echelons of the military, but omit to mention that the federal 
civil service was representative of all the main linguistic and cultural groups. PaJic 
continues to press his argument by pointing out that the Yugoslav federation 
established an Albanian-language university in Albania, just as the federal multi- 
cultural policy supported Macedonian-language education in the republic of Zý 
27 Paul Parin, "Open Wounds: Ethnopsychoanalytic Reflections on the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia, " 
in Alexandra Stiglmayer (1994), p. 48. 
28Denitch (1994), p. 38. 
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Macedonia. " This situation, until possibly the second half of the 1980s, produced a 
reasonably stable multi-national federation, at least as far as the national question was 
concerned. For the politicians other more urgent problems - democratisation, the 
crumbling economy, and entry into the European Community - relegated romantic 
notions of nationalism to the margins: seemingly of importance only to schola rs, 
novelists or academics. 
However, one could ask whether Tito's commitment to the equal distribution of 
positions of power throughout the national groups turned out to be self-defeating? 
Moreover, did his constant attention to the issue of multi-nationalism, particularly in 
preventing domination by the most numerous national group, keep the issue of 
nati6nal identity prominent in the minds of the populace? This concern for national 
identity was effectively the central tenet in determining the career paths of two 
generations of politicians and civil servants. In addition, Tito's concern with 
protecting the rights of the republics from domination by the federal centre, 
encouraged the republics to develop a 'controlled' or 'sanctioned' nationalism. 
Therefore, people's loyalties to the republics, meant national loyalties. It has been 
suggested that in terms of ideological structure, nationalism and communism have 
common affinities: they are both based on an anti-liberal ideology, they advocate 
collectivism, and on occasion, violence. With regard to Yugoslavia, Zarko Puhovski 
has noted: 
Class struggle was a dominant ideological doctrine, and for 
decades society was indoctrinated with collectivist rhetoric. 
Against this background of an indoctrinated "public sphere", it 
was relatively easy to transform one form of collectivist 
ideology into another, even if it was distant in content, so long 
as the collectivist nature of the ideology was preserved. 
Therefore ethno-national collectivism was almost tailor-made to 
replace the old ideological schema. " 
While Tito was attempting to create a Yugoslav identity based on his own brand of 
socialism and Marxism, an identity which was distinct and separate from the direct 
29Z, oran Pajic, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Multiethnic Coexistence to 'Apartheid, " in Payam 
Akhavan (1995), pp. 152-163. 
3()Zarko Puhovski, "Yugoslav Origins of the Post-Yugoslav Situation and the Bleak Prospects for Civil 
Society, " in Akhavan (1995), p. 123. 
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influence of Moscow, one unanticipated, but in retrospect predictable result was 
nationalism. Without any voluntary group identities, which are assumed most easily 
in a contested multi-party environment, the only group identity which was officially 
recognised was the 'nation'. which in turn was expressed through the republic in 
which it was dominant. Thus, following Tito's death, and in the absence of an 
institutional equivalent to act as a legitimate arbiter and with the system in a severe 
state of decay, local nationalist leaders found it reasonably unproblematic, particularly 
in the rural areas, to begin mobilising traditional nationalisms. 
Ideology 
The idea that there was no liberal ideological base in Yugoslavia, and that this could 
have been a contributory factor in the descent into war, has been mentioned above. 
However, some scholars, for example Robert Howse as mentioned below, have based 
their analysis of the Balkan conflict on this one fundamental point. Therefore, this 
idea is worth pursuing briefly. Nationalism (ostensibly the essence of all these 
discussions), no less that communism, appears to legitimate the exercise of ultimate 
power by an elite in the name of a unifying ideology that suppresses individual 
expression, identity and freedom in a collective struggle against a recognised 'other'. 
Although, as mentioned above, Tito attempted to break the 'standard' mould of the 
communist state by introducing pluralistic policies and spreading the balance of 
power: these 'rights'were always viewed in collective terms - as collective 'rights. It 
appears that they were not perceived, particularly by the ethnic minorities, as 
individual righis to allow self-development and equality within their own linguistic 
and cultural setting within a wider multi-cultural federation. Robert Howse takes this 
argument one step further by suggesting that the transformation from nationalism to 
multi-culturalism within the Yugoslav model was simply not possible. He states 
categorically that: 
The failure of the Yugoslav communists to transform 
nationalism into multi-culturalism cannot simply be attributed to 
either the supposedly intractable or immutable character of 
nationalism as a mode of ethnic self-assertion or the suppression 
of ethnic conflicts under Tito. What was absent was an essential 
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foundation of liberalism, which could not be supplied by the 
fundamentally collectivist ideology of Yugoslav communism. " 
In support of Howse's argument, Dusan Janjic maintains that: 
Where the collectivity prevails over individuality and individual 
rights are repressed, the conditions for critical thinking or plural 
identities are not found. Within such a context, ideological 
rhetoric and artificial political integration rule the day. " 
In the 1970s, Tito had virtually reduced all liberal reformers to the status of 'non- 
persons', that is, non-party philosophers, political scientists, jurists and economists 
alike. " However, it is clear that the ordinary citizens of Yugoslavia had more 'rights' 
than citizens of other 'communist' countries. At least until the rnid-1980s, when the 
country was irretrievably immersed in deep financial crisis and unable to meet its 
foreign debt repayments, the Yugoslav people were relatively prosperous, with access 
to Western clothes, music, and films. Indeed, the younger generation, particularly in 
urban areas, practised a lifestyle closely resembling their counter-parts in the West; 
hedonistic, sexually liberated, and with little fear of state repression. Why then, as 
Fukuyama and other liberal idealists would have us believe, did the Westernisation 
and modernisation of personal lifestyles not lead to a liberal foundation within 
Yugoslavia? " By way of explanation Slavenka Drakulic, a Croatian journalist, 
suggests the following: 
We traded our freedom for Italian shoes ... Millions and millions 
of people crossed the border every year just to savour the West 
and to buy something, perhaps as a mere gesture. But this 
freedom, a feeling that you are free to go if you want to, was 
very important to us. It seems to me now to have been a kind of 
contract with the regime: we realise you are here forever, we 
don't like you at all but well compromise if you let us be, if you 
don't press too hard ... We didnl build a political underground of 
people with liberal, democratic values ready to take over the 
government; not because it was impossible, but on the contrary, 
because the repression was not hard enough to produce the need 
for it. " 
3 'Robert Howse, "A Horizon Beyond Hatred, " in Akhavan (1995), p. 6. 
32 Dusan Janjic, "Resurgence of Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslavia, " in Akhavan (1995), p. 42. 
33VOj in Ditnitrijevic, "The 1974 Constitution and Constitutional Process as a Factor in the Collapse of 
Yugoslavia, " in Akhavan (1995, ) p. 53. 
34F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 
35Howse (1995), p. 7 
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Under Tito's regime in Yugoslavia, citizens, particular the urban middle-classes, were 
able to enjoy an acceptable degree of personal freedom, which was devoid of civic or 
personal responsibility, in return for political apathy. A liberal democratic revolution 
entails an assumption of responsibility through citizenship - the missing link in 
Yugoslavia. For the Yugoslav people, the ultimate fate of their society was seen to be 
in the hands of the communist elite, not with themselves, as citizens with 'rights'. But 
as Kant suggested, it is not only the force of authoritarian repression that can delay the 
advance of liberal enlightenment, but also the reluctance to assume ultimate 
responsibility for one's own life choices; the absence of self-discipline and personal 
existential courage. " Perhaps this highlights the complacency, or perhaps naivete, of 
Yugoslavia in having the desire for Western material values, without wanting to pay 
the 'real' price. Yei Yugoslavia should not be judged too harshly as this is an 
accusation which could be levelled at all Western states in one context or another. 
Economy 
There is a strong set of arguments suggesting that a severe economic crisis was at 
least a background factor in the onset of the war in the Balkans. In the former 
Yugoslavia where nationalist demagogues and propagandists were disseminating 
seeds of dissatisfaction and contention, the unstable economic situation guaranteed 
fertile ground. During the 1980s living standards had fallen dramatically with 
inflation spiralling out of control, unemployment had escalated and the country's 
foreign debts ran into billions of dollars. " Urban and rural populations alike were 
feeling aggrieved. For the rural, mostly southern agrarian peasant farmer's discontent 
had been steadily growing for many years. Since the Second World War, agriculture 
had been a persistent problem for Tito and his government. Tito's priority had been 
industry not agriculture, thereby favouring the development of the northern states. 
Post-war spending to rebuild, expand and modernise heavy industry averaged about 
$1 billion annually, while the predominantly agrarian southern regions were starved 
361mmanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment? " in Hans Reiss, ed., Kant: 
Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 54. 37 Magas (1993), p. 81. Zý 
92 
of capital, leading to poor cultivation and poor irrigation, which in turn led to the 
susceptibility to drought, and, as occurred intermittently, severe food shortages. Also 
fuelling the fire was the constant conflict between the government and the southern 
rural population over the 'collectivisation'of farmland, which was never resolved. The 
north/south divide continually increased over the decades. " 
As Yugoslavia began to 'open-up'to world trade and tread the path toward a socialist 
'market economy'. the payoff, in addition to the extensive aid and credit deals supplied 
by the West, provided Yugoslavia with the highest living standard in Eastern Europe. 
However, the decentralised federation into which Yugoslavia evolved appeared 
locked into an unequal distribution of this wealth, due in part to the traditional 
Communist pro-industrial bias. This resulted in, as alluded to above, the agricultural 
and raw material producers of the south feeling discriminated against by a 
government whose policies had skewed economic growth in favour of the north. In 
actual monetary terms the statistics show that the income per capita ratio between 
Slovenia in the north and Kosovo in the south grew from three in 1947 to five in 1985 
and eight in 1989. " - 
Although the more developed regions in the north benefited from the expansion and 
development of the Yugoslav economy, this did not prevent dissatisfaction and 
discontent germinating in the north as well. While the southern states were 
complaining about receiving to little, Slovenia and Croatia were grumbling about the 
inefficient southern regions costing the north too much. Denitch describes the 
situation, in the following manner: 
The citizens of the richer republics in the north became ever 
more firmly convinced that their relative prosperity was due to 
the fact that they worked harder, were more virtuous, were more 
European, and in general more superior to those in the backward 
south. ' 
38 Dragomir Vojnic, "Disparity and Disintegration: The Economic Dimension of Yugoslavia's Demise, " 
in Akbavan (1995), pp. 75-111. 
39Hakan Wiberg, "Societal security and the explosion of Yugoslavia, " in Ole Waever, ed., Identity, 
Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 2. 
4ODenitch (1994), p. 71. 
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If this was indeed the general attitude of the urban populace of the northern states, 
then it is easy to understand how in the hands of powerful propagandists one region's 
pride at their economic success and development was played off against another 
region's poor infrastructure, relative poverty and hence their insecurities. 
The failure to deal equitably and effectively with multi-ethnicity and to develop a 
cohesive federal model contributed greatly to both the breakdown and demise of the 
'first'Yugo5lavia between the two world wars, and to the moral and political defeat of 
the non-communist parties directly after the Second World War. Potentially, one of 
the strongest sources of unity for the 'second' Yugoslavia was economic 
interdependence between its multi-ethnic federation of states. However, if the state of 
Yugoslavia's economy led to arrogAnce and disdain from one quarter, and fear and 
hostility from another, then the contribution of Yugoslavia's economic crisis toward 
the onset of war, was not a minor one. Indeed, Professor Janjic has concluded that the 
point when the collapse of Yugoslavia was no longer preventable, in economic or 
social terms, was 1989. He illustrates his claim in the following statement: 
That year witnessed and revealed the economic collapse and the 
bankruptcy of the identifying values of socialism, self- 
management and Yugoslavia as a confederation under 
communist rule. Socialist ideology made way for nationalist 
ideology, homogenisation, and hegemony. Since then, all 
political, social, and other conflicts have been expressed 
exclusively in nationalist terms. All the existing differences and 
the complexity of society were replaced by only one reality: 
national divisions. 41 
The country's severe economic crisis, while probably not solely responsible 
for the decent into war, nevertheless, created a situation conducive to the rise 
of demagogues and propagandists who played on the dissatisfaction and 
resentments of the Yugoslav people. 
Nationalism 
4'Janjic (1995), p. 44. 
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The war in the former Yugoslavia, replete with ethnic tensions and hatred, can be 
partly attributed to the complex ethnic structure of the country. However, the single 
fact that Yugoslavia was a highly heterogeneous society does not alone infer a 
predisposition to war. The nations which made up the former Yugoslavia had evolved 
through distinct social, economic and historic circumstances, and when they were 
united under the banner of the Yugoslav federation they were also at varying stages of 
development; socially, economically and culturally. " However, despite their great 
diversity, residing at the cross-roads between East and West, the people of the Balkan 
region do appear to have more in conunon with one another than they do with other 
people; their common identity to an 'outsider', appears distinct. Nevertheless, 
regardless of the views of others, history shows that with minimal manipulation the 
disagreements and tensions which arose betweeh the constituent republics, including 
the autonomous provinces of Serbia, were easily turned into inter-ethnic conflicts: 
more successfully by leaders with radical nationalist tendencies than others. Indeed, 
as will be demonstrated in Chapters Four and Eight, nationalism, and all its attendant 
tensions, has been cited as one possible explanation for the mass raping of civilians in 
the Balkan conflict. 
The most serious threat to the institutionalisation of democracy within the former 
Yugoslavia was the prominence and influence of radical nationalism in political life. 
As Dusan Janjic has stated, '[fln a society such as Yugoslavia, nationalism represents 
a sort of social cancer and an enemy of democracy'. " The fundamental premise on 
which democracy is formed is that of equality; equal rights for all individuals 
regardless of their ethnic, social, religious, national or linguistic origin. Nationalism, 
however, is based on exclusionist principles, such as segregation, the rejection of 
pluralism, and the repression of individual rights. Individual liberty is negated 
because the citizen does not choose his/her ethnic or national group, it is merely 
assigned at birth. Nationalism establishes a boundary between 'Us' and 'them'. and 
b ases that boundary on inborn national characteristics. The use of this 'politics of 
identity'- the defining of one's own identity only in relation to the 'other'in order to 
42 For a comprehensive statistical breakdown of the economic and ethnic disparities between the 
republics of the former Yugoslavia, see Dragomir Vojnic (1995), pp. 75-111. 43 Janjic (1995), p. 42. 
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arouse nationalistic pride or evoke patriotic emotions as has been seen throughout the 
Balkans - is a tool used to incite an already insecure public into paranoia and hatred 
for their fellow countrymen by those, who arguably have an incomprehensible sense 
of morality. Paul Parin, in response to claims that the descent into war was due to the 
Balkan 'temperament'. has stated: 
Errors come about if the ethnologically understood unique 
character of a people, based on its recorded historical 
experiences and traditional mentalities, is deemed the 
determining cause of conflicts. Pseudopsychologists have tried 
to do this, attributing a "phallic-aggressive, " warlike character to 
the Serbs, for example, and an "anal-passive", deceitful nature 
to the Croats. Such views are nothing other than psychologically 
disguised prejudices and projected fantasies. ' 
Therefore, pre-war claims by Serb nationalists that the Albanians were conspiring 
with Islamic fundamentalists and 'eternally lust after pure Serbian womanhood'. that 
the Croats were plotting with the Vatican against Orthodox Christianity, or that 
Germany still retained expansionist policies, is the politics of identity reduced to mere 
'sound bites', of the most destructive form. " This manipulation of personal and 
national insecurities into inter-ethnic rivalry appears to have been viewed by some 
nationalist leaders as more an opportunity than a danger, and they chose to exploit 
ethnic nationalism as a political resource - with disastrous consequences. 46 
Religion 
Religious-based national intolerance has been a common feature of Yugoslav history. 
Catholic right-wingers in Croatia and Slovenia, religiously identified Muslim Slav 0 
nationalists, and Christian Orthodox nationalists, all preach their own brand of 
religious nationalism, which appears to have no connection with the 'Christian' or 
Miuslim' teachings of the actual religion. " Religion in Yugoslavia also seems to serve 
as a national identifier. For example, Bogdan Denitch has suggested that in 
"Par-in (1994), p. 36. 
45 Denitch (1994), p. 159. 
46 Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's DisinteFgýration and Balkan Politics in Transition - 2nd. 
ed. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p. 51. 
47NIichael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia ondon: University of 
Califomia Press, 1996). 
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Yugoslavia one can have a 'Christian'or Miuslim'atheist. " The actual religious beliefs 
one holds appears to be a secondary issue, the crux of the matter within this brand of 
'identity politics', is that the attached religious label defines whether you are located 
within the community, or, often more significantly, whether you are located outside 
the community - the 'other'. To illustrate this point, Denitch recounts a conversation in 
Yugoslavia: 
Religion is the most commonly used ethnic identifier ... This was brought home to me years ago when I was pretesting a survey 
questionnaire that included the question, "What is your 
religion? " The first respondent immediately asked me, "And 
what is yours? " I replied, 'I am an atheist. " To which he shot 
back, I know all you damn intellectuals are atheists but are you 
a Catholic, Orthodox, or Muslim atheist? I want So know your 
nationality! " 
For many centuries, particularly under the Ottoman Empire, religion was recognised 
as the most significant national identifier throughout the region and this still exists in 
areas where a legacy of nationally identified churches have been left, for example, the 
Serbian Orthodox Church. Roman Catholicism lost much of its universal, or trans- 
national appeal in Eastern Europe when the church became less hierarchically based 
and the clergy began to flirt with populist, often nationalist, politics. By becoming 
more closely nationally identified, these churches inherited the specific traditional, 
national hostilities toward the rivals of their chosen nation, for example, traditional 
Christian/Muslim rivalries. Thus, it could be argued that the churches have 
exacerbated rather than mediated ethnic tensions. " As will be discussed in Chapter 
Four, it has been suggested that religion played a significant role in the incidents of 
mass rape in the former-Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s. 
Propaganda 
The case that the use of propaganda by nationalist leaders to promote ethnic rivalries 
and hatred hastened the onset of war by encouraging civilians to take up arms against CP 
their neighbours, is a strong one. Whilst again, not the sole cause of war, it is 
43Denitch (1994), p. 29. 
49ibid. 
50Denitch (1994), p. 133. 
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nevertheless difficult to find a commentator on the subject who would claim that 
propaganda was not used or did not have any influence on the general Yugoslav 
public. Indeed, as will be noted in Part Two, some journalists were also convinced of 
the crucial role that propaganda played in inciting and prolonging then use of rape in 
the Balkan conflict. Taking the lead in the propaganda war was Serbia's Slobadan 
Milosevic who, as early as 198 1, began to arouse Serbian nationalistic passions during 
the uprising of the Kosovo Albanians who were demanding more autonomy. The 
rebellion was quashed, but in Serbia it was reported that the Albanians were planning 
'genocide' against the Serbs, Albanians were raping 'pure Serbian women', 
slaughtering cattle and destroying Property. " The stories were reportedly untrue, 
nevertheless, Milosevic, the most ardent promoter of the 'genocidal Kosovo 
Albanians' theory, *swept to power using the 'national' ticket and was piesident of 
Serbia by 1987. " 
Consequently, the press and national television network were taken over by Milosevic.. 
and in regular impassioned speeches he talked of Serbian 'disfranchisement'. of past 
'injuries'. of Serb 'historical greatness', and of Slovenia and Croatia as 'enemies of 
Serbia'. " The Serbian people, who were all too willing to believe in someone who 
would 'deliver'them from the 'evils'of their life, were obviously stirred by the fervour 
and passion with which he accused Franjo TudJman (the Croatian President) of being 
a Ustasha' agent and the leader of the 'new fascists. ' Moreover, to exacerbate the 
situation, rather than denounce the accusations as nationalist propaganda, TudJman 
chose to change the Croatian constitution and demote all Serbs living in Croatia from 
a 'national people'to a 'minority', thereby, in the minds of the Serbs, confirming the 
propaganda. Both Milosevic and TudJman used emot ive terminology such as 'Ustasha' 
or'Chetniks'and old national symbols to conjure up the buried memories and fears of 
past atrocities. In campaigning for a greater-Serbia, the leader of the Croatian Serbs, 
Milan Babic, played on the Serbian people's fear that they would become a displaced 
people. He stated that, liff Yugoslavia collapses and the present-day borders of the 
51 Stiglmayer (1994), p. 14. 
52 ibid. 
53Stiglmayer (1994), pp. 14 -18. 54ibid. 
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republics remain intact, then we Serbs would have to live in four different republics. 
What people want to be treated like the Kurds? " 
In turn, Milosevic's attention was focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina and in particular 
the Muslim population who he branded as Islamic fundamentalists' and 'extremists'. 
Milosevic used Serbian state television to broadcast the message that the Serbian 
nation was under threat from another 'genocidal' neighbour. Alexandra Stiglmayer 
claims that Serbian television was the linchpin in disseminating war propaganda: 
Television Belgrade played and continues to play an important 
role, for it is the only Serbian information medium in all the war 
zones and far-flung sections of Serbia and Montenegro. It 
spreads the idea Qf 'dangerous Muslim fundamentalists' and 
'fascistic, genocidal Croats'. Nor does it back away from lies. 
Thus for two months Belgrade television did not report that 
Serbian troops were firing on Sarajevo - rather, it reported that 
Muslim extremists'were shooting at their own people. 56 
The combination of Milosevic's presidential and media control allowed him to build 
up and project his own distorted and biased view of reality for his own ends. No doubt 
many Serbs were taken in by the complex web of lies and deceit spread by Milosevic 
and his followers, and were convinced that they must fight to protect themselves 
against the 'genocidal tendencies' which their former friends and neighbours 
harboured against them. Political statements made in the Serbian parliament such as, 
'[t]he truth is that all non-Serbian ethnic groups, especially the Croats, are at this very 
minute preparing the genocide of all Serbs', " when heard by an increasingly scared 
and insecure Serb population are surely going to sound convincing, and as history 
shows, they were. 
As outlined abo-ýe, nationalistic propaganda is based on the deliberate creating of 
negative, threatening images of the 'enemy'. in this case of reducing the 'other' to 
primitive stereo-typical images of Serb, Muslim or Croat zealots. When this 'image' 
can be combined with 'real' experiences, either remembered or relayed from 
generation to generation - memories of a grandfather murdered by a Ustasha guard or 
55 StigImayer (1994), p. 6. 
56 Stiglmayer (1994), p. 20 (also see p. 34, n. 7 1). 
57 Parin (1994), p. 50. 
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an aunt raped by an armed Chetnik - then the manipulation of peoples emotions, and 
then actions, through propaganda, becomes a strong political weapon. " As memories, 
either individual or collective, are revitalised through the media, collective national 
bonds and hatreds are forged. Those critically minded people (most often children or 
intellectuals) who attempt to stand on the side-lines and claim immunity to 
nationalism, are ostracised from the community, or are seen as 'ignorant, naive, or 
crazy and lose all influence on the public consciousness'. " The difficulty faced by 
those 'neutrals' attempting to persuade the public of the futility of war, is appreciated 
when one is aware of the power generated by the images the propagandists choose to 
project. British journalist Ian Traynor describes a typical image in the 'television war. 
Contorted corpses, maimed bodips of children or old peasants, 
singed limbs and faces with bloody holes in place of eyes - this 
was the everyday fare ... The perpetrators and victims of this kind 
of slaughter are not invented characters in an imported horror 
film. The scenes come from Yugoslavia's television war; they 
were snapshots of the atrocities being committed on both sides 
in the Croatian war zones. The continual presentation of the 
massacre victims incited fear, hatred, hysteria, and blood lust on 
both sides of the, ethnic border. ' 
Even experienced foreign observers have stated that the war in the Balkans was 
fundamentally different to other 'ciyil'wars - for example; Lebanon, Afghanistan or 
Angola - due primarily to the 'intensity and effectiveness of the rival propaganda 
machines'. " Marco Altherr, head of the International Red Cross delegation in 
Yugoslavia has stated that, '[ilf you talk to them, the people on both sides are 
absolutely convinced that the other is intent on killing them. And it's all the result of 
propaganda'. " However, in the people's defence, for individuals living in perpetual ZD 
fear, lacking civil and legal protection, and under pressure economically, the 
collective shelter of. nationalism could have appeared to be a convenient and welcome 
outlet for their frustration and discontent. 
58 Denitch (1994), p. 18 1. 
59Parin (1994), p. 40. 
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Western Response 
With the end of the Cold War and the ensuing collapse of communism throughout the 
Eastern Bloc, two seen-tingly diametrically opposed schools of thought concerning the 
future of the region came to the fore. Francis Fukuyama's theory suggested that the 
collapse of communism was the manifestation of the progression and expansion of 
capitalist liberal democracy which would ultimately be recognised, universally, as the 
only viable social and political order. " In contrast, John Mearsheimer, an ardent neo- 
realist, predicted that the resurgence of ethnic conflicts was inevitable as the world 
returns to the instability of the past. ' It has been suggested, that while seeming to be 
at opposite ends of the political spectrum, both these theories can be, and have been, 
used by the West to justify their minimalist response to the war in the former 
Yugoslavia. " For Fukuyama, as an inevitable stepping-stone on the path to a stable 
liberal democracy, the Yugoslav conflict would also appear temporary, it would 
therefore, be pointless to forfeit Western lives and resources to what amounts to no 
more than a localised growing pain in the Eastern reaches of Europe. As for 
Mearsheimer and the realist camp, they would suggest that the structure of 
international politics in the post-Cold War age is characterised by unpreventable and 
unsolvable national conflicts, the kqy is simply to prevent them from escalating into a 
conflict between the major powers. Thus, considering Germany's historical links with 
Croatia, and Russia's historical, religious and ideological links with Serbia, the 
Western response, quite understandably, was one of minimalist intervention in 
Yugoslav affairs and this rationale forms the basis of the West's justifications for 
rejecting immediate intervention in Yugoslavia. Moreover, whatever our moral stance 
or instincts, given the ideological character of the forces the West would be facing, 
the Western response has been regarded by many scholars, and politicians, as entirely 
reasonable, " but not by all. 
63 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History? " The National Interest (Summer 1989); and The End of 
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Many scholars and commentators on the Balkan conflict blame the combination of 
Western complicity, ignorance and inaction as a major causal factor in the onset of the 
Balkan war. Denitch, for example, complains bitterly at the lack of sensitivity on the 
part of Germany: 
One would have hoped that some minimal historical memory of, 
and shame about, the German responsibility for the genocidal 
horrors that took place in its satellite "Independent State of 
Croatia" in 1941-1945, as well as the wide destruction and 
carnage caused by Hitler's aggression against Yugoslavia, 
would have made the now democratic states extra cautious 
about meddling in Yugoslav matters .... Absent such sensitivities, 
the Germans have ended up as major external factors in the 
destruction of two Yugoslavias. 67 
While this quotation may seem a little harsh in its indictment of German policy 
towards the recognition of Croatia, and undoubtedly with hindsight it is much easier 
to pass judgements, nevertheless, generally one expects the leaders of western powers 
to have a degree of foresight regarding their policies, particularly in such delkate 
matters - there is no doubting that Slobadan Milosevic's policies were imbued with a 
great deal of foresight. " 
The United States, particularly the Bush administration, has also been criticised for 
their inaction and their inability to recognise, or admit, when change was inevitable. 
To justify U. S. inaction, a directive from the Bush administration was issued which 
stated that the war was to be portrayed as an 'impenetrable civil war' with no 
possibility of intervention. This fact came to light with the resignation, for reasons of 
conscience, of George Kenney, the State Department responsible for the Balkan 
region, in 1992. To explain his resignation, Kenney wrote the following: 
I 
The Bush administration pronouncements on the Yugoslav 
crisis between February and August exhibited the worst sort of 
hypocrisy, I know; I wrote them. My job was to make it appear 
as though the U. S. was active and concerned about the situation 
and, at the same time, give no one the impression that the U. S. 
was actually going to do something significant about it .... It 
managed to downplay the gravity of the crisis and obscure the 
67 Denitch (1994), pp. 51-52. 
63 For an interesting account of the German decision to recognise Croatia, see Hella Pick, "A master 
Germany wants to lose, " The Guardian, 10 January 1992. 
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real issues. Of course, it did so at the expense of civilian 
casualties in numbers that are not yet known ... The which in this instance was to ignore any facts - whether they pertained to 
atrocities, rumours of concentration camps, or starvation - that 
would complicate thegoal of not getting involved. " 
Thus, for the US administration the fact that there was not a large community of US 
expatriates or military presence in the Balkans and the region was of little economic 
worth to the United States, the 'powers that be'took the decision to ignore the conflict 
until the closing stages of the 1992 presidential campaign. While acknowledging the 
delicate position the United States was in politically, past history does reveal that the 
U. S. is no stranger to intervention for political or economic ends; but what of 
hiananitarian ends? 
Britain was no less culpable. John Major, addressing the House of Commons in the 
summer of 1993 'explains'the root-cause of the Balkan conflict as follows: 
The biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia 
is the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the discipline that - 
exerted over the ancient hatreds in the old Yugoslavia. Once 
that discipline had disappeared, those ancient hatreds 
reappeared, and we began to see their consequences when the 
fighting occurred. There were subsidiary elements, but that 
collapse was by far the greatest. 'o 
While Moscow undoubtedly retained a modicum of influence over Yugoslavia, when 
Tito was expelled from Stalin's Cominform organisation in 1948, any direct 
'discipline'exerted by the Soviet Union was immediately curtailed. As for the 'ancient 
hatreds'which John Major refers to, and to reiterate a point made above, although the 
Balkans had ethnic tensions and racial problems, those hatreds were not innate but 
were aroused and mobilised by nationalist leaders, through the use of historical and 
religious symbolism, as a means to actualise their own agenda. In other words, 
although there may have been suppressed tensions and even hatreds which were 
carried on through the retelling of past atrocities, those feelings were not predestined 
to create war at a predetermined time, and may have eventually have been consigned 
to the annuls of history as folklore or legend. However, they were picked up and used 
69George Kenney, "See No Evil: Make No Policy, " Washington MLnthly, November 1992, p. 33. cited 
in Stiglmayer (1994), pp. 22-23. 
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103 
as a tool by the nationalistic leaders who were intent on building a nationalist 
movement and a war. 
Of all the accusations of diplomatic horse-trading, " of ineptitude, and of 'processing ZýI 
words while Croatia bums and Europe freezes', " the European Community (EC) came 
under the most sustained attack. Jonathan Eyal has made the following incriminating 
observation: 
The tribulations of the Community would have been funny, had 
they not sown the seeds of a greater war in Yugoslavia. The 
entire debate about the recognition of Yugoslavia's constituent 
republics missed the essence of the problem from the beginning. 
The question was not recognition per se, which could not have 
been avoided and should have actually come much earlier if 
only in order to serve notice on the Serbian-controlled military 
that the old states could not be kept together by force .... the real 
tragedy was to be found not in the recognition of -Slovenia and 
Croatia as such but, rather, in the Community's determination to 
take any risk in order to maintain a semblance of unity. 
Recognising the independence of Slovenia and Croatia was 
bowing to the inevitable; transforming it into a process 
applicable to all former Yugoslav republics was the true mistake 
committed in December 1991. It was a shameful game that 
failed both to preserve the Community's reputation, or prevent 
the war from widening. " 
Paradoxically, a western policy which was initially an attempt to hold Yugoslavia 
together, ended up forcing Bosnia and Macedonia to ask for independence based on 
criteria which were, arguably, inappropriate. Eyal in his condemnation of European 
Community policy outlines many other unanswered, unresolved questions and 
suggests that the priorities of the European Community were; to appease public 
opinion; to limit the damage to the reputation of European institutions and individual 
governments; to prevent any further confrontation -within the EC; and'finally, to 
reduce the fighting in the Balkans without acquiring open-ended obligations. Eyal 
7'Jonathan Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons from a Failure (London: Whitehall Paper Series, The 
Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993), p. 25. 
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concludes that the EC failed on all accounts. ' Payam Akhavan supports Eyal's 
observations and makes his opinion clear in the following statement: 
In response to the carnage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Europe regressed to replaying the balance of power theatrics of 
the First World War. At a critical historical juncture, when 
mankind seemingly stood at the threshold of a new world order, 
such cynical and dithering statesmanship came to be identified 
with the anticlimax of a tragic drama where the protagonist 
turns a quintessential moral and historical challenge into a 
realpolitik quagmire. " 
While all of these critics, particularly of the ECs inaction (as it was then), make some 
interesting and valid points, they nevertheless assume that there was a self-evidently 
'right' policy to choose. However, these scholars are blessed with hindsight to help 
them suggest which 'correct' action should have been taken. And moreover, if Tito 
could no longer keep these nations together could the EC really be expected to t3 
succeed? 
Conclusion 
Whether the war in Yugoslavia was 'inevitable'or not, all the causal factors discussed 
above are embedded in the national, linguistic, religious, cultural and historical 
differences of the region. To these could also be added the lack of a liberal 
democracy, an authoritarian heritage, and indecisive Western policies. Thus, the 
conditions for war at the start of the 1990s were present in numbers and were 
conclusive. At present, it is impossible to Iweigh'the reasons for the conflict and say 
whether the traditional ethnic cleavages contributed to the onset of war to a greater or 
lesser degree than the absence of a strong' federalist democratic alternative to 
nationalism; or, whether Yugoslavia's economic crisis caused more dissatisfaction 
among the populace than the effect of increasing social and political uncertainty on 
people who, because of an authoritarian political heritage, sought further collective 
security in nationalism. In time these questions may be resolved, though this is 
unlikely given the political nature of historical writing, but what seems clear is that 
74Eyal (1993), p. 69. 
75Akhavan (1995), p. xxv. 
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the war in the former Yugoslavia was not simply a spontaneous continuation of the 
inter-ethnic fighting which had been simmering for decades and occasionally rising to 
the surface. To accept that 'myth' is to read from the script prepared by nationalist 
leaders and demagogues. 76 
This chapter has identified and analysed various factors said to explain the war in the 
former-Yugoslavia. The main areas of focus were questions of identity, nationalism, 
religion, the economy and the response of the West. What has emerged from this brief 
investigation into Yugoslavian history is two-fold. First, the complex and at times 
traumatic cultural and political heritage had left divisions within their society which 
appear to have been exploited and deepened, rather than ameliorated and healed by 
those seeking war. Second, the many hypotheses trying to explain the extenuating 
circumstances which led to war are, of course, not mutually exclusive and the 
escalation of the war in the former-Yugoslavia is best explained as a result of multi- 
causal rather than reductionist factors. 
This account of possible explanations for the war provides a necessary background 
and introduction to Part Three - the investigation of the ways in which the British 
broadsheet press represented the allegations of mass rape in the Balkan conflict, and 
how the accounts of rape in war by the journalists might be better understood by 
viewing them through a feminist lens'. 
76ýVilliarn Pfaff, "Invitation to War, " Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, no. 3( Summer 1993), pp. 97-109. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 
As was stated in the Introduction, the study of press representations in the thesis as a 
primary source of information would produce two distinct categories of information. 
First, the press can provide a rich source of information on mass rape in war in the 
Balkan conflict. In the absence of any government, EU, or NGO reports at the time, 
the press reports of the raping of women on a massive scale in the Balkans offered a 
large body of previously untapped information with which to investigate these claims. 
Moreover; the overall response of the British broadsheets to the issue of rape in war 
stands in stark. contrast to the initial silence of national and international institutions. 
Indeed, much of the broadsheets' coverage and discussion provided daily evidence, 
interpretation and comment of a sophistication not found anywhere else. 
Second, the press can provide a great deal of interesting material surrounding 
contemporary attitudes to mass rape in war. Under analysis the journalists'reports can 
reveal how mass rape in war is currently understood, with the explanations of the 
journalists providing an insight into how this wartime phenomenon is interpreted 
within a social context. However, using the press representations as a primary source 
of information presents certain problems, particularly questions of impartiality, 
credibility of reports, and verification of the claims. Moreover, any investigation into 
the workings of journalists and the press will find it steeped in contradictions and 
anomalies. 
As discussed in the Introduction, it is virtually impossible in the Western world to 
remain detached and unaffected by the media in some form or other. The media, in its 
various forms, makes increasing demands on our lives and to some extent even 
defines our lives - our leisure interests, our consumer preferences, and what interests 
us politically, economically and/or culturally. It also helps shape our attitudes, values 
and beliefs and that we live in a 'global media culture'. with the collective media 
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forming what some have called the Nvorld's central nervous system'. ' This implies an 
ability to induce reactions or responses from society and most would also argue that 
the media also has commensurate responsibilities. ' The notion of responses and 
responsibilities will be discussed next. 
Responses and Responsibilities 
The representation of any 'event' through the media elicits a response, from 
government leaders, from individuals, from communities, and so on. That response is 
shaped by many factors: by the event itself, the way it is represented, and the way in 
which that event impacts upon individual and society's valuei. For example, either 
collectively or individually, we frequently identify with the events being represented 
in the media. That response may be a positive one, which may possibly motivate 
some people to action: giving money to charity, joining a local support group, writing 
to an MP, and so on. Or it may be a negative one, perhaps a dismissal of the 
information as irrelevant to their lives. Nevertheless, whether positive or negative 
these responses illuminate a certain set of social or individual values. 
In an age of rapidly expanding global communications, media representations and 
societal responses are playing an increasing part in international politics at every 
level. ' Governments have to react to the reports in the media, while governments also 
use the media to disseminate messages both on a domestic and an international level. ' 
Media coverage in some recent wars, particularly in Vietnam, in the Falklands and in 
the Gulf, to a greater or lesser degree demonstrated the complex interplay between the 
power and control of the media, ' the use of the media by the political/military elites, 
and the influence public responses to media/press representations can have on 
'John Downing, Ali Mohammadi, and Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, eds., Questioning the Media: 
A Critical Introduction (London: Sage Publications, 1995), p. xvi. 
2 James Curran and Jean Seaton, Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain 
(London: Routledge, 1991), p. 262. 
3 Martin Shaw, Civil Societv and Media in Global Crisis: Representing Distant Violence (New York: 
Pinter, 1996), ch. 1. 
4 Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992). 
5Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the-Mass 
Media (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 298 & ch. 5. 
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governments, resulting in significant shifts in policy. ' As Martin Shaw states 
categorically in his latest work: 
Media coverage directly affects state responses, and the 
responses of groups within Western society to the mediation of 
the conflict also have an affect on state policies. It is important 
to distinguish these factors in principle, but in practice it is 
often difficult to separate them. Governments often act on 
calculations about how coverage will affect public opinion, and 
media do not only report but also attempt to mobilise and 
represent opinion! 
If we turn to the representation of any 'event' such as the mass raping of women 
during the war in the former-Yugoslavia, this could, arguably, evoke an empathetic 
response from the majority of the British public. Women, children, and men were 
raped, the conflict was in reasonably close geographical proximity to Britain, and 
particular religious and ethnic prejudices were involved. Therefore, there were some 
key similarities with which the British people could probably identify with and 
subsequently make a 'response'. However, whatever the response of the British public 
and for whatever reason, those responses were due solely to the media's 
representations of the conflict. We were not present in the Balkans witnessing the 
war, the rapes, the bombings, at first hand. We therefore have to rely on reports, 
images, and representations of the war from the media; this is where the concept of 
'responsibility' comes in. Indeed, Ian Jack, Editor of Granta, has argued that the. 
primary role journalists now play in society is not to record the facts, but to act as the 
conscience of society. Almost, that is, a religious role and one that carries important 
normative responsibilities. ' 
It is not unusual these days to come across discussions of the ethical responsibilities 
of journalists. 9 Sociologist Denis Quail'. for- example, has proposed the'f6llowing list 
of responsibilities: " 
6 Phillip KnightIey, The First Casualty: From the Crimea to the Falklands: The War Correspondent as 
Hero, Propagandist and Myth Maker (London: Pan Books, 1989), ch. 18. ' 
7 Shaw (1996), p. 7. 
slan Jack, "Now for the bad news, " The Guardian, 8 August 1998, p. 3; also see, Linda Grant, "Can we 
hack the truth? " The Guardian, 11 August 1998, sec. G2, p. 8. 
9Andrew Belsey and Ruth Chadwick, "Ethics and Politics of the Media: The Quest for Quality, " in 
Belsey and Chadwick, eds., Ethical Issues in Journalism and the Media (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 
1-15. 
'ýDenis Quail, Mass Communication Theory (London: Sage, 1994), p. 126. 
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" Truth and accuracy 
" Impartiality and fairness, Respect for individual privacy 
" Independence from vested interests 
" Responsibility to society and the public good 
" Respect for law 
" Moral decency and good taste 
Here we are primarily concerned with the first responsibility - truth and accuracy. 
However, it is important here not to misunderstand Quail's point, and in these 
postmodem times notions such as Iruth', 'accuracy' and facts' can appear distinctly 
pass6, if not even anachronistic. Quail's claim, however, is not that journalists always 
adhere to and achieve these aims, but that they act as norms guiding journalistic 
practices. If Quail is correct, violation of these norms should meet with censure, and 
recent high profile cases of journalistic misconduct, such as the furore in 1998 over 
Carlton TV's award winning programme 'The Connection, do seem to validate 
Quail's argument. " In this respect the responsibilities of journalists are similar to 
those of academics. An academic who deliberately falsifies evidence and who is 
discovered is also liable to be censured. 
This raises an important theoretical point. For as Martin Hollis and Steve Smith have 
consistently argued, what separates the study of the social world from the study of the 
natural world is that in the social world what the agents think they are doing crucially 
affects the way they carry out their studies. " For the purposes of the thesis this is 
what matters. Journalists, as well as academics, 'normally' adhere to the norm of 
seeking truth and accuracy. " This is not to claim that this is ever achieved, but merely 
to highlight that this is what the journalists think they are doing. Even in those cases 
where journalists intentionally violate this norm, they are aware that they are 
violating it. In instances where a misrepresentation unintentionally occurs, journalists 
"Kamal Ahmed, Joanna Coles, Michael Scan Gillard and Laurie Flynn, "CBS drawn into fake TV 
storm, " The Guardian, 5 August 1998, sec. HOM, p. 3. 
12 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), ch. 4. 
13 For the purposes of this research most of the journalists (whose articles are reviewed in the thesis) 
have been written to and asked for their opinions on these issues. However, not enough replies were 
received to make a valid generalisation. 
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adhering to the norm welcome the corrections to their reports because they see the 
corrections as upholding the norm. As Don Hewitt, editor of the influential US 
documentary programme '60 Minutes' has put it, 'Any time any reputable news 
organisation gives its readers or viewers details that later turn out not to be true, they 
are obligated to tell the truth'. " Journalists, then, insofar as they adhere to the norm, 
believe they have a duty to actually report the war and in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, the thesis will proceed on the basis of this assumption. 
Accepting the assumption that journalists are reporting events Iruthfully' does not 
entail the claim that these reports are literally The Truth in some absolute sense. 
Obviously there are complexities and difficulties involved in any interpretation of 
events, and perhaps these complexities are exacerbated in war with propaganda in full 
flow. However, as David Morrison and Howard Tumber in their book Journalists at 
War have stated: 
All we can expect from journalists is a reasonable amount of 
accuracy and a round presentation of the facts. Unfortunately, 
however, facts are provisional upon wider understandings than 
that which is observed; but a factual account can be taken to be 
what a community accepts as reasonably accurate, given the 
limitations and difficulties of observing events. " 
Thus, one cannot treat the journalist, any more than any other observer, as if they 
were simply a pair of eyes objectively viewing an event and responding with 
unbiased neutrality. We must consider that they are active, thinking human beings 
who make judgements based on their, no doubt extensive, but always limited, 
knowledge. Indeed, one well-respected journalist has even stated that there are 
instances when it would be morally wrong to remain neutral. Ed Vulliamy, in a recent 
statement on his discovery of the Omarskadeath'camp, made the following comment 
regarding a journalist's responsibility to be both objective and neutral: 
It is, of course, essential for a reporter to be objective so long as 
objectivity concerns the facts. Sometimes, however, those facts 
are so appalling that to remain neutral is not really neutral at all 
- there are moments in history when neutrality is complicit in 
14 Ahmed, Coles, Gillard and Flyno, 5 August 1998. 
15David E. Morrison and Howard Tumber, Journalists at War (London: Sage, 1988), p. xi. 
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the crime. I cannot and do not want to be neutral between the 
inmates of Omarska and its guards, torturers and managers. " 
Given this statement, it would be wrong on the readers' part to accept that the 
journalist's account of events was a Irue' representation of the facts and relayed from 
a position of neutrality, to do so would be to presume a perfect knowledge of events 
and an inhuman sense of amorality. As one Salvadoran journalist has stated, I do not 
believe in journalistic objectivity. For me, objectivity cannot exist, because we are 
human beings, with feelings, thoughts, and the capacity to analyse. We are not simply 
transcribers of what one or the other says. We have a right and a duty to what is 
said'. " 
Journalists are, therefore, not simply passive observers of these things called facts, 
but are active witnesses of happenings that call for judgements on their part. And to 
support Vulliamy's point above, Mark Pedelty in his study of war correspondents, has 
concluded that journalists who profess total objectivity and deny any political agenda 
are doing their readers a disservice. For example, Penelty states that, Jo]bJective 
journalists deny their subjectivities, rather than acknowledge and explain them. They 
evade contradiction, rather then letting the reader in on the inevitable doubts and 
difficulties encountered in any act of discovery'. " Although it should be noted that the 
judgements that journalists make are made within professional codes of conduct" and 
they are held responsible for ensuring certain standards of accuracy. " 
From the perspective just discussed, journalists have a responsibility to represent the 
war as accurately as possible so that the recipients of the information can also make 
reasonable judgements based on what they are reading. Furthermore, those. fighting 
and suffering in war also have a human 'right' to have their needs and values 
effectively relayed to those in positions of global power. For the victims of rape in 
war, for example, the representation of their experiences and suffering is almost 
always indirect. They seldom have the opportunity to communicate directly to the 
16Ed Vulliamy, "Death that cheated justice, " The Guardian, 4 August 1998, sec. G2, p. 9. 
17 Quoted in Mark Pedelty, War Stories: The Culture of Foreign Correspondents (London: Routledge, 
1995), p. 10. 
18ibid., p. 196. 
19Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory (London: Sage, 1994), p. 125. Zý 20'Nigel G. E. Harris, "Codes of Conduct for Journalists, " in Belsey and Chadwick (1992), pp. 62-76. t, 
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Western public or political elites, they cannot convey their own experiences or create 
their own images. They rely on a third party which can be either individuals or Z: I 
institutions, but over which they have no control and, in addition, they can neither 
regulate that representation nor judge its political impact. Frequently, what is 
represented and how it is represented is dependent upon how the particular issue to be 
represented fuses with the interests, values and agendas of the individual journalist Z: I 
and the specific media group involved, which in turn are fed by the dominant 
interests, values and agendas of Western society as a whole. " Those being 
represented are, in effect, powerless. As a consequence, the inequitable evolution of 
global communications has made it difficult for those people who become victims of 
human rights abuses in peripheral countries, away from the core of global power, to 
achieve accurate representation. Thus, the responsibilities of the journalist, 
particularly those reporting from distant conflict should not be under-estimated. As 
journalist John Pilger has put it, journalists write history's first draft. ' 
One suggestion that news reports are tailored to suit British concepts of 'taste' comes 
from journalist and MP Martin Bell. He claims that the accusations aimed at 
journalists of news exaggeration, distortion, and misconstruing the context of reports 
are mis-placed. For example, regarding his reporting from Bosnia, he makes the 
following comment: 
[I]n the Bosnian war we tended to understate and under-report 
and not show things quite as we found them. Sometimes 
courage failed. Certainly mine did. I believe we should show 
more than we do and take out less than we do on the grounds of 
taste. 23 
John Pilger has also commented on this point in what he describes as 'censorship by 
exclusion'. ' "He" defines this form of censorship as leaving out the Unpalatable, a 
process that is important to the task of minimising or obfuscating the culpability of 
governments and their institutions. ' Therefore, whether achieved by exaggeration or 
exclusion, the journalist still appears to be guilty of a distortion of the 'facts', 
2'Editorial, "The Media and Images of War: Perception Versus Reality, " The Defense Monitor Vol. 
XXIII, no. 4 (Washington, DC: Centre for Defense Information, 1994), p. 3. 
22john Pilger, "John Pilcrer Column, " New Statesman, 2 August 1996, p. 26. 
23Martin Bell, "Conflict of interest, " The Guardian, II July 1996, p. II 
24john Pilger, 2 August 1996. 
25ibid. 
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however, as mentioned above, Bell was aware of this 'violation' of the journalistic 
'norm' while he was reporting. Furthennore, Pilger concludes that '[t]here is no 
suggestion here of a conspiracy. Historians and journalists are no different in their 
capacity to internalise the priorities and fashions of unaccountable power'. " 
There is, then, a complex web of relationships formed between the British press, its 
effect on the ideology, culture, religion, language and identity of Western society Z. 13 
(and vice versa), its representation of the ideologies, cultures, religions, and identities 
of 'others'. and the process of British socialisation. This entails a complex set of social 
forces and tensions that are difficult to separate and analyse in isolation. However, 
one way in which these forces can be identified and critically analysed is by focusing 
on one partidular issue and how it has been reported in the British Press. Therefore, 
by critically analysing the British print media's representations of mass rape in the 
Balkan conflict, it will help to illuminate these various cultural forces and how they 
affect the reporting of, and the responses to, mass rape in war. 
Structure of Part Two 
Part One equipped us with an understanding of some basic theories of rape, an insight 
into the history of mass rape in war, and some knowledge of the background to the 
Balkan conflict. Part Two attempts to offer an in-depth study of the reports of the 
rapes as published in the chosen British broadsheet newspapers. In researching the 
reports between 1991-1995, that included references to rape in war in the former- 
Yugoslavia, they have been categorised depending on the context in which the rapes 
were represented. Consequently, the articles have been divided into three distinct 
issue areas: nationalism, war games and Western responses. These three areas each 
frame a chapter and within each chapter other related themes are also drawn out. 
Chapter Four analyses articles which claimed that nationalism is at the root of mass 
rape in war in the Balkans and the categorisation of these reports were depenclant on 
the way in which this nationalism had been expressed. Some journalists claimed that 
26 ibid. 
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the rapes in the Balkans were due to ethnic cleansing, some suggested religious 
manifestations of nationalism, and yet more claimed that nationalistic wartime 
propaganda has been the provocation. 
In Chapter Five, the articles analysed have 'war games' as their focus, suggesting that 
the rapes were possibly part of a pre-planned strategy of intimidation and terror by the C, 
militar y elites. Some articles suggested that, as in most wars, the rapes simply form a 
part of the soldier's R&R (rest and relaxation) and had little to do with overtly 
political motives. Other articles, however, stated that the rapes were the result of 
misogyny, either innate, or derived from the forms of socialisation involved in 
military training. Chapter Five also includes a number of reports which deal with the 
subject of male rape afid mutilation in war, of which there are a surprising raimber, 
given that male rape is generally regarded as a 'forbidden' subject. 
Finally, Chapter Six analyses newspaper articles that are based on the responses of 
Western political elites, feminists, and other commentators to the reports of mass rape 
in the Balkans. For example, these were articles by journalists who concentrated on 
one or more aspect of the Western response'to the reports of rape. These responses 
include discussions of EC (as it was known then) and NGO investigations, the 
adoption of Yape babies' women's human rights and the setting up of the War Crimes 
Tribunal at The Hague. 
Overall, then, Part Two identifies and describes the reports of British broadsheet 
journalists, and offers a critical examination of them in an attempt to establish how 
the rapes have been represented and what explanations have been suggested for their 
occurrence. 
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4 
NATIONALISM 
Issues surrounding nationalism make up a large proportion of the texts analysed 
within this case study. The war in the fonner-Yugoslavia has been constantly referred 
to in the media as an 'ethnic conflict', thus presenting the conflict as a war between 
rival ethnic groups. In numerous articles, which will be identified throughout this 
chapter, the press has written simply about Muslims' , 'Croats'and 'Serbs'. They have 
also continually and subtly endorsed this 'ethnic account' of the war by constantly 
referring to the legitimate and pluralist Bosnian government - which prided itself on 
its own multi-ethnic composition - as the 'mainly Muslim Bosnian government. 
Indeed, such was the frustration of the Bosnian government over what they 
considered to be a false representation by the British media, that in October 1994 
during the launch of an appeal by the Sarajevo Citizen's Assembly to gain support for 
a free, open and ethnically undivided Sarajevo, Eric Herring noted the following 
ironic remark: 
With heavy humour, the Bosnian Embassy in London stated in 
its press release: 'A special award for services to the Foreign 
Office will go to any British journalist or editor who manages to 
insert the prefixes "Muslim-dominated", "Muslim-led" or 
"predominantly Muslim" into any of the -... aims of the 
campaign. " 
By the same token, no articles have been unearthed which refer to the Serbian 
Nationalist regime of Radovan Karadic as anything other than the Bosnian Serbs'. 
Although many people of Serb origin remained in Bosnian government territory, 
'Eric Herring, "An Uneven Killing Field: The Manufacture of Consent for the Arms Embargo on 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, " in Malcolm Evans, cd., The Challenge of Chanee: The Eurol2ean Union and 
International Law (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Press, 1996), p. 8. 
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many opposed to Serbian nationalism; no article researched reported this fact. 
Likewise, the media referred to those Croatian leaders and fighters who committed 
atrocities against Muslims as Bosnian Croats'. even though more Croats lived in 
government areas than in the newly formed Croatian state, again, many were opposed 
to Croatian nationalism. 
Despite these implicit accommodations to the official British government line, the 
media in Britain arguably played a critical role in relaying the information concerning 
multiple rapes, genocide and other atrocities to the attention of the British public and 
political elites. It was due to the press/media's representations, and attempted 
explanations, of the experiences and needs of the victims of rape that these issues 
were placed, however briefly, onto the political agenda, implicitly generating pressure 
for action. The articles in the British press which contain possible explanations, or 
assumptions, for the mass raping of predominantly women in the former-Yugoslavia 
based on nationalism, fall into separate, but related, categories: Rape as 'ethnic 
cleansing'. religion, identity, or propaganda. Each will be identified in turn. 
Rape as 'ethnic cleansing' 
A United Nations Commission of Experts was appointed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 
October 1992 to 'examine and analyse information gathered with a view to providing 
the secretary-general with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law 
,2 committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Quoting from its first interim 
report (S/25274 - note 55 and 56), the commission describes 'ethnic cleansing' as 
follows: 
The expression ', 'ethnic cleansing" is relatively new. Considered 
in the context of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, "ethnic 
cleansing" means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by 
using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups 
from the area. "Ethnic cleansing" is contrary to international 
law. 
2Cited in Beverly Allen, Ral2e Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 43. 
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Based on the many reports describing the policy and practices 
conducted in the former Yugoslavia, "ethnic cleansing" has 
been carried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest 
and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual 
assaults, confinement of civilian population, deliberate military 
attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and 
wanton destruction of property. Furthermore, such acts could 
also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention. ' 
Given the above definition, rape and sexual assault can be described as a form of 
'ethnic cleansing'. Indeed, there are many newspaper reports that represent the rapes 
in this manner, although this is not consistent throughout the broadsheet newspapers. 
Between January 1991 and December 1995, the Sunday Times and The Times both 
made the direct link between the reports of mass rape and 'ethnic cleansing' in only 
one and three articles respectively. In the same time period, however, The Guardian 
published eighteen articles that referred to the rapes as a form of 'ethnic cleansing'. 
The majority of these articles can be divided into three distinct categories. The first 
group appears to be offering 'evidence'of rape as 'ethnic cleansing'. mostly by using 
Western sources of information. These include reports by the EU, quotations from a 
UN High Commissioner, and so on. A second, smaller group of articles, concentrates 
on verifying the journalists claims of rape as 'ethnic cleansing' by including anti- 
Muslim sentiments which are mainly derived from interviews with Serb or Croat 
nationalists. The third and smallest category is linked to the second group, but 
includes the responses of Muslims to 'ethnic cleansing'. In these articles the Muslims 
are generally represented as the victims with part, or all, of their experiences used as 
'evidence' against Serb 'ethnic cleansing'. 0 
Published in The Times in December 1992, and as an example of the first category of 
article, Roger Boyes wrote simply that '[t]he "rape camps" appear to be a sinister off- 
shoot of ethnic cleansing'. ' This view was continued in The Times in January 1993 
when the authors corm-nented that: 
The European Community last night confirmed in an official 
interim report that rape was being used as a systematic weapon 
of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As many as 20,000 Bosnian 
3 ibid. 
4 Roger Boyes, "Churches say Serbs are using rape as a weapon, " The Times, 23 December 1992, p. 6. 0 
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Muslim women may have been raped by Serb soldiers as part of 
a plan to enforce the 'ethnic cleansing' of captured districts and 
to drive them and their families from their homes. ' 
Both these reports represent rape as just one tactic which is involved in the 
construction, or execution, of what has been called 'ethnic cleansing' - an 'off-shoot' 
even implying that it plays a rather minor role. Many of the articles actually refer to 
'ethnic cleansing' as a by-product' of the war and in turn the rapes as being a by- 
products'of 'ethnic cleansing'. Some journalists, however, have suggested that this is 
a mis-representation of the role of rape in the Balkan conflict and have questioned 
whether 'ethnic cleansing, rather than being a by-product of the war, was actually the 
ahn, with rape one of the fundamental tactics used to achieve the aim. In essence, 
, %yomen's cultural position and their importance in the fqmily structure - particularly 
appropriate in the case of the Muslim women living under traditional Muslim laws - 
was a key factor in their victimisation under a strategy of 'ethnic cleansing'. This point 
will be raised again in Chapter Seven. With the raping of Muslim women in nund, 
Catherine Bennett wrote the following passage in an early 1993 article for The 
Guardian: 
For rape is an effective instrument of war - an act which at once 
demoralises and humiliates the enemy, defiles his property, and 
deters him from propagating his own people through the bodies 
of violated females, and hence assists in crushing a people. ' 
This is not to suggest that Muslim women were the only targets of 'ethnic cleansing', 
however, this does constitute one explicit definition of 'ethnic cleansing' which is 
referred to as 'genocidal rape'. (This notion of 'genocidal rape' will be discussed at 
length in Chapter Eight) However, while understanding that the term 'genocidal'has 
probably been attached in order to emphasise the heinousness of the crimes and also 
the possible raison d'gtre behind the crimes, the use of the term could also be 
regarded as a counter productive. Rape and genocide are generally regarded as 
different crimes. ' Although both are based on the dehumanisation of the victim(s) and 
seek to humiliate, terrorise and destroy, genocide is the attempt to destroy a people 
5Michael Evans and Joel Brand, "Serbian heavy guns hit British base in central Bosnia, " The Times, 9 
January 1993, p. 11. 
6 ibid. 
7 Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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based on their national identity, whereas rape is sexualised violence, generally against 
a woman and based on her identity as a woman. 
These two separate atrocities appear to have intersected in the Balkans and from the 
standpoint of the rape victims they could be regarded as inseparable. But to 
concentrate on representing the rapes as 'genocidal', which at the time of writing 
remains factually dubious, could eventually render the rapes invisible. For example, 
in war, rape is still notfidly recognised as a war crime. ' Therefore, now the war is 
over, and the atrocities are being analysed and the war criminals named, for what 
crimes are they being held accountable? At the War Crimes Tribunal set up in The 
Hague, genocide has proved to be an indictable war crime, but rape has played a very 
minor role in cbmparison. 1 Yet, if rape in war is continually recogniýsed as a war 
crime, at least by the press and the public, then eventually it might be regarded as 
such by those political elites involved in expanding and developing the international 
legislation which is put in place to protect civilians in war. 
Traditionally, the civilian casualty has been represented as being outside the target of 
attack. Terms such as 'unintentional' and 'accidental'are bound up with the notion that 
civilian casualties are unavoidable by-products' of war, which arguably reduces 
civilian victims on all sides to non-entities, or at least diminishes their importance to 
some extent. However, recent military history suggests that civilian casualties, the 
majority of whom are women and children, rather than being 'unexpected by- 
products' of war, have actually constituted a significant part in many military 
victories. Indeed, over time the ratio between civilian and military casualties has 
dramatically changed. 'o Therefore, within the context of the systematic involvement 
8Theodor Meron, "Editorial Comment, " American Journal of International Law Vol. 97, no. 3 (July 
1993): pp. 424-428. 
9Christopher Greenwood, "The International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, " International Affairs 
Vol. 69, no. 4 (1993): pp. 641-655; Theodor Meron (July 1993), pp. 424-428; and also Theodor 
Meron, "The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, " Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 
1993): pp. 122-135. 
"The suggestion that civilian populations are systematically drawn into war strategy is confirmed by 
the following numbers: In World War Ia disproportionately greater number of civilians than soldiers 
were killed. The former Soviet Union cites the number of 9 million soldiers of both sexes killed in 
World War H compared with more than 16 million civilians. Official statements about the Korean War 
quote a proportion of 1: 5, and for the Vietnam the proportion is 1: 13. According to UNICEF data, in 
the wars fought since World War 11 90% of all victims were civilians, a large percentage of them 
women and children. For future wars, a study from 1979 anticipates a proportion of 1: 100; also see 
Richard Gabriel, The Culture of War: Invention and Early Developmen (London: Greenwood Press, 
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of the civilian population in war strategies, it could be argued that the attack on 
women in the Balkans was not a by-productof war, but a conscious military tactic - 
a target of 'ethnic cleansing'. Again, this point will be discussed at length in Chapter 
Seven, under the heading 'rape as a weapon'. 
The Guardian in the spring of 1993 published an article which, to some extent, 
reiterated these sentiments and represented the rapes of women and children as being 
a particular 'target'of the policy of 'ethnic cleansing'not merely a by-product'of it. 
The article states: 
Information about massacres, futile deaths and human suffering 
affects men and women alike. But the images from Bosnia have 
a particular horror for women. We have read the reports about 
mass rape, the rape of children, the holding captive of pregnant 
women until it is too late for abortions and then the 
extermination of whole families and villages. "Ethnic 
cleansing" is a term repeated only reluctantly. But its reality in 
Bosnia has to be faced. The aim is the destruction of one's 
group's integrity, either by literal annihilation or by the abuse 
and rape of women ... [w1omen and children are the target of 
ethnic cleansing, not just innocent victims of an 
incomprehensible ethnic clash, as the western media portrays 
them. " 
Against this background the representation here is that these mass rapes appear to 
take on a new meaning, they are no longer represented as acts of senseless brutality, 
but as culture-destroying actions with a strategic rationale. According to this article, 
in a Bosnian war zone women appeared to be in a more precarious situation than men. 
As mentioned earlier, for the majority of Muslim women their unique position within 
their particular societal structure denotes that their destruction is a specific objective 
in 'ethnic cleansing'. 
According to an article published in The Times in January 1992, it was not just 
women who were singled out as specific targets. Despite Geneva Conventions 
demanding the contrary all civilians - women, children, the old and infirm - were the 
1990); Carolyn Nordstrom, "Women and War: Observations from the Field, " Minerva: Quarterl 
Report on Women and the Military Vol. 9, no. 1 (1991); and Ruth Seifert, "War and Rape: A 
Prelirninary Analysis, " in Alexandra Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia- 
Herzegovin (University of Nebraska Press: Lincoln, 1994), pp. 54-72. 
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targets of 'ethnic cleansing'. The 'evidence' given by Borislav Herak, a volunteer 
Serbian fighter who had been charged with rape and murder by the Yugoslav war 
crimes tribunal supported this suggestion. In a front-page leading article, it states the 
following: 
His eyewitness testimony, the first by a participant in the 
notorious process of 'ethnic cleansing', should also offer a 
unique insight into how Serb forces killed tens of thousands of 
Muslim and Croat Bosnians and drove hundreds of thousands 
more from their homes... "The order was that nobody should 
stay alive, we should kill everybody, " he said, adding that the 
instruction had come down the Serbian chain of command from 
the area commander in the town of Eijas. "We did not have any 
choice. He told us what had to be done, and we did it. " In 
probably the most gruqsome episode, he said the Serb fighters 
were encouraged to rape young Bosnians at the prison turned 
military brothel where inmates were killed to make way for 
newcomers. 12 
The representations in this passage not only highlight the issue of civilians as prime 
targets in 'ethnic cleansing', with women being particularly vulnerable, but also depict 
the soldier's role in 'ethnic cleansing'as one of passive obedience to the military, or at 
least the orders of their next-in-command. This notion of military expectations will be 
discussed in Chapter Five, and again in Chapter Eight. However, the soldier's role 
here appears to be one that unquestioningly promotes the use of 'ethnic cleansing'on 
order to satisfy the Serb ideology of ethnic dominance. 
In the summer of 1993, Ed Vulliamy wrote an article that was published in The 
Guardian entitled "Croats' new ethnic purge leaves a ghost town". This article is 
depicted as a first-hand account of the results of 'ethnic cleansing' as can be seen in 
the following passage: 
CapIjina is left a terrifying, sealed-off town, penetrated only by 
The Guardian and The Washington Post this weekend, and 
found to be 'cleansed' of almost its entire male Muslim 
population between 18 and 60, their womenfolk cowering in 
fear in their houses, Muslim shops systematically dynamited, 
their houses looted, the first reports of rape reaching the United 
12 Leading article, "Serb learnt rape and murder, " The Times, 14 December 1992, p. 1. 
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Nations High Commission for Refugees. The UNHCR says 
these violent conditions are "a pattern across the region". " 
In this article, rape is represented again as a result, or a by-product, of 'ethnic 
cleansing'. If the inventory of atrocities are listed in order of importance, which they 
tend to be given the nature of newspaper editing (i. e. cutting articles from the 
bottom), then rape lies at the end of the list. Above it are what are considered by 
Vulliamy to be the more newsworthy components of 'ethnic cleansing. - the expelling 
of the majority of Muslim males from the town (their fate is unknown); the fear of the 
remaining women; destroyed shops; and looted houses. There is no further mention of 
rape in this lengthy 1,000-word article. However, this article does include an 'anti- 
Muslim' quotation, which brings us to the second category of article: those which try 
to expose and support the 'ethnic cleansing' theory by incorporating excerpts from 
anti-Muslim statements made by Serb or Croat nationalists. 
Following Vulliamy's visit to CapIjina his investigations took him to the man 
allegedly responsible for the 'ethnic cleansing'in the Bosnian town. Vulliamy makes 
the following statement: 
The man behind the expulsions in CapIjina is the mayor and 
head of the local Croatian HVO army, Pero Markevic. He was 
unavailable for interview this weekend. A UNHCR official 
described Mr. Markevic as being "about as extreme as possible" 
and surnmarised a "breeding programme" he has been trying to 
introduce to restrict Muslim women having children. The 
UNHCR quoted Mr. Markevic as calling the Muslim refugees 
"a Bohemian group breeding anti-social, anti-authoritarian 
individuals". " 
Many variants have been reported in the patterns of alleged systematic rape and 
'ethnic cleansing' throughout the war zone, possibly reflecting the predilection of the 
local commanders, or the reporters. However, this reporting of a 'breeding 
programme' , even though Vulliamy does not expand on the subject further, is rare. 
Research has unearthed only one other article which mentions an equally radical and 
abhorrent form of 'ethnic cleansing'. based on the curbing of the Muslim population's 
reproductive freedoms. It was written by Michael Simmons at the same time that Roy 
U Ed Vulliamy, "Croats' new ethnic purge leaves a ghost town, " The Guardian, 19 July 1993, sec. 
HOM, p. 20. 
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Gutman's first accounts of mass rape were being published in August 1992. The 
article by Simmons was also published in The Guardian and stated that a report had 
been issued by a 'Frankfurt-based Intemati. onal Society for Human Rights' (ISHR), 
which contained information on Serb-generated 'ethnic cleansing' programmes. The 
article included the following extract: 
(The report] claims that "thousands may have been killed" in 
two [prison camps], Prijedor and Foca, and that Albanian 
children in Kosovo have been poisoned en masse in an attempt 
to sterilise them. Using material it says is based on eyewitness 
testimony collected over the last month and which has been 
authenticated in every case, the report lists allegations of 
murder, torture, starvation and rape. " 
In other previously mentioned articles, claims by numerous other 'international 
bodies'. particularly those specialising in human rights, have been taken seriously and 
further investigations by journalists to support the claims have been carried out where 
possible. Furthermore, they have been represented as 'truth-telling'organisations and 
their reports have been represented as 'fact'. However, in this case, as Vulliamy states, 
the ISHR's report has been met with 'caution' if not scepticism and Vulliamy even 
suggests that the group may have 'a political axe to grind'. To support this view 
Vulliamy uses quotations from other prominent humanitarian groups in which they 
confirm that they are doubtful of the authenticity of the report's content. For example, 
Vulliamy paraphrases Christian Aid's head of research, Derrick Knight, as saying 'that 
ISHR reports had to be seen in the context of its strongly anti-Communist background 
... According to Mr. Knight, the society was founded by a group of Ukrainian and 
Romanian anti-Communist nationalists "with fascist inclinations"'. " Although 
Vulliamy included a quotation from the society's international secretary, Robert 
Chambers, which refuted all accusations in the following manner: '[t]here is a whole 
bag of those kinds of abuse floating around. But it is not true'. " The resulting 
impression is that all the reports of human right's violations that have emanated from 
this source, including rape, are at best exaggerated and at worse falsified. 
15Michael Simmons, "German atrocity report treated with caution, " The Guardian, 12 August 1992, p. 
6. 
16 ibid. 
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Rape, here, has been represented as both a lesser atrocity and as unsubstantiated 
political rhetoric. This is not to say that all allegations of rape, no matter what the 
context, should be regarded without question as factually correct, but in this case to 
dismiss allegations of atrocities because they are made by a group whose history 
stems from a controversial ideology is to buy into the same mode of thought that is 
being criticised in the first place. In other words, to disallow the ISHR's report to be 
taken seriously and investigated further because of some dubious historical beliefs 
and allegiances is to render all the allegations of enemy atrocities by warring factions 
worthless. 
Writing on the issue of anti-Muslim statements - it being the basis for the journalists' 
lihks between rape and 'ethnic cleansing' - Ian Traynor ih November 1993 made the 
following statement: 
In a war where the establishment of ethnically pure mini-states 
has always been the central ambition for the Serbs and the 
Croats, ethnic cleansing - the forced uprooting of people 
through terror, killing, rape. and looting - is less an effect of the 
fighting than its aim. " 
In a similar vein, this time reporting from Mostar in September 1994, Traynor stated 
that, 'most Croats here see the Muslims as the threat. A local Croat official said to me 
this morning, "The Muslims have got to be destroyed or the Muslims will win"'. " 
This view that both the Serbs and the Croats have used 'ethnic cleansing'as a means 
of achieving their goal of ethnically-pure states is one that is fairly consistent 
throughout the representation in the British press. In comparison, although there have 
been abuses committed by the Bosnian forces, on the whole these have been 
represented as unauthorised, unplanned and in no way comparable to the abuses 
committed by the Serb and Croat forces. In the second Traynor quotation above, there 
is also a discernible fear in the tone of the Croatian official's statement. But does this 
fear of a Muslim victory extend beyond the 'nonnal'fear of an enemy victory that one 
would expect to find in any wartime scenario? Although the Serbs, Croats and 
Muslims have lived along side each other in the homogenous state of Yugoslavia for 
18Ian Traynor, "Aid saves lives but keeps the war going, " The Guardian, 25 November 1993, sec. FOR, 
Fian 
Traynor, "Home is a hundred yards away but another world for Mostar's victims, " The Guardian, 
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decades and mixed-marriages, and off-spring from those mixed marriages, are 
common-place, " the propaganda machine put in motion by the Serb and Croat leaders 
has been so pervasive, as will be illustrated in the following quotations, that many 
Serb and Croat people appear to be fearful, not only of the Muslim population, but of 
the Muslim culture as a whole. In a Guardian article outlining the story of Borislav 
Herak, the convicted Serbian soldier already mentioned above, and whose alleged 
crimes include genocide, rape and looting, John Bums, the author, outlines various 
propaganda exercises which were allegedly used to encourage soldiers like Herak to 
rape. In the article, he continues: 
According to these accounts, Herak says, Muslims would also 
require Serbian children to wear Muslim clothing. "We were 
told that we would have to cleanse our whole population of 
Muslims. That's what we have been told. That's why it has been 
necessary to do all this". " 
For this 'cleansing' - as Herak describes it - to be successftil it appears as if the 
Muslim women were the important quarry for the 'cleansers'to target. And, in turn, it 
is these 'cleansers' who are targeted by the propagandists who use 'fear' to achieve 
their objectives just as the 'cleansers'use rape. The overall representation is that rape 
for any purpose, whether to defile and dishonour, to sexually abuse and mutilate, to 
threaten and terrorise, or to impregnate with enemy seed, lies at the core of the 'ethnic 
cleansing' project. To quote from a Western European Union motion that was 
published in The Guardian in December 1992: Those responsible for the rape want to 
reduce the Muslim population, which is tantamount to 'ethnic cleansing". " 
In response to the perceived reality of 'ethnic cleansing' , some journalists depicted the 
Muslim population as powerless to defend themselves from both the enemy soldiers 
and the enemy propagandists. Jon Swain, writing in the Sunday Times in the summer 
of 1995, gives his impression of the double standards at work, which he attempts to 
persuade the reader is integral to the 'ethnic cleansing'plan: 
2 ýHermann Bausinger, "Concluding Remarks, " in Renata Jambresic Kirin and Maja Povrzanovic, eds., C, War, Exile, Everyday Life: Cultural Perspectives (Zagreb: X-Press, 1996), p. 287. 
2'John Bums, "Slaughter in the name of Serbia, " The Guardian, 3 December 1992, sec. G2T, p. 2. C, 22 Reuter in Paris, "NVEU demands justice for Yape camp' victims, " The Guardian, 4 December 1992, 
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Mladic played a sordid role, reassuring frightened 
[Muslim] civilians they were safe as his troops handed out 
chocolates and patted children's heads for the benefit of Serbian 
television. At the same time his creed of total war 
encompassing murder, rape and destruction was put into brutal 
effect ... The Serbs were so sure of themselves, said [one] 
woman, "they told us they were expelling us, that we were 
Miuslim vermin'no country wanted. They said they would kill 
our men they were taking away". " 
The Muslim response to 'ethnic cleansing' is difficult to assess. Some press 
representations seem to suggest that the Muslims were aware that they were being 
'ethnically cleansed' , but the term 'ethnic cleansing'is an expression which came into 
popular usage after many of the reported atrocities had taken place and in addition, 
the term is a phrase which is peculiar to the English language, although it, of course, 
has its equivalents in other languages. " 
The articles on the Muslim- responses are concluded, as indeed is the chapter as a 
whole, by reviewing a report by Maggie OKane published in The Guardian on 
Christmas Eve 1993. In the small village of Krustica in central Bosnia, Maggie 
O'Kane interviewed one of a dying breed of idealists who still held out hope for a 
return to a peaceful multi-ethnic Bosnia. Misha, a businessman from the village fights 
with the men of the 17th Brigade, the Refugee Army'. who were survivors of Serb 
detention camps. In OKane's words these men have been 'routed from their homes, 
wrenched from their families, they have lost everything but the will to live and the 
forlorn hope of a multi-ethnic Bosnia'. ' 
My father is a Serb, my mother is a Croat, my wife is a Muslim 
and I'm wondering what my children are. All I'm interested in is 
who can provide a normal free life for my children and these 
people.. [men of the '17th Brigade]. They are the only ones who 
make any sense. " 
This particular OY-ane article is one of the few accounts of the Bosnian war which 
suggested that the war began because of a Serb 'campaign of territorial expansion', 
23Jon Swain, "Bosnia endures more atrocities, " Sunday Times, 23 July 1995, p. 1&13. 
24Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Reliýrion and Genocide in Bosnia (London: University of 
California Press, 1996), pp. 12-15. 
25Maggie OKane, "Bosnia's Last Stand, " The Guardian, 24 December 1993, sec. NVEE, p. 4. 
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rather than the standard simplistic explanation of the war as an 'ethnic conflict'- part 
of a continuing squabble between ancient ethnic tribes -a 'myth' which some 
academic commentators have stated is circulated by the majority of the press. " One 
example of this particular representation is an article written by Paul Wilkinson and 
published in The Guardian in the summer of 1994. In one passage it states: Cp 
Characteristically, [inter-ethnic] conflicts are fought by armed 
militias ... extreme savagery is shown to the civilian population, frequently including the policy of ethnic cleansing to terrorise 
whole sectors of the civilian population into fleeing from their 
homes; and mass rape, torture and massacre are common. 28 
However, OKane clarifies her position by stating that 'pillage, rape and detention 
camps' were all part of the campaign by Serbian nationalists 'aimed at building an 
ethnically homogenous state'. " It should be noted though, that Oxane is literally 
'camped out' with a group of multi-ethnic Bosnians who are fighting against Serb 
nationalism. Therefore, however sympathetic one is to her views, it is also apparent 
that she is not reporting from a position of impartiality. " Although Ian Traynor, 
writing in The Guardian supported her arguments stating that: 
In a war where the establishment of ethnically pure mini-states 
has always been the central ambition for the Serbs and the 
Croats - the forced uprooting of people through terror, killing, 
rape and looting - is less an effect of the fighting than its aim. " 
In addition, The Times, in response to Roy Gutman's initial reports of rape and 
'systematic sla ughter on a huge scale'published in The Guardian in August 1992, " 
also linked rape to 'ethnic cleansing' in an article by Barbara Hewson. The article 
states that: 
One hundred Muslim women and girls were rounded-up and 
held at a school in Rogatica, Bosnia-Herzegovina, during 
27SCe, for example: Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1994). 
28Paul Wilkinson, "Mad dogs of war are still running wild, " The Guardian, 17 August 1994, see. FEA, 
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'ethnic-cleansing'by Serbs. The women were repeatedly gang- 
raped. " 
While concentrating on the rapes of Muslim women, Hewson also describes how 
'Serbian women were subjected to a two-month reign of terror by Croatians', 3' thus, 
possibly convincing the reader that the analysis is comprehensive and liberal in its 
approach with a implicit attempt at fairness and balance. Hewson does admit, 
however, that Ihese accounts were carried in the British press on August 10' -a 
reference to the first Gutman accounts of the rapes and other atrocities - so the actual 
reports of rape are actually second-hand accounts and to some extent merely 
reiterated Gutman's own sentiments. 
The claim that 'ethnic cleansing' played a role in the mass raping of women in the 4D 
Balkan conflict is a strong one and it is probably safe to assume that if there had been 
no 'ethnic cleansing'the numbers of women raped would have been considerably less. 
However, as will demonstrated throughout this chapter, it is just one explanation 
among other potentially destructive concepts. 
Rape as Religion 
Religion is one issue that has played a rather dualistic role in the representation of 
rape in the Balkan conflict within the British press - it has been represented as both an 
issue and a non-issue. To explain this, I suggest that the term Muslim' is used in the 
British press more often as a marker of nationality as of religion. Croats, Serbs and 
'Muslims'are generally represented as the three warring factions in the Bosnian'war, 
not Croats, Serbs and Bosnians'. Yet, the war has been represented as a war between 
nations not religions. Therefore, I-would also suggest that when the term 'Muslim'is ZD 
used in this context - as a marker of a national identity - then the religious meaning it 
carries becomes a less significant issue. " However, the word Muslim' is a religious 
term. It denotes the religion of the person as being Islamic, which in itself could be 
33 Barbara Hewson, "Rape is a war crime too; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Modern Times, " The Times, 8 
September 1992, sec. LT, p. 4. 
34ibid. 
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seen to make it an over-riding 'issue' given the implications of the traditional Islamic 
culture upon women's lives. As it has been documented in many places, for women in 
the Islamic faith, being a Muslim is not simply a set of beliefs but a whole way of life 
with her role in the community clearly defined. " But is this the way in which Bosnian 
Muslim women have been represented in the British press? And how has the religion 
of the rape victims affected the way in which they have been represented? 
First, Bosnian Muslim women have generally been represented as Iraditional'. devout 
Islamic women. One example of this can be found in an article in The Times, written 
by Alice Thomson in January 1993. The ensuing quotation probably comes from a 
statement by the president of Lucy Cavendish College, Cambridge, Dame Anne 
Warburton, who was asked by the EC, via the British Foreign Office, to investigate 
allegations of mass rape in the former Yugoslavia. Dame Anna was interviewed by 
Thomson on her return from a 'fact finding mission' to Bosnia. I say 'probably' 
because in this rather disordered article the quotation marks simply begin and end 
with no mention of who is talking. However, as the article is written primarily as a 
documentary of Dame Anna's visit to the Balkans I believe that it is safe to assume 
that they are her words - although contextually I am a little more sceptical. This 
section of the article is discussing the female victims of rape and states: 
It is difficult for any woman in a state of trauma to talk. But the 
Bosnian Muslim women are even more inhibited. Traditionally, 
they do not come out of their houses, let alone have outside 
sexual relationships. " 
This statement runs contrary to other information sources that portray the Bosnian 
Muslims in the former-Yugoslavia as having become more liberal thinking and 
accepting of Western values. Azra Zalihic-Kaurin, a reporter for the Croatian daily 
newspaper Vecernii List, has written on this subject and comments that in the former 
Yugoslavia the traditional influence of the Islamic culture has considerably weakened 
over time and states that: 
Muslims were scarcely different from members of other 
nationalities. Muslim women lived new lives, transmitted this 
36 See for example: Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias, eds., Woman-Nation-State (London: 
Macmillan, 1989). 
37 Alice Thomson, "Truth that the world finds hard to hear, " The Times, I January 1993, p. 11. 
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new way of life to their children ... [t]hey no longer had 
anything to do with Islam: the only thing they still knew was 0 
that Muslims do not eat pork. Travel, city life, education, and 
communist ideology had changed them. " 
This is a different picture than the one painted by the previous Warburton quotation. 
Of course, there are many other factors which could have a bearing on the level of 
commitment to the Islamic faith - geographical location (urban or rural), the 
diminishing influence of communism, and so on. However, many contemporary 
scholars have suggested that the for Yugoslav people, particularly the younger city 
dwellers, the orthodox fundamentalist Muslim lifestyle was little practised. " While 
Zalihic-Kaurin endorses this point of view, nevertheless, she states without hesitation 
in then following quotation the one area in which the Bosnian Muslims 'never fully 
forgot their traditions'. She claims that, '[y]oung Muslim women today may wear 
miniskirts and have boyfriends, may study and work, but they still respect the 
commandment of virginity. " This is obviously an important point with respect to the 
raping of Muslim girls and women and will be discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
There is also evidence that may point to the fact that the Bosnian Muslim men never 
fully forgot their religious traditions too. In one of Roy Gutman's articles in August 
1992, a Bosnian man who had been held prisoner by the Serbs in a detention centre is 
quoted as saying that while being detained 'he experienced nearly every form of 
humiliation the Serb captors inflicted on Muslim prisoners, from desecration of the 
local mosque to witnessing the murder and mutilation of male prisoners and gang 
rape of women'. " From this statement it can be deduced that this Muslim man felt 
personally humiliated, even defiled when the Serbs desecrated his local mosque, or at 
least Gutman represents him as having those feelings. Religion, as demonstrated by 
this case, was a-significant factor-in*how the war was fought. " Furthermore, the 
Serbian troops would surely have considered the issue an important one given the 
38Azra Zalihic-Kaurin, "The Muslim Woman, " in Stiglmaycr (1994), pp. 170-173. 
39Sce, for example: Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1994); Dusan 
Necak, "Historical Elements for Understanding the Yugoslav Question, " in Payam Akhavan, ed., 
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widespread military action involved in the destruction of the mosques throughout 
Bosnia. " 
Given the certitude that religion played a significant part in how the war was fought, 
it played a more limited role in the explanations by the British press concerning the 
raping of women. This could, of course, be due to the fact that, as explained above, 
religion is tied up with ethnicity, many journalists may have been drawn to suggest 
explanations for the rapes based on ethnicity rather than religion. However, the first 
article to mention the rapes in conjunction with religion does so in relation to the 
'Islamic world' and the possibility of the 'Arab states and Iran' declaring a jihad' or 
holy war in the Balkans, due to the 'Christian West's"neglect of Bosnia'. The section 
of the article in question states: 
All the pent-up tension between Islam and the Christian West 
seems now to be concentrating on the Bosnian war. Graphic 
accounts of the rape of Muslim women that have been 
circulating around Middle Eastern embassies and information 
ministries are partly to blame. Partly to blame is also the 
bombardment of mosques, while frustration with Western 
reluctance to commit a large military force to the region is also 
a factor. ' 
As the above quotation demonstrates, throughout most of the article both the author 
and the sources he quotes take a very detached attitude to the raping of the Bosnian 
Muslim women, preferring instead to concentrate the discussion on which Islamic 
countries are helping the Bosnian Muslims financially by donating humanitarian and 
military aid. The crux of the article is that the Middle Eastern Islamic states used the 
Balkan war, and in particular the emotive issues surrounding the war such as the 
raping of Muslim women, as a means of gaining a greater foothold in 'the new 
ordering of Europe'at a 'strategically appropriate moment'. 45 As justification for this 
claim, Roger Boyes the author, makes a statement concerning one of the issues 
already mentioned in this section - the Bosnian Muslim's level of dedication to the 
Islamic faith. Boyes states: 
43 Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The policy of 'ethnic cleansing' (College Station, Texas: A&M C, 
University Press, 1995), pp. 59-60. 
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There are some oddities in this enthusiastic involvement. The 
first is that Bosnian Muslims are certainly not the most devout 
of the faithful in Europe. Their conversion more than 500 years 
ago was pragmatic: Bosnian landowners could keep their 
estates under the Ottomans if they swore allegiance to Islam. " 
The rapes of the Bosnian Muslim women are represented by Boyes as being merely a 
tactic by which Middle Eastern Islamic states; first, to justify their closer involvement 
in the Balkan conflict; second, to justify their suggestion of a possible jihad..: - as the 
article states, '[tlhe commentator of Al-Riad, a Saudi Arabian newspaper, described 
the Bosnian fighting as a 'prelude to the war between Islam and the West'. " Third, the 
article claims that the way the rapes have been used to raise money for war aid. As 
Boyes states, '[t]here is surely no mosque in the Gulf that has not been drumming up 
donations for the Borsnian cause'. " As the author of the article suggests7 in his 
concluding remarks, there must be 'more than Islamic solidarity or straightforward 
human sympathy' involved. The rapes are therefore represented here as merely a 
pawn in a much wider political game. - 
Another article in The Times which represents the issue of rape within a religious 
context, but in a more positive way, is one already mentioned above and comprises an 
interview with Dame Anna Warburton written by Alice Thomson. In one section of 
the article, which is discussing the efforts being made to help the survivors of rape 
both mentally and physically, Dame Anna is quoted as stating the following: 
We must integrate the victims back into society. We talked to 
men who couldnI see how raped women could be reinstated. 
The Imam of Zagreb made a point of saying that raped women 
are heroines of the war and that Muslims must treat these 
women as special rather than cast them aside. " 
, The Imam is an influential leader within the Muslim religion and therefore this 
statement by the Imam of Zagreb was no doubt courageous and controversial as it 
indicated a significant bre* with tradition: this tradition dictates that the 'honourable' 
thing for the rape victims to do would be to commit suicide and thus become 
46 ibid. 
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'martyrs'. " There is no further information available in the article as to the reaction of 
the general Muslim population to the Imarn's suggestion; nevertheless, this 
representation of an Islamic religious leader showing a degree of sensitivity to the 
plight of the female rape victims stands in stark contrast to the more typical 
representation of Muslim leaders as intransigent and unsympathetic. Moreover, this 
representation of the rape victims as receiving little or no help from their own 
'patriarchal' leaders has often been used as the crux of the argument for the giving of 
Western aid to the Bosnian rape victims. " This bleak picture has portrayed a situation 
whereby there is negligible help forthcoming locally for the rape survivors due the 
cultural and religious restraints of Islamic law; therefore, the West needs to 
intervene. " I concede that the point might have been stretched somewhat; however, 
this is the only report found thht indicated that a Muslim religious leader was 
prepared to even acknowledge the problem of the mass raping of Muslim women, let 
alone call for their reintegration into Muslim society. This particular representation of 
women will be pursued further in Chapter Seven. 
The final article to be discussed in this section is one in which the Muslim leaders 
have indeed been portrayed as having a less than sensitive solution to the problems 
surrounding the reintegration into Muslim society of the rape victims. Linda Grant in 
an article written in the summer of 1993 and published in The Guardian states the 
following: 
The solution of some Muslim leaders is more sinister. Dr. Izet 
Aganovic, president , 
of the Red Crescent in Croatia, went on a 
tour of North Africa at the end of last year to raise support for 
refugees. After his return, he was inundated with requests from 
North African men to take these light-skinned, no longer chaste 
women as second or third wives. "They will forgive them, " 
Aganovic says, with a startling absence of irony. " 
There is no further explanation or analysis of this statement; however, the gendered, 
and also racial, assumptions at work in this passage are astounding. There is also no 
mention of whether Dr. Izet Aganovic is a Muslim, which might have some bearing 
50 Zalihic-Kaurin (1994), p. 173. 
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on his attitude and how he is articulating these four simple words - 'they 1villforgive 
them' First, what is there to forgive? Do these women have to be forgiven for being 
the victims of rape? Second, does the emphasis on the Ihey'. as in 'they will forgive 
them', mean that the North African men will be able to forgive these women their 
unchasteness, whereas the Bosnian Muslim men cannot? On one hand, Aganovic 
appears to be implying that the North African men are more merciful and 
understanding than their Bosnian counterparts as they are willing to marry these 
defiled rape victims, albeit as second or third wives. On the other hand and more 
insidious, is the implicit suggestion that these darker-skinned North African men will 
forgive almost anything to have a light-skinned' woman. On reflection, it seems 
incredible that these powerful implications can be drawn from one simple statement 
made by a man who is the Croatian president of one of the world's leading 
humanitarian organisations. 
As has been demonstrated, explanations for the mass raping of women due to 
'religion' alone can offer only a partial account of events. This is possibly due to the 
fact that within the Muslim community religion is inextricably linked to notions of 
ethnicity and nationalism. However, we now turn to an issue that seems to 
accompany all wars - that is, the use of propaganda. 
Rape as Propaganda 
Propaganda has been studied from various disciplinary perspectives. " To study ZD 
propaganda from a historical perspective is to examine the practices of propagandists 
as past events and the subsequent happenings as possible effects of-that propaganda. 
Political scientists, on the other hand, have generally examined propaganda by 
analysing the ideologies of the practitioners, the dissemination of their propaganda, 
and impact that propaganda subsequently had on public opinion. Alternatively, to 
study propaganda through a sociological lens would entail the examining of social 
movements, including the development of counter-propaganda, which often emerges 
54See, for example: Garth S. Jowett and Victoria ODonnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (London: 
Sage, 1992). 
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in opposition. Moreover, in the academic study of propaganda there have even been 
psychological studies into its influence on individuals. " However, in this section of 
the thesis, the journalists' reports will be analysed by drawing on most of the above 
fields by loosely defining propaganda as a purveyor of ideology with specific 
objectives, with a view to highlighting the possible use of the journalists as a means 
of disseminating wartime propaganda. 
Propaganda, in its most passive sense, means to disseminate or promote a particular 
idea or set of ideas. The word is derived from the Latin to propagate and the 
dictionary expands this information in the following way: 
propaganda a congregation of the Roman Cýtholic Church, 
founded 1622, charged with the spreading of Catholicism (de 
propagandafide, 'concerning the faith to be propagated): any 
association, activity, plan, etc., for the spread of opinions and 
principles, esp. to effect change or reform: the information, etc., 
spread by such association. " 
Therefore, because the 'Church's' use of the word denoted the spread of Catholicism 
to the New World and in addition the opposing of Protestantism, the word 
'propaganda' subsequently lost its neutrality. Thus, to identify any form of 
communication as 'propaganda' nowadays, is to suggest something derogatory, 
negative, or even dishonest. Words frequently used as synonyms for 'propaganda'are 
lies, distortion, deceit, manipulation, psychological warfare, and brainwashing. 
Furthermore, propaganda is also frequently associated with control and is often 
regarded as a deliberate attempt to alter or maintain a balance of power that is 
advantageous to the propagandist. The propagandist has a clear aim, to broadcast a 
particular ideology to an audience with a related objective. Whether it involves a 
government attempting* tQ instil a wave of patriotism in the nation to support a war 
effort, or a military leader attempting to frighten the enemy with claims of strength, 
there is a careful and predetermined plan of contrived symbol manipulation which is 
communicated to an audience in order to fulfil the particular objective. Moreover, the 
objective sought generally requires the audience to reinforce or modify their attitudes 
55N. F. S. Burnett, "Ideology and Propaganda: Toward an Integrative approach, " in T. Smith, ed., 
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and/or behaviour. This section will be examining how journalists have identified 
various ways in which the mass raping of women in the Balkan conflict has been used 
by political elites as a tool in their 'propaganda war'. and how this has been 
represented. In addition, and contrary to the structure of previous sections which have 
been organised by issues, the articles analysed in this section will be dealt with 
chronologically in order to afford some sense of the timing and development of the 
'propaganda war. 
The first article to appear in the sections of the British press researched for the thesis 
that made mention of propaganda, was published in the Sunday Times during the 
summer of 1992. The article's author, Louise Branson, was interviewing a Serbian 
named ZivoradTeodorovic, who she describes as a 'one-legged survivot'of the war in 
Croatia. The 'Serbian authorities' apparently named Teodorovic, who Branson met at 
a rehabilitation centre in Belgrade, as an 'eyewitness of Croatian atrocities'. Branson 
mentions some of his claims: 
[Teodorovic] claimed he had seen a child baked in an oven, and 
he had even seen three pies filled with human eyes. What sort 
of oven? He couldn't say. But, he insisted, the eyes had been 
sent for analysis. Where to? He couldn't say. Not once did he 
look me straight in the eye ... Teodorovic claimed that a woman doctor had wanted to castrate him after he was captured by 
Croats. What had she looked like? He couldn't say. " 
Branson is forthright about her 'mission impossible'. She is attempting to 'establish 
the truth', - to discover which of the many stories of atrocities are 'true'and which are 
not. Branson tells the reader clearly that she considers the stories recalled above by 
Teodorovic to be false. She states, 'he was clearly lying. People who tell the truth 
look you in the eye and fill their stories with detail, unburdening themselves. " 
Perhaps an initial question to ask would be how does Branson know that these are the 
actions of Iruth-tellers? She does not expand further. However, although this article 
does not specifically mention rape at this point, the reason for looking at this 
quotation is to compare Branson's point of view with that of another interviewer in a 
similar position. 
57 Louise Branson, "Atrocities: Muslims, Croats and Serbs in catalogue of shame, " Sunday Tim , 12 
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Alice Thomson, writing in The Times in January 1993, includes a quotation from 
Dame Anna Warburton who, as mentioned previously, was in Bosnia on a fact- 
finding mission for the EC (EU). Dame Anna had been interviewing a rape victim 
when she made the following comment: 
The atrocities are of a kind that you don't readily give credence 
to and with the propaganda war in full flow in Bosnia, you have 
to be extremely careful ... [but]... We became convinced the 
stories were true because of the way they were told and the fact 
that the women rarely looked us in the eye. One face I shall 
never forget was that of a beautiful Croat girl, who had been a 
leading light in her town. She had been repeatedly raped in a 
Serb camp until she was exchanged for 50 Serbian soldiers. 'At 
least I-know my value now, 'said the girl. Her face was totally 
expressionless. As if her experiences were beyond words. " 
So, do Iruth-tellers' look you in the eye, or not? The contrasting views of both 
interviewers highlight the subjective nature of personal perceptions and expectations 
when interviewing. Perhaps, given the situation in the Balkans and the nature of rape 
as a wartime atrocity, a lot of men, particularly those men who have been fighting in 
the war, are looked on with suspicion. And conversely, perhaps women, due to the 
general suffering of women reported from this war, are given a sympathetic ear. 
Moreover, perhaps the expectations of the interviewer are dependent on the sex of the 
interviewee, with women and men expected to act differently under similar 
circumstances. In general, perhaps the interviewers expect women to act in certain 
pre-determined ways; to display shyness, reserve, subservience, to look demure and 
avoid eye contact. Whereas men are expected to act with forthrightness, candour, to 
sit upright and look you straight in the eye. By acting in the expected and 'appropriate' 
manner for your sex you are then accepted as 'normal'and Irue'rather than excluded 
as 'other'and 'false'. 
Although it should not be forgotten that the interviewees are war victims and quite 
understandably reticent, nervous and possibly psychologically damaged. Yet one is 
represented as a Irue' victim of mass rape in war, while the other is represented as 
Talse'- a deceitful ex-Serbian fighter who is intent on spreading propaganda. Perhaps 
59Thomson, 1 January 1993. 
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one problem with accepting that truth is always the first casualty of war is that when 
faced with the 'truth'it is often impossible to recognise. 1 The above representations 
could be accurate, but I would suggest that it is impossible to tell by simply looking 
into the victim's eyes. 
The next two reports, both of which contain the suggestion that the Yapes'were being 
used for propaganda purposes, were written by Roy Gutman and Nina Bernstein and 
Published in The Guardian on 10 and 12 August 1992- respectively. The first report 
contains a quotation from the Serbian leader, Radovan Karadzic, which came in 
response to a Bosnian government estimate that 200,000 people were being held in 
prison camps. Bosnian officials had said that 'they knew of at least one camp reserved 
for women and children, Wit said there was no way to estimate how many had bden 
raped"' The article, allowing Karadzic a response, stated the following: 
Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, denied that 
there were any detention camps for civilians in Bosnia, and 
added that no women or children were detained. Asked about 
the reports of systematic rape, he said: "There are six places in 
Sarajevo alone where they [the Muslims] are raping Serb 
women. We Serbs know what is going on". " 
The article does not make any attempt to comment on Karadzic's statement but 
merely responds by retelling in detail the story of the rape of a Muslim teenager by 
three Serb military guards. " 
Belgrade bewildered by international outcry' is the headline for the second article. It 
is primarily a report of the Serbian response to international condemnation of the 
Serb-run detention 'camps' mentioned above. The author, Nina Bernstein, has built 
the article around comments and opinions bbtained directly from the Serbian general 
public in Belgrade's bustling shopping centre'. According to Bernstein, the majority 
of her interviewees blame either 'paramilitary extremists'or Western propaganda'for 
the presence, or supposed presence, of the 'camps. For example, Bernstein quotes a 
6ýPhillip Knightley, The First Casualty: From the Crimea to the Falklands: The War Correspondent as 
Hero, Propagandist and Myth Maker (London: Pan Books, 1989). 
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sales clerk as commenting that Ihe rest of the world is completely misinformed ... the 
Serbs are not the aggressors and, in Bosnia, Serbs are not the guilty ones'. ' This 
appears to be the general consensus of opinion, as Bernstein comments that the local 
'Serbian Renewal Movement'. like the nationalist regime, 'has treated Western media 
accounts of Serb-run concentration camps for Muslims in Bosnia as one-sided 
propaganda'. " Bernstein also uses quotations from the president of the local 
Democratic' party, DragoIjub Micunovic, who states that the reports of concentration 
cainps are merely 'a tough propaganda manoeuvre'. " However, it is unclear whether 
Micunovic. is suggesting that the concentration camps in toto were stage-managed as 
a major propaganda exercise by the Croat or Muslim governments, or whether he is 
referring only to the adoption of the phrase 'concentration camp'. The use of 
quotations is always a selective'exercise, but for the joumalist, Nina Bernstein, to 
reduce this particular quotation to such an extent that the ambiguity is startlingly 
obvious, is not only frustrating for the reader, but also renders the article in question 
delusive and somewhat questionable. 
Returning to the bustling shoppers, Bernstein attempts to explain the concerted 
opinions and attitudes of the Serbian people by stating that they have been 'cocooned 
by the omissions and denials of state-dominated news media' and that they bad not 
seen the television footage of the Serb-run camp in Omarska, Bosnia'as "it was not 
shown on the state-run television channel'. " However, Bernstein does quote one man 
as having a slightly different view on the matter. She interviews a 'former professor' 
and vice-president of one of the two opposition parties who states that 'everybody 
here speaks of an international plot against Serbia. I don't agree. Our minister of 
information is so mediocre the Serbs don't find a way to present their truth. The 
Muslims were much more effective'. " One must bear in mind that- this is a politician 
in opposition speaking. 
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The issue of rape was also mentioned by the 'former professor', Komnenic, during a 
discussion of the problems caused by extremist paramilitary groups and who, he 
claims, 'strut' around the streets of Belgrade in paramilitary uniforms. The article 
continues with Komnenic's opinion on the subject: 
"They don't go to war, " Mr. Komnenic said contemptuously of 
the paramilitaries. "They don't cross the Drina River 
. 
(into 
Bosnia). They rape girls and mistreat people in the street. 
They've become a problem here". " 
The article offers no possible explanations for the raping of Serb 'girls' by Serb 
paramilitary forces, suffice to say, quite unconnectedly, that the city has recently seen 
an influx of '500,000 ethnic Serbs who fled their homes in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Slovenia as the former republics broke away. To many, they are refugees competing 
for jobs in a collapsing economy'. " Is Bernstein implying a connection? Is there 
hostility between the Serbian refugees and the native Belgradians - enough animosity 
to incite rape? Although this article is not using the raping of women as a propaganda 
tool, as such, this article stands as an example of the persuasive power of propaganda 
on the attitudes of the general population. 
In April 1993, The Guardian published an article in which Ian Traynor profiles Ratko 
Mladic, who is described initially not as the head of the Bosnian Serb army, but as 
'the general at the head of the campaign of ethnic cleansing'. This introduction alone 
confirrns the direction which Traynor intends to take. In the article Traynor includes 
direct quotations from NUadic, who, as expected, denies even the existence of 
detention camps, mass rape and other atrocities. For example, the article states: 
Named as a suspected war criminal by the US, General Mladic 
to this day ridicules-the main charges against the Bosnian Serb 
leadership. Detention Camps? "The [television] pictures were 
arranged by the Bush administration to justify the use of [US] 
weapons throughout the entire planet. " Systematic rape of 
Muslim women? "There has never been a Muslim woman in 
any prison.... We would have to be maximal sex maniacs to 
achieve it. [The rape charge] is a product of a sick mind and 
paid propaganda. "" 
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It is obvious from the general tone of the article that although it is Mladic, who talks 
about Western propaganda as being the source of the problem, the representation of 
the situation explicitly implied in the article is that Mladic is himself one of the main 
disseminators of anti-Muslim, pro-Serbian propaganda. So, even as Mladic is 
categorically denying that Muslim women have been detained or systematically 
raped, the reader is already convinced that whatever he says, it will be false. 
In a later Guardian article also by Ian Traynor, written in the summer of 1993, the 
subject of propaganda is touched upon again. Traynor is talking to Serbian Pavle Ivic, 
whom he calls a highly educated man, [who] speaks several languages, has a 
distinguished career behind him and is a rabid Serbian nationalist'. " Ivic works, we 
are told, as an academic at the brains trust of the Grdater Serbian Project'which is 
housed at the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Belgrade. Traynor, during the. 
inter-view raises the question of 'plots' - presumably Serbian 'plots' that are hatched 
within the walls of the brains trust'. The article continues by airing Ivic's views 
(although there are no quotation marks used), in the following manner: 
You want to hear about plots? Ivic asks tetchily. Ethnic 
cleansing, mass rape, detention camps, thousands dead, 
hundreds of thousands homeless, the end of Yugoslavia, all of 
this and more has been caused not by the combatants and their 
political masters, but by the rest of the world. " 
Traynor states that this is 'a common view repeated across Serbia, a view lifted 
straight from the TV broadcasts Milosevic controls', and then continues to quote Ivic: 
Germany definitely had an interest in creating vassal states in 
the Western part of Yugoslavia (Croatia and Slovenia). If we 
talk about the war in Bosnia, the main culprit was the West. The 
Muslim world is extremely important, extending from Morocco 
to Indonesia. The US was eager to please the Muslim world and 
Saudi money funded the world media which satanised the 
Serbs. " 
If, after assessing all the evidence to support the theory, one accepts that the raping of 
Bosnian women did occur on a massive scale, then Ivic's views, as well as accusing 
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others of using propaganda, could also be regarded as propaganda. The denial of an 
event is as much a propaganda strategy as the fabrication of fictitious events. 
Moreover, Traynor's representation of Ivic's views as propaganda signifies that he 
believes, and therefore will represent, the war-rapes as fact. 
The question of the effects of propaganda on Serbian soldiers' actions, and thus 
possibly on their propensity to rape, is raised by Traynor in a later passage. He uses 
the example of Borislav Herak - the Sarajevo Serb sentenced to death in March by the 
Bosnian government for multiple murder and rape. Traynor states that the impact of 
the 'formidable weave of propaganda' on the Serbian soldiers can be seen by 
analysing the court testimony and press interviews with Herak. Traynor states: 
.A 
fairly unremarkable factory worker before the war, [Herak] 
had never nursed any hatred of his fellow Muslims and Croats 
with whom he grew up, he said. No tribal urge to kill nor 
burning resentment of ethnic adversaries. Once he joined up 
with the Serbian fighters, the exercises included slitting pig's 
throats as practice for killing Muslims, he said. He was told the 
Islamic government would stigmatise the Serbs, as the Nazis 
did the Jews, that Serbian babies were being slaughtered and 
Serbian girls held in brothels, and that the Muslims had killed 
his father. After his father visited him in prison, he said at the 
trial, he realised he had been lied to. " 
Propaganda for Traynor, Ivic and Herak played an important role in their perceptions 
of the war and hence their actions. The representations here are that for Herak it was a 
spur to take part in Serbian atrocities, including rape. For Ivic it convinced him that 
mass rape and other Serbian atrocities were simply figments of the West's 
imagination. And for Traynor, following research, interviews, and the weighing up of 
evidence, he has made his position perfectly clear and has presented his views on the 
dissemination of Serbian propaganda in the British press in the following way: 
While the papers that no one buys may say what they like, state 
television, which enjoys a monopoly outside Belgrade, daily 
drums home its message of Serbian righteousness against the 
world, serving up a diet of charred and disfigured corpses; the 
camera invariably lingering greedily on the details. The 
message is that of Serbian innocence, persecution and revenge. ZD 
For five years, long before the wars began, television had first 
75 ibid. 
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been creating enemies, then dehumanising them, and 
representing them as a threat to the very survival of the Serbian 
nation. The result is that violence is routine, and implicitly 
condoned. What follows is that the facts are manufactured and 
tailored to lend credence to the propaganda lies. "' 
When Traynor's and Ivic's views on what constitutes propaganda in this war are 
placed on a continuum, both men would take up positions close to opposite ends of 
the spectrum: one believed in mass rape as just Western propaganda, the other 
implied that initially the raping of Serbian women was used by Serbia as a 
propaganda tool to encourage Serbian men to fight. But in this situation what happens 
to the actual rapes (the information or knowledge of those rapes) and the rape victims 
themselves? When used as propaganda, it is the various representations of the rapes 
and the victims that become important to the warring factions, not the real pain and 
distress of the women, men, or the children who have suffered sexual violence and 
even death. 
Salah Ezz, one can only assume a member of the public, in a letter to The Guardian 
and written a few weeks after the Traynor article was published, makes the same 
point, namely that propaganda allows the world's gaze to be diverted from the real 
victims. Writing from Oxford, Ezz states: 
The first mention by Serb propagandists of the "Islamic 
declaration" is maliciously selective. All his subsequent 
writings, which stressed the virtues of democracy and 
pluralism, are deliberately ignored. This selectivity has always 
been intended to justify Serbian savagery and sway Western 
public opinion ... [who have] turned a blind eye to the 
extermination of European Muslims, let war criminals off the 
hook, render the mass rape of women, the slaughter of children 
and thegenocl. de of a whole nation worthless. " 
Bearing in mind that the writer's background and status are unclear, this letter, written 
in response to the press' representation of rape and other atrocities in the Balkans, is 
stating that the West has been complicit in the continuous slaughter and sexual abuse C7 
of European Muslims'. As mentioned in the Introduction to Part Two, in all war 
reporting complete impartiality is difficult to achieve. Of course, an illusion of 
76 ibid. 
77 Salah Ezz, "Letter: War Tom, " The Guardian, 23 July 1993, sec. FEA, p. 23. 
145 
balance is relatively easy for journalists to create - by including quotations from both 
'sides' and by using language that sounds objective to express subjective questions. 
Yet, one must always question which 'side' the journalist is reporting from. For 
example, the journalist cannot always get access to information and interviews from 
all warring factions in the conflict and this is dependent, for the most part, on where 
the journalist's own government stands on the conflict. Take, for example, the 
Falklands War, British journalists did not have constant access to information and 
interviews with Argentineans. " And research has since revealed that the majority of 
British news reporting from the Falklands War was partial due to government 
censorship, both at the point of delivery and in the editing rooms. " Thus, all war 
reports should be read with care. 
In yet another Ian Traynor article, written again for The Guardian and published in 
the autumn of 1993, the notion of propaganda is briefly mentioned in passing. The 
article is discussing the launch of the international war crimes tribunal and its relative 
merits. However, Traynor comments that '[t]he rival authorities in ex-Yugoslavia 
have their own war crimes commissions, working overtime compiling lists of 
massacres and pumping out blood-curdling propaganda'. " Traynor offers no example 
of this Wood-curdling propaganda', however, Catharine MacKinnon perhaps gives us 
an insight into the kind of propaganda to which Traynor is referring. In an article 
Turning Rape into Pornography: Post-modem Genocide'. MacKinnon describes how 
some of the raped Croatian and Muslim women were videotaped as they were being 
abused. MacKinnon refers to many incidents and cites her source as Natalie Nenadic, 
an American of Croatian and Bosnian heritage. One example includes the following 0 
passage: 
One woman who survived the Bucje rape/death camp in 
Serbian-occupied Croatia reports the making of pornography of 
her rapes this way: "In front of the camera, one beats you and 
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the other - excuse me - fucks you, he puts his truncheon in you, 
and he films all that". 81 
MacKinnon continues to explain how the filming of these rapes is 'clearly intended' 
for 'mass consumption as war propaganda' and how this is most commonly done by 
switching the ethnic labels of both the rape victims and the rapists. Muslim and 
Croatian women are forced to 'confess'on film that they are Serbian women and that 
those raping them are not Serbian soldiers but are men from either the Croatian or 
Muslim forces. Through this use of propaganda, symbols, words, images and 
identities can be manipulated to represent anything, even to 'represent' these women - 
the 'real' rape victims - out of existence. It should be noted that even though 
scepticism might appear somehow disloyal in the face of what could be real suffering, 
careful reading of these and the following accounts is required before accepting their 
Iruth'. Particularly as MacKinnon does not offer any references to support these 
claims other than thanking the survivors of the Kareta Feminist Group in Zorica 
Spo1jar whom she interviewed. 
However, MacKinnon sustains the propaganda argument by claiming that the actual 
rapes of Muslim and Croatian women by Serbian soldiers, filmed as they happen, 
have been shown on the evening news in Banja Luka, a Serbian-occupied city in 
western Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that the women were represented as being Serbian. 
MacKinnon continues: 
In September 1992 one woman about age fifty, entirely naked 
and with visible bruises, was shown being raped on television. 
A Serbian cross hung around her neck; the rapist - using a tenn 
for Serbian fascist collaborator that has become a badge of 
pride among Serb forces - cursed her Chetnik mother; someone 
was yelling "hard , er". 
The verbal abuse was dubbed - and 
unmistakably Serbian in intonation and usage. " 
However, although this example might demonstrate to some extent the amateurish 
nature of these attempts at propaganda, MacKinnon's next example underlines this 
fact: 
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In another televised rape a few days later, a women near age 
thirty-five, with short, dark hair, was shown on the ground; her 
hands were spread and tied to a tree, her legs tied to her hands. 
Many men watched her raped in person; thousands more 
watched her raped on television. This time in an apparent 
technical lapse, about four or five seconds of the actual sound 
track was aired: "Do you want sex, Ustashas? Do you like 
Serbian stud horses ? 1183 
Although these examples of Serbian attempts at blood-curdling propaganda' may 
seem bungling and inept, to concentrate on this fact is to miss the point entirely. The 
point is that the films might have been made, " and if they were the women involved 
not only had to suffer the pain and humiliat ion that accompanies violent sexual abuse, 
and also bear the added burden of shame that their abuse has been recorded for others 
consumption. Furthermore, they would have had to cope with the ignominy of being 
falsely represented and to carry the knowledge that they have in some way, albeit 
innocently, contributed to the'continued raping of Muslim and/or Croatian women by 
the videos of their rapes inciting further retribution. The sense of complete 
powerlessness for these women is difficult to comprehend. Psychological reports 
have suggested that coming to terms with being unable to stop the rape is one of the 
most difficult hurdles for the victims to overcome. " However, these rape victims also 
have to come to terms with the possibility that the film of their sexual abuse and 
humiliation could continually be repeated - all in the name of propaganda. 
This form of propaganda has been used primarily -by or against rival nationalist 
groups within the. former-Yugoslavia. However, Ian Traynor reported in mid- 
December 1993 that in the run-up to Serbian parliamentary elections, Slobadan 
Milosevic: and Vojislav Sese1j, the leaders of the two main political parties have been 
accusing each other of organising 'rape', massacre and plunder'. " According to 
Traynor, Milosevic has called Sese1j 'the personification of evil', has published 
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allegations of 'outrages against civilians'. has claimed that Sese1j's paramilitaries, the 
Chetniks, have 'murdered, raped and slaughtered people, and even played football 
with chopped-off heads'. Furthermore, Milosevic has also dropped heavy hints that 
SeseIj may stand trial for alleged war crimes. In return, SeseIj claims that Milosevic 
sponsored atrocities in Croatia and Bosnia, 'controlled an orgy of killing and looting, 
and has stashed away 'several billion dollars'in secret bank accounts in Cyprus which 
he and his associates have 'earned from war booty'. " The form that the representation 
of rape has taken in this instance is that it is merely pigeonholed as 'another' atrocity 
to be used as a propaganda tool in a game between political rivals. Throughout the 
article neither Milosevic nor Seselj actually deny the allegations made against them 
by the other party, but merely counter the other's claims with even more grotesque 
accusations levelled at the opposing side. For exarrfple, in the closing passage of the 
article Traynor states the following: 
Although Mr. Sese1j's campaign is flagging because it lacks 
access to state-controlled television, he is capable of divulging 
sleaze about the Milosevic regime. He said he had no objection 
to appearing before the recently established Yugoslav war 
crimes tribunal in The Hague. But there would be little point 
going, he added, unless accompanied by Mr. Milosevic. " 
Sese1j, in this barely veiled threat to Milosevic, appears to be almost admitting that 
they are both guilty of war crimes, with rape, or at least the condoning of rape, 
included. Rape when represented in this context, as with the other atrocities of war 
mentioned above, appears to have lost its due context. Rape no longer seems to be 
about women's experiences of suffering and humiliation, but the word has been used 
purely for its ability to sensationalise. Neither Milosevic nor Seselj are represented as 
feeling apologetic or remorseful in any way and the only emotion displayed is one of 
concern for their own political standing. The 'rapes'were not being discussed for any 
other reason than to elicit a response from their political opponents, the term appears 
to have been used simply for its 'shock! value in a m8lde of political propaganda. This ZD 
issue will be discussed again in Chapter Eight. 
87 ibid. 
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The last article, which deals in a sense with the futility of trying to argue against 
propaganda, was written by Maggie OKane and published in The Guardian on 
Christmas Eve 1993. This article was first mentioned in the 'ethnic cleansing' section 
of this chapter, but to reiterate, OKane had been interviewing some men from the 
'17th Brigade' or Ihe refug ee army' whom she described as 'survivors of [Serbian] 
detention camps' and who had been living in a forest on the side of a mountain for 
fifteen months. Originally fighting with the Croats, OKane quotes one Bosnian 
Muslim soldier as saying that 'now the Croats have turned against us too'. " After 
interviewing the soldiers of 'the refugee army', who recounted many horrendous 
stories and various sets of tragic circumstances which brought the individual men 
together as a unit, OKane returns to Vitez and states the following: 
Back in Vitez, our Croat landlady, Victoria, asks the returning 
journalists about the men we met on Krustica mountain, men 
she calls "mujahadeen" (Muslim guerrilla fighters). Her 
husband, Milan, spends his days in a muddy trench waiting for 
them to come over the hill. For a brief moment, around their 
stove, you try to explain that their are no mujahadeen, about 
Commander Churkin who lost all his family in Kozarac, and 
Kalco whose bus never came to take him back to his village. 
But Victoria says she knows they are preparing for a Muslim 
jihad (holy war) and it just seems easier to shut up and drink 
some more schnapps. ' 
It has been shown that the effects of propaganda are the greatest where the message is 
in line with the existing opinions, beliefs and experiences of the receivers. " For 
example, we are not told how old Victoria, the Croat landlady is, but it is possible that 
she has memories of previous antagonisms between the Serb and Croat people. In 
addition, she may harbour stereotypical views of the Muslim people as Islamic 
fundamentalists, and through continuous massaging by the nationalistic media these 
'vague beliefs'become 'truth'for Victoria. Here the effects of propaganda would tend 
to take the form of reinforcement rather than change. Moreover, when propaganda 
does have an affect. on Victoria, it does so due to a number of factors, not due solely 
to the Croatian media. The media, of course, plays a major role, however, the social 
context, social interaction and the perceived credibility of the sources of the 
information all contribute to the affect of this propaganda. For example, an article in 
89Maggie OKane, "Bosnia's Last Stand, " The Guardian, 24 December 1993, sec. WEE, p. 4. 
90ibid. 
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The Times detailing the confession of Borislav Herak, the Serb conscript who 
admitted rape and murder, states that '[Herak] added that Serb commanders 
continually told their men that Bosnian troops were performing worse atrocities 
against Serbian civilians and that they were in a fight for their survival'. ` In an 
equivalent article in The Guardian it also states that '[flrom Serbian radio and 
television and in gatherings with other Serbian fighters, particularly the older 
generation steeped in Serbian folklore going back to Serbian defeats by the Ottoman 
Turks in the Middle Ages, [Herak] said he learned that Muslims posed a threat to the 
Serbs'. " Given the representation within these articles of Herak's social situation, it 
does seem a possibility that he did believe everything his commanders, his comrades, 
the media, and so on were telling him. 
Furthermore, generally a propagandist does not have to convince people on every 
issue in order to gain their support. If the propagandists can change opinions on one 
or two issues, often-favourable responses to other issues will follow. For example, if 
Victoria (the Croatian landlady) believed her leaders when they assured her that the 
Muslims were preparing for a jihad, then it was likely that she would also believe 
them if they announced that the Muslims were mass raping Croatian women, or that 
the Serbians were playing football with severed Croatian heads. Moreover, the greater 
the monopoly of the propaganda source over the receivers, the greater would be the 
effect in the direction favoured by the source. 
The outcome of the use of rape as propaganda as discussed above, is that it becomes 
nothing more than just another faceless atrocity: 'mass rape'becomes a dehumanised 
term which appears to be used in political circles in an attempt to discredit one's 
political opponents. WIile at the same time, Women of all nationalitiesý throughout the 
Balkans are struggling to come to terms with the physical and psychological damage 
inflicted upon them, albeit indirectly, by these same political elites. As Barbara 
Hewson states in an article written for The Times in September 1992, in war 
'[w]omen it seems are peripheral; rape is so much propaganda'. " In other words, to C, 
91See Jowett and ODonnell (1992). 
92 Leading article, "Serb learnt rape and murder, " The Times, 14 December 1992, p. 1. 
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94Barbara Hewson, 08 September 1992. 
151 
those in political power the actual experiences of the raped women are insignificant; 
the only value of 'rape'is as a propaganda tool. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has offered an analytical and critical examination of the newspaper 
articles, which claim that nationalism in its various manifestations is the root cause of 
the occurrence of mass rape in war in the Balkans. Some journalists have claimed that 
the alleged rapes in the Balkans were due specifically to ethnic cleansing, some 
suggested that religion played a major part in inciting the rapes, while others claimed 
that the use of nati6nalistic wartime propaganda was significant in promoting the use 
of rape as a retaliatory weapon against women in the Balkans. 
However, when explained as just 'part'of ethnic cleansing, the reality of mass rape in 
war - specifically the women's experiences of rape - become invisible within the term 
'ethnic cleansing'. For example, when taken as a part of an all-encompassing atrocity 
it is not viewed as a separate act of sexual abuse and violence against women, but as 
just one part of a larger wartime phenomenon. " When placed within a religious 
context, however, and explained as occurring due to religious differences, the rapes 
appear more visible. This specifically seems to be the case when set against the 
backdrop of the traditional roles played by Muslim women and the 'sacredness' of 
virginity for unmarried females and monogamy for married women. Yet, as the 
Muslim women's bodily integrity is so inextricably linked to their religious laws and a 
gross violation of one is also a gross violation of the other, there is the danger that the 
women's bodily experiences will be overshadowed by the community's reaction to the 
'religious' violations. Moreover, within a religious framework, the women's 
experiences of rape, as has been illustrated, were often hijacked by politicians from 
other Islamic countries attempting to use the rapes either in a game of political point 
scoring, or as a means of gaining extra wives for their own male populace - arguably 
95 Jasmina Kuzmanovic, "Legacies of Invisibility: Past Silence, Present Violence Against Women in the 0 former-Yugoslavia, " in Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, eds., Women's Rights and Human Rights: 
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adding 'trafficking of women for sexual slavery' to the women's experiences of rape 
in war. 
96 
In the propaganda war, as with ethnic cleansing, when the rapes are regarded as just 
another tactic, the consequence is that they become invisible in the m8l6e of theories 
concerning larger wartime phenomenon. Moreover, once the notion of propaganda 
has been introduced, whether the rapes are 'fact' or 'fiction', whether they appear 
'believable' or 'unbelievable', it is almost impossible to differentiate between them. 
Thus, one tends to suspend belief until more 'evidence' is forthcoming, which in the 
case of incidences of rape in war often never does. " Consequently, the experiences of 
the rape victims are relegated to mere 'stories', at least temporarily. 
While sections of the British press have portrayed the rapes as having happened on a 
massive scale, the current mainstream explanations for mass rape in war discussed in 
this chapter are unable to fully explain all incidents of this wartime phenomenon as 
they occurred in the Balkan conflict. Therefore, theories based on a 'war game' 
framework will now be discussed. In other words, Chapter Five attempts to identify 
those journalists' explanations which look at rape as 'strategy', as soldier's R&R, 
militarisation and/or misogyny. 
96 Editorial, "The Coalition Against the Trafficking in Women, " Coalition Report Vol. 3, no. 1 (1995): 
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5 
WAR GAMES 
Any inquiry into rape in war is soon embroiled in a confusion of myths and 
ideologies. One of the most frequently cited and seemingly widely accepted of myths, 
as discussed in Chapters One and Two, is the theory that rape is a 'natural'part of war 
and that the male soldier's sexual-urges, normally kept in check by societal 'peacetime' 
restraints, run rampant during the anarchy of war. This explanation is predicated on a 
'pressure-cooker' theory of male 'nature', ' as detailed in Chapter One, where men are 
ýeen as involuntary victims of their own violent and instinctive nature, and thus 
relieved of any personal responsibility for their actions. This chapter intends to 
expand on this theme by critically analysing newspaper articles which have used this, 
and similar theories based on 'war game'themes such as 'strategy'. R&R' , 'misogyny' 
and 'militarisation'. to try and explain the rapes in the Balkan war. In so doing it 
questions the press' role in perpetuating simplistic explanations for a far more 
complex issues. . 
Language has obvious significance in the writing of newspaper articles, and the way it 
is used is of interest here. In particular, it is within some articles analysed in this 
chapter that the most sustained use of military euphemisms and 'war language' are 
found. Throughout the various issues addressed in this chapter, including Yape 
camps', misogyny and two smaller sections within 'misogyny' which deal with the 
issues of militarisation and male rape, there is a discernible change in the rhetoric 
used by the press, from the language of humanitarianism to the euphemistic language 
of war. It appears as though the use of military euphemisms is designed to achieve a 
particular objective, that is, whether consciously or subconsciously, abstraction. It 
1D. Scully, Understanding Sexual Violence: A Study of Convicted Rapists (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 
1990). 
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seems to remove the reader from the real experiences of war, because confronted by 
descriptions of actual wartime experiences such as rape and death, the reader is more 
likely to interpret the report in a personal and identifiable way. ' But, the press'use of 
euphemistic %var-talk' anaesthetises the reader to the harsh realities of fighting a real 
war: rape, death, and genocide. ' 
Rape as Strategy 
To begin the discussion of 'rape as strategy' we review an article first discussed in 
Chapter Four which describes the personal account of Borislav Herak, a 'Serbian 
volunteer' drafted as an auxiliary to the regular Serbian army, and his claims that he 
was ordered to rape by his commanders. Herak had been convicted of rape and was 
awaiting execution. The majority of the two thousand word article, written by John 
. Burns for The Guardian, is primarily concerned with detailing Herak's recollections of 
the atrocities he took part in during a six month period of the Balkan war. For 
example, Herak spoke of massacring Muslim civilians, including whole families from 
young children to grandparents. According to. The Guardian, Herak's indictments 
include the following: 
29 individual murders between June and October, including 
eight rape-murders of Muslim women held prisoner in an 
abandoned motel outside Vogosca, seven miles north of 
Sarajevo, where Herak says he and other Serbian fighters were 
encouraged to rape women and then kill them. The indictment 
also covers the killings of at least 220 other Muslim civilians, 
many of them women and children, in which Herak has 
confessed to being a witness or taking part. ' 
The article begins with a quotation from Herak himself in which he claimed, '[ilt was 
an order. I simply did what I was told. ' There are some unanswered questions that 
arise from reading this passage. For example, who encouraged the soldiers to rape? 
The implication from Herak's statement is that the order came from above, from his 
2Roger Fowler, Language in the news: Discourse and Ideology in the Presý (London: Routledge, 1996), 
ýp. 41-45. 
Israel Charny and Chanan Rapaport, How Can We Commit the Unthinkable? Genocide: The Hurnan 
Cancer (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982). 
4john Burns, "Slaughter in the name of Serbia, " The Guardian, 3 December 1992, sec. G2T, p. 2. 
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commander. Does the fact that he was not a regular soldier, but a volunteer or an 
'irregular'and represented in this article as more undisciplined than 'regular' soldiers, 
mean that he was more likely to rape.? Again, that appears to be the implication as the 
article continues with Herak explaining the incidents of rape and murder that he has 
confessed to and recalled in fairly explicit detail. 
Meanwhile, Bums keeps up a running commentary on some of the more negative 
aspects of Herak's life. The reader is informed that Herak had a history of poor grades 
in school, erratic behaviour as a conscript in the Yugoslav navy, and a problem with 
alcohol which led to bouts of heavy drinking accompanied by threats to physically 
harm his father. The cupboards in Herak's room were filled with 'piles of 
pornographic magazines and empty liquor bottles'. (It should be noted, that these 
possible explanations for Herak's behaviour mirror the explanations given for rape by 
both Groth and Scully in Chapter One. ) Furthermore, prior to the war, Herak 
apparently had only 'a menial job at a Sarajevo textile company. 'In addition, to these 
negative pieces of information we are also told that until Herak joined the Serbian 
fighters Herak had, in Bum's words: 
spoke[n] kindly of Muslims, in particular of Jankovic, his 
brother-in-law, whom he described as exceptionally kind and a 
good husband to his sister. Speaking of the couple's daughter, 
Indijana, who like tens of thousands of people in Sarajevo has a 
mixture of Serb, Muslim and Croat forebears, he says, I love 
her more than anything in my life ... Everywhere I went, Muslims helped me. They are a very correct people. "' 
Herak then goes on to describe his claims of indoctrination by the Serbian political 
leaders and military commanders against the Muslim -people. He said he was also 
persuaded by ýSerbian radio and television' and by 'the older generation steeped in 
Serbian folklore' who told him that Miuslims posed a threat to Serbs' and were 
planning to declare 'an Islamic Republic'. So, here is a man who by his own admission 
had been involved in the mass slaughter and rape of Muslims. He could quite 
understandably be labelled a delinquent or a drunkard and, moreover, it is also a fair 
assumption that he had difficulty in getting a girlfriend, as the article states that he 
5ibid 
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was 'also motivated [to join the army as an irregular] by the urge to have things he 
never had before the war, including women'. Another important point brought out by 
the above quotation is the assumption that because Herak had no regular girlfriends. 
before the war this gave him an additional spur to rape. The implications of this 
assumption are far-reaching and will be discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
However, another over-riding question that comes to mind is whether Borislav Herak 
is typical of the Serbian volunteer fighters? Does the military at large, or perhaps just 
the volunteer force attract those men who are dysfunctional and dissatisfied with what 
their society has to offer them? Perhaps it is a 'strategy'of the military commanders to 
encourage Tlerak-type' individuals into the irregular forces; as dysfunctional 
individuals who are so dissatisfied with society that theý prove to be open to 
manipulation. Alternatively, of course, the information contained within this article 
could have been carefully selected by The Guardian to present a photofit of a Serbian 
psychopath which suitably represents the public's image of an evil Serb soldier, which 
while fitting the general anti-Serb pattern of reporting, nevertheless contributed to the 
criminalising of an entire nation. Yet, it is interesting to note that less than a quarter of 
all Serbs voted for Milosevic's nationalist regime: ' but to my knowledge that small 
Tact'was never widely reported in the British press during the period covered by this 
thesis. 
The last few paragraphs of the article are given over to Herak's description of the 
actual rape and murder of Muslim women. The most surprising thing about the rapes 
Herak describes, if the quotations are accurate, is their apparent organisation. Given 
Herak's background, particularly the claim that before the war he had 'not had any 
women', one might- have : expected the rapes'he committed to have been random and 
opportunistic. As in the reports from Vietnam in Chapter Two, a young soldier with 
little or no sexual experience of women and facing death on a daily basis might have 
used the occasional opportunity for rape in war as his 'first and last'chance (I am not 
suggesting here that this, or any other reason, could ever excuse the act). Yet, Heraks 
accounts of the rapes talk exclusively of the Sonja Cafe, a motel and restaurant 
complex on the main road north of Sarajevo, which was used as 'a prison for women' 
6 Ivan Vejvoda, "Not our war, " New Internationalist, June 1994, No. 256., pp. 10-11. 
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and 'ruled'by a Serbian fighter named Miro Vukovic who established 'a system'for 
the Serbian fighters to rape and kill Muslim women. 
Herak continues his account by explaining how 'Serbian commanders' told the 
soldiers that 'raping Muslim women was 'g ood for raising the fighters' morale', and 
how the 'prison commander'had told them, 'fy]ou can do with the women what you 
like. You can take them away from here - we don't have enough food for them 
anyway - and don't bring them back. 'The author interjects at this point and explains 
that Herak understood the prison commander 'to mean that the women should be 
killed'. Herak's recollections also include the recalling of names and approximate ages 
of some of the women he raped and murdered, and even how and where the women 
were taken away and killed. The article also claims that, '[Herak] says he w&nt to the 
motel once every three or four days, and that although Serbian fighters routinely took 
women away and killed them, there were always more women arriving'. Borislav 
Herak's last words on the subject are It was never a problem. You just picked up a 
key and went to a room. ' 
So, how are the rapes of these Muslim women being represented? Could they be 
regarded as part of a strategy devised by military or political elites, with orders passed 
on 'down then line? It's difficult to ignore the fact that Herak's accounts of the 
atrocities he, and his fellow Serbian fighters, committed are represented 'in a 
believable'way, replete with intricate details of the events. This is not to suggest that 
The Guardian journalist and editorial staff were not selective in infonnation they 
included from the interview with Herak: but why would Herak embellish, or even 
admit to, atrocities he did not commit? He was unlikely to do this when the end result 
for him could be death by firing squad. To recall Herak's opening statement: '[i]t was 
an order. I simply did what I was told'. This may, of course, have been the standard 
defence of many soldiers indicted - or risking indictment - of war crimes. ' 
"ibid. 
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In another article written for The Guardian by Catherine Bennett, Helena Harbraken, a 
researcher on Amnesty International's Yugoslavia research team, was asked for her 
opinion on whether concerted rape is radically different from random, opportunistic 
rape during wartime. Harbraken, at the time the article was written, had yet to find 
any conclusive proof that rape has been used as a 'strategy' rather than a side effect of 
war in the Balkans. Moreover, she suggested that any speculation which infers that 
the rapes in Bosnia were ordered from 'above'is unhelpful and serves to mask the real 
root of the problem. By way of explanation Harbraken states that, 'men never need an 
excuse to rape, and if you say they rape because it's an order you take all the power 
out of that first statement, and youYe saying actually they don't want to rape, and in 
general they're really good, brave guys? To support Harbraken's viewpoint - that 'the 
current concern over rapeý-strategy is peripheral' - Catherine Bennett quotes feminist 
Susan Brownmiller, whose book Against Our Will written in 1975, still remains the 
most comprehensive account of rape, including rape in war, produced to date. 
Brownmiller has said: 
My point has always been that you don't need orchestration, or 
commands from on high when you have a young soldier with a 
gun. You don't need any orders to rape'. " 
These arguments, while attempting to show that 'all men'are capable of rape, an idea 
that will be discussed in Chapter Seven, and that no 'strategy' of rape, initiated and 
condoned by military commanders, is necessary for men to rape in war, could also be 
regarded as an apologist argument for nfflitary or political elites who may, or may not, 
have ordered their armed forces to rape as part of a pre-determined and organised 
strategy. 
In an attempt to balance the 'rape as stfategy' argument, " Bennett includes a quotation 
in at the beginning of her article from an unnamed source. The quotation is short and 
seemingly obvious given that the subject being discussed is rape in war. It reads, 
'[t]hey said they'd kill me if I didn't'. Within the context of the article, the reader is 
expected to believe that this is a rape victim speaking, but Bennett informs us that 
9Catherine Bennett, "Ordinary Madness, " The Guardian, 20 January 1993, sec. G2T, p. 2. 
loibid. 
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these are in fact the words of a convicted rapist -a 'deserter' from the Serbian forces. 
Bennett continues the explanation in the following manner: 
The people who were going to kill him if he didn't rape two 
teenage girls were his fellow soldiers. His story, together with 
statements from other penitent rapists, is part of the evidence 
that rape in Bosnia is not sporadic but systematic, organised 
rather than adventitious'. " 
First, the use of the label 'deserter' is questionable. On one hand a 'deserter' conjures 
up the image of a coward or a traitor who has abandoned his 'post' and his comrades 
for purely selfish reasons. Could he be regarded as trustworthy or his stories accurate? 
On the other hand, if this 'deserter' was being forced by his brothers in arms' to 
commit rape and other sexual abuse, and he sacrificed his 'post' to save his and 
possibly other women's honour, do we sympathise with him? Is he perceived as a 
brave, moralistic man; a defector from the 'wrong'side to the side of Iruth and right'? 
Second, Bennett also mentioned 'other penitent rapists'. However, research has 
indicated that there are no further reports which suggest that there are more than one 
or two 'penitent rapists' waiting to tell their stories to the world. And as to their 
'penitence', that is another subject for debate, although the cynical view would be that 
penitence frequently accompanies the discovery of one's crimes. The identity of the 
'deserter come penitent rapist' is not disclosed and it is not made clear whether this 
'evidence'is going to form part of prosecution evidence at the War Crimes Tribunal. 
That the mass raping women in the Balkans was due to a prearranged military or 
political strategy has been a popular accusation carried in the British press and 
levelled in particular at the Serbian government. Although there has been no hard 
evidence to support this allegation, the numbers of rape victims and the wide 
geographical spread of the incidence of rape, does suggest that there was more than 
random sexual abuse and wartime violence against women at work. Whether the 
allegations are ever substantiated or not, as mentioned above, these suggestions fitted 
the general consensus of opinion at the time, which rightly or wrongly served to 
demonise the Serb population further. 
"ibid. 
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However, it should be noted that even if these allegations were accurate and there was 
a Serb 'policy' of rape, then that policy would have called for a considerable number 
of men to be complicit in this strategy. If so, did all the men have to be ordered to 
rape? Moreover, is it physically possible to rape to order? Whatever the answers to 
these questions, the fact remains that if one accepts the extent of the rapes, then there 
must have been plenty of men who did not need much coercion. Therefore, the 
explanations for the rapes that concentrate solely on 'strategy' cannot be sufficient; 
there must have been other factors at work. Thus, a further journalistic explanations 
for the rapes is now discussed, namely the soldiers need for R&R. 
R&R (&'Rape Camps') 
Rest and Relaxation (R&R) appears to have become an integral part of war. " As has 
been illustrated in Chapter Two, in Vietnam 'camp followers'were condoned and even 
encouraged by military commanders, " and in the Second World War 'comfort women' 
were imported specifically to sexually service the Japanese soldiers Ineed'for R&R. " 
The newspaper articles analysed in this section primarily represent the rapes in terms 
of R&R for the soldiers, but rather than this R&R being portrayed as a collection of 
random acts of rape and violence committed as the soldiers move from village to 
village, the majority of the articles conclude that, in a similar fashion to the World 
War H experiences of tha 'comfort women'. women and girls were rounded up and 
held in 'rape camps'or 'makeshift brothels'for the soldiers regular use. 
The use of the word 'camp'in this instance carries with it some emotive baggage, as it 
conjures up pictures of World War II concentration c amps re plete with images of 
Nazi atrocities. On the other hand, it also evokes images of holiday camps packed 
with fun and excitement - and R&R. The use of the word 'camp' conjures up 
conflicting images, neither of which sit comfortably with the word 'rape'. The use of 
the word brothel'in these circumstances also raises a few questions. One connotation 
12C ynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics 
(Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1990). 
13 Linda Grant, "Vietnam Tango, " Sexing the Millennium (London: Harper Collins, 1993), ch. 10. 
14 Barbara Ehrenreich, "Wartime in the Barracks, " Time, 2 December 1996, p. 80. 
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carried by the word is the suggestion that those living/working in a brothel are 
somehow complicit in their actions, therefore, on some level this phrase also sits 
uncomfortably next to the issue of rape. This is supported by the dictionary definition 
of the word brothel', which states, '[h]ouse etc. where prostitutes may be visited'. " To 
my knowledge the women and girls who have been subjected to rape in the Balkan 
conflict have never been represented as 'consenting' prostitutes. Therefore, the terms 
brothel camps' and 'enforced prostitution' - another term often used to refer to the 
women's detention in 'rape camps'- could both be viewed as a contradiction in terms. 
The first journalist to be credited with reporting on the raping of women in the Balkan 
conflict was Roy Gutman writing from Split in August 1992. However, a month 
earlier Louise Branson, writing for the Sunday Times, detailed tw6 small accounts of 
rape which seem to have been lost within the lengthy fifteen hundred word article. 
The paragraph in question begins as follows: 
It is without question that rapes and torture occur on both sides 
in camps where hostages are held for exchange. One woman, 
Liliana Sjeran, said she listened as a Serb woman doctor, Olga 
Drasko, 40, was raped repeatedly in a camp in Caplina. "She 
was raped perhaps a hundred times. She has gone crazy, " Sjeran 
told me. In one of the seedy Belgrade hotels where many 
Serbian refugees now live, I also met Bozo Vucetina, who said 
his wife and daughter had been raped outside Sarajevo and were 
still trapped in the city. He was a broken man. " 
It is interesting that the British media in general did not appear to pick up on these ZD 
accounts. Was this because they were not described in graphic detail as were the 
accounts by Roy Gutman a month later? Or was it because the accounts were both 
concerning the rape of Serbian women and therefore did not fit with the 
representation--of the Serbs as the bad guys? It could, of course, have been simply 
that both cases of rape were second-hand accounts and not direct interviews with the 
rape victims themselves. Alternatively, it has been suggested that because the reporter 
was a woman her stories might have been regarded as more unbelievable than that of 
her male counterparts, particularly when discussing what has traditionally been 
15J. B. Sykes, ed., "Brothel, " The Concise Oxford Dictionary - 6th ed. (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), p. 125. 
16 Louise Branson, "Atrocities: Muslims, Croats and Serbs in catalogue of shame, " Sunday Times, 12 
July 1992, p. 1&13. 
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regarded as an 'emotive women's issue'. " (An interesting point which will be raised 
again in Chapter Seven. ) However, a recent report (June 1998) detailing the raping of 
women on a large scale during Indonesia's latest troubles was written and reported by 
a man, 18 yet the report was paid little attention by the British media. Perhaps it was 
simply the subject that was found to be uncomfortable and unbelievable and not the 
sex of the journalist. 
It was Gutman's account in August 1992, published in both the North American 
tabloid Newsday and The Guardian, that was credited with apparently first detailing 
rape and other atrocities in a Serb-run detention 'camp'by retelling the experience of, 
and directly quoting, a sixteen-year-old rape victim. I say 'apparently' because in the 
article it appears thaf Gutman is quoting directly from a personal interview*with the 
young victim, however, in his later book, A Witness to Genocide, he admits that he 
was not. In Gutman's own words he defined the articles as 'explosive', " and at the 
beginning of his book Gutman discusses the story of the atrocities and rapes in the 
Balkans as it was breaking, and states: 
I sensed that the story was of such dimensions and seriousness 
that every element had to be sourced, using eyewitnesses or 
official statements, and that photos were essential to establish 
instant credibility. Every theory I developed about the events 
and those responsible should be potentially falsifiable - that is, 
structured in a way that if it was wrong, it could be so proven. ' 
However, Gutman decided to break his own rules and in the very next paragraph he 
stated the following: 
Having set such lofty standards, I immediately made an 
exception and wrote about the Omarska camp, which I had not 
visited, based on the second-hand witness account. The witness 
was too scared to talk with me directly, but her account had so 
17 Linda Steiner, "Power at Work: Accounting for discrimination in the Newsroom" (paper presented at 
the News, Gender and Power, University of Wales, Cardiff, 12-13 September 1996); Kay Mills, "What 
Difference do Women Journalists Make? " in Pippa Norris, ed., Women, Media and Politics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 41-55. 
18Reported on BBC Radio 4s Today' programme (23 June 1998) and also found on the Web site: 
httl2: //www. bbe. co. uk/worldservice/eastasiatodav/ea980623. htm#story4. Although not a broadsheet 
there was also comprehensive coverage in the following article. Sarah Strickland, "The systematic rape 
of ethnic Chinese women was so terrible that counsellors break down describing it, " The Express, 10 
August 1998, p. 16. 
19Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element Books, 1993), p. xiii. 
20ibid., p. xii. 
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startled the Muslim leadership in Banja Luka that I asked them 
to dictate their notes to me. My thought was that if Omarska 
was a death camp, this needed to be put in print to alert others. " 
To even the most uncritical reader, armed with this information, it would be difficult 
to read the article in question without speculating on its factual content and raising the 
possibility of the Muslim leadership' using Gutman for propaganda purposes. There 
are, without doubt, some seemingly implausible statements in the article. For 
example, the article states: 
Reports of rape have been so extensive that some analysts think 
it may be systematic. Sevko Omerbasic, the leader of the 
Muslim community in Croatia and Slovenia, who is in touch 
with hundreds of refugees, has reached that conclusion. "There 
is more and more evidence that all the young women have been 
raped, " he said in a recent interview ... [T]housands, perhaps 
tens of thousands, of rape victims may remain in the prison 
camps that have been set up in schools, factories and entire 
villages. " 
In Gutman's defence, he states in his book that following the writing of this initial 
article, he immediately went to the Balkans to report directly from the war zone and 
all subsequent reports were written from first-hand experience. However, with regard 
to the above article, considering that the report as a whole is a shocking account of 
rape in war, and by Gutman's own standards was regarded by him as 'explosive'. the 
issue of Yape camps' does not surface again in The Guardian for a further four 
months. Other atrocities are discussed in the interim period and rape is mentioned in 
other contexts, but the issue of 'rape camps'is not explored further. 
Another point worth making is that Gutman did not use the phrase 'rape camps'. but 
spoke only of incidents of rape within. 'Serbian prison camps'. It was not until later in 
1992 that the term appears to have come into common usage. For exam le, the next 0p 
article to mention the rape of women and girls in 'camps' was published in The 
Guardian on 4 December 1992. ' The article has no cited author, but was simply 
submitted from the international news agency Reuter in Paris'. Therefore, it is not 
21ibid. 
22 Roy Gutman, "Witnesses call teenager's rape in camp typical', " The Guardian, 10 Au, -, ust 1992, see. 
FOR, p. 8. 
23 Reuter in Paris, "WEU demands justice for 'rape camp' victims, " The Guardian, 4 December 1992, 
sec. FOR, p. 11. 
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possible to say now whether the term came from Reuters, from editorial input, or 
whether the term was already in use in other areas of the British/international media. 
This short article with the headline WEU demands justice for 'rape camp' victims', 
packs a considerable amount of supposition into only eight sentences. The article 
begins in the following manner: The Western European Union parliamentary 
assembly said yesterday that it had received credible reports of the rape and torture of 
women and girls in Serb-run camps in former Yugoslavia'. " The obvious question 
here is: How does one define 'credible'? What is a 'credible report? There is no further 
r information given on these reports so the reader is left wondering who cbmpiled the 
reports. Where in the former Yugoslavia were the 'camps? On what scale was the 
'rape and torture? The fhct that the article only mentions 'Serb-run camps' wbuld 
generally not arouse criticism as it quite legitimate that the author was simply 
reporting one event in a war of atroc ities committed by all sides. (It should be 
mentioned here that it is standard practice in most broadsheet reporting to make 
reference, at the end of the article, to an alternative viewpoint, thereby balancing the 
main line of argument and suggesting an unbiased stance. ) However, the majority of 
articles researched so far have only made reference to Serb atrocities. Therefore, one 
can assume that either the reporting is an accurate reflection of wartime events and 
there have been proportionally more atrocities committed by the Serbs than by Croats 
and/or Muslims, or the press have been extremely selective in their reporting, or the 
press did not have access to all the warring sides in the conflict. 0 
It is important to reiterate one point which might have some bearing on the reporting 
style and content of the article in question, and that is the fact that the article does not 
have a by-line (it has not been attributed to'any particular journalist) but merely states 
Reuter in Paris'. meaning that the information was passed on to The Guardian by the 
news agency Reuters'office in Paris. Does this suggest that the newspaper is likely to 
be more liberal and sweeping with its editing, as there is no commissioned journalist 
to offend? Possibly. But one also has to remember that all news articles are subject to 
the structural constraints of the newsroom. For example, once a piece has been written 
it moves on to a sub-editor for changes in sentence structure, wording, heading, and 0 
24ibid. 
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so on. Then a copy-editor decides on how much, if any, of the article will appear in 
print, depending on the development of lother'news stories, advertising space, and so 
on. The final published piece often does not resemble the original article in length or 
possibly in meaning, therefore, journalists cannot afford to be 'precious' about their 
work. " 
The article continues in its condemnation of only Serb actions and its detailing of only 
Muslim victims when reporting on the Yape camps'and the subsequent motion signed 
by thirty two West European MPs. The article states: 
"Those responsible for the rape want to reduce the Muslim 
population, which is tantamount to ethnic cleansing, " the motion 
said. "Women and girls are held in 'rape camps'where each day 
they are humiliated and tortured repeatedly and ... are often even killed. " Women were being forced to have 'Chetnik' (Serb) 
children, the motion said. " 
This passage leaves similar concerns as the previous article, namely that the word 
'rape' can be used in con unction with 'camps' to create what has become a well- 
known jourrialist-friendly phrase, but when some form of explanation is required - i. e. 
what is actually taking place in the 'rape camps' - the author talks of women's 
humiliation, repeated torture, killing, even their being forced to have Serb children, 
but there is no mention of the word 'rape'. One is left to make the, perhaps obvious, 
assumption that the women and girls are being raped. The majority of the terminology 
used in the article is, on the whole, derived from direct quotations from the EU 
motion', however, it would be interesting to discover what words have been ornitted. 
For example, what information came before '... are often even killed'in the original 
document? It is possible, of course, that the motion originally mentioned rape in that 
space. If so, and the Guardian editorial team choose to ornit it, perhaps they felt that 
the word was being over-used. This is just one suggestion, and it should also be noted 
that the motion did in fact refer to rape earlier in the passage so it does not appear that 
the Euro MPs were shying away from the use of the word. 
25Personal experience and conversation with the Features Editor of The Guardian on I October 1996. 
26 ibid. 
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The next equally short Guardian article, also written in December 1992, is entitled 
Tory demands Bosnia action'. In it the Tory MP for Staffordshire South, Patrick 
Cormack, stated categorically that, in his opinion, the Government's decision not to 
use force in Bosnia was 'faint-hearted'and their inaction made them 'parties to a great 
crime'. ' There was only a brief mention of rape, and this came when Cormack was 
recounting his visit with the Bosnian foreign Minister, Haris Silajdzic, during the 
Edinburgh summit the week before. He states that Silajdzic had 'spoken of children 
being tortured and women being killed in Yape camps". " Cormack continued to be. 
quoted as saying that, 'a total of 128,000 people were reported to have been killed in 
Bosnia between May and November 23'. " This may be a pedantic point, but it is 
interesting to note that rape is only mentioned within the context of Yape camps' 
which quite quickly, as mentioned ab6e, became a well-used, if rather controversial, 
phrase. It is a phrase which journalists could regard as 'easy to usebecause there is 
seemingly little responsibility to be borne for using it. In other words, once a phrase 
has been used regularly in the media, a journalist can pick it up and use it without the 
need for explanation, or responsibility. However, when mention was made of the 
activities which were carried out within those 'camps'the words 'tortured'and killed' 
were used, but again there was no mention of rape taking place: even though the 
journalist described the holding place for the detainees as Yape camps'. 
The Times' contribution to the discussion also did not begin until December 1992 
when two articles, both published on the 23 December, stated categorically that 'rape 
camps' did exist. After mentioning, as did The Guardian, that the WEU (Western 
European Union) had reported that 'women and girls are held in rape camps where 
each day they are humiliated and tortured repeatedly and ... are often even killed', the 
first article continued: 
The "rape camps" appear to be a sinister offshoot of ethnic 
cleansing. Many victims say they were told that they would be 
raped repeatedly until they became pregnant and could bear 
ethnic Serbian children. Once they were visibly pregnant they 
27 No byline, "Tory demands Bosnia action, " The Guardian, 15 December 1992, sec. HOM, p. 7. 
28 ibid. 
29ibid. 
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were left alone until the seventh month of pregnancy, when 
abortion would be impossible. " 
While both articles discussed the presence of Yape camps' this article discussed the 
issue in a slightly different context. In essence, this article was suggesting that the 
Yape camps'were primarily initiated for the purpose of impregnating Muslim women 
and forcing them to bear Serbian children. Whereas the second article (first' and 
'second'mean nothing in this context, save the order that they were filed in the Times' 
indexing system) concentrates on telling the story of two rape victims and comparing 
their experiences with women in previous wars. Rather than using the term Yape 
camps'this article refers to them as brothel camps'. For example: 
Bosnian and Croatian human. rights groups list more than a 
dozen sites, which they describe as "brothel camps" where 
women of all ages have been held and repeatedly raped by Serb 
fighters. In survivors' testimonies the name of the Vilina Vlas 
appears again and again. In the Second World War the Nazis 
had their "joy division" of female concentration camp inmates, 
and the Japanese ran "comfort camps" where Korean women 
were forcibly recruited to act as prostitutes. Now the Bosnian 
war appears to have its own version. " 
The article also tells of survivors who claim that, 'once the soldiers have finished with 
their female captives, many of the women are killed'. " This 'policy' appears to agree 
with Tlerak's' description of events, but runs in stark contrast to the 'policy' of 
impregnation mentioned in the 'first' article above, unless, of course, all the women 
killed happen to have been either under or over reproductive age. To support the idea 
that soldiers were using the brothel camps' as simply a means of R&R, the author, 
Adam Lebor, recounts the story of Borislav Herak, mentioned at length earlier in this 
chapter. His accounts of being ordered to rape and murder, as represented in the 
British press, make no mention of orders to impregnate the Muslim women he raped, 
on the contrary he specifically mentions that it was suggested to him that he kill them 
due to the lack of food available to feed the women. " Of course, neither of these 
contrasting representations of the functions of the 'rape/brothel camps' are mutually 
exclusive, on the contrary, in the second report a Dr. Mihamet Sestic rejects both 
30Roger Boyes, "Churches say Serbs are using rape as a weapon, " The Times, 23 December 1992, p. 6. 
3 'Adam Lebor, "Victim tells of her brothel camp ordeal, " The Times, 23 December 1992, p. 6. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid. Also see, John Burns, 3 December 1992. 
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R&R theories and instead suggests that the lorganised rapes' served a far wider and 
'darker' political purpose; that of ensuring that 'Serbs and Muslims are never able to 
live together again'. " Sestic, a psychiatrist, is quoted as being representative of 'many 
Bosnians' and states that, '[t]hese Serbs are destroying our culture, the tradition and 
the houses of the Muslims. And (by these rapes) they destroy relations between 
neighbours'. " Sestic, then regards these rapes, as a crime against the nation, rather 
than a crime against individual women. 
The next article, written by Alice Thomson, appeared in The Times on the 1 January 
1993. The short section of the article devoted to a discussion of 'rape camps'begins on 
a historical note, but then becomes rather familiar as it appears in part to have been 
lifted straight ftorn Adam Lebor's article, published the previous month: 
Homer's Iliad refers to Greeks enslaving captured women and 
distributing them to soldiers as spoils of war. The Nazis had 
their concentration camp "joy division", and the Japanese ran 
"comfort camps" where Koreap women were forcibly recruited 
to act as prostitutes. Now the Bosnian war seems to have its 
own version. Is this a by-product of brutality in war, or is there 
something more sinister? " 
Historical analysis is, of course, important to demonstrate the ongoing nature of the 
'rape in war'phenomenon. However, the journalists appear to have concentrated their 
comparative historical analysis of the Bosnian rapes, predominantly with the 
experiences of the 'comfort women'in World War Il. " The mass raping of women in 
the Bakan conflict have rarely been compared with other incidences of large scale 
rape in war, many of which are much closer in timescale to events in the Balkans; for 
example, Kuwait, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Peru, Somalia, Liberia, Burma, Uganda, or 
Rwanda. " Moreover,. the journalists have tended to draw comparisons with World 
34 Adam Lebor, 23 December 1992. 
35 ibid. 
36Alice Thomson, "Truth that the world finds hard to hear, " The Times, I January 1993, p. 11. 37 For further press coverage during August 1993 of the Japanese 'comfort women' issue see, Leading 0 
article, "Apologists of war, " The Guardian, 5 August 1993, sec. FEA, p. 19; and Kevin Rafferty, "Japan ZD 
admits forced wartime prostitution, " The Guardian, 5 August 1993, see. FOR, p. 10. 38 Slavenka Drakulic, "The Rape of Women in Bosnia" in Miranda Davies, ed., Women and Violence 
(London: Zed Books Ltd., 1994), p. 176. Although including no comparisons, the following are a 0 C, 
selection of articles which do discuss other incidents of rape in war: David Harrison, "Frail Suu Kyi 
prepares for final showdown, " The Observer, 2 August 1998, p. 20; Editorial, "Uganda: Security for 
whom? " Ms., November/December 1992, p. 10; Donatella Lorch, "Campaign of Rape Emerges in 
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War H events, in order that they might utilise the 'camp' analogy: with many 
references, for example, to Auschwitz? " 
By August 1993, approximately a year after the first accounts of large-scale rape had 
begun to appear in the British pres s, the media's thirst for 'rape camp' stories seemed 
to have dwindled to nothing. " As Linda Grant, writing in The Guardian, notes, 
'[h]aving had their fill of both pretty Muslim virgins sobbing out their tales of sexual 
violation and British couples cradling the Bosnian rape babies they have adopted, the 
media have lost interest'. " Linda Grant goes on to suggest possible reasons for the 
lack of interest and scepticism in the media, for example, she states that '[n]o one was 
able to come up with any reliable figure for the numbers of women actually raped'. " 
She'also submits that 'these doubts have crept in because'. some aid agencies have 
begun to admit privately that rape has always been a part of the spoils of war: the 
officers get the paintings and the jewellery, the men are let loose on the local 
population'. " It is interesting to note Grant's assumption that the 'officers' are not 
interested in taking part in rape. Presumably, as officers, their minds are on higher 
things - such as art and finery - whereas the satisfying of base physical urges is the 
soldiers domain. In fact, there are references within the articles analysed which 
comment that the military commanders have 'first pick' of the female detainees. ' 
Concerning the presence of 'rape camps'. however;, Grant states the following: 
Even the allegation of rape camps now seems contentious. 
Certainly, women were raped in general prisoner of war camps. 
But no one has produced hard evidence of special installations 
established to impregnate Bosnian women with Serbian babies. 
What seems more likely is that Serbian paramilitaries would 
move into an area and establish a base in a villaue. After most 
of the local population had been terrorised into fleeing, a 
number of women would be rounded up and held in a motel or 
Rwanda, " International Herald Tribune, 16 May 1995, pp. 1 &6; Kenneth Auchincloss, " 1992: The year 
of fratricide, " Newsweek, 4 January 1993, pp. 24-25. 
39See, for example: Leading article, "The German responsibility, " The Times, 14 May 1993, p. 15. 
40For an interesting account of newspaper editor's 'victim fatigue' and how they require news that is 
'new', 'hot' and 'sexy', see, Jenny Kitzinger, "Silent voices and the risks of 'False Memory, " Paper 
presented at the 'News, Gender and Power' Conference, University of Wales, Cardiff, (12-13 
September 1996). 
4'Linda Grant, "Anyone here been raped and speak English? " The Guardian, 2 August 1993, sec. G2T, 
P. 10. 
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restaurant which would be used as an enforced brothel by 
soldiers tanked up on drugs after a hard days killing and torture. 
When the Serbians moved on, after a few weeks, the women 
would be murdered or released according to no clear pattern. " 
Although attention has been drawn to the use of emotive language by the British 
press, particularly with their continual use of 'camp' analogies, Grant's interpretation 
of the term 'rape camps' - that of 'special installations established to impregnate 
Bosnian women with Serbian babies'- seems to constitute a rather narrow definition 
of the term. Moreover, given this definition, then the journalists by their use of the 
term 'camp'- which carries with it images of row upon row of purpose-built huts and 
which was not the reality in the Balkans - have relegated the experiences of the rape 
victims into the realms of indeterminacy. In essence, if the idea of a 'rape camp' 
cannot be expanded to incorporate the reality of 'a number of women rounded up and 
held in a motel or restaurant and used as an enforced brothel by soldiers'then what of 
those women's experiences? Therefore, is it a fiction to suggest that the women were 
held in 'rape camps? It appears that for Grant, if reality does not resemble the 
journalists' established, self-built imagery then she is content to ignore it: once again 
'rape in war' is effectively invisible. Yes, an 'enforced makeshift brothel' probably 
does more closely describe the reality than the term Yape camp'. but using a different 
term does not make the rape victim's experiences any less real. 
The last of the articles which refer to 'rape camps', or in this case a 'Serb-controlled 
brothel', is concerned primarily with a discussion surrounding the break-down of 
peace talks between Croatia and the Serb-held enclave of Krajina. However, at the 
end of the article, as an aside, it states the following: 
In Sarajevo, the United Nations confirmed that an investigation ZD 
would be held into allegations that peacekeeping troops in 
Bosnia had patronised a Serb-controlled brothel containing 
captive Muslim and Croat women. " 
There follows no elaboration, no further information or explanation, and I can find no 
subsequent reference to the UN investigation in British newspapers to date, although 
in Beverley Allen's book Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
45 Linda Grant, 2 August 1993. 
46Michael Evans, "Secret talks over Krajina break down, " The Times, 3 November 1993, p. 13. 
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and Croatia she does make (unsubstantiated) claims that Unprofor soldiers had also 
been perpetrators of rape ... [at] ... Sonja's, a restaurant-rape/death camp in Vogo9ca, six 
miles north of Sarajevo. " (Indeed, the same location as mentioned by Borislav Herak 
in his confession. ) Allen also quotes the Bosnian Serb commander of the camps as 
saying that UN personnel came to the camp several times a week, 'for food and 
drinks, to watch television on his satellite receiver, and they came for the girls too'. " 
However, to my knowledge this was not reported in the British press, and for the 
purposes of the thesis the 'truth' of the allegation is, to some extent, irrelevant. The 
significance of this passage is that it represents 'good' soldiers, presumably good 
'male' soldiers if they were 'patronising a brothel', as subject to the same 
uncontrollable sexual urges and disregard for the suffering of women as the 'bad 
soldiers' discussed aboVe. " Whatever label one wants to place on the representhtions, 
the outcome remains the same; that is, that male soldiers whether regarded as 
'goodies' or 'baddies', 'terrorists' or 'freedom fighters, when it comes to the issue of 
'sex' they all appear to be represented in a similar fashion: as misogynistic. 
Rape as Misogyny 
'Andrea Dworkin has a theory', suggests Catherine Bennett in The Guardian. 'Rape 
happens, she thinks, because we live in cultures which promote hatred of women, 
which purvey debased images of women - and despite the best efforts of polemicists 
like herself, nothing has changed'. " This claim sets the scene for this section, which is 
looking at those explanations for rape in war that are based on the theory that 
instances of mass rape in war are acts of misogyny. 
Catherine Bennett's extended article entitled "Ordinary madness" begins in C) 
uncompromising fashion: 
47 Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia 
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Thousands of abused women testify to systematic rape in 
Bosnia. But the Serbian army is not made up of proven sex 
offenders; they are 'regular guys'. Are, then, all men potential 
rapists? " 
Bennett's claim that 'thousands' of women have been 'abused' is later substantiated, 
although unsatisfactorily, by stating that an EC mission has estimated that 20,000 
women have been the victims of 'organised rape' in Bosnia. ' The first, perhaps 
obvious, question to be asked is, which EC mission? Bennett makes no mention of its 
name, its members, or its mandate. " Is she purposely withholding the information to 
protect the anonymity of the mission? Or, has this rather woolly statement been lifted 
second-hand from another source? Possibly from the same source, Bennett quotes 
Muslim and Croat sources as alleging that the incidence of rape is much higher, 
'50,000 women raped, more than 30,000 women impregnated'. 53 However, Bennett 
does not assume these figures are correct, as she states: Uncorroborated, one-sided, 
and publicised by a desperate people, the figures must be received with scepticism'. " 
It may be an inconsequential point, but when reading an article such this, it could be 
argued that one generally remembers the more shocking elements in the story, 
particularly a large rounded number - 50,000 - phenomenally large when it is 
describing the number of raped women. The scepticism that follows could easily get 
forgotten in the wake of such abhorrent statistics. This just leaves the question as to 
whether it is defensible to use uncorroborated, unreferenced statistics which, when 
read in context as an complete article, could readily be perceived as 'truth'. On the 
other hand, one could argue that these enormous figures, although vastly different, are 
large enough to justify the concern that something significant could have taken place. 
Also, the accounts, in a sense, could be seen to corroborate one another, although 
without checking the sources this is rather dubious. 
The crux of Bennett's article is concerned with asking the fundamental question: 4-: ) 
which men rape in war, and why? Challenging the claim that all rapists are criminals, ZD 
51ibid. 
52 Following an interview with Catherine Bennett she informed me that the EC mission was headed by 
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Bennett remarks that '[w]hatever the figures, the collective testimony of the women 
who have been sexually abused in this war still challenges the assumption that rape is 
the preserve of a criminal minority'. " Bennett extends her argument by using Susan 
Brownmiller's opinion on what changes 'common soldiers into rapists'. In her reply, 
and reiterating an argument she has made before, Brownn-diler implies that, given the 
right circumstances, all men are capable of rape. The circumstances appear 
frighteningly straightforward. Thus, according to Brownmiller: 
First [men are] adrenaline rushed; second, in Bosnia the Serbian 
fighters are irregulars, they're not part of an official army. Every 
army has rules of conduct in warfare, and we know that rape is 
outlawed in the terms of the Geneva Convention - but what is 
the authority that's going to court martial these guys? There is 
no authority there, so thby have permission to rape, the way they 
have permission to kill. " 
If this is the heart of Bennett's argument, and it does appear to be, then it could be 
argued that it is not only too simplistic, but also quite disconcerting for the reader. A 
rush of adrenaline and a touch of anarchy can often be found at many football grounds 
throughout Britain every Saturday afternoon, and while Bennett comments that 'it 
certainly tells us something about the conditions in former Yugoslavia' she also 
continues, 'does it also, as women's groups are now asserting, tell us something about 
the men we live with here? " The implicit suggestion being that all men carry with 
them an ingrained misogyny and desire to rape, which could violently manifest itself 
if the conditions are right - an unnerving claim. Therefore, it could be argued that to 
put forward this theory without the balance of other possibilities or counter-theories is 
on some level irresponsible and unnecessary. 
Bqnnett's -thesis - that 'ordinary'. men cap: and do Tape - is continued as she interviews 
Slavenka Drakulic, a Croatian writer, who in turn has interviewed Bosnian rape 
victims. Bennett states that Drakulic's questioning of the rape victims 'reflects a 
common female incomprehension that 'ordinary' men can rape. " Bennett quotes 
Drakulic as stating that: 
55 ibid. 
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I asked one woman who was raped by four men, were they 
drunk? Did they look abnormal? How did they look? She said, 
"No, no, they were perfectly non-nal men, if you were to meet 
them in the street you wouldn't say they were rapists". " 
Firstly, neither Bennett nor Drakulic make any mention within the article of how 
many women Drakulic interviewed, or how many gave similar answers to the woman 
quoted above - perhaps Drakulic's interviews were at a very early stage when she was 
approached by Bennett - nevertheless, on some level the use of just one woman's 
testimony actually seems to weaken the argument rather than solidify it. On the other 
hand, if one studies the press' representations of the incidence of rape in the Bosnian 
conflict in its entirety, one would discover numerous references in which interviewed 
rape victims have commented that the men who raped and abused them were in fact, 
prior to the war, 'ordinary' friends and neighbours. ' And this also reiterates the point 
made in Chapter One, that rapists are just 'ordinary guys'. 
This brings me to the second point, and to two standard questions, both of which were 
raised in Chapter One in the context of 'peacetime'rape. Did they look abnormal? And 
second: Is it a 'common female incomprehension' that all rapists are somehow 
recognisable by their obvious physical abnormalities? Bennett clarifies her views on 
this. She sets out who she considers to be the 'types of men who are likely to rape in 
peacetime'. and they are, according to Bennett, 'proven sex offenders'. former victims 
of sex abuse'or 'sufferers from disinhibiting brain abnormalities'. All of which appear 
to be mental conditions (some of which can be likened to suggestions in Chapter One) 
rather than physical disabilities; although I would consider the last category to need 
some form of accompanying psychological or physiological definition before it could 
býý taken seriously. However, Bennett's use of these classifications, with the 
implication being that if a man falls into one of these categories then he is more likely 
to rape - as she makes no attempt to suggest otherwise - could be perceived as being ID 
naive and analytically crude in the extreme. 
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To return again to Catherine Bennett's article, Slavenka Drakulic concludes that 
although a 'disheartening' and 'unattractive' verdict, in her opinion, all men are 
potential rapists. She states the following, although perhaps with a little reticence: 
I'm very unhappy to say that, I really am - but what can you 
conclude? How can they do it under the conditions? How can 
they do it when a gun is pointed at their head? You would say 
they cannot do it if a woman is revolting against it, and 
screaming - but they do it! It's amazing. " 
Bennett appears to have used this concluding statement of Drakulic's for its 
sensationalist or melodramatic value rather than as part of a balanced consideration of 
the issue; this overly simplistic reading of events could no doubt leave the reader a 
little more than 'disheartened. whether the reader is 1he wife, the partner, the lover, 
the mother, the sister, the daughter of a man, or the man himself. Of course, it would 
take a detailed physiological and psychological study to ascertain how one's 
behaviour would be affected by a situation in which one was subjected to rape and 
sexual abuse - if such a study was possible at all. In the absence of such a study and 
without personal experience, how can one make sound judgements about how a man, 
or woman, would act when a gun is held against their head? It is difficult to 
comprehend what men and women might be physically capable of if forced at 
gunpoint, however, perhaps in general Western society has very set ideas about 
where, how and why men should be capable of performing a 'sexual' act, and these 
'romantic' notions do not fit any accounts of rape, particularly those being reported 
from the war in Bosnia. 
Bennett also draws on other sources to support her theory, all of which make further 
sweeping generalisations which remain unsubstantiated by any concrete evidence. 
Robert Bly, the author of Iron John, a book which encourages men to 'rediscover the 
wild, hairy man within', " is quoted as saying, 'I'd say 50 percent are capable of doing 
it [raping]. 'When questioned about the other 50 percent, he states that 'they're not the 
type, they would be the ones who are expressing emotion and doing art'. " Bly's 
representation of men in this quotation appears to be that the world's male population 
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can be divided in half, with one half - those who are 'gendered'with masculine traits - 
having a propensity to rape, while the other half - those who have been 'gendered' 
with feminine traits - do not. Bennett also quotes a Vietnam veteran who was 
commenting on seven of his friends who he saw gang rape a young Vietnamese girl. 
He states that they were all basically nice people, I just couldn't figure out what was 
going on to make people like this do it. It was just part of the everyday routine'. ' 
Finally, in this section of the article, Bennett quotes Carol Sellars, a principal clinical 
psychologist at Broadmoor, who comments that, '[w]hat stops most men is social 
sanction and a sense of the sequel to what would happen in peacetime'. In an attempt 
to substantiate this claim, Sellars cites an American study of male undergraduates in 
which 'a hýalthy majority said they would commit a rape if they'thought they could 
get away with W. " At face value the results of this study can be perceived to be 
extremely 'disheartening'. However, surveys - probably a more accurate word to 
describe the aforementioned 'study' - of this nature are notoriously controversial and 
are often found to have a large margin of error. Moreover, one has to question the 
validity of even a survey which considers 'US male undergraduates' to be typical of all 
men everywhere. Therefore, if Bennett tries to authenticate her arguments with the 
use of such dubious data, she deserves to be challenged. However, in Bennett's 
defence, the average age of army regulars and conscripts is usually around the 18-22 
year old age range - undergraduate age. 
Bennett's article, having discussed the Vhich men rape? question, then moves on to 
discuss the question of 'why men rape? And, 'what kind of act actually is rape'? 
Bennett has accepted without question, on Sellars' advice, that rape, although 
frequently -portrayed as such, is'not a sexual act. To reiterate the point; as Sellars 
explicitly states, 'one of the problems is that it's always portrayed first and foremost as 
a sexual act, which it isnl'. " Now Bennett poses the question 'then what is it? 'Sellars 
expands on her position in the following manner: 
If you actually talk to rapists, in most cases it's about two things. 
One is about asserting domination and humiliating the victim, 
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and sexual degradation is seen as the ultimate form of 
degradation. The other is to do with asserting masculinity, 
which again is essentially about domination and aggression, not 
really about true sexuality. " 
So, on the one hand Sellars - and presumably Bennett as she offers no alternative 
explanation - contends that rape is not a 'sexual act, but on the other hand, states that 
rape is about 'sexual degradation'. This brings into question the way in which Sellars 
and Bennett are defining the word 'sexual'. Sellars defines it as, or to be more accurate 
Sellars states that 'Women commonly'define it as, 'an expression of warm feeling and 
closeness' and Bennett clarifies it as 'the most intimate act'. However, it could be 
argued that these are over-idealised definitions of the sexual act, which trade on 
contemporary culturally manufactured images of male/female bonding, and could be 
seen as having confused issues of sex with those of love. Moreover, the defining of 
rape as 'sexual degradation' is explicit recognition of the sexual nature of the act. 
Equally, although power, domination, anger, frustration, aggression, and so on, may 
well be the motivating factors behind specific instances of rape, insofar as it is an act 
of 'rape'then these factors can be seen to manifest themselves in a sexual act. In other 
words, although sexuality can be viewed as only the method through which other 
motivational factors are expressed, this does not mean that its sexual content should 
be denied. 
For example, when discussing the 'intimacy'and 'closeness'of the sexual act Bennett 
asks, '[i]f male Bosnian Serbs hate female Bosnian Muslims, how can they tolerate 
this proximityT In reply, I would refer Bennett to Sellars' earlier suggestion that 
'sexual degradation is seen as the ultimate form of degradation'. The soldiers, of 
whatever nationality, who are actualising this 'degradation', are not shaving the 
women's heads or cutting off their hands, or committing any other form of 
degradation in isolation, they have chosen a sexual act as their primary method of 
humiliation. Put simply, sexual gratification appears to be thefitel which drives this 
expression of power and dominance. " This issue will be discussed at length in the 
final chapter, Chapter Eight. 
67 ibid. 
68For further discussion on this issue see, Robert Crooks and Karla Baur, Our Sexualit (London: 
Brooks & Cole, 1996), pp. 715-720. 
178 
Generally though, throughout this section Bennett's simplistic view of the individual, 
bome out by her use of support from those who advocate a similar position, appears to 
be that of a coherent rational entity, who, no matter what the circumstances, can 
engage in a predetermined and rational set of social interactions. In reality, however, 
individuals are constantly being pulled by unconscious, multiple drives and desires, 
which during wartime are arguably heightened, or at least made more complex. 
Therefore, there can be no mono-causal explanation for individual actions, 
particularly ones based on a simple misogynistic explanation. This is not to deny that 
rape generally appears to be an act of pure misogyny - indeed, it could be argued that 
it is the ultimate misogynistic act. But it is extremely hard to consider that latent 
peacetime misogyny can be trinsformed into the mass raping of women in war to the 
extent that has been witnessed in the Balkans. Can we really believe that all those men 
consciou sly and sequentially decided to unleash their suppressed hatred and contempt 
for women through expressions of sexual violence and rape? 
Once again, we have considered a reductionist explanation for the mass raping of 
women in the Balkans and found that it has not proven satisfactory in helping us to 
fully understand the occurrence of this wartime phenomenon. The next section 
considers another explanation, which some would consider to be an 
institutionalisation of misogyny - militarisation. 
Militaiisation 
Writing on behalf of the World Council of Churches, the 'Commission of the 
.. Churches on International Affairs'has offered this definition of 'militarisation' 
Militarisation should be understood as the process whereby 
military values, ideology and pattern of behaviour achieve a 
dominating influence on the political, social, economic and 
external affairs of the state, and as a consequence the structural, 
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ideological and behavioural patterns of both the society and the 
government are 'militarised'. " 
In the Bosnian conflict, the manifestations of militarisation can be identified in the 
stories and representations of, and explanations for, mass rape in war. Some 
journalists, writing for The Guardian, in their analysis of the reported rapes in the 
Bosnian conflict, implicitly suggest militarisation as a possible root cause of the 
phenomenon, and in particular when militarisation is defined as a socialised 'military' 
form of masculine identity. Journalists writing for The Times, however, have not been 
so forthright as there are no articles in The Times that suggest a direct link between 
the incidence of rape in the war in the former-Yugoslavia and militarisation, as 
defined above. 
Throughout the early 1990s most sections of the press covered a number of stories 
regarding this issue - the link between the militarisation of soldiers and the incidence 
of rape. The US, British, and Japanese military, for example, have all been forced to 
acknowledge that there are serious problems of sex abuse in their ranks, " and further 
reports from Amnesty International have concluded that 'women and girls as young as 
14 are being raped or sexually abused'by soldiers and government agents throughout 
the world. " In the United States a Senate Committee recently stated that, '[s]ome 
60,000 women have been sexually assaulted or raped -while serving in the United 
States armed forces' - and they are not referring to rapes committed by 'enemy 
forces'. " One American Senator, Dennis DeConcini, even commented that, 'American 
women serving in the Gulf were in greater danger of being sexually assaulted by our 
own troops than by the enemy'. " The British Army also had to face the indiscipline of 
their own troops following the rape and murder of a tourist guide on Cyprus by three 
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privates with the First Battalion of the Royal Green Jackets, " and they have also had 
serious complaints from sexually assaulted female soldiers. " Furthermore, the 
Japanese Government has now been under pressure for a considerable time to openly 
acknowledge, and apologise for, the enforced prostitution of 'comfort women'during 
the Second World War. Numerous other articles in the British press have also 
reported similar stories. " 
A letter written by reader Michele Wates and printed in The Guardian as a response to 
the article by Catherine Bennett (analysed at length in the previous section), 
comments that what was missing from Bennett's account of rape in war was 
recognition of the dehumanising effects of soldiering in general and being a soldier in 
wartime in particular. " The dehumanising theme is *also raised in The Guardian in a 
later article, however, on this occasion it is used to describe the effects of rape on the 
victims. Rosalind Coward, the journalist, states that rape 'is a violation of rights, a 
dehumanising experience [and] mass rape is the dehumanising of a whole culture, an 
assault on those who give a community its life and meaning'. " Wates, in her letter, 
then attempts to link these two issues by predicting the possible outcomes when 
soldiers who have been 'dehumanised' through the militarisation process and 
subsequently rape, and the victims of those rapes, try to 'reconnect with their 
humanity. For the soldiers, Wates suggests that, '[flaping women and witnessing their 
terrified screams is one way in which men get to hear the sound of their own buried 
terror'. And for the rape victims, Wates concludes that '[t]he issue for the women who 
have been raped is essentially the same except that the desperate attempts at 
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reconnection are more likely to be turned inwards in so called madness and self- 
hatred'. " Her explanation for the rapists' acts of sexual violence suggests that the act 
of rape is almost psychologically affirn-ling for him. Furthermore, it also implies that 
their role is almost a passive one and devoid of ultimate responsibility. This 
psychoanalytical explanation of rape in war, while reflecting a recognised theory of 
rape, is not an explanation that is expounded further in the sections of the British press 
researched. If the process of militarisation dehumanises soldiers it is to be hoped that 
societies can discover a more acceptable way of 'reconnecting them with their 
humanity'. 
One theme that was given significant coverage in the articles analysed, was the notion 
that the rapes were committed primarily by 'irregula? soldiers. Therefore, rather than 
the suggestion that it is military training, replete with the repression of emotion, the 
embracing of all things 'macho' and the 'dehumanisation' of the soldier, which 
contributed to the raping in Bosnia, these particular representations suggest that it was 
untrained 'irregulars'who were the main perpetrators of the crime of rape. As early as 
August 1992, public uneasiness due to 'irregular forces' in the Serbian capital, 
Belgrade, was being reported. For example, in a previously mentioned article in The 
Guardian, Nina Bernstein included quotations from the Serbian public. Komnenic, a 
former professor, stated his concern over the young men who 'strut'the city streets in 
'the paramilitary uniforms of extremist groups. 'They don't go to war'. Komnenic said 
contemptuously of the paramilitaries. They don't cross the Drina River [into Bosnia]. 
They rape girls and mistreat people in the street. They've become a problem here'. "' 
It is interesting to note that although these young men may be 'irregulars' they, 
nevertheless, have a-uniform and take pride in wearing it - note 'the paramilitary 
unifonns of extremist groups'. Roy Hattersley, writing in The Guardian, has also 
commented on the appearance of the 'irregular soldiers in the Balkans. For example, 
he makes the following observation: 
Shirtsleeves were ripped to display biceps. Bandanas were tied 
around foreheads. Cartridge belts were wom over shoulders and 
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across chests. The style was neither Serb nor Croat. It was based 
on the Hollywood nightmare of what some Americans wore in 
Southeast Asia, circa 1965. The role model was Rambo. I have 
never seen one of Sylvester Stallone's epics. No doubt they 
neither extol nor encourage rape. But they undoubtedly glorify 
other forms of violence. " 
That these Yapists' are represented in the press as Ramboesque' feeds into various 
debates surrounding rape, militarisation, and media imagery. The instantly 
recognisable Rambo image carries with it a complex assortment of ideas and practices 
which has at its core a particular strain of militarised masculinity. The use of imagery 
in the media is commonplace and in the absence of photographic evidence, the press 
journalist must often use powerftil language to 'draw' an image in the mind of the 
reader. However, to conjure up a well-known image from popular culture, such as 
Rambo, takes little skill or imagination on the part of the journalist or the reader, as 
such, the story is 'sold'with little effort. The Rambo image is generally perceived to 
be the epitome of masculinised power, including the power to kill, to maim, and to 
rape at will. Is this the image that the 'irregular' soldiers have tried to portray, or have 
the media manipulated the Rambo image for their own purposes? If so, is the media 
correct in perpetuating this unrealistic, stereotyped image? I raise this question 
because, inseparable from the Rambo image, are inferences of unreality and big 
screen fiction'. Therefore, with these images of Hollywood fantasy established in the 
subconscious, will the reader have difficulty separating out the Yeal' - the 'irregulars 
and the rapes -7 from the 'fantasy' - the 'irregular soldier/Rambo image? Is there a 
possibility of the rapes becoming lost in a blurring of fact/fiction, reality/imagery, 
which renders them as unbelievable as Rambo? As Roy Hattersley explains, life has 
prepared him to think about many natural and/or man-made disasters, however, on the 
subject of (the reality of) rape, he writes: 
But mass rape - rape as a political statement, rape as an 
assertion of territorial rights, rape as a military strategy carried 
out on orders and to numbers - is near to literally beyond my 
comprehension. I accept the truth of the reports. But the 
descriptions that they contain remain a step away from reality. 
The taboos of our society have prevented me from thinking 
8'Roy Hattersley, "Endpiece: The terrible facts of war that I refuse to face, " The Guardian, 12 April 
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about such things and I am not equipped to think about them 
now. 82 
If Western society has ill-prepared us to think about and accept the full horror of mass 
rape, does it need the press making it even more difficult to comprehend. I am not 
suggesting here that society should ever be able to 'come to terms with it' for that 
suggests some form of acceptance, but we should be able face up to the reality - to 
improve our understanding of the phenomenon and look for solutions. 
Another point raised in the press relating to the wearing of uniforms has been made 
by Barbara Ehrenreich, who supports the argument that an (in)voluntary identity 
accompanies the donning of a uniform. Speaking specifically about the US military, 
Ehrenreich draws parallels between the recent events at Waco, Texas and the war in 
Bosnia, and suggests some interesting connections between aggression, 'uniforms'and 
power. She states that 'Americans are not known for their restraint in matters 
involving armed confrontation .... A uniformed American with firepower is much like 
a three-year-old with a garden hose: Someone in whose presence no one can expect to 
remain dry and composed for long'. " Feminist Georgina Ashworth made a similar 
point in Chapter Two when she commented on the higher than average level of 
violence against women experienced in 'uniformed'homes. " 
Another article concerned with the behaviour of 'irregulars' and published in The 
Times, reports how 'Serbian women were subjected to a two-month reign of terror by 
Croatians who had joined the local militia. Journalist, Barbara Hewson, recounts the 
story of Ljubica, a young Serbian woman: 
[S]he and three other women were taken to a house where 15 
men in battle fatigues abused them: "They said, We want to see 
you naked. 'They told us that the Chetniks [Serbian irregulars] 
had raped 150 women and now they were going to do the same 
to us. Seven men raped us, one after the other we were abused 
for five hours. They were all neighbours of mine... " Another, 
Gordana, was taken to a house and gang-raped by drunken 
irregulars: "They tried to make me yell that I was having a good 
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time. When I screamed, one of them smashed my head against 
the floor. It all lasted three hours. Afterwards they said I would 
have an Ustashi (Croatian fascist) child. "" 
This passage does indeed state that 'irregulars' took part in rape and abuse, but what of 
the '15 men in battle fatigues? There is no mention of their military status as there is 
the 'irreaulars'. Can the reader therefore assume that they are Yegular'soldiers? If so, it 0 
would seem that both trained, discipline soldiers and 'irregulars' rape in war, although 
whether they rape in proportionate numbers in would be impossible to say, as there is 
no mention of how many 'irregulars'were involved in the gang-rape of Gordana. " 
This passage also brings out another point - that the 'irregulars' were drunk. In another 4: -) 
letter in The Guardian, also written in reply to the Catherine Bennett article,. the writer 
berates Bennett for making 'no mention of the effect of alcohol on the tendency of 
many men to rape whether in times of war or peace'. " This is an interesting point and 
one that I feel is worth pursuing briefly. The writer supports his argument by stating 
that '[e]ven the supposedly moral US armed forces have recently witnessed 
frightening tales of serving female personnel being stripped and molested whilst 
running the gauntlet of their masculine counterparts following victory parties'. " One 
can assume that the author of the letter, Bill Jackson, was here referring to the US 
Navy's Tailhook scandal. " 
From this point the arguments begin to slip into wom rhetorical generalisations: 
although he does make three interesting points. First, that marriage and the home - 
often assumed to be the safest environment for women - is a place where women are 
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often 'cowed into submission by threats of physical violence from husbands seeking 
their conjugal rights after a night down the local'. ' Indeed, research has indicted that 
the suggestion that married women are safer due to the fact that they are 'protected'by 
the husbands is a fallacy. " Second, that '[v]ery few gang rapes take place without the 
presence of alcohol'. While there is an acknowledged link between levels of alcohol 
and levels of violence, " Jackson offers no supporting evidence to back up his claim. 
Third, Jackson states that 'most individual and multi-rapes by a victorious aggressor in 
times of war are invariably preceded by large intakes of local spirits and wines to 
provide the necessary Dutch courage to those who would otherwise be regarded as 
normal law-abiding citizens'. " Again, he offers no basis for his claim. However, his 
suggestion that soldiers us6alcohol to 'provide the necessary Dutch courage' in order 
to rape is a disturbing suggestion. The general connotation connected with gaining 
Dutch courage' is that one needs an extra boost of confidence in order to achieve a 
premeditated, intentional goal. The implication being that many 'normal, law-abiding 
male citizens' (civilians and soldiers) carry an innate desire to rape and that a certain 
level of alcohol is all it takes to transform this innate desire into reality. This argument 
can be likened to Catherine Bennett's simplistic and 'disheartening' explanations for 
rape in war discussed earlier in this chapter. 
The issue of 'irregulars' was mentioned again in November 1993, when it was 
reported in The Guardian that the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, facing a 
vote of no confidence in his government tabled by the Serbian Radical Party - former 
allies of the president - ordered the arrest of 'paramilitary members and supporters of 
the racist Serbian Radical Party, accusing them of terrorising civilians'. " The article 
continues to-state that: 
[P]olice arrested 14 members of a handful of Serb irregular 
units, among them the ferocious Serbian Chetnik Movement, 
the armed wing of the Radicals (SRS). The charges range from 
9OBill Jackson, 22 January 1993. 
9'Judith Hicks Stiebm, "The Protected, the Protector, the Defender, " in Alison Jaggar (1994), pp. 592- 
608. 
92 Alcohol Concern, Measure for Measure: A Framework for Alcohol PQILiLcy (London: Alcohol 
Concern, March 1997). 
93 Bill Jackson, 22 January 1993. 
9"Yigal Chazan, "Serbian radicals held before poll, " The Guardian, 6 November 1993, see. FOR, p. 14. Z, 
186 
illegal arms possession to rape and murder. Police said the 
crimes were committed on Serbian territory, primarily in the 
ethnically mixed province of Vojvodina. Croats and Hungarians 
there have been victims of ultra-nationalist terror since the 
outbreak of the Yugoslav war. " 
The article goes on to discuss the measure of control that President Milosevic has over 
these 'ferocious' irregulars. My point in including this quotation is two-fold. First, it 
represented a balance to the reporting above of the raping of Serbian women by 
Croatian 'irregulars'. And second, it depicted the possible fallaciousness of what is 
frequently represented as one of this war's unresolvable dilemmas - the difficulty of 
the regulation and control of 'irregular' soldiers. However, as the above quotation 
demonstrates, when a political need arises, 'irregulars'can be duly dealt with, although 
the extent to which their activities can be curtailed depends, of course, on the 
particular circumstance. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that this article 
represents Milosevic as having had sufficient power to restrain Serbian "irregulars' 
when he saw fit to serve his political ends, but there is no record of him making an 
attempt to act in a similar manner to stem the tide of rape, a large proportion of which 
has been reported as being due to Serbian 'irregulars'. and accounts of which were 
being reported throughout the world for at least the previous fifteen months. 
According to a report in the Sundqy Times it was not only the 'irregulars'who were, 
on occasion, undisciplined and disobedient. Louise Branson begins her report by 
stating that '[t]he victorious Bosnian Serb army has been exposed as a chaotic, 
mutinous force by its own second-in-command, General Slavko Lisica'. " General 
Lisica, now head of the Bosnian Serb military academy, commented to a Serb 
magazine and was duly reported in the Sunday Times, that in the Bosnian Serb army 
'commanders disobey orders' and -morale is so low that the army relies on heavy 
weapons rather than men'. ' Lisica's disillusionment with the Serb army arose when 
'regular' soldiers under his command refused to obey his orders to advance and take 
the town of Livno. In Lisica's words: 
I said those who do not want to fight should lay down their arms 
and remove their uniforms ... they all started doing it. Then I got 
95ibid. 
96 Louise Branson, "Troops scared out of their pants, " Sunday Times, 8 August 1993, see. p. 1&13. 
97 ibid. C, 
187 
angry. And I said: Everything, even your underpants, is army 
property. 'And imagine ... 40 of them, including the commander, 
took off their underpants. " 
The story ends With the author stating that Ihe naked men not only left the front, they 
later began shelling [Lisica's] headquarters'. While this 'story'is not directly related to 
the issue of rape in war, it challenges the assumptions that trained, disciplined soldiers 
act in a predictable, militarised, almost unconscious fashion and illustrates the fact 
that soldiers do not always blindly follow orders, to rape or otherwise" - although the 
'deserting' of these soldiers was still a collective action. The notion of 'collective 
action' in the context of military training will be discussed in Chapter Eight. Of 
course, Lisica's decision to talk to a 'Serb magazine'. particularly about the constant 
undermining of his own leadership, could have been. made for a myriad of different 
political reasons, however, no possible explanations for his revelations are given, or 
even alluded to, in the article. 
Another interesting point that this article brings out relates, once again, to the position 
of 'irregulars'. The journalist comments that '[nIothing appears to have angered Lisica 
more than Serb paramilitary forces fighting alongside the regular army'. " Was this 
the scenario in the above account of soldier's defiance? The reader is not told. 
Nevertheless, Lisica describes the 'irregulars'as: 
a burden ... 
disorganised, irresponsible ... war profiteers. They 
are the types who would kill a man of 90 for a lamb ... my men 
on the front line would say, 'General, they rob, they rape and 
they steal. Why are we fighting and for what? "' 
There is no way of knowing whether the accusations by Lisica are accurate or whether 
he had a political axe to grind, or perhaps another agenda altogether. Although it does 
appear contradictory that in the first instance Lisica is condermling his soldiers for 
insubordination, while immediately following this statement he is attempting to blame 
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all wartime excesses on the 'irregulars'. thus, by implication, absolving the regular 
soldiers of any blame for breaches of international law. However, we must keep in 
niind the possibility of journalistic error, or if not actual error, then we could question 
whether the. article in the Sunday Times is represented in the same context as the 
original interview; bearing in mind that these quotations from Lisica have been 
through one translation and two representations: three if this one is counted! 
A final article in The Times which is also concerned with the role of 'irregular' 
soldiers - female Croatian 'irregular' soldiers to be precise - and begins with the 
suggestion that, '[w]hether as regular soldiers or fanatical guerrillas, female fighters 
have always had a role on the battlefield'. "' While on first reading this statement does 
appear to be a rather dubious claim, the author of th6 article, Kate Muir, qualifies this 
statement in a later passage by stating that: 
[s]ince the Greeks, and probably before, women have always 
fought as irregulars. Because no established state army would 
have truck with them, female soldiery has been confined to civil 
wars, guerrilla groups, piracy, ragged half-baked armies, and 
revolutionary or terrorist cells. " 
Rape enters the discussion by way of an inducement for Croatian women to fight. As 
Kate Muir further explains: 
As word came out of Serbian atrocities and the systematic rape 
of women prisoners as part of 'ethnic cleansing'9 many more 
women offered to become soldiers. If this war were being 
fought according to the Geneva Convention, which it is not, 
women soldiers ought to be treated as normal prisoners of war 
and might be less likely to be raped. " 
There are some issues here that need addressing (in addition to the preoccupation of 
Serbian atrocities and the indiscriminate use of the term 'ethnic cleansing). First, in 
the last quotation there appears to be no clear link between the issue of a rise in the 
number of female volunteers and the issue of women soldiers not being treated in 
accordance with the international laws of war. Rape is mentioned as a significant 
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factor in both issues, but that appears to be as far as the connection goes. "5 Is this 
sloppy journalism or loose editing? Regardless, it is interesting to speculate whether 
an increase in female 'irregulars' would make a significant difference to the attitudes, 
behaviour, and the raping of women in war. While the article does not propound any 
consequences to the possible increase in numbers, this is an interesting and potentially 
huge issue and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight. 
The'second point worth making, which is alluded to in this article, is the difference in 
ideology between 'irregulars' - in this passage referred to as 'freedom fighters' - and C) 
'regular' soldiers. As Kate Muir states: The life and rationale of the freedom fighter 
[read 'irregular] is far from that of the regular soldier. The Croatian woman is there 
oui of desperation: her life, her home and her family are direatened and all around her 
is chaos. " If a parallel could be drawn between male and female 'irregulars', would 
this scenario be the same for both sexes? This suggestion does not fit with a previous 
theory that suggested that male 'irregulars' chose combat for very different reasons. 
Would a male 'irregular'be fighting for his life, his home, his family and to generally 
restore order? Possibly. But the reports so far have indicated that the primary 
motivations behind men becoming 'irregulars' and having the will to fight are 
excitement, to stem the boredom of a monotonous life and, of course, to have access 
to women. 
Third, the suggestion that 'Women soldiers' were exclusively raped and sexually 
abused is open to question. There are no statistics included in the article to determine 
the extent of female involvement as 'irregulars' or what proportion of those female 
'irregulars' were raped. However, it would be safe to conclude that the numbers of 
female civilians, and male prisoners 6f war, raped would far outweigh the sum total of 
female soldiers suffering the same abuse. " This is not to belittle the suffering of the 
raped female soldiers, nor to suggest that this issue should ever develop into a contest 
to ascertain who had suffered the most at the hands of rapacious soldiers, either 
between national groups or, as in this case, between groups of women on the same 
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side. However, it could be argued, that when a soldier enlists or volunteers and 
subsequently goes to war, that soldier, regardless of her/his sex, is more aware of the 
consequences and possible violence, of any form, should s/he fall into enemy hands: 
an insight that female civilians arguably do not have. "' 
Having now covered all the articles that discuss the rapes in relation to militarisation, 
it is appropriate within this 'misogyny' section to take a brief look at the issue of the 
sexual abuse and mutilation of men during this conflict. 
Mutilation and Mate Rape 
While this research. project is primarily looking at the mass raping of wonzen in the 
Balkans, there have been some reports from journalists detailing the rape and 
mutilation of men. It may appear out of context to include a section on the mutilation 
and rape of men within a section entitled Misogyny'. However, it could be regarded 
as appropriate because the mutilation, sexual abuse and rape of male prisoners is, in 
essence, an issue of gender. The castration and sexual mutilation of men can be seen 
on one level to be an attempt to neutralise the victim's masculinity. And by the same 
token, the sexual abuse and rape of men serves to reverse his gender, literally 
subjugating him into an inferior, or traditionally feminine, position. 
One example of such an article is the following report from The Guardian. While not 
directly mentioning male rape, it is nevertheless an unrestrained account of the deaths 
and funerals of twenty-eight sexually mutilated Serbian men. The author, Paul Martin, 
begins with a graphic description of the corpses stating that, '[s]ome victims had been 
burned to death, others. bore huge gashes in'their chests, legs and torso. -'Many had 
been castrated, either before or after death. "' While the issue of male sexual violence 
and sexual mutilation against men is one which overall is reported infrequently, in this 
report it is mentioned on two occasions. In addition to the above passage, the report 
later reiterated the same point by stating that, '[m]any of the men .... had been either 
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castrated or crudely circumcised, either before or after death'. "' It is interesting to note 
the continued use of the phrase 'either before or after death' - suggesting the 
possibility of great cruelty. 
However, while it makes an enormous and undeniable difference to the pain and 
suffering of the victims if the castrations were performed 'either before or after death', 
if regarded as a ritualistic act of male sexual symbolism the amount of physical pain 
suffered is reduced in significance. One argument could be that this kind of sexual 
mutilation, whether performed before, during or after death, would be regarded as the 
ultimate humiliation for the enemy, a sadistic act in which some of these men are 
denied their manhood, their means of reproducing, even in death. 
This article, like many others of its kind, does not at first appear to simply relay the 
'facts' of war, but reads like a piece of prose lifted from a novel. The article is 
embellished with adjectives and visual imagery. For example, some of Mar-tin's 
phrases are as follows: 
a distraught family intoned a seemingly ancient lament; the 
killers had gone about their task with a gruesome viciousness; 
the day before we had arrived the corpses had been laid gently 
on a lawn; others bore huge gashes .... into which maggots *had busily swarmed'. "' 
However, while one can take issue with a few of these representations - how could the 
author know that the corpses had been laid gently on the lawn if it had happened on 
the day before he arrived - it cannot be discounted that the majority of the article, 
although having been written in a particularly dramatic style, could nevertheless be 
factually accurate; if maggots were busily swarming in the wounds, why not report it? 
Another interesting point is the response to the massacre by the Serbian president, 
Radovan Karadzic. According to the report, Karadzic was 'challenged to allow a 
British television team to film the evidence [of the massacre], he promptly obliged by 
offering a lift in his own helicopter"". He even 'cut short a meeting with the 
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commander of French UN forces in Sarajevo' to accompany them and speak at the 
graveside. The implications within the article are that Karadzic was not going to miss 
an opportunity to use the situation to his advantage for a number of reasons. First, it 
was suggested that Karadzic used it as a forum to blame "'western callousness and 
treachery" for the plight of the Serbs - and the massacre of the 28 [sexually mutilated 
Serbian men]. '"' Second, it was suggested that Karadzic used the incident to justify 
revenge attacks. And although Karadzic told Western journalists that 'his people 
would not take revenge' , local Serb leaders apparently said that the local Muslim 
villages where the killers are alleged to have 'grouped themselves' will soon be 
'emptied'. And lastly, the author implies that Karadzic was anxious to redress the 
balance of atrocities in the eyes of the West. 
Karadzic could equally have been portrayed as a concerned leader who was prepared 
to console the families personally, was co-operative with the Western press, and who 
promoted policies of no revenge. But would that have reinforced the Serb stereotype 
which by September 1992 appeared already to be an established part of the British 
press' inodits operandi? The press had already given Karadzic a 'personality' and 
obviously were not prepared to portray him 'out of character'. Of course, when one 
takes the evidence against Karadzic to date, in its entirety, it is reasonably easy to 
become cynical of his actions. However, in reporting incidents such as the one above, 
should the author's scepticism of the Serbian president's motives be quite so evident? 
Another article in The Guardian by Roy Gutman tells of the mutilation of Muslim 
men in a Serb-run 'concentration camp'. ` This was the first published article in the 
British press which included reports of witnesses who claimed to have been held in, 
what was' instantly interpreted - by'ý Roy Gutman as, 'concentration camps'. The 
emotionally loaded language used by Gutman and subsequently repeated by most Cý 
broadsheet journalists seemingly without question, points to its general success in 
conjuring up images of Belsen, Auschwitz, and the Holocaust in the minds of other 0 
journalists and therefore, it can be assumed, in the minds of the general public too. As 
has been noted before, the projection of these images corresponded effectively to the 
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Serbs being cast in the role of the Nazi aggressors and the Muslim population playing 
the oppressed nation being persecuted for their religious beliefs -a stereo-typical 
image which both nations found increasingly difficult to shake off. The two 
'concentration camps' mentioned in Gutman's first report were actually one 'former 
iron-mining complex at Omarska' and one 'custom's warehouse on the bank of the 
Sava River"' which had been converted into detention centres to house prisoners of 
war. However, this is not explained until later in the article and not until the term 
'concentration camps'had been referred to three times. 
One of the witnesses interviewed by Gutman, a fifty-three-year-old traffic engineer 
called Alija Lujinovic, is reported as saying that during his time at the 'camp'by the 
Sava River he 'experienced nearly every form of humiliation the Serb captors inflicted 
on Muslim prisoners, from desecration of the local mosque to witnessing the murder 
and mutilation of male prisoners and gang rape of women. "" Lujinovic describes in 
his 'own words'some of the horrible mutilations'that he witnessed: 
The very worst day, and I saw it with my own eyes, was when I 
saw 10 young [Muslim] men laid out in a row. They had their 
throats slit, their noses cut off and their genitals plucked out. It 
was the worst thing I saw. 117 
The journalist then inter ects, stating that, '[a] Serb guard appeared before the 
prisoners who were made to observe the killings with a home-made wire device with 
three prongs attached to a long handle'. And then Lujinovic concludes that, '[hle 
threatened to castrate us. "" There is an interesting comparison to make between the 
reporting and representation of the mutilation and rape of men and the reporting and 
representation of the raping and torture of women. There are many reports that 
mention the rape and even 'torture' of women, but any'mention of mutilation is rare. 
This following passage in The Times, for example, which has already been mentioned 
in this chapter, quotes a Western European Union (WEU) report comments that, 
'[wlomen and girls are held in rape camps where each day they are humiliated and 
tortured repeatedly and ... they are even killed. 
"" While the suggestion is evident - 
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lortured repeatedly'- there is no mention of explicit mutilation. However, there is one 
later reference in the Sunday Times which refers to the mutilation of children in 
Srebrenica, in particular the severing of noses, ears and limbs by Serbian soldiers. "O If 
one is to accept this allegation then some of these children could, of course, have been 
girls, but in general there is no record of women being mutilated in the same manner 
as in, for example Vietnam, as detailed in Chapter Two. 
This raises a number of interesting questions. Does the lack of 'evidence' of 
physical/sexual female mutilation suggest that it simply did not occur? Given the 
representations studied to date, the issue of female mutilation does not seem to be an 
emerging characteristic of the Balkan war: as it did, for example, in Vietnam, as 
detailed in Chapter Two. On the other hhnd, perhaps the word 'rape'. as used in the 
reporting of sexual violence against women, is used as a catch-all term to encompass 
a multitude of horrors inflicted on the female victims, including mutilation? However, 
given the possible opportunity to use another emotive and shocking term such as 
'mutilation', would the British press, even with only sketchy, second-hand 'evidence' 
shy away from using it? If, therefore, reports of the sexual mutilation of men do far 
exceed that of women, what explanations could be given for this phenomenon? 
Perhaps, given the popularity in the British press of the theory of 'ethnic cleansing' 
through the impregnation of Muslim women by Serbian soldiers, as suggested in 
Chapter Four, then the lack of female sexual mutilation would accord with this theory. 
Why, especiaRy if acting on orders, would soldiers impregnate the women and then, 
literally, cut off the means by which the women could bear and feed the 'rape babies? 
Catharine MacKinnon has included one account of the mutilation of a Muslim women 
by Serbian soldiers, not in the British press, but in her contributory chapter in 
Alexandra StigImayer's book Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia 
Herzegovina. This account is detailed in a previous chapter, however to reiterate, a 
heavily pregnant Muslim women is tied to a tree and wl-iile her Muslim husband is 
forced to watch, the unborn child is cut out of her. "' Horrific as this incident is, it 
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again fits with the 'impregnation theory'. In this case the unborn child was Muslim, 
therefore 'aborted. Of course, it may be the situation that there are far more incidents 
of female physical/sexual mutilation than have been reported to date, perhaps, as with 
Vietnam, these 'stories'will only be told, and listened to, with the passing of time. 
Alternatively, could it be the case that the mutilation and rape of men is an even more 
shocking 'story' for the press to detail than that of women? Perhaps the British press, 
always on the look-out for a new attention-grabbing headline - as detailed in a recent 
article by Jenny Kitzinger" - were keen to disseminate this latest, shocking 
revelation? If Kitzinger's theory of 'victim fatigue' is employed, then the raping of 
women in the Bosnian war might have become a little pass6 for the news editors and 
among the general public the constant exposufe and familiarity with the subject could 
have bred indifference. This might have been a consideration in the reporting and 
printing of later reports, but the Gutman report mentioned above was the first account 
of the rape in the Balkan war of both men and women. It would be difficult, therefore, 
to accuse The Guardian of sensationalising one issue over the other. 
These issues of male rape and mutilation raise the issue of whether Western society's 
construction of masculinity has forced male rape into silence. As cited in Chapter 
Four, rape is often referred to as a 'forbidden' subject or the 'hidden crime' as it 
frequently remains unreported due to the shame, guilt and dishonour felt by the victim 
and, in some cultures, the family and community as well. However, given the social 
pervasion of masculinity and the 'macho' baggage it carries, has this resulted in male 
rape becoming an even more unseen and 'silenced' crime? Is the press attempting to 
open up a previously 'taboo' subject in reporting these accounts of the rape and 
mutilation of men? This wider question is relevant because there have been an 
increasing number of articles published during the period of time covered by this 
research, particularly in The Guardian, which deal with this issue in a 'peacetime' 
context. " Perhaps the discussion in the press of the rape and mutilation of men during 
war has helped to open up the issue of male rape more generally. 
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The Times carried a total of four reports that detailed incidents of the rape and 
mutilation of men at the hands of their male captors. One of these contained a similar 
account, as previously reported in The Guardian, of Alija Lujinovic's experience, the 
traffic engineer who was held at the Luka 'facility'on the Sava river. (Note the use by 
The Times of the term 'facility' instead of the usual 'camp'. 'Camp'is, however, back 
in usage in the following paragraph. ) The article does not appear to be a direct 
inter-view with Lujinovic but forms part of an 'American report'to the United Nations 
which refers to the same incident recount6d in The Guardian and is reported in the 
following way: 
Lujinovic ... once saw about fifteen naked rorpses of young men 
with their genitals torn off. A guard at the Luka facility on the 
Sava river where Mr. Lujinovic was being held threatened to 
use a 'scissor-like instrument'on him. " 
That part of the story is virtually identical to the account previously reported in The 
Guardian. However, Lujinovic then continues with some supplementary information 
which, if one assumes that the information was gleaned from the same source, must 
have been edited out of his published interview with Roy Gutman in The Guardian 
two months earlier. The Times article continues in the following manner: 
Mr. Lujinovic said he also saw a doctor slit the throats of young, 
healthy people, cut out their organs and pack them into plastic 
bags for transportation in a refrigerated lorry. "' 
How did The Times receive additional information when it was a journalist working 
for The Guardian who carried out the original interview with Lujinovic? The 
interesting point here is that according to The Guardian, although Roy Gutman writes 
for them, he also works for Newsd , -a Long Island newspaper in New York which 
holds the copyright to Gutman's interviews and reports. But James Bone, the author of 
the article in The Times, did not obtain his information from NewsdU, but states that 
it came from an un-named US report that was filed with the United Nations. Thus, the 
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chain of information from source to public readership appears to be an extended and 
rather complex one. The incident recounted above by James Bone has travelled 
through a number of unanalysable human filters - translation, possible distortions, 
mis-representations, and so on - on its journey into the pages of The Times. The 
incident first had to be actually witnessed by Lujino vic who described the moment in 
his own words which were, of course, coloured by his own perceptions, emotions and 
understanding of the event. One assumes Roy Gutman filtered the information in a 
similar way with the added complication of translation, also Newsda could have 
affected the report in additional significant ways. Here the trail runs a little cold and 
the reader is left to fill the gap with a few vague possibilities. Could the 'US report' 
have obtained its information from Newsday? Is it standard practice for national 
reports to th6 United Nations to use unsubstantiated evidence aý the basis for 
allegations against another country? If so, this accords the role of the press particular 
significance in the creating and recreating of society's current understanding of rape in 
war -a theme which will be returned to in Chapter Seven and in the Conclusion to the 
thesis. To question further the content of the US report'. the article by James Bone 
mentions another 'unnamed' source which is included in the report as evidence, he 
states that: 
An unnamed Muslim butcher who spent 27 days at the Luka 
camp said he saw about 20 soldiers rape a women in the 
presence of her child and that other girls were picked up almost 
daily and taken to the camp canteen where they were raped and 
then 'disappeared'. "' 
Without wanting to trivialise the story the butcher is telling, it is pertinent to again ask 
whether 'unnamed' sources are regularly regarded as admissible evidence in reports to 
the United Nations? Considering the need for the victims of rape and their lawyers to 
produce only 'trial-grade evidence' to the War Crimes Tribunal if it is the case that 
these reports containing 'unnamed' sources of information are given credence, then it 
appears rather anomalous. 
What this report brings out is not that all newspaper accounts of atrocities in the 
Balkans have had such a attenuated passage into print, nor that due to the hand-to- 1.1: ) 
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hand nature of its journe-y that the account must be factually incorrect. However, 
when analysing press reports of any description one has to be aware of the often 
lengthy process it has gone through to reach the final print stage, and therefore the 
opportunities for embellishment, misunderstandings, changes, and so on. 
James Bone in The Times article also cites another two alleged incidents, which are, 
once again, both described by 'unnamedmen: 
A Muslim cleric who was interned in the Serb-run Omarska 
camp for 75 days testified that guards forced male inmates to 
have sexual intercourse with each other, and sometimes cut off 
prisoners' hands and penises to frighten other men. Another 
survivor of the Omarska camp said that he had seen a guard rip 
a testicle from a young Muslim inmate by tying a wire around' a 
motorcycle and riding off. '27 
First, this raises the issue of forced sexual intercourse, which at first reading seems 
implausible, but is mentioned with surprising regularity throughout the articles 
examined. This issue was discussed in the Rape as Strategy' section earlier in this 
chapter, with reference to the forced raping of women and girls by soldiers held at 
gun-point by their fellow soldiers. Second, it is interesting to note that the majority of 
the mutilation meted out to the ininates of the detention 'camps' is based around the 
injury or dismemberment of the reproductive and sexual organs, with the severing of 
hands also being mentioned. As these forms of mutilation are carried out on men by 
men, does this suggest that the severing of the penis or genitals is the ultimate method 
of torture? Whether this mutilation is part of a symbolic war against the Muslim 
religion, or part of a wider 'male' symbolic ritual against the enemy male in wartime, 
on a sliding scale of atrocities for men, to suffer the loss or mutilation of the 
reproductive organs would probably rank as the worst possible scenario. 
Early in 1993, The Times reported that there was to be a 'diplomatic offensive ... as 
new allegations of atrocities in Bosnia were revealed', which included '[h]arrowing 
descriptions of castration and rape ... given by survivors of two prison camps there'. 
"' 
However, as the following passage illustrates, the accounts given as 'harrowing' 
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examples of Serbian atrocities in this article are similar to those referred to above 
which were published in The Times four months earlier. For example, here Bone 
states: 
One of the men incarcerated in the Omarska and Tmopolje 
camps said he watched as his friend was castrated by a Serb 
'after three days of torture'. Another said some of the guards 
'enjoyed killing people slowly. They broke their hands, their 
legs, everything'. "' 
It is a little difficult to understand how the 'new' allegations mentioned in this passage 
can be regarded as having spurred. the European and US negotiators into not only 
staging a 'diplomatic offensive'. but also into further discussions regarding the 
possibility of military intervention. As already mentioned, allegations of this type 
(and notably by the same author), and some arguably much worse, were published in 
the same newspaper four months earlier. Moreover, Roy Gutman's original interviews 
with accompanying allegations were- published in The Guardian six months before. 
However, the article does mention that '[t]he charges are made by Bosnian Muslims, 
living in exile, who say they were victims of Serb "ethnic cleansing"'. "' Perhaps if the 
allegations were made by people living in exile' , their stories were easier to verify. Or 
perhaps, the 'powers that be' decided to pre-empt a backlash of negative public 
opinion: as the article also mentions, as an aside, that '[tlhe chilling claims, along with 
scenes of burnt Muslim homes, will be broadcast by the, Dispatches programme on 
Channel 4 tonight'. "' (Is this a comment on the power of the visual image over the 
power of the written word? ) The article does not disclose any further information 
regarding the atrocities in what is a rather lengthy (thousand word) article, save to 
identify and name two officials who were responsible for running the afore-mentioned 
camps. However, the article is primarily concerned with detailing the various military 
and diplomatic strategies open to the United Nations. 
The final article in The Times which refers to the mutilation of male prisoners is 
based on an interview with Dame Anne Warburton, who, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, was asked by the EC, via the British Foreign Office, to investigate 
129ibid. 
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allegations of mass rape in the former Yugoslavia. The following passage is the only 
mention of the sexual abuse of men in the article and begins with a quotation from 
Dame Anne on her findings in the former Yugoslavia: 
"People were ordered to rape members of their own family and 
animals. Men in prison camps are being castrated. " Dame Anne 
will not list the centres where women are being detained, 
because she says that has led to them being cleared and bodies 
being removed. "' 
This Alice Thomson article, as commented on before, is a rather disjointed affair with 
quotations from Dame Anne Warburton seemingly cobbled together to support the ZD 
author's arguments. As the first two sentences in the above passage demonstrates, the 
article consists of quotations that ýomehow do not fit together. In this example the 
tenses of each sentence are different and while it is not out of the ordinary to change 
tenses while speaking, in this case there is no emphasis added to aid the reader's 
understanding of that change. Again, it is possible that the author has lifted various 
sentences from the interview and combined them to create the required meaning. 
However, even this remains unsatisfactory as the passage above is a paragraph that 
stands on its own and offers no further explanation or elaboration on the contents. 
One interesting point that the article does bring to light is the difference in 
representation of atrocities committed against men and those committed against 
women. The author, 'Alice Thomson, asks Dame Anne why she thought 'it took so 
much longer for the crimes against women to be recognised than the atrocities against 
male captives? 'The reply was as follows: 
I think the tales told [about the raping of women] were so far 
-from our idea of reality. that people found them hard to grasp. 
We accepted the images of men because they reminded us of the 
concentration camps in the second world war. "' 
Dame Anne is probably right in assuming that the British people, including the 0 
general public and political elites alike, responded to the various media 
representations they were presented with in different ways. However, Roy Gutman, in 
writing his initial reports from the former Yugoslavia in August 1992, appeared 
132Alice Thomson, "Truth that the world finds hard to hear, " The Times, I January 1993, p. 11. 
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balanced in his coverage of the atrocities, in as much as he wrote equally about the 
raping and detaining of civilian women and girls, and the torture, detention and sexual 
abuse of men. Therefore, it may not have been that the crimes against women were 
not 'recognised', and it may not even have been that the crimes against women were 
particularly unbelievable or bard to grasp'. but, in a practical sense, given the option 
between acting on reports of rape, which are notoriously difficult to substantiate, "' or 
acting on reports of 'concentration camps'which are accompanied by hard evidence, 
including television news footage, the 'authorities' would no doubt choose the option Z: ) 
which could be substantiated by supportive material. 
The final article to be reviewed in this chapter was published in the Sunday Times 
during the summer of 1993, and begins in *the following way: 
Chilling accounts of rape and sexual abuse of male prisoners by 
all three sides in the Bosnian war are beginning to surface as 
victims talk about their suffering at a United Nations refugee 
camp in the Croatian town of Karlovac and at other centres. 
While attention has been focused on allegations of systematic 
rape of Muslim women by Serbian captors, atrocities committed 
against men by each of the warring factions have remained 
largely hidden from the world. "' 
Here is a slightly different view than the one suggested in previous articles. In this 
passage the author, Louise Branson, comments on the extent to which the media's 
preoccupation with the 'systematic rape of Muslim women' has overshadowed the 
'atrocities committed against men'. And, indeed, by July 1993 The Guardian alone had 
published forty articles which all commented to a greater or lesser degree on the mass 
raping of women and girls in the Balkan conflict, whereas apart from Roy Gutman's 
contribution in early August 1992, only one other article had been published in The 
Guardian which dealt with the sexual abuse of male prisoners in the Balkans. "' But, 
one has to ask whether the journalists knew about the rape and sexual abuse of men in 
the 'camps'yet chose not to write about it. Were the editors aware of the atrocities but 
decided to edit those sections out? Both these scenarios seem very unlikely, and I 
would suggest, given the previous comments on the value of sensationalism, that a 
134 See, for example: the section on the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague in Chapter Six. 135Louise Branson, "Men tell of sexual abuse, " Sunday Times, 25 July 1993, p. 1&20. 136 
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more conceivable explanation is that the victims of this abuse simply preferred, for 
their own reasons, to remain silent. 
This possibility is also supported by Louise Branson who, after interviewing Pierre 
Salignon, a French aid worker studying the psychological treatment of refugees, 
stated that, '[s]o far it is proving difficult to coax evidence from victims because 
Yugoslav men, with their deeply macho culture, regard rape as a humiliation that can 
never be erased'. "' So, the social construction of masculinity within the Yugoslav 
and/or Muslim culture has seemingly created men who can discuss starvation, torture 
and tribulation of any kind, except that of a sexual nature. However, if men are now 
beginning to respond to the coaxing of psychologists and are starting to talk about 
their suffering, this could prove to be invaluWe for the psychological healing 
process, not only for the men themselves, but for their relationships with their 
possibly raped and abused wives, mothers, sisters, daughters, neighbours, and so on. 
In essence, perhaps they could now empathise with the female victims who have also 
suffered sexual abuse, and their mutual suffering could form part of the foundation for 
rebuilding relationships. 
The article continues by asking who were the lorturers? And why did they use sexual 
abuse as a means of torture? In reply, the author uses another quotation from 
Mcdecins sans Frontieres' Pierre Salignon. Branson first comments that Salignon 
believes male rape is carried out by "intelligent" torturers who want to degrade their 
victims as much as possible. They don't want to kill them, they want to break them, ' 
[Salignon] said'. "' This explanation has, of course, been used in a similar form to 
explain the mass raping of Muslim women and has been discussed at length in 
previous chapters. However, this is the first time that-it has been used to account for 
male rape and mutilation. As with the raping of women, this 'theory' suggests that the 
sexual abuse was pre-meditated: the implication being that this was a policy that was 
decreed, or at least condoned, by some higher authority. Whether 'true' or not, this 
explanation runs contrary to the image conjured up by the 'irregulars theory', 
mentioned earlier in this section. This suggested that the 'torturers' were primarily an 
137 Louise Branson, 25 July 1993. 
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opportunistic, undisciplined, rapacious, group Of irregular soldiers who commit rape 
and sexual abuse at will, ostensibly answering to no one. 
It appears that the reports of the rape and mutilation of men are significantly different 
from those of women in one respect. Although a large proportion of the women 
victims were allegedly raped in some form of detention camp, it is evident that this 
was not so in all cases; however, men's experience of rape in this war appears to have 
been solely in 'camps'of some kind. One can deduce from this, then, that the raping 
and mutilation of the men would have to have been premeditated and orchestrated by 
their torturers. Yet, although some men are now beginning to speak of their 
experiences, one can only speculate how many Balkan men are alive and silently 
suffering both physically and mentally from the trauffia of rape and mutilation. The 
conclusion to be drawn from this article is that there must be a significant number. 
The article gives two examples of male victims who admitted publicly to having 
suffered sexual abuse at the hands of their captors and it is refreshing to see that 
Branson has attempted to portray a balanced picture of the atrocities, in as much as 
she has given examples of both Serb and Muslim men as having suffered from sexual 
abuse. The first is Rade DrIjaca, a Serbian bricklayer -a job which is traditionally 
associated with 'macho' culture in Western society - who was captured by Croatian 
forces bent on revenge after their families had been killed by advancing Serbs. He and 
another Serb called Goran, were held in a cell in the town of Pula on the Dalmatian 
coast. DrIjaca is quoted as retelling the following account of his rape: 
[The Croatian forces] were full of hatred, their state of mind was 
far from healthy. The guards wanted to humiliate us and they 
enjoyed torturing us While we were tied to-a wall. One of their 
favourite games was to see which one of them could urinate 
longer in our faces. We were sexually abused and beaten. We 
were made to perform oral sex on the guards and Goran was 
raped a few times even before my arrival. I cannot describe the 
other things we were made to do to the guards. My life will 
never be non-nal again. "' 
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While I have read no account of soldiers of any nationality urinating in the faces of 
women prisoners - perhaps this is one humiliation that can only be understood by 
men"' - the other abuses mentioned above are identical to stories that have been told 
by raped women, once again, of all nationalities. There is nothing in this account that 
immediately identifies the victim as either male or female. However, in the second 
example the victim recalls suffering sexual abuse of a distinctive and now familiar 
kind. Dian Menkovic, a young Muslim driver was held in the 'notorious' Serb-run 
Omarska detention camp, the article continues: 
Since the closure of the camp after an international outcry, 
scores of former inmates have testified about massacres and 
torture. Mankovic says he was strung up against a wall while a 
guard tried to cut off his genitals with a bayonet. TIke clumsy 
operation failed as Mankovic fainted; he recovered in hospital 
after being given 20 stitches for his wounds. "' 
There is only one question that arises from this passage that does not fit with previous 
reports from the Omarska detention centre, and that is, if the 'camp'was as 'notorious' 
as the reader is led to believe and 'scores of former inmates have testified about 
massacres and torture' how did Menkovic end up in hospital? After the bungled 
castration attempt why was he not just killed, the evidence destroyed and his fate the 
same as those mentioned in other reports? The 'reported' fact that he was taken to 
hospital for medical assistance appears inconsistent with previous representations of 
the 'detention camps'. However, there is no further explanation and the article ends 
with Branson making a poignant statement with more than a hint of resignation. She 
suggests that, '[the psychological trauma of these experiences remains deeply buried 
and can only contribute to the endless cycle of Balkan revenge. "' 
Within thig - section there have been a series of explanations for rape in the Balkans 
based loosely around the notion of rnisogyny and there have been some interesting 
assertions. For example, Catherine Bennett's reiterated a classic fen-dnist theory that 
suggests that, given the right circumstances, all men are capable of rape. Michael ID 
Simmons also acknowledged the problem of rape in war, but suggested that due to 
140For an account of an American GI urinating into the mouth of a dead Japanese soldier, see; Paul 
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militarism troops of many nationalities and stationed all over the world have been 
shown to display a tendency to rape - either locals, their fellow servicewomen, and in 
'peacetime'. In addition, the idea of mostly 'irregular' soldiers being to blame for the 
rapes was mentioned, due, it was suggested, to their lack of control and anyone's 
control over them. Moreover, in the analysis of the reports which referred to the 
mutilation and raping of men it was revealed that this sexual abuse of male prisoners 
was a more common occurrence that had been expected. This suggests that some 
simple explanation of 'rape in war', like misogyny, is not sufficient. 
Conclusion 
Chapter Five has offered a critical examination of the newspaper articles which claim 
that an analysis of certain forms of 'war games'can offer satisfactory explanations for 
the occurrence of mass rape in war in the Balkans. The various journalists identified 
in this chapter have claimed that the rapes were due to either a premeditated strategy 
on the part of military or political elites - and that 'irregular' soldiers might, or might 
not, have formed part of that strategy; or, they have suggested that the rapes were due 
to an in-built misogyny which manifest itself in the raping and mutilation of both 
women and men, and which was heightened by militarisation; alternatively, some 
journalists suggested that for the soldier's the rapes just became part of their expected 
R&R. 
However, when explained as just one part of a soldier's rest and relaxation the crime 
of mass rape in war, and specifically the crime as a violation of women's human rights 
becomes less significant. It is almost regarded as excusable, due to the apparent 
socially acceptable 'need' of the soldier to unwind and release his sexual tension: 
presumably so that his soldiering skills will subsequently be more efficiently utilised. 
This explanation touches on two previously mentioned theories of rape in war, both of 
whose validity was questioned. The first is the notion that when soldiers go to war it 
is just expected that they will take any 'spoils of war'which they feel are due to them. 
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Second, is the idea that soldiers have 'natural' biological urges which just have to be 
satisfied, or they will fail to perform to the best of their ability on the battlefield. 
These theories, which will be discussed at length in Chapter Seven, are based on 
highly gendered notions of human nature and of biological detern-linacy (a notion that 
will be discussed at length in Chapter Seven), are not useful when looking for 
solutions to this age-old problem. They rely on fixed notions of human propensities 
that set limits for social change, implying that any search for 'solutions' will be 
fruitless. When placed within a misogynistic context, however, and explained as 
occurring due to an in-built contempt of women which is leamt'during 'peacetime' 
and enhanced through the militarisation process, then the explanation that soldiers 
rape as part of their R&R becomes more understandable. 
The journalists' explanations, which claimed that the rapes were part of a military or 
political strategy were interesting, although again, confusing messages were given out 
regarding the soldiers' general behaviour. There were some journalists who reported 
the rapes as being very much 'under control', that is, the rapes were controlled by 
political and military elites and by the commanders of the troops and so on down to 
the infantry. They were reported as being orchestrated from above and deliberate in 
their conception and this was the case for both the raping of women and men. 
However, there were also journalists, particularly those who wrote about the actions 
of the 'irregular' soldiers, who described the rapes as a crime that was 'out of control' 
and committed on a more random and opportunist level. These conflicting accounts 
make it difficult for the reader to build up a general picture of the events surrounding 
the rapes. However, this is not to suggest that both these accounts are not accurate, 
there may well have been different motivations for different groups of soldiers, with 
the Irregulars' having a different agenda from that ý of 'the 'regulars'. and the 
representations could, of course, reflect that possibility. While the journalists' 
suggestions for the underlying motivations for rape in war discussed in this chapter 
are all plausible explanations, there is a danger of looking for a reductionist 
explanation that would explain all rape in war. 
We now turn to the final chapter analysing the press representations on mass rape in 
war. Chapter Six offers journalists' explanations based on the West's reaction to the 
reports on mass rape in the Balkans, for example, governmental and non- 
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governmental investigations into the reports of rape, the issue of 'rape babies'. the 
'rapes' in relation to women's human rights, and also the press representations of the 
setting up of the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague. 
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6 
WESTERN RESPONSES 
This chapter will examine those press reports that identify lVestenz responses to the 
reports of rape in the Balkans. In particular, it seeks to identify the differing responses 
to the issue of rape in the Balkan conflict. The chapter is divided into four sections, 
each dealing with a separate type of response, but each issue provoking a high level of 
response in the British press. The first section looks at representations of government, 
EC and NGO investigations into rape in the Balkan conflict, and discusses the 
differing responses of the governmental and non-governmental institutions. The 
second section will look at one consequence of rape in war in which the media in 
general showed great interest, that of 'rape babies': and in particular the possibility of 
the 'rape babies' being adopted by childless British couples. The third section 
discusses the issue of women's human rights and looks primarily at the reporting of 
the activities of women's groups in Britain and in the former Yugoslavia, many of 
whom are working to both raise the profile of the consequences of rape in war and to 
offer practical support to rape victims from all sides in the conflict. The final section, 
linked to the notion of women's human rights as detailed in the previous section, 
focuses on the reporting of rape as a war crime and the instigation of the subsequent 
War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague, which also raises the issue of indicting and 
convicting wartime rapists on the available evidence. 
Rape and Western Investigations 
Roy Gutman has made some interesting comments regarding the reaction of the West 
to reports of rape and other atrocities. At the beginning of his book A Witness to 41) 
Genocide, Gutman recounts the way in which he first highlighted the atrocities being 
committed at the Omarska detention 'camp. However, Gutman claims that once these 
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first 'shocking' reports were written and in the public domain, he was surprised by the 
Western response, or lack of it, to these accounts. He states that the British media 
responded first by sending an ITN team to Omarska, but that the United States 
Government failed to respond even though 'every major government agency'had been 
alerted in advance. ' Gutman explains his concerns on this matter in the following 
lengthy excerpt: 
Something about the world reaction did not sit right. Since when 
in the age of spy satellites does a reporter come up with such a 
scoop? After all, U. S. intelligence or UN organisations must 
have had some information and could have disclosed the 
practices in the camps weeks if not months earlier. I began to 
develop a theory that the Western governments had written off 
Bosnia and haO not bothered to tell the public. Media reports 
such as mine represented so much inconvenience. The assault 
against Bosnia had all the earmarks , of genocide, 
but no official 
would utter the word because it would force them to come up 
with a policy response. So there was no official confirmation, 
and public interest diminished. Indeed, the [U. S. ] acting 
secretary of state publicly raised doubts about the entire story. ' 
Gutman's first reports of Serbian and Croatian atrocities and possible 'ethnic cleansing' 
to which he was referring, were published in August 1992, and included the 
suggestion that Bosnian women were being raped en masse. Following these reports, 
other sources also began making similar accusations. However, Michael Sirnmons, 
writing in The Guardian, reported on 12 August that 'aid agencies and human rights 
organisations reacted with caution'to a report by a Frankfurt-based organisation. ' The 
International Society for Human Rights (ISHR) and its allegations of Serbian 
atrocities included 'murder, torture, starvation and rape'. ' The reasons for the caution 
have been detailed in Chapter Four, but to summarise briefly, the general consensus of 
opinion among the aid agencies mentioned in this particular article, was that ISHR had 
a 'strongly anti-Communist background' and as an example of this stated that ISHR 
had 'support[ed] the pro-apartheid status quo'in South Africa. ' Although-it-is-reported 
in the article that ISHR's information is sourced from authenticated eye-witness 
'Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (Shaftesbury: Element, 1993), p. xii.. 
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testimonies and faxes from a Muslim and Croat 'citizens committee' appealing for 
help, Simmons appears to share the scepticism of the aid agencies and human rights 
organisations as the article concludes that 'almost all massacre reports in Bosnia's 
ethnic conflict have come from second-hand sources or from individual refugees and 
have been difficult or impossible to verify independently'. ' The underlying suggestion 
here is that these reports are impossible to verify without governmental support, or 
intervention. Moreover, Simmons appears to be saying that these allegations could be 
'true' , 
but that there seems to be a general lack of will on the part of the political elites 
to attempt to verify the reports. 
Barbara Hewson, writing in The Times a month later, makes a similar point. Her 
article begins with the statement that '[t]he world remains silent over reports of 
violations of women in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina'. ' Hewson continues to explain 
that the accounts of rape that she recounted in the article were carried in the press on 
10 August (she is referring to one of Gutman reports) and that ITN had also shown 
news footage of an interview with a rape victim, yet still there had been no official 
recognition of the problem by either politicians or human rights observers. Hewson 
compares the accounts of rape with the accounts of men being held in detention 
centres and suggests that the reports of mass rape in 'rape camps' 'have not attracted 
the same international outcry as the camps where men are held'. ' This is, of course, in 
contrast to Gutman's suggestion in the earlier quotation which implied that Western 
political elites had been silent about all the reports of atrocities emanating from the 
Balkan conflict. Although Hewson could have been referring to initial media interest. 
Hewson suggests a possible reason for this general silence and states that 'possibly 
male politicians believe that war is a tacit licence to rape? Furthermore, she proposes 
that the lack of fesponse illustrates that 'silence'is the 'standard censoring mechanism 
that men employ when dealing with the rape of women'. " Hewson also makes theý 
point that as well as many other reported atrocities, rape is also a war critne and 
should be treated as such and not dismissed by silence. (This point will be discussed 
further in the final section, which deals directly with the War Crimes Tribunal. ) 
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The issue of the general silence of Western Europe to the mass raping of women in the 
Balkans was poignantly illustrated in an Observer article by Richard Brooks, which 
commented on the fact that a painting by Britain's official Bosnian war artist, Peter 
Howson, had been vetoed from being shown with the remainder of his collection. " 
The painting, entitled 'Croatian and Muslim' , depicts the rape of a women -a common 
occurrence in war - yet it wýs deemed by the Imperial War Museum's curator to be 
loo upsetting' and 'too brutal'. " The two women who serve on the museum's artistic 
record committee had wanted the picture shown, but they were overruled by their 
three male colleagues. While disappointing, this scenario does not appear surprising. 
The Imperial War Museum, a bastion and showplace of all that is deemed to be 
heroically symbolic in war remains in denW: it would not want its walls sullied with 
an image that graphically details the sordid reality of war, and tarnishes the image of 
the gallant, hero soldier. But this exclusion highlights their complicity in the discourse 
of silence that surrounds rape in war and allows its continuation. 
The silence of Western governments was also apparent and there was still no sign of 
any response by Western governments to Gutman's allegations of mass rape in the 
British press until over six weeks later when James Bone, writing from New York, 
appears to have broken the silence, with the US finally taking the initiative. He reports 
that the United States had filed a report with the United Nations detailing atrocities, 
including rape, that had occurred during the Balkan conflict. To quote directly from 
the article, the report describes 'atrocities that a State Department spokesman said 
"make your blood boil and your stomach turn". "' However, interestingly in a later 
leading article written in The Times, the author criticises the Europeans' jaundiced 
view that American policy over Yugoslavia fluctuates from 'inaction to over- 
commitment', stating that it is 'high time' that the European governments followed the 
Americans example and took a more 'activist stance'. " The author could have been 
referring to a more 'militaristic'response, however, it would be equally poignant if the 
author were referring to 'responses' in general. The representation of both those 
"Richard Brooks, "Bosnian rape too brutal as war art, " The Observer, 18 September 1994, sec. NEW, 
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statements is that they were positive and supportive of the Bosnian war victims, and 
advocated some form of response. The James Bone article also cites another report 
that was published on the same day by the London-based human rights organisation, 
Amnesty International. However, although torture, killing and detention centres were 
discussed and condemned, there was no mention of rape in this particular report. 
The next article in The Times to discuss the responses of Western political elites also 
fails to mention the issue of rape in war. This leading article', promisingly titled Time 
to act', begins in the following manner: 
Foreign ministers arrived in Geneva Yesterday in a very different 
mood from the start of the London conference four months ago. 
Disillusioned, angry, determined, they no longer have hopes that 
the murderous Serb advance in Bosnia can be halted by reason, 
negotiation and sanctions. The horrors of the detention camps, 
the callousness of the daily slaughter in Sarajevo, the cynical 
deceit of the Belgrade government and their placement in 
Bosnia: all have swelled a wave of international revulsion and 
increased the pressure to confront the Serbian fighters and halt 
their attack of the Muslim victims. " 
In comparison to the James Bone article above, this article conveys a positive and 
hopeful response to the reported atrocities, which makes frequent reference to the fact 
that, in the author's opinion, Western governments have been 'too cautious for too 
long'. However, this comment, and those made above, remain simply the opinion of 
the author. There are no supporting statements by interviewed ministers, for example, 
to assure the reader that there is indeed a 'wave of international revulsion'which has 
spurred Western political elites into producing a coherent and united course of action 
and which will in turn halt the detention, murder and rape of Muslim victims'. How 
does the reader, or the author for that matter, know that the ministers are 
'disillusioned', 'angry'or Idetermined? Have they been personally interviewed? There 
is certainly no evidence in the article that points to any interviews having taken place 
and this raises the question of whether this article can legitimately be included in this 
section if it does not actually include a reported response by political elites to the 
allegations of mass rape in the Balkan conflict. However, it does demonstrate, once 
again, the attempts by the press to encourage a concerted response to the Balkan crisis. 
l5ibid. 
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During December 1992 a number of articles appeared in the British press all of which 
included responses by governmental and NGO sources to the atrocities in the Balkans 
- with The Times publishing two major articles and The Guardian offering double that 
figure. These may not seem large numbers when compared with issues such as 'ethnic 
cleansing'which have been discussed in previous chapters; however, considering the 
minimal response by political elites recorded over the five year research period, six 
articles in one month indicates widespread coverage of the issue. The 'Church', for 
example, was next in line to respond to the allegations of mass rape in the Balkan 
conflict and did so in the following manner: 
Rape has become a systematic weapon oý war in the Bosnian 
conflict and the rapists should be put before war crimes 
tribunals, according to a report by the World Council of 
Churches (WCC). Women investigators from the WCC have 
just returned from two Croat refugee camps and have compared 
their evidence with that gathered by other groups, including the 
United Nations Commissioner for Refugees .... Other international bodies, including the parliamentary assembly of 
the Western European Union (WEU), had been collecting 
credible reports of large-scale rape. " 
There are several interesting points raised by this article. First, concerning the 
language used and why Roger Boyes, the author, mentioned the fact that the 
investigators were women? It is possible that Boyes was probably passing on this fact 
to the reader in an effort to portray the WCC in a sensitive gender-aware light. 
However, are we as readers to assume that all investigators are male unless we are 
informed otherwise? This may appear pedantic, but I have yet to read an article that 
refers to a report having been written by 'male investigators'. And second, at first it 
4ppears encouraging that both the WCC and the. WEU are investigating the reports of 
mass rape, indeed the article states that both organisations are in agreement that 'many 
thousands of women' have. been raped. " However, the article also states that the 
Western response to the rapes has provoked anger among the rape victims and 
refugees, not only anger at having been raped and sexually assaulted, but also anger at 
the way in which the rapes have been 'sensationalised'. " In fact, Brenda Fitzpatrick, 
16Roger Boyes, "Churches say Serbs are using rape as a weapon, " The Times, 23 December 1992, p. 6. 
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speaking on behalf of the WCC, went so far as to call the Western response 
'international voyeurism'. " She criticised most Western organisations as having fail to 
offer the rape victims psychiatric assistance, although how she is defining 
'organisation'is unclear and she continued by stating that 'many victims believe that 
the rapes are not being treated seriously when they are reported to the authorities'. " 
This is, then, an article detailing a Western response that in turn is criticising the very 
Western response of which it is a part. 
Also published in The Times, on the same day and, incidentally, on the same page, 
Adam Lebor writes an article from the Balkans entitled 'Victim tells of her brothel 
camp ordeal'. ` Towards the end of the article, following a lengthy description of the 
rape victim's 'ordeal'. Sylvana Foa, a spokeswoman for the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva is quoted as saying: We have credible and 
consistent reports of widespread and systematic rape .... stories of rape and sexual 
abuse that independently bear each other out'. ' This supports the suggestion in the 
previous quotation, that the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
had also sent investigators into the Balkans to examine the 'truth' behind reports of 
mass rape. The article also explains the concerns of UNHCR and Red Cross relief 
workers in the area by commenting in the following manner: 
Neither the Red Cross nor the UN has access to sites such as the 
Hotel Vilina Vlas. Relief workers fear that any woman still 
being held there could be killed and the evidence destroyed, 
should they demand access. Already the UN has recorded a 
sinister imbalance in the ages of the refugees who manage to 
leave Bosnia. "There is a lack of women of reproductive age, 
just as there is of men of draft age, especially among refugees 
who left after their towns were occupied by the Serbs, " said Ms. 
Foa. ' 
This appears to be a Western response on behalf of the people of Bosnia in an effort to 
elicit further responses from Western government sources. And in terms of 
hierarchical political NGO status, UNHCR and the Red Cross were arguably very well 
19ibid. 
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placed to influence government policy, compared with the small women's human 
rights groups that were also attempting to achieve similar responses and promises of 
practical help. This issue will be discussed further in the 'women's human rights' 
section later in this chapter. 
In The Guardian, December's interest in Western responses to the raping of women in 
the former Yugoslavia continued, and on the fourth of the month The Guardian 
reported in an article alicady mentioned in Chapter Five, entitled '%VEU demands 
justice for 'rape camp' victims' that, '[t]he Western European Union parliamentary 
assembly said yesterday that it had received credible reports of the rape and torture of 
women and girls in Serb-run camps in former Yugoslavia'. ' There is no mention, 
however, of the s6urces of these 'credible' reports - perhaps it was the Red Cross and 
UNHCR? Nor is there any intimation of the scale of the rapes. Nevertheless, although 
the article lacks satisfactory detail and sources to support its claims it does continue by 
stating that, '[t1he assembly demanded in a unanimous resolution that those 
responsible be tried for crimes against humanity. ' A seemingly positive step and one 
that was supported by thirty-two West European MPs. However, towards the end of 
the article the reader is informed that the assembly has only consultative powers and 
although they have 'called on reluctant governments of the nine members states to 
start planning a possible military intervention'. 2' they could do no more. The article 
ends on a high note, though with the author informing the reader that Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl of Germany has 'urged the European Community to act' in offering 
'rapid help for the women'and has even offered them ahaven in Germany'. ' 
Ten days later on 14 December 1992 it was the turn of the European Council'to have 
their response to the rape-. and atrocities in the'foftner Yugoslavia detailed in the 
British press. The Guardian reported that the Council called the detention and rape of 
Muslim women 'acts of unspeakable brutality' which formed part of a 'strategy of 
24Reuter in Paris, "NVEU demands justice for 'rape camp'victims, " The Guardian, 04 December 1992, 
sec. FOR, p. 11. 
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terrorism and ethnic cleansing'. " The general impression one gets from the article is 
that the author, Hella Pick, is attempting to portray the European Council's stance in a 
positive light. Pick portrays them as a European Council which holds a strong, united 
position with major deterrents at its disposal to use against the aggressors should they 
fail to meet the demands the council has set. These deterrents, which the European 
Council can, it appears, use at will, are detailed as follows: '[A] tightening economic 
noose, rupture of diplomatic relations, exclusion from the United Nations and other 
international bodies, and the use of force'. " Yet, these strong words of warning to the 
aggressors, spoken at the Edinburgh summit were, only a matter of weeks later, 
condemned as being 'toothless rhetoric'to appease the media. " 
One undoubtedly positive mbve that emerged from the Edinburgh summit was thý 
decision to send a delegation, headed by Dame Anna Warburton, to the Balkans to 
investigate the reports of rape and other atrocities. As The Guardian puts it: '[A]n EC 
fact-finding mission, led by Dame Anna Warburton, is to leave for Bosnia to report 
urgently on the state of the camps and inmates'. " The issues surrounding Dame Anna's 
proposed visit to the Balkans is further remarked upon in another Guardian article 
published a few days later which suggests that the widespread condemnation of rape 
in 'Serb-run detention centres' is coming from diverse sources throughout the 
international community. The article states that many international bodies have joined 
in the condemnation, but mentions by name the European Community, the UN 
V Security Council, who have agreed to provide a military escort for the delegation, the 
Ecumenical Council of Churches and the Croatian government. " 
The day after Hella Pick's article was published, another Guardian article began with 
the- following statement by Patrick Cormack, 'MP for Staffordshire South. Cormack 
28Hella Pick, "Edinburgh summit: Serbs given ultimatum, " The Guardian, 14 December 1992, sec. 
HOM, p. 2. To date research has indicted that no haven'in Germany was forthcoming: although there 
have been reports that the US have announced new immigration legal guidelines that formally 
recognise wartime rape victims as having, potential grounds for political asylum. See, for example: 
Ashley Dunn, "US opens door for abused women, " International Herald Tribune, 30 May 1995, p. 4. 
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was speaking in response to a conversation he had with the Bosnian foreign minister, 
Haris Silajdzic, whom he had met at the Edinburgh summit the week before and who 
had spoken of 'children being tortured and women being killed in rape camps'. The 
article recounts Cormack's remarks in the following manner: 
A senior Tory said last night he was "rath*er ashamed" of 
Britain's approach to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, and 
warned the Government it could not rely on his support unless 
action was taken. [Cormack] said that ministers made a serious 
mistake when they ruled out the use of force. "I feel rather 
ashamed of my country and the faint-hearted view that seems to 
prevail. We have got to do something now. If we don't, we could 
all be parties to a great crime. "" 
This particular response to, a conversation. rather than previous press representations 
of rape in war could be regarded as a strenuous, if controversial, call for government 
action. Patrick Cormack is represented in this article as showing genuine concern for 
the plight of the Bosnian rape victims and as being prepared to go 'out on a limb' to 
demonstrate his support for them publicly, even though he could incur the wrath of 
senior government ministers. In contrast, another political figure, Roy Hattersley, 
again writing in The Guardian and published four months later, states that he 'no 
longer read[s] the descriptions of the horrors which are inflicted on Bosnian women 
and children'. Part of the following statement by Hattersley has been quoted in the 
previous chapter, however, he continues this 'confession'in the following way: 
My refusal to face the details of ravage and rape is, I know, a 
less than heroic response to the tragedy. But I take craven 
comfort from this thought: that an improvement in my 
, mowledge would not save one life or feed a single child. And I 
insist that my retreat into ignorance is, in part, prompted by a 
different emotion from that which impels me to change channels 
whenever -pictures of starving babies-'appear . orf my television 
screen ... life and literature has prepared me at 
least to accept 
famine. But mass rape ... is literally 
beyond my comprehension. 
I accept the truth of the reports. But the descriptions which they 
contain remain a step away from reality. The taboos of our 
society have prevented me from previously thinking about such 
things and I am not equipped to think about them now. 34 
33 No byline, "Tory demands Bosnia action, " The Guardian, 15 December 1992, sec. HOM, p. 7. 
34 Roy Hattersley, I'The terrible facts of war that I refuse to face, " The Guardian, 12 April 1993, sec. 
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There are many questions that arise from the representation of these differing 
responses and the reasons underlying Cormack's and Hattersley's particular attitudes. 
While both were apparently sympathetic to the plight of the rape victims, Hattersley, 
unlike Cormack, felt unable to lobby publicly for governmental action. Perhaps after 
many years in the political arena, Roy Hattersley was more aware of his inability to 
alter the course of events than Cormack. In other words, despite Con-nack's posturing, 
perhaps both men felt impotent in the face of unyielding governmental policy. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the political outcome, both Cormack and Hattersley were 
instrumental in keeping the topic alive and debated in a public forum. 
The Times carried a series of responses to previous reports of mass rape in Bosnia 
throughout January 1993. The first was an intervidw with Dame Anna Warburton on 
her return from the EC fact-finding mission to investigate allegations of mass rape in 
the former-Yugoslavia. As previously mentioned, the author, Alice Thomson, begins 
the article in a manner which does not engender confidence in her ability to deliver an 
ungendered and thought-provoking article. In the process of contextualising the 
article, Thomson makes the unnecessary, stereotypical link between women and 
shopping, by stating that Dame Anna 'originally ... had no intention of spending her 
pre-Christmas shopping period in the Balkans'. " Would this phrase 'pre-Christmas 
shopping period'be used in conjunction with male political elites? Thomson continues 
on the stereotypical theme by stating that the 'Foreign Office was told to find a woman 
who would be tough enough not to squirm at the details or be blinded by 
sympathy'. " The implication being that most women are 'naturally' too 'soft' for the 
job, one would presume. There is no indication that these sentiments are Dame 
Anna's, therefore, one can only deduce that they are the author's contributions. The 
issues surrounding the representation'bf 'Women'in the press will be -discussed further 
in Chapter Seven. 
Nevertheless, Dame Anna's response to the first-hand accounts of mass rape, which 
she heard in the Balkans, is represented as being fair and sympathetic, despite the 
Foreign Office's job description. When asked about the number of women raped and 
35 Alice Thomson, "Truth that the world finds hard to hear, " 'Me Times, I January 1993, p. 11. 
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the reason why she thought it took so much longer for the crimes against women, 
rather then those against men, to be recognised, Dame Anna is quoted as stating the. 
following: 
The atrocities are of a kind that you donI readily give credence 
to and with the propaganda war in full flow in Bosnia, you have 
to be extremely careful ... Even if the numbers are exaggerated, 
the methods used are intolerable, you have to ask yourself, does 
it matter how many? Any is too many ... I think the tales told 
were so far from our idea of reality that people found them hard 
to grasp. We accepted the images of men because they reminded 
us of the concentration camps in the second world war. " 
Dame Anna's final sentence above restates the point made by Roy Hattersley in his 
earlier statement, that of the difficulty in finding comparative experiences to draw 
upon from either life or literature' (as Roy Hattersley put it) which helps us 
understand the reality of mass rape. For most, this constitutes new knowledge - new, 
horrific, unbelievable knowledge - and given the choice of whether to think about the 
actual experiences of the rape victims and try to come to an empathetic appreciation of 
their suffering, or to close our minds to the real horrors of war, which option will most 
people choose? Bearing in mind that a well read, highly regarded member of the 
political elite, with no doubt still a modicum of influence chose the latter. 
Towards the end of Thomson's article, she asks Dame Anna how much she thinks the 
EC can do in helping to shape a secure and rewarding future for the rape victims. In 
her reply Dame Anna states the following: 
If the community could act together it would be the best way 
forward. Our brief was just humanitarian, not political. I want 
something to happen as a result of these visits so I don't want aid ZD 
mixed up with politics-. I want governments to increase their aid 
now that we are beginning to be able to pinpoint where it is 
needed. I am very conscious that people are fighting for their 
lives. " 
It is surprising that a senior British diplomat would state categorically that she does 
not want 'aid to be mixed with politics'. This may be a laudable sentiment - though 
always difficult to separate in practice - but Dame Anna appears to be arguing against 
37 ibid. 
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herself, in as much as she is calling for an increase in aid from EC and governmental 
sources, yet she believes that this aid can be divorced from politics. Her brief from the 
Foreign Office may have been just' humanitarian and her subsequent report apolitical, 
but the commissioners of that report did so as a means of gleaning further information 
concerning the situation in the Balkans before taking political action. 
The first of the ECs responses to Dame Anna's 'four-page' report, which was based on 
'evidence from refugees in Croatia and aid organisations in Geneva', was summarised 
in The Times approximately a week later on 9 January 1993 with the author, Michael 
Evans, stating that: 
The European Community last night confirmed in an official 
interim report that rape was being used as a systematic weapon 
of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As many as 20,000 Bosnian 
Muslim women may have been raped by Serb soldiers as part of 
a plan to enforce the "ethnic cleansing" of captured districts and 
to drive them from their homes ... "It's horrifying and very 
serious, " one EC official said yesterday. "Soldiers are being 
ordered to go out and rape. "" 
There is no mention of the identity of the EC official who made the final comment 
above, therefore there is no way of knowing the extent of the official's involvement 
with Dame Anna's investigative team and/or whether the official had read the report 
first-hand. However, on one level this information is unnecessary, as it is the way in 
which his comment is represented and subsequently received that is important. And in 
this particular case, the impression is that this official is speaking from a position of 
knowledgeable authority. However, there is no mention in any of the reported 
quotations from Dame Anna Warburton of soldiers being ordered to rape. On the 
contrary, in the quotation above, Dame Anna is quoted as saying: We kept asking 
ourselves, is the rape systematic? Regiments dont seem to have been issued specific 
orders, but there is a recognisable pattern'. " The implicit suggestion of a 'pattern' 
being quite a different matter from the explicit assertion that soldiers are being 
'ordered to go out and rape'. Perhaps the important question here is whether or not 
casual statements like the EC official's serve to undermine the genuine findings of the 
39Michael Evans, "Serbian heavy guns hit British base in central Bosnia, " The Times, 9 January 1993, 
P. 11. 
40Alice Thomson, I January 1993. 
221 
delegation. One example of these 'genuine findings' is mentioned in the closing 
sentences of the article. The author, referring to comments made by the EC delegation 
headed by Dame Anna Warburton, states that, '[t]hey said that the number of credible 
reports of rape was "horrifying". Women were being raped in "particularly sadistic 
ways" to inflict maximum humiliation. The vast majority of victims were Muslims, 
but Croats and Serbs were also violated. " It should be noted that this notion of 'rape 
as a weapon'will be discussed at length in Chapter Seven. 
Charles Bremner writing in The Times also appears to have taken the EC team's 
findings out of context. For example, Bremner reported that, on their return, the EC 
investigative team had 'charged the Serbians with committing mass rape as a weapon 
of terror'. " First, 'chatged'is an interesting choice of words as it suggests thdt the EC 
delegation have the legal authority to officially 'charge' someone with an offence, 
whereas their mandate was purely a humanitarian fact-finding mission. Second, this 
statement seems to imply that it was only the Serbians who were found to have 
committed acts of rape as a weapon of terror. However, the delegation's interim report 
stated clearly that both women and men from all sides of the warring factions had 
suffered rape. 
In a lengthy article in The Guardian, the authors, William Colby and Jeremy Stone 
discuss the development of the Balkan crisis and the various military and/or 
humanitarian options available to the West - rape is only mentioned once. That 
occasion is when the authors, as commentators on the crisis, suggest that both Yeltsin 
and the West have a common interest in preventing the spread of the diabolical 
techniques of "ethnic cleansing" by which rape, killings, torture and family separation 
are used to degrade, demoralise and drive people out'. " The aýthors conclude that the 
techniques of war mentioned above, including rape, could spread to the world's 'ethnic 
flashpoints' of which, according to this article, there are at least sixty in existence in 
the former Soviet Union. 
4 'Michael Evans, 9 January 1993. 
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It is interesting to note that these authors regard the issue of rape in the Balkans as a 
potentially potent enough issue to play a part in inciting unrest in other parts of the 
globe. Although I accept that the issue of rape is represented in this article as merely 
one element of the wider 'technique'of ethnic cleansing, nevertheless, the point is that 
it ivas mentioned, which is unusual given that the article is primarily concerned with 
military analysis. My research has indicated that in the majority of articles which 
comment on the Balkan crisis and have as their main focus some aspect of military 
involvement - possible intervention, UN troop manoeuvres, an-ning of Muslims, and 
so on - there is no mention of the occurrence of rape. 
The next two articles analysed offer an interesting insight into first, the standard 
Western response to reports bf mass rape and other atrocities in the Balkan conflict; 
and second, the possible barriers, either real or socially constructed, which prevent the 
proposals contained within those responses from being carried out. The first article, 
written by Michael Binyon, was published in The Times during the summer of 1993 
and is entitled Revulsion prompts Geneva meeting'. " It sets out one Western 
government's response to the growing reports of atrocities in the fonner-Yugoslavia, 
including mass rape, in the following manner: 
Prompted by increasing world revulsion at "ethnic cleansing", 
civilian massacres, mass rape and the brutality of the war in 
Bosnia, the Swiss government has , called an 
international 
conference to reaffirm the signatories' commitment to the 
Geneva conventions and look at ways of enforcing them. " 
As mentioned above, this is a 'standard' representation in the British press of a 
Western government's response to the wartime events in the Balkans. The government 
in question (or NGO, collective international organisation, political institution, etc. ) 
first, states their repulsion at the reported atrocities; second, they condemn the actions 
of the aggressors (generally the Serbians); third, they call for a forum in which 
Western political elites can discuss the matter; and finally, words like enforcement, 
intervention, or military action are used - possibly to appease those less cynical 
readers who are hoping for a rapid end to the suffering and for some form of justice, 
or, possibly to add credence to, and justification for, the proposed international 
44Michael Binyon, "Revulsion prompts Geneva meeting, " The Times, 19 August 1993, p. 8. 
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conference. However, towards the end of the article - and again, we can use the 
Binyon article as an example - the potential problems will be highlighted by the 
author. Both to prepare the reader for the inevitable news that the conference has been 
unable to secure any collective opinions on the matter - let alone collective action. 
And so that with great aplomb, the political commentator or journalist can, at a later 
date when the conference's achievements are acknowledged to have been minimal, 
remind'the reader of his/her political foresight. To quote from the Binyon article: The 
conference may be mired in arguments over how to define the rules of modem 
warfare, and how offenders against the convention should be punished'. " This 
quotation could, of course, be read as one barrier to the realisation of particular 
proposats of action often accompanying Westem responses to mass rape, genocide 
and other atrocities. However, the *second article, written by Will Hutton, offers a 
more insightful analysis into possible reasons why even collective Western responses 
had not been translated into collective political action. 
Will Hutton's article was published in The Guardian on 1 February 1993. It is entitled 
New tribalism threatens to infect us all' and bears the sombre message that if Western 0 
governments allow racial intolerance within the Balkans to go unchecked then it will 
eventually spread throughout Europe. For example, Hutton states in the following 
excerpt: 
In Yugoslavia the notion of the barbarian (the "other") has been 
resurrected and with that has come its twin - the idea of ethnic 
purity. These disfigure not only Yugoslavian civilisation but 
also a Europe unable to intercede successfully to bring the 
conflict to a close.... As the French philosopher Bernard-Henri 
Levy argued at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Europe 
feels that its border implicitly stops somewhere around the limits 
of Catholic Europe - certainly before the complexities of the 
Balkans. Within our borders there is civilised Europe; beyond 
there is a land of the barbarian, of ethnic cleansing, of multiple 
rape. We observe; of course we care; but ultimately it is not of 
us. 47 
Whether one agrees with Hutton's view or not, it remains an interesting analysis of, 
and a thought-provoking explanation for, the lack of responsive action on the part of 
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Western political elites. Or, at least, that was the continuing representation - that 
Western political elites were forthright in their verbal responses, yet apathetic in their 
practical application of those responses to the Balkan crisis. 
Ian Traynor, in another Guardian article, cites an example of the lack of practical 
application on behalf of Western governments - the EU in this case. Traynor reports 
from the city of Mostar where 'Croatian extremists' 'rule the west bank'. He writes of 
Croatian troops who spend their days clearing the west side of the city of Muslims and 
who talk openly of 'need[ing] Muslim women to rape'. " The European Union has been 
charged with keeping the peace in Mostar by way of a multi-ethnic federation. 
Heading this newly established EU peacekeeping mission on the ground is Hans 
Koschnick, a German Christian Democ7rat and former mayor of Bremen, however, 
Traynor remains sceptical of its potential for success. He states that the EUs sense of 
urgency in helping these people appears less than urgent'. and qualifies this with the 
following statement: 
In the critical area of policing and security, Brussels promised 
200 Western European police officers to oversee and retrain the 
local forces. Ten have arrived. "EU bureaucracy is a wonderful 
thing, " Mr. Koschnick sighed. "They're still discussing what 
colour the cars will be and what symbols to put on the uniforms. 
But don't ask me why it's not secure here. Ask your government 
why they don't send the police they promised". " 
This representation, arguably, bears out Will Hutton's analysis above - that the EU has 
definitely 'observed', probably 'cared'. but in the end has views shaped by the fact that 
those being raped and victimised are not 'us'. However, press representations are often 
very simplistic readings of the various problems on which they report. And in this 
instance the. many complex issues surrounding international peacekeeping are not 
fully represented in this article. This also applies to the final point below which again 
comments on Hutton's ideas surrounding the relationship between the present 
European member states and those European countries that fall outside the EUs 
borders - the 'others'. 
481an Traynor, "Home is a hundred yards away but another world f6r Mostar's victims, " The Guardian, 
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As already stated, the final article in this section is arguably another example of 
Hutton's theory. Published in The Guardian in May 1993 and written by John Carvel 
and Alan Travis, it is entitled EC rule adds to Bosnia misery'. " The article is an 
account of British and EC decisions regarding the rules of immigration for Bosnian 
refugees wishing to enter the EC and/or Britain. The article begins in the following 
way: 
European Community ministers are expected to decide a tough 
line this week against the families of wounded, raped and 
threatened refugees from former Yugoslavia being allowed to 
join their relatives in the West. Despite an appeal from Sadako 
Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the 
12 EC immigration ministers meeting in Copenhagen tomorrow 
are proposing to limit the possýbility of family reunion to 
11 exceptional circumstances" .... [and] most people displaced by 
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia should be given protection 
and assistance in the region. " 
Over and above the problems this 'tough line' will generate - continued enforced 
separation for many rape victims and their families - the West's narrow culturally- 
specific definition of the family will mean that even those few refugees who do fall 
into the 'exceptional circumstances' category will not be able to bring with them all 
those whom they consider to be their 'family'. Carvel and Travis set out the British 
definition of the farnily according to British immigration rules as: '[W]ives and 
children up to 18 with discretion to admit unmarried dependent daughters up to the 
age of 2F. " 
For Serbian, Croatian and particularly Muslim people, the 'family'is defined in much 
wider terms than this, indeed, it is not unusual to have three or even four generations 
of the family unit living in the same accommodation. " Yet, the representation here 
once again bears out Hutton's theory that even though the Balkan conflict is 0 
geographically 'on our doorstep'. Ve'are unprepared to do more than observe or pay 
lip service to how much 'we' care. We' appear to be unaccepting of their different 
50john Carvel and Alan Travis, "EC rule adds to Bosnia misery, " The Guardian, 31 May 1993, sec. 
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cultural definitions, unaccepting of their refugees, and, as Hutton stated, unaccepting 
of them as Europeans. The 'We'. of course, could be replaced by the words Western 
political elites', but on one level that would be failing to take responsibility for 'Our' 
actions, for it is %ve'who place those political elites in their positions of power. Carvel 
and Travis end the article by stating that, in their opinion, particularly vulnerable 
groups should continue to be admitted into the European Union. In their words, they 
suggest that those groups should include: 
[F]ormer prisoners, as well as the wounded and those with 
illnesses which cannot be treated locally, those whose lives or 
physical safety are threatened, rape victims who do not have 
access to rehabilitation, and returning combatants who face 
serious problems in their places of origin. ' 
These Western responses, while originating from different sources, nevertheless, have 
been concerned with the collection of information and data on who and how many 
women have been raped. Moreover, the press has represented Western political elites 
as being keen to support the rape victims in any way possible, but simply lacking the 
authority or the consensus of opinion needed to agree on actual 'action'. Therefore, 
while most of the Western responses to the mass raping of women in the Balkans, 
proved to be well meaning, ultimately they have had little immediate consequences 
for the rape victims. However, we now turn to one issue which 'grabbed'joumalists' 
attention, albeit for a limited length of time, and that is the issue of potential Yape 
babies'. 
Rape and 'Rape Babies' 
One rape-related topic that attracted many journalists' attention for only a very short 
space of time, was the issue of 'rape babies' and the possibility of British couples 
adopting abandoned Bosnian babies born to raped Bosnian women. Tim Yeo, the then 
junior health minister, appeared to have begun this short topical debate by suggesting 
that international adoption procedures should be 'streamlined' in order to aid the 
arrival of the babies. Yeo's proposals were reported in The Guardian in early January 
54 John Carvel and Alan Travis, 31 May 1993. 
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1993 in an article written by its political correspondent, Alan Travis. The article began 
in the following manner: 
Government ministers will accelerate local authority legal 
formalities to allow British fan-lilies to offer homes to babies 
born to Muslim women raped by Serbian soldiers ... and the Foreign Office requested to consult welfare organisations in 
Bosnia looking after women who have been raped to identify 
unwanted children who could come to Britain ... [Tim Yeo] said 
yesterday he had been horrified by reports of the systematic rape 
of hundreds of Muslim women in Bosnia and Serbia. "We are 
talking about babies not yet born, " said Mr. Yeo. '5 
Note that there is no mention of Croatian or Serbian women having been raped, even 
though by January 1993 there had been numerous reports, including the interim report 
by the ECs investigative team mentioned in the previous section, which concluded 
that Croat and Serb women had also suffered a considerable degree of rape at the 
hands of enemy soldiers, with presumably a consequential number of unwanted 
pregnancies. Yeo also makes a huge assumption in preparing the ground for an influx 
of 'rape babies'which might never happen. Although if Mr. Yeo accepted the stereo- 
typical view of Muslim women and their role within traditional Muslim society as 
being the 'norm' in Bosnia, and indeed this view had been promoted in the British 
press, then it is not surprising thathe preferred to address the worse case scenario - 
that of the mothers being rejected by husbands, fathers, as well as the community at 
large and in turn the mothers rejecting and abandoning their 'rape babies'. However, 
Tim Yeo is reported as making the following admission: 
I do not know whether they will be rejected by their mothers or 
communities. But if they are, it is right that we, with our 
considerable experience of adoption, should ensure there are no 
bureaucratic obstacles in coming to this country. " 
It is interesting to compare the reluctance of the British government to adapt and 
'streamline' immigration procedures to help rape victims, prisoners of war or the 
dispossessed refugees of the Balkans in their search for humanitarian assistance in 
Britain, with the speed at which the government wish to 'accelerate legal formalities' 
in the acquiring of 'rape babies'for British couples to adopt. As Alan Travis comments 
55 Alan Travis, "Britain will ease way for adoption, " The Guardian, 4 January 1993, see. FOR, p. 9. 
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in the article: There was no shortage of British couples formally approved as foster 
parents but who could not find babies to adopt'. " 
Four days later the issue of 'rape babies' appeared in The Guardian again and takes the 
form of a leading article entitled The babies of Bosnia'. The article is a measured 
critique of Tim Yeo's proposals reported above - cutting the bureaucracy which 
controls adoption from overseas - and includes the following assertion: 
His cause is a worthy one: the large number of Bosnian babies 
who will be abandoned this year by their young Muslim 
mothers, repeatedly raped by Serb soldiers, There has been 
widespread horror at this latest Bosnian atrocity: systematic rape 
by the Serbs with the deliberate intention of impregnating 
Muslim women with unwanted Christian babies. No doubt at all 
about the need for a humanitarian response. The issue is the 
form it should take. " 
The, point this leading article makes is a valid one, although the question of whether or 
not Serb, soldiers raped with the 'deliberate intention of impregnation Muslim women' 
remains a controversial one. 
Another question brought up by this passage which needs some qualification is what 
exactly does the article mean by a large number'of Bosnian babies? There appeared 
to be no estimates in the British press, either in this article or any other articles dealing 
with this issue, which alluded to the total number of Yape babies' abandoned by their 
Bosnian mothers and available for adoption. The reader has only The Guardian's word 
that such large numbers exist. In an article in The Observer dealing with the same 
issue in Rwanda a spokesperson for the Ministry of Population is quoted as stating 
that between 2,000 and 5,000 women have 'delivered or are ready to deliver children 
conceived through rape'. " Although all estimates of this kind should, of course, be 
read with care. Regarding the Balkans, however, an adoption specialist is quoted as 
stating, in yet another Guardian article concerned with the issue, that '[t]here is no 
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clarity about how many children are expected as a result of the abuses or what 
arrangements will be made in Bosnia'. ' 
There is, however, some statistical evidence offered by Alexandra Stiglmayer in her 
book Mass Rqpe: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina. " Stiglmayer 
quotes statistics from a UN report drafted by a UN delegation which was 
commissioned to investigate the human rights situation in the former-Yugoslavia 
including allegations of mass rape. In January 1993 the commission analysed the 
situation in the larger women's clinics of Zagreb (Croatia), Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina), and Belgrade (Serbia) and found 119 cases of pregnancy 
resulting from rape. " Stiglmayer initially states that '[w]omen who become pregnant 
following a rapd normally reject both the pregnancy and the childreW. " She then 
continues with the following statistics: 
In 104 of the 119 cases the women decided to abort the 
pregnancy. In nine cases the women were forced to carry the 
child to term because it was too late for an abortion. (In the 
remaining 6 cases -4 current pregnancies and 2 births - there is 
no information about whether the women decided to have the 
child voluntarily or had to carry it to term for medical reasons). ' 
These statistics, if they are a true reflection of reality, appear to bear out the widely 
accepted idea that women generally do reject the pregnancies that are the consequence 
of rape. However, this data cannot claim, as Stiglmayer does, to prove that the women 
would also reject the children once they are born, as at the time the statistics were 
documented the children were not yet born. There are some further statistics that 
support the theory of pregnant rape victims rejecting the pregnancies, and to a lesser 
degree the children of rape, in a recent journal article by Claudia Card. The article 
entitled Rape as a weapon of war'includes statistics originally'published in the New 
York Times and refers to the raping of women and girls in Rwanda. Card states that: 
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According to a front page report in the New York Th-nes, of more 
than 15,700 women and girls between the ages of thirteen and 
sixty-five who were raped in Rwanda between April 1994 and 
April 10,1995, more than 1,100 gave birth but 5,200 had 
abortions, and many more pregnancies were untrackable (Lorch 
1995). Many raped Rwandan women were reported to have 
abandoned new-boms or killed themselves. " 
For The Guardian's leading article (The babies of Bosnia) mentioned above, however, 
this issue does not seem to be the overall focus of this particular article. The crux of 
which is basically the myriad of potential problems which adopting a child from the 
former-Yugoslavia could entail; problems of a physical, mental, emotional and 
cultural nature. 
Yet another Guardian article published on the same day continued to highlight these 
problems by comparing the possible adoption of 'rape babies'frorn the Balkans with 
the failed adoptions of 'orphaned' Romanian children, many of whom 'ended up in 
council care'because, in some cases, the children had emotional problems or genetic 
defects. An additional worry of adoption specialists was Tim Yeo's proposals to 
'speed-up' the adoption process, which would create a two-tier adoption system 
'possibly letting people who would not usually pass rigorous screening procedures to 
get a child'. " However, none of these articles even made a passing reference to the 
possible fate of the mothers; the rape victims. The overall inference of the articles was 
that, on the whole, the 'rape babies'had been a rather convenient solution to the lack 
of British babies available for adoption, although there was, of course, a general air of 
British magnanimity emanating from each article, persuading all but the most cynical 
of readers that British political elites had only the welfare of the 'rape babies'at heart. 
One Guardian article which took a rather more candid view of the situation, and one 
that was more in line with both StigImayer's and Card's theories and statistics, was a 
piece written by Linda Grant and published in August 1993 -a good six months after Cý 
the initial furore surrounding the possible influx of 'rape babies' into Britain. The 
influx did not, in fact, materialise and this article offered one reason why the 'rape 
babies'were not 'delivered'. Linda Grant elaborates with the following explanation: 
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The reason for the lack of rape babies is obvious. Only women 
who have been held over a period of months would be forced to 
bring a child to full term. Abortion on demand is available in 
Bosnia up to 10 weeks, in Croatia up to 12. Most raped pregnant 
women would have had abortions without having to notify 
anyone of the cause of the pregnancy. The rate of miscarriage 
has also increased generally throughout Bosnia. The very high 
level of this and abortion makes it impossible ever to estimate 
how many women might have been raped. " 
Grant's suggestions here fall in line with the story told by the official UN statistics as 
set out in Stiglmayer's book. However, her article also tries to tell another story; that 
of the 'media's' constant search for 'hot' news. And how, in that search, the real 
underlying social and political issues are either ignored in the drive for sensationalist 
copy, or trivialised. Grant's views are clearly highlighted in this excerpt from her. 
article: 
Eight months ago, in a maternity hospital in Zagreb, a British 
journalist and a French camera crew degenerated into an 
undignified tussle over the bed of a teenage girl who was 
pregnant after being raped by a Serbian. The media was 
desperate for rape babies. Rape in Bosnia was the hottest story 
of the new year. The city was teeming with foreign journalists, 
scouring refugee camps with a revival of that familiar wartime 
phrase: "Anyone here been raped and speak English? "" 
This article by Linda Grant, as well as trying to halt the 'rape babies' bandwagon' , 
takes the view that the press' preoccupation with questions such as: how many 'rape 
babies'are there?; how many are coming to Britain?; how many women have actually 
been raped?; and why were they raped? These questions have overshadowed another 
issue, that is, what has happened to the women since their ordeal ended? Grant 
illustrates this point while in conversation with two psychiatrists, Dr. Vera Folnegovic 
and Dr. -Dragica Kozarie-Kovacic'. 'For them' Grant states, 'the --numbers game is 
irrelevant. ' She then quotes the psychiatrists as commenting that, '[w]e have one or 
two women who were raped eight or nine times a day for five months. Is this one case 
or hundreds? " 
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The Western response'by British political elites concerning this issue appears to be 
rather egotistical, however, the press' preoccupation with the 'rape babies' issue is 
perhaps understandable. On one level it seemed to be regarded by the press as 
something positive to come out of a messy and complex war which they were finding 
increasingly difficult to keep up the momentum of coverage and condemnation for. 
Moreover, it also appeared to have been represented as one war issue that could have 
immediate practical consequences, and would possibly not be halted by the usual 
complex political bureaucracy. Yet, this is not to excuse their tendency to 
sensationalise certain aspects of the war, particularly those that sell papers, to the 
detriment of other more 'real'issues. However, Linda Grant's concerns over the need 
for the rape victims to be offered support and counselling brings us on to the next 
section of this chapter which will be looking at those reports of the raping of women 
during the Balkan conflict that have been linked with the issue of women's human 
rights. 
Rape and Women's Human Rights 
Constituted in 1945 as a response to the atrocities committed during World War H, the 
Human Rights dimension of the United Nations Charter served to usher in the 
contemporary international movement for human rights. " However, in recent years 
scholars and advocates have criticised human rights law for its failure to grant 
protection to women facing gender-based violence, " including rape in war. Although 
the physical abuse of women in war is pervasive, cutting across cultural, class and 
economic boundaries, traditional concepts of human rights have been developed 
. ., within a male-dominated frameývork which arguably does not recognise the 
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experiences of women as women. 72 Violence against women, therefore, is frequently 
viewed as the result of 'private' disputes and not as having an important, political 
context. The articles analysed within this section attempt to challenge this view and to 
bring the issue of mass rape in the Balkans into the wider context of women's human 
rights. 
In Linda Grant's article, just mentioned at the end of the last section, we see that she 
criticises the press in general for concentrating solely on certain aspects of the 'rape 
story' , sensationalising those aspects to the detriment of what she regards as the 
important issues. To illustrate her viewpoint the following quotation, reviewed 
previously in Chapter Five, and which is taken from the introduction to her two 
thousand word feature article, 'Anyone here been raped and speak English? '. It begins 
in the following way: 
Having had their fill of both pretty Muslim virgins sobbing out 
their tales of sexual violation and British couples cradling the 
Bosnian rape babies they have adopted, the media have lost 
interest. One issue, however, still bums: what has happened to 
these women in the wake of their ordeal? 73 
Following this question and the berating of the insensitivity and superficiality of the 
journalists involved in the sensationalism of many of the issues surrounding rape in 
the Balkans, Grant goes on to catalogue a few of the issues that have made Yecent' 
headline news. On the list is the EC investigation into the allegations of mass rape 
which, according to Grant, "concluded that around 20,000 women had suffered sexual 
assault at the hands of Serbian forces'. Referring to the investigation she also states 
that 'the mission gave credence to the claim that rape was being used as a systematic 
weapon in the campaign of ethnic cleansing'. Grant then mentions the junior health 
minister, Tim Yeo, and his attempt cut through red tape thereby 'helping childless 
British couples to adopt the potentially thousands of Bosnian rape babies that were 
supposed to be languishing in orphanages in former Yugoslavia'. ' Then, in Grant's Z: - 
words 'the issue went dead as far as the foreign press was concerned ... The hospitals 
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of Zagreb and Sarajevo did not fill with abandoned infants and the media lost 
interest'. " 
The article claims that doubt and scepticism, regarding the importance of the issue of 
rape in war, has gradually crept in because, again in Grant's words, 'some aid agencies 
have begun to admit privately that rape has always been part of the spoils of war: the 
officers get the paintings and the jewellery, the men are let loose on the local 
population'. " Grant, however, makes no mention of which aid agencies she is 
referring to, neither does she make clear whether it is the opinion of just one 
individual. That rape has occurred in war since records began is generally accepted, 
and it is therefore surprising that an aid agency would alter its policy on rape in the. 
Balkans because of the realisation that rape iý not a new phenomenon in war, and 
furthermore that they would accept, not resist, any suggestion that rape in war is a 
'natural' side-affect of war. 
Grant also states that rape only became an international issue in the Balkans because 
"it is the first war that has been monitored by a well-organised, modem women's 
movement, which has survived the disintegration of the Yugoslavian state and 
maintained links with feminist groups in Europe'. " The article also states that there 
have been 'demands by women's organisations that rape be included as a war crime 
within the Geneva Convention'. In calling for the expansion of the conception and 
practice of human rights legislation to incorporate the specific experiences of women, 
or indeed, to create new mechanisms that address the human rights concerns of 
women as women, these (nameless) women's organisations have sought to begin to 
address the shortcomings of the present international human rights legislation - an 
issue. that will be addressed at length in Chapter Nine,. One major shortcoming being 
that gender-based violence in war is generally not recognised as a violation of human 
rights, but is regarded as a by-product of war, and often simply interpreted as the 
isolated actions of individual soldiers. This notion of inadequate international 
legislation to address the problem of rape in war will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
Nine, along with some feminist proposals for change. 
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A large proportion of Grant's article is taken up with the issue of post-rape support for 
the victims. She makes the point that due to the absence of any established rape 
counselling service the only way in which the rape victims can get help and support is 
through medical channels. Grant explains the situation in the following manner: 
In Zagreb, there is a growing number of reports of suicide and 
attempted suicide among female Bosnian refugees. The stigma 
associated with rape in a country that has never had a rape 
counselling service means the most likely way for women to 
receive help is if they have developed psychiatric problems. 
Other women have been referred by their families after two 
psychiatrists went on a local radio phone-in. " 
The psychiatrists explained the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorders to the 
radio listeners in an attempt to reach those women and families suffering in silence. " 
Yet, Grant also informs the reader that 'earlier this year, the Croatian government 
announced that the Bosnian refugees would no longer receive free medical treatment 
and this avenue of help is no longer open'. This is a clear representation of the failure 
to recognise gender-based sexual violence as a violation of human rights - women's 
human rights - and to accord the rape victims the rehabilitation and support they need. 
Once again, this failure can be attributed to a male-dominated conception of what 
constitutes a human rights abuse and also a patriarchal definition of human rights 
which privileges 'public' over 'private' activity - using, of course, masculinist 
definitions of both 'public'and 'private'. 
Grant continued her article with a statement that suggests that there is considerable 
controversy surrounding the actual form the support for the rape victims should take. 
For example, she states that: 
A debate had been raging about what should happen to the raped 
women of Bosnia. Women's groups in Zagreb want to set up a 
special hostel where they could receive long-term counselling. 
Specialists in war trauma, however, argue that rape as a specific 
issue will become an acute problem only after the conflict is 
over and people are no longer in survival mode. The Muslim 
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community believes special hostels will identify and stigmatise 
the women. " 
However, one positive consequence of the EC mission' to the area and, arguably, a 
recognition of post-rape counselling being, if not a necessity in basic human rights 
terms, then certainly a recognition of the desirability for the future welfare of the rape 
victims, was the recommendation for money to be made available to set up rape 
counselling services throughout Bosnia. Grant reports that it was the Marie Stopes 
Society which 'snapped up' the money and went on to establish bases at Tuzla and 
Zenica, with its directive being to help existing groups and to deliver resources and 
training. This is at least a departure from the generally narrow Western' conception of 
human rights which tends to focus on state violations of civil and political rights and 
subordinate economic, social, cultural, and in this case, 'intimate' or 'private' rights 
such as bodily integrity. 
Linda Grant finished this extended article by, once again, accusing the press of 
cheapening and sensationalising the rape victims suffering by using some 
unnecessarily uncomfortable, sexual images. First, Grant comments on her own 
article, stating that on the whole '[tlhis makes pretty dull reading'when compared with 
the issues raised, and the images used, by the media in general. She continues to 
berate the press in the following manner: 
There is something sexy, in media terms, about thousands of 
pre tty Muslim virgins sobbing out their tales of sexual violation: 
"The 15-year-old pulled her thin blouse over her full breasts and 
said, The Chetnik penetrated me many tirnes', " was the general 
quality of the news reporting in January. When there are no 
more weeping girls posing prettily and no photogenic babies in ZD I-) 
the arms of happy British couples, the long-term fate of a 
tfaurnatised nation became substantially less worthy of Media 
attention. " 
The question that Grant's closing passage raises for this section is to what degree are 
the following linked; the media, policy-making Western political elites, feminist calls 
for greater awareness of gender-related abuse as an abuse of human rights, and the 
practical application, if any, of that heightened awareness? In other words, does the 
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call by feminists for an expansion of the responsibility of states, at the local, national 
and international levels to protect women under existing legal mechanisms, and to 
further expand that those mechanisms, fall on deaf Western political elites'ears unless 
the media is extensively covering the 'story? If this is the case, even to a small degree, 
then the dilemma for feminists, or arguably any gender-sensitive person, is whether or 
not to condemn the overtly sexual manner in which the 'story, in this case the Bosnian 
rape victims plight, is covered. If the media is restricted in the way in which it can 
report the 'story', would they then feel inclined to ignore it. And if the 'story'is ignored 
will the impact on policy-makers be as strong as if the story had constant media 
exposure? But, does there have to be a choice at all? While calling for increased 
awareness of gender-specific abuse in war and for that awareness to be used in the 
expansion of the definitions of human rights given that many of the currýnt legal 
mechanisms fail during wartime, feminists could also condemn insensitive 
press/media reporting. Moreover, this would serve to further emphasise the degree to 
which narrow, male-dominated definitions of what constitutes a 'story' don-iinates the 
media. Yet, it is difficult not to condemn some of the press' representations of the 
Bosnian rape victims more directly when they present reports that are replete with 
obviously sexist and overtly sexual connotations. The rape victims in the Balkans 
have already had their bodies officially and systematically targeted a first time, should 
the press remain unchallenged while they target their them (and their bodies) for a 
second time? 
The work in Bosnia of the Marie Stopes Foundation (the organisation is referred to by 
the British press as both a 'Society' and a `Foundation), mentioned above, makes 
another appearance in the British press nearly a year later in the early summer of 
1994. An Orticle in the Sunday Times, written by- Anna Pukas, follows the society's 
work with the victims of rape in the Balkans and in particular the work of Chelsea 
Renton, the daughter of Tim Renton, a former Tory chief whip. The article explains ID 
that Chelsea Renton was one of a team of helpers who were dispatched by the Marie 
Stopes Foundation after a borrifying report by the European Community-sponsored 
Warburton Comrnission, which estimated that 20,000 women had been sexually 
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violated in a campaign of terror by the Serbs. The reality, Pukas reports, proved to 
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be rather different. Pukas justifies this point by quoting from her interview with 
Chelsea Renton, in which Renton states the following: 
Within a couple of weeks, we were seriously wondering about 
the figures. If they are true, they are impossible to corroborate. 
We barely found a handful, never mind thousands. Pukas states 
that by the time the Marie Stopes team had arrived many of the 
victims were lost among the diaspora of the former Yugoslavia. 
Any rape victims left behind are not telling anyone about it, and 
even if they are, rape. is just not top of their trauma list, the 
women are far more worried about their husbands or fathers 
fighting on the front line, about what happens to their children, 
about when they can go back home and start their lives again. 
All those problems are far more important that anything that 
they have suffered personally. " 
There are three points which are raised by this passage and the first draws on a later 
comment in the article, which is, that another women's aid organisation called the 
Muslim Union of Women in Bosnia had also collated information on the rapes in 
Bosnia, however, Pukas states that this organisation 'Will not share data with a foreign, 
non-Muslim organisation'. ' That the Bosnian Muslim rape victims may have 
preferred to share their experiences with an organisation that appreciates more closely 
their cultural and social background is not surprising, although it is also not 
necessarily the case, as the data has not been made available. Second, the assumption 
that the rape victims are preoccupied with other 'more important' issues - the welfare 
of husbands, fathers, children, and so on, even given the context - is a sweeping 
generalisation to make. 
Without wanting to be guilty of making similar generalisations, it is possible that 
many older women, perhaps those with more experience of life are able to 
compartmentalise their own, *personal suffering, and to focus on other problem areas 
of their lives - even to force those issues to become 'more important'. But what of the 
younger survivors of rape? What of the young girls, and boys, for whom their rape at 
the hands of enemy soldiers, could have been the most harrowing incident of their 
lives; it might not have been quite so easy for them to focus on other more pressing 
matters. The third point, which is inextricably linked to the second, is reiterating a 
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possibility that was suggested in Linda Grant's article above. That is, the possibility 
that the women are still functioning in survival mode and that the full extent of the 
physical and psychological damage these rape victims have suffered will not be 
manifest until their lives have returned to some semblance of normality. Perhaps only 
then, when they no longer have other traumatic circumstances in their lives to focus 
on, will they have the time and/or the need to deal with their experiences. 
This general argument - that the women need to focus on 'more important' issues in 
their lives in order to cope with the trauma of rape - put forward by Chelsea Renton in 
Pukas' article, is contrasted with Renton's next argument which contends that it is 
important for the well-being of the Bosnian rape victims that they have 'trivia'in their 
lives. Pukas explains that faced with a dearth of rape victims to counsel the Marie 
Stopes team 'tailored its ambitions and offered more general encouragement to 
Bosnian women'. " Chelsea Renton and the team have. established sixteen drop-in 
centres throughout the Bihac region of north-west Bosnia and offered a range of 
activities from hairdressing to aerobics. In explaining the reasoning behind the 
centres, and the types of activity offered, Pukas uses a direct quotation from Renton, 
who explains the situation in the following manner: 
Some people think that all reftigees need is food and a roof over 
their heads. They're supposed to have too much on their minds 
to be bothered with trivial things like hairstyles. We say these 
women have lost control over every part of their lives. They 
have no say in where they live and for some, the only personal 
space they've got is a mattress in a school hall. They can't 
choose what they eat or what they wear. They have no control 
over their future they can't even see a future. All they can 
control is how they spend the time while they wait for their 
future to happen. " - 
It is difficult to criticise the work of the Marie Stopes team. While on a national and 
international level the Foundation was helping towards the call for the recognition and 
incorporation of human rights that are particular to women, on a local level the team 
worked towards giving the Bosnian women encouragement, support and a modicum Z> 
of control over their lives. There are undeniably arguments that might suggest that in 
offering the women activities such as new hair styles and aerobics the Marie Stopes 0 
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team is aiding the perpetuation of the Western stereo-typical image of women. 
However, one could also argue that that argument pre-supposes a pre-social view of 
woman and, moreover, there are utilitarian and pragmatic arguments that could also be 
valid in supporting the work of the Marie Stopes team. 87 As Pukas goes on to 
elaborate, the success of the drop-in centres in building the women's confidence both 
on a personal level and between themselves and the Marie Stopes team, apparently 
resulted in the gradual 'opening up'of many of the Bosnian women, some of whom 
began to share their experiences of rape with the team and with the other women 
members of the centres. Although stories of rape and sexual abuse at the hands of 
mostly Serbian troops are disclosed, as Pukas states, lu]nspeakable suffering is never 
far behind the jollity, other more hopeful stories have also emerged 'of the good 
Serbian neighbour who gave a whispered warning by telephone or persuaded the 
Serbian soldiers to leave a Muslim house standing. " 
Although initially suspicious of the centres, fuelled by accusations from local leaders 
of frivolity, spying, performing illegal abortions and trying to destabilise the Muslim 
birth-rate by issuing free contraceptives, Pukas states that the women 'soon came to 
trust the vivacious Englishwomen who would not allow them to sink into 
depression'. " In fact, on one level, the whole article reads like a acclamation to the 
work of Chelsea Renton. As Pukas c6ntinues: 
Renton is greeted with embraces and kisses whenever she 
appears. Her contract with Marie Stopes ends in a month but she 
is already being showered with leaving presents. One of them is 
a tapestry from the women of Buzim, a remote mountain village, 
which says simply: 'We love you Chelsea. " For the women the 
centres are a lifeline. "This is our second home and our second 
family, " said 39-year-old. Merima.... "Without it* we'd be'- stuck 
doing nothing all day, going quietly crazy. ' 
One has to wonder whether or not the Marie Stopes Foundation and the Bosnian rape 
victims would have received this degree of press attention had they not had a young, 
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vivacious, Tory MPs daughter cast in the starring role. However, overall the article 
represents both rape victims and the international organisations as trying to offer help 
and support in a positive light, even to the degree that one is given the impression that 
there was an emerging, although somewhat amorphous, international community of 
supportive women offering solidarity and understanding to the Bosnian women - 
while also fighting for their human rights. " 
An article published in The Guardian over a year before, also created the image of a 
growing international movement of female solidarity. It was written by Wendy 
Webster and entitled Women against war crimes against women'. In the article 
Webster gathered together information on some of the women's groups that were 
working toward helping the women of the Balkaný either on a national, international, 
or local level. Webster begins the article in the following up-front way: 
Martina Belic states the facts: "Women in the refugee camps are 
in a situation of overwhelming instability. Many do not know 
what has happened to their relatives, their houses are destroyed, 
they have no money, no status. They face complete uncertainty 
about their future. 1192 
The press is notorious for categorically stating 'facts, taking one small representation 
and giving it the distinction of being a factual account of an event and leaving little 
visible room for the reader to question the 'facts' without appearing cynical in the 
extreme. In this case, the 'facts'. as Belie stated them and Webster represented them, 
are probably reasonably accurate. This assumption can be made given that we are in 
the posiýion of having looked at many press representations on the Balkan conflict and 
the plight of the rape victims, and by stepping back and viewing the big picture'one 
can appreciate the 'story' that these representations have. built up, consequently one 
can make a fair judgement on the possible credibility of Belie's 'facts'. Of course, we 
can never be one hundred percent certain that our judgement is correct - we are not 
Bosnian rape victims in a refugee camp experiencing the 'overwhelming instability' 
(and if we were would we recognise that our position was unstable). 
91For further information on some women's projects which are trying to rehabilitate women suffering 
from wartime atrocities and attempting to bridge violent communal divides, see, Cynthia Cockburn, 
"Mixing it, " Red Peppe (September 1996), pp. 22-24. 
92NVendy Webster, "Women against war cfimes against women, " The Guardian, 17 February 1993, sec. 
G2T, p. 11. 
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Webster's article goes on to explain that Martina Belie worked in the Centre for 
Women War Victims in Zagreb and planned for the group to play a similar role to that 
initially planned by the Marie Stopes Foundation. Webster specifies the practical ways 
in which they intended to help and support the victims of rape: 
[The Centre for Women War Victims] is forming teams of 
women to go into refugee camps to counsel those who have 
been raped. It also plans to establish a counselling service and 
self-help groups for women outside the camps, and to open a 
house for 15 women and their children who are in the greatest 
need. " 
Other groups, such as the National Women's Network for International Solidarity are 
attempting to help in other ways. For example, Webster quotes one spokeswoman for 
the Network as stating that grassroots women's movements are 'actively calling for our 
support on money and resources, and our influence on bodies like the UN 
Commission'. ' At first sight the article appears a little 'piecemeal', as do the 
representations. In other words, in Webster's first few passages she seems to be just 
listing the supporting roles that the different women's organisations are undertaking 
and it leaves one a little uneasy about the possible lack of co-ordination and 
communication between the groups and also the possible waste of time and resources 
if all the groups are trying to play the same role. However, eventually Webster 
clarifies the position by stating that: 
In January, a wide-ranging coalition of women's groups in the 
UK came together in response ... to the widespread violence 
against women in former Yugoslavia. Women Against War 
Crime is campaigning for the prosecution of rape as a war 
crime, for the lifting of immigration restrictions on women war 
refugees and for the channelling of government resources to 
women's aid groups working with women victims of violence in 
Bosnia. " 
Webster also included information on the Women's Rights Committee of the 
European Parliament which was demanding action from European governments and 
was quoted as saying that, '[w]e cannot be passive spectators while innocent women in 
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their thousands, only a day's drive from Brussels, are being tom and broken. We want 
action to stop the sexually violent use of women as a weapon'. " The representation is 
now clear; a wide and diverse collection of women's organisations had joined together 
to consolidate their expertise towards a common goal - to help and support the rape 
victims of the Balkan conflict. This support took many forms with each group playing 
a particular role depending on its strengths. Some lobbied the EC/EU to fund practical 
projects. For example, the supplying of buildings to provide space for living, r: - 
counselling and medical help, while other groups spent their time lobbying for an 
expansion of present human rights definitions to take account of the gender-based 
violence that the rape victims have suffered. Yet more groups specifically followed up 
the recommendations of the EC Investigative Mission and called for the identifying of 
rape, dnforce. d prostitution and indecent assault against w6men as a war crime. 
Finally, those groups with specialised training offered counselling and medical help to 
the rape victims themselves. Whether the reality ran as smoothly and co-ordinated as 
the representation remains to be seen, but at the end of the article Webster publicised a 
Europe-wide vigil ko mark support for all women victims of war' , and then remarks 
%vomen only, bring candles'. " Throughout the article there was no explicit comparison 
with the general inertia and lack of consensus which characterises the response of 
Western governments (led in the most part by male political elites), but the implicit 
contrast was there, perhaps reinforced by the fact that men were not invited to the 
vigil. But would men attending the vigil really pose a threat to female solidarity, or 
just to the statement, the image, or the representation of that solidarity? ZD 
In April 1993, The Guardian ran a thousand word article by Rosalind Coward that was 
simply called 'Loud and clear. It was published in conjunction with a statement about 
Bosnia which was'signed by 200 'influential'women and expressed a simple desire, lo 
let women's voices be heard on the issue'. 9' Here, Coward uses a quotation from Sarah 
Dunant, one of the protagonists of the statement, as an example of the motivations 
behind the action. Dunant is quoted as making the following statement: 
I couldn't bear to read the newspaper reports. I didn't feel able to 
have a view. But as more pictures came from the camps, more 
96ibid. 
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news of the rapes and murders of women and children, I felt I 
had to have a response. I have two little girls and I kept thinking, 
what will I tell them in fifteen years if they ask me what I did 
about the atrocities in Bosnia? " 
Although the signed statement, in effect, advocates military intervention, Coward's 
article reveals that many of the women are active members of groups that tend to take 
an anti-militarist stance, for example, CND and END. Indeed, Coward comments that 
their action goes 'against the grain of women's traditional alliance with pacifism'. " 
Putting aside the generalisation of this view of women's links with peace movements, 
this statement happens to be a reasonably accurate historical representation. Coward 
also states that for many of the signatories there were long 'moments of soul- ZD 
searching' - pacifist ideals were being put aside in favour of calls for military 
intervention. Yet, Coward justifies their actions by stating that the common feeling 
amongst the signatories was that 'as the carnage deepens, the consequences of inaction 
seem worse than those of action'. "' Many members of the 1980s 'peace movements' 
favoured military action in the Balkans - leading some to call them B-52 Liberals'. 112 
The above quotation by Sarah Dunant implies, as does the signed statement in general, 
that women have reacted to the rape crisis in the Balkans in a different way than men. 
Coward's article supports this view and she explains this viewpoint in the following 
way: 
Information about massacres, futile deaths and human suffering 
affects men and women alike. But the images from Bosnia have 
a particular horror for women. We have read the reports about 
mass rape, the rape of children, the holding captive of pregnant 
women until it is too late for abortions and then extermination of 
whole families and villages ... As Maggie OKane reported, 
raped Bosnian women have been told, "There are too many 
Muslims and a lot of Muslims are going to give birth to Serbian 
children. " Women and children are the target of ethnic 
cleansing, not just innocent victims of an incomprehensible 
ethnic clash, as the Western media portrays them. 'O' 
99ibid. 
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It is interesting to note that Wendy Webster's article, written approximately two 
months before this article was published, was detailing how a coalition of women's 
organisations were lobbying, planning, calling for additional funds for humanitarian 
aid, and so on, yet there was no mention of a demand for military intervention. Could 
this signed statement possibly be part of that 'planning and lobbying process'. or 
conversely is it a result of the women's experience of planning and lobbying? In other 
words, past representations have indicated that the women's coalition was a well- 
organised, highly motivated, professional body of women who had clear goals and 
defined methods of how to achieve those objectives. But, generally speaking, it would 
be difficult for the coalition to achieve all those objectives without the support and co- 
operation of, at least some, Western political elites. Perhaps frustration at the failure of 
the coalition to gain supporf for their more 'peaceful'goals led this group of womeh, 
many of whom belong to one of the women's groups within the coalition, to demand 
stronger action publicly. 
Another point raised by Coward in the article is that she, and many other of the 
signatories, felt a particular solidarity with the women of the Balkans due to their 
previous close working relationship with some of the ex-Yugoslavian women's 
movements. Coward illustrates this solidarity in the following quotation: 
European women feel a particular horror at this war's proximity. 
Many of us had contact with the active women's movement in 
former Yugoslavia. Broadly speaking, their concerns were our 
concerns.... Many of us have spent time in Yugoslavia, 
welcomed into their homes, sharing discussions about 
democracy, communism, fen-dnism, desire and sexuality. To 
misquote Baudelaire, it's a case of "Mon semblable, ma socur. " 
They are like us, they are our sisters. " 
Again, the strong representation of female solidarity is in evidence. However, the 
European theme was taken one step further by Coward and in a similar vein to the 
view espoused by Will Hutton in the earlier section on Western Investigations'. she 
asks the question, just '[h]ow much are they like us? 'This question could be taken two 
ways. First, as Hutton proposes, it could be suggesting that the inaction of Western 
governments is due in part to the notion that these are women who live outside the 
104ibid. 
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borders of 'real'Europe and that they are therefore viewed as the 'other'. Alternatively, 
and this is the option expanded by Coward, a parallel could be drawn between the 
events in the former Yugoslavia and ethnic conflicts in other European countries, 
including Britain. Coward defines this argument in the following way: 
If it was so easy for nationalism, chauvinism and systematic 
male. violence to erupt there, how far is it buried here? Would it 
need only the 10 years they had of massive inflation, 
unemployment and shifting populations for all our latent ethnic 
and social conflicts to take on a more brutal aspect? " 
The idea of rape occurring on a massive scale in Britain, France, Germany, or any 
other EU country, seems inconceivable, even absurd, yet the idea could also have 
appeared to be beyond the realms of possibility for the Balkan women before the 
conflict began. Moreover, the suggestion that nationalism plays a crucial role in the 
occurrence of rape in war will be discussed in Chapter Eight. 
Coward's article, in its entirety, was both a demand for the Western world to take 
responsibility in defending the ideal of a multi-ethnic society and also a demonstration 
of the strength of support that a policy of intervention would have. She concedes that 
'military action is extremely problematic' and that calls for stronger UN action in 
Bosnia is 'complex and will cause heated debate'. However, in her concluding remarks 
Coward makes one of the objectives of the signatories clear, and also illustrates their 
awareness of the need for flexibility. She concludes that '[t1his is only the beginning of 
the debate. Many women will disagree with the conclusions reached. And the 
instability and confusion of the situation make rigid positions undesirable. But the 
British and American governments are still being told there is no public support to end 
the killing in Bosnia. Today, women have begun. the process of letting them know that 
just isnI true. "' 
The last of the articles reviewed in this section was written by Janet Daley and was 
published in The Times on 16 April 1993, two weeks before the above article by 
Rosalind Coward. It carried the same message although in a very different manner as 
the Coward article - that Western governments were not doing enough to protect the 
105ibid. 
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people of Bosnia, and in particular the rape victims. The article begins by confirn-iing 
that Britain is contributing to the sending of a force to Bosnia to support the local 
populace, a force made up of experts in their field. The article then continues in the. 
following way: 
Will it be a squad of paratroopers, a contingent of the SAS or 
even a fleet of munitions lorries? No, what we are talking about, 
wait for it, is an "emergency team" of psychologists and social 
workers to offer counselling to Muslim women who have been 
the victims of rape and violence. The European Community, 
having given much thought to what is urgently needed by the 
tragic population of Bosnia, has instructed the charity Marie 
Stopes International.... to dispatch this task force with all due 
speed. The women of Bosnia raped, impregnated, widowed and 
starving as they may be are not to be offered the wherewithal 
either to defend or avenge themselves. Never mind: they are to 
be offered the ultimate panacea instead. No circumstances are so 
appalling, no fate so unjust, as not to be susceptible to the 
ministrations of psychological therapy. " 
This explicit criticism at the inaction of the EC and the work of the team from Marie 
Stopes International is continued throughout the article, however, Daley does make 
some interesting points. First, she comments that a single rape victim in Britain may, 
however irrationally, feel shamed and a loss of self-respect and consequently may 
benefit from the 'talking cure'. as Daley puts it. But Daley goes on to say that in 
Bosnia rape has become a weapon of war and almost an entire generation of women 
have been 'subjected to indiscriminate degradation, which as they must know, has 
nothing to do with them as individuals'. " According to Daley, this 'fact', while 
possibly dehurnanising the women, has led to solidarity between the rape victims 
which has helped Io keep them sane'and, in addition, while an individual rape has the 
legacy of 'irrational terrors' the Bosnian rape. victims. would feel 'rational terror and Z; I 
rage'. which again would have helped them to 'go on living'. Daley justifies her 
viewpoint in the following manner: 
[I]f I may be so arrogant as to try to identify with them, the one 
emotion which I should imagine is keeping them alive is 
outrage. Anger and hatred, in cases such as theirs, can 
sometimes be the sustaining forces which can make the 
"37Janet Daley, "Janet Daley Column, " The Times, 16 April 1993, p. 16. 
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difference between real life and the living"death which comes 
with despair. 109 
Daley's insistence that the rape. victims should nurture their anger as a means of 
coping with their suffering is, according to Daley, contrary to the advice that the rape 
victims would have been receiving from the Marie Stopes team. The advice that is 
favoured by professional counsellors, states Daley, is to 'get rid of your anger'. to 'talk 
through the problems' and to 'come to terms' with your experience. But, in Daley's 
opinion this advice would not be helpful to the rape victims in Bosnia for two reasons. 
First, for the reasons stated above, Daley suggests that the women need to harbour 
their 'anger and hatred' in order to have a reason to survive, and second, to quote 
Daley directly: Is there not something at least fatuous, if not downright offensive, 
about suggesting that people come -to terms with the kind of horror which has been 
perpetuated against the Muslim women of Bosnia? '10 
To support her arguments - that the rape victim's main problem was physical danger 
not psychological stress - Janet Daley included a quotation ftom Indijana Harper, a 
spokeswomen for the organisation Bosnian Women in London, who asserted that 
'[t]hese women you are trying to counsel will soon be captured again and either raped 
or slaughtered'. "' Indeed, there is a powerful, although complex, argument put 
forward by the Coward article and endorsed by Janet Daley which called for military 
intervention in order to secure the future of the rape victims. However, Daley's other 
argument - that the anger and hatred felt by the Bosnian rape victims should not be 
defused - perhaps needs further expansion. It has been suggested in other articles 
mentioned above that many of the rape victims are still functioning in 'survival mode' 
and that they have yet to 'come to terms'with their experiences, but there has been no 
mention that inherent to this 'survival mode' is the need to foster feelings of outrage 
and hate. Indeed, it is the long term harbouring of these very destructive emotions, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, that arguably contributed to the initial triggering, and the 
continuation, of the Balkan conflict; although Daley may, of course, have been 
restricting her argument to the short term - there is no way of knowing. Therefore, the 
representation is that she. was encouraging a further period of ethnic hatred. t7 
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Another question mark that remains over Daley's argument is the question of 
solidarity among the rape victims themselves. As mentioned in a Chapter Four, there 
have been reports from Bosnia that claim that the Muslim women in particular have 
found it extremely difficult to talk about their experiences of rape amongst 
themselves. While this could be true of women in all cultures, this reluctance may be 
heightened due to their religious and cultural background and the shame and 
humiliation commonly portrayed as being the primary emotion felt by this group of 
women. Whether this is the case or not, if one has not got comprehensive, first-hand 
knowledge of the group one is trying to prescribe for it would probably be an 
extremely speculative business. Indeed, apart from military intervention, Daley's other 
prescription for the people of Bosnia is the 'Withdrawal of the Marie Stopes team who, 
according to Daley's theory are doing more hann than good by talking away the rape 
victim's will to survive. Yet, the representation of the work being accomplished by the 
Marie Stopes team in the earlier Pukas article, is that it has achieved a remarkable 
amount of success in a fairly short period of time. The anger and hatred of the rape 
victims and women in general appears to have been defused. For example, Pukas 
mentions that the women have discussed the fact that not all Serbs are badjust as not 
all Muslims are 'good'. "' And in addition, the Marie Stopes team offered other 
activities to try and fill the women's lives with positive images. Indeed, in contrast to 
this article by Janet Daley, the Pukas article portrays the Marie Stopes team and their 
work as playing a positive and supportive role. 
That these efforts were being made to consider the specific needs of the female rape 
victims was a positive step, and one that was particularly welcomed by advocates of 
women's human rights. Moreover, that measures were being offered to aid -the 
women's recovery in a practical way was more heartening still. Yet, perhaps just as 
important as the pragmatic shows of support was the appreciative reporting that, for 
the most part, was characteristic of the reports detailed in this section. Thus, feminist 
notions of women's human rights have been relayed to the public in a positive light, 
and thereby assisting their incorporation into mainstream social discourse. 
112 Anna Pukas, 19 June 1994. 
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Rape and the War Crimes Tribunal 
This final section is concerned primarily with analysing articles in which the issue of 
rape in war has been linked to the establishment of the international War Crimes 
Tribunal situated in The Hague. "' These consist mainly of the opinions of journalists, 
'experts'and Western political elites. The first article to be looked at here is neither a 
leading article, nor is it accredited to a particular author, but was published as a 
historical feature within the Education section of The Guardian. It is entitled War 
Crimes: A history of war's killing codes' and details the history of the laws of war, 
from the armies basic 'code of conduct' in the field, formulated at the end of the 
American Civil War, to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1977. The issue of rape 
is briefly mentioned in the following passage: 
The Geneva Conventions also contained the principle of "grave 
breaches". Those are particularly repulsive violations of the law 
of war such as mistreatment of civilians or prisoners of war, 
torture, rape, etc. 114 
This article, although providing simple, factual, rather than analytical, information, 
nevertheless provides an insight into one issue that the editors of The Guardian would 
have the children of Britain learn about and the fact that rape was mentioned within 
the context of the laws of war is a small but positive step in keeping 'rape in war'on 
the agenda. The next article in this section, written seven months later, and dealing for 
the most part with the limited progress of the Vance-Owen peace plan, reiterates the 
fact that rape, as a violation of the Geneva Convention and as mentioned in the 
previous article, can and should be punished by the War Crimes Tribunal. In the 
closing passage, Ian Black, the author and The Guardian's diplomatic editor, 
summarises Lord- Owen's views in the following statement: 
An international court already set up by the UN should pursue 
efforts, for years if need be, to bring Yugoslav war criminals to 
justice, Lord Owen said. "It needs to be reaffirmed ... that the laws which govern conduct in war - the rape of women, torture 
113FOr a comprehensive analysis of the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague see, for example: 
Christopher Greenwood, "The International Tribunal for Yugoslavia, " International Affairs Vol. 69, no. 
4 (1993): pp. 641-655; or, Payarn Akhavan, "Punishing War Crimes in the Former-Yugoslavia: A 
Critical Juncture for the New World Order, " Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 15 (1993): pp. 262-289. 
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of prisoners and other gross violations of the legal framework 
we have established to operate world-wide - will be upheld". "' 
It is interesting to note that Lord Owen talks of the rape of women and torture of 
prisoners, which, due to the fact that women have already been mentioned, one 
assumes the 'prisoners'are meant to be men. Therefore, the rape and sexual violation 
of men is represented here within the general term 'torture'- although one must admit 
that if all the abuse inflicted on prisoners, both sexual and otherwise, was listed, it 
would not fit neatly into a concisely worded sound-bite for the press. 
Another Guardian article which confin-ned the fact that rape is indeed a war crime, 
was a general article by The Guardian's foreign staff and entitled Bosnia crisis: Sex 
assaults 'a war crime'. 'This article was written almost a year before the previous Black 
article and quotes a leading intemational jurist and advisor to the United Nations 
Security Council, Frits Kalshoven, as stating categorically that 'the systematic, 
repeated rape of women prisoners in former Yugoslavia is a war crime'. "' Kalshoven 
attempts to justify and elaborate his view by stating what at first reading appears to be 
the obvious. He concludes that '[t]he numerous cases of rape amount to a war crime 
when it is connected to a situation of war'. 117 However, is he stating Ihe obvious? 
Whether Kalshoven meant to or not, on closer inspection he appears to be saying two 
very different things. In the first statement he suggests that rape is a war crime if the 
women are, first, prisoners (In a 'camp? In their homes? ), and second, that the 
individual women have to be repeatedly raped. Yet, in the second statement, 
Kalshoven implies that there needs to be a certain number of women raped for it to be 
recognised as a war crime. These are two very different scenarios. Despite the 
inherent confusion of these statements, which does not engender confidence in those 
Western political elites whose job it is to define rape as a war crime, once again the 
representation is generally positive; rape, in some. form, is officially recognised by 
both Western political elites and in international law as a war crime. 
1151an Black, "Owen says Bosnian split is inevitable, " The Guardian, 26 November 1993, sec. HOM, p. 
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As early as the summer of 1992 calls were being heard for the need to set up a 
Nuremberg-style'war crimes tribunal. One of these calls was documented in a two 
thousand word article printed in the Sunday Times. The main point made by this - 
extended article, written by Louise Branson, was that contrary to popular 
representation, the Serbs were not the only aggressors and the Bosnian Muslims were 
not the only victims, but all sides in the war committed atrocities and suffered 
atrocities themselves. Towards the end of the article, following a passage describing 
the rape of some Serbian women, comes the specific appeal for a war crimes tribunal. 
It comes from Dr. Milan Bulajic, head of the Serbian federal commission on war 
crimes and genocide, and who is also an international lawyer with United Nations 
experience. Branson explains Bulajic's request in the following manner: 
[Bulajicl has appealed to Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN 
secretary-general, for help in gathering evidence and setting up 
Nuremberg-style trials, under the auspices of the International 
Court of Justic'e in the Hague, for those who have perpetrated ZD - and ordered atrocities and massacres, possibly including senior 
political and military leaders.... [I]n order to underline his 
credibility and sincerity, be has suggested that the UN should 
first investigate atrocities by his fellow Serbs. "For those 
families whose members were killed we have to establish the 
truth. I don't make any borderlines. " he said. "' 
The above quotation is just one of many that call for those accused of war crimes in 
the former-Yugoslavia to be indicted and brought before an official tribunal. The 
reason for choosing this example was that it was the only appeal for a war crimes 
tribunal found that came from a Serbian political elite. There may, of course, have 
been other general appeals for a War Crimes Tribunal from Serbians, but they were 
not included in the press reports analysed. However, another statement regarding the 
- setting up of a war crimes tribunal did come from the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan 
Karadzic, and was more typical of the Serbian response, as represented in the British 
press. George Brock, the co-author of the article, stated that Karadzic 'would refuse to 
co-operate with the war crimes tribunal over the former Yugoslavia' and Brock also 
1181-ouise Branson, "Atrocities: Muslims, Croats and Serbs in catalogue of shame, " Sunday Times, 12 
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claimed that Karadzic stated categorically that any criminals would be dealt with by 
our own judiciary. "' 
Karadzic's statement aside, there were many calls of support and encouragement for 
the speedy instigation of a War Crimes Tribunal to be, set up in The Hague. However, 
there had also been as. many displays of frustration in the British press, particularly by 
feminists who considered that governments were failing to act in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention and the more recent War Crimes Act of 1991. Barbara Hewson, 
writing in The Times in September 1992 is one such example and she makes the 
following statement: 
[H]aving passed the War Crimes Act 1991, and with more and 
more evidence of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, the 
British government shows little enthusiasm for bringing 
contemporary war criminals to justice. The London peace 
conference did not mention the violation of women's rights by 
the military, let alone reparation. Rapes are ritually denied by 
official Serb, Croat and Muslim spokesmen. Women, it seems, 
are peripheral'. "' 
This admonition of the British government, due to its seeming lack of resolution in 
supporting the most recent War Crimes Act, came only a few months before the 
World Council of Churches added their name to the growing list of NGOs and 
women's groups who were calling for more commitment on the part of the Western 
governments who signed the 1991 War Crimes Act. Roger Boyes, reporting for The 
Times, stated that the World Council of Churches had declared that, in their opinion 
and following extensive evidence-gathering in Bosnia, Yape has become a systematic 
weapon of war in the Bosnian conflict and the rapists should be put before war crimes 
tribunals'. "' In addition, they claimed that the experiences of the rape victims were not 
being taken seriously by the authorities, or the 'international coinmunity'. This may 
well have been the case, but once again, it is impossible to draw any accurate 
conclusions. However, there were no references in the British press for approximately 
five months following this article which displayed any attempt by the British 
government or other political elites to assure the readers that either the rapes were 
119Gcorge Brock and James Bone, "NATO refuses to back five-nation formula for peace in Bosnia, " 
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being taken seriously or that the War Crimes Tribunal would attempt to bring those 
accused of committing, and/or ordering, the rapes to trial. 
Perhaps one reason for this silence becomes evident in the Spring of 1993 when Ian 
Black, writing for The Guardian, stated that 'experts'had estimated that in its first year 
the War Crimes Tribunal, to be set up in The Hague, would cost approximately thirty 
million pounds and doubts over the practicality of the tribunal had surfaced. Black 
elaborates on this claim in the following way: 
Plans to set up an international tribunal to deal with war crimes 
committed in the former Yugoslavia are being given the go- 
ahead by the United Nations Security Council despite 
widespread. recognition that legal and political complications 
mean very little justice is likely to be done ... some officials and lawyers are sceptical as to whether the tribunal will ever have 
more than symbolic value. 122 
Without doubt, the explicit representations in this article, are that the problems 
besetting the instigators of the tribunal were immense, including financial restrictions, 
the non-compliance of the former-Yugoslavia with extradition demands, and the 
gathering and presenting of Irial-grade' evidence. Trial-grade' evidence is not defined 
however, and it is interesting to note that Black comments that the British 
Government, initially against the strong US-sponsored attempts to formulate a tough 
UN war crimes policy because of the need to involve the Serb leaders in the peace 
process, nevertheless relented when presented with evidence which illustrated the 
scale of the atrocities. If this evidence is of a sufficient 'grade' to alter governmental 
policy, is it not sufficient for the prosecution to use at the war crimes tribunal? 
Moreover, the 'evidence' available to the tribunal must be extensive. It has been 
gathered from* many . 'sources a: nd by various organisations. For example, there is the 
war crimes commission's own investigations; the research of human rights groups; 
press reports; not to mention diplomatic, intelligence and humanitarian assessments by 
foreign embassies and other UN missions in the Balkans. In fact, it was also reported 
that Britain had banded over to the UN investigating commission 100 pages of 
evidence of war crimes, including rape, committed in Yugoslavia'. " The source of 
1221an Black, "UN lays plan for war crimes trial, " The Guardian, 26 May 1993, sec. FOR, p. 8. 
123Michael Evans, "Bosnia raid rift puts UN general's job in jeopardy, " The Times, 18 January 1994, p. 
12. 
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this evidence was interviews with approximately four thousand refugees from the 
fon-ner-Yugoslavia eventually offered asylum in Britain. Surely some of this evidence 
could be corroborated by other sources, although I do not underestimate the time and 
manpower needed to achieve this. Indeed, Melanie Phillips, writing in The Observer, 
commented that the difficulties in setting up the War Crimes Tribunal and bringing 
the perpetrators to justice remain forn-fidable'. 1" 
Despite the inherent problems, the War Crimes Tribunal was launched on 17 
November 1993, a few months behind schedule, but launched nevertheless. Ian 
Traynor, writing for The Guardian, marked the launch with a lengthy article entitled 
'Yugoslav war crimes court takes first faltering steps. First, Traynor set the scene by 
putting the War Crimes Tribfinal into context. He summarises past events in the' 
following way: 
[T]he court's ambit is former Yugoslavia, for the past two years 
the site of ethnic cleansing, massacres, prison camps, rape, 
looting and pillage -a calendar of atrocities not seen in Europe 
since Auschwitz. An estimated 200,000 people have died or are 
missing, and hundreds of thousands, the overwhelming majority 
civilians, have been displaced or dispossessed [and] the Bosnian 
war rages on. "' 
While this article begins with a positive almost gung-ho attitude, particularly with 
Traynor's comparisons of the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal with Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, it soon becomes clear that the problems and general lack of will are what 
overshadows all other representations. To support his general lack of confidence in the 
tribunal, Traynor used quotations from various 'expert' sources. A Canadian navy 
commander and expert on the law of armed conflict, who is also the cominission's sole 
on-site investigator, was asked for his opinion on whether the tribunal will bring the 
villains to book'. Traynor quotes the commander as saying that as yet, 'the prosecution 
service has to be set up, no cases are prepared, and it has a very tiny budget'. " 
124 Melanie Phillips, "War Crime and Punishment, " The Observer, 16 July 1995, see. LEA, p. 25. 1751an Traynor, "Yucoslav war crimes court takes first faltering steps, " The Guardian, 17 November Zý Z11 
1993, sec. FOR, p. 8. 
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Traynor also quoted a 'fed up' and sceptical retired Dutch professor of international 
humanitarian law, Frits Kalshoven, who commented that because of British and 
French efforts to frustrate his work there would be no 'speedy results. " Traynor 
stated that other, unnamed critics are even suggesting that 'the tribunal is an empty 
gesture by the Western powers to offset accusations that they stood by idly while a 
defenceless Bosnia was mauled by extreme nationalists'. "' The overall representation 
of this article is that the War Crimes Tribunal and the War Crimes Commission have 
been generally unde r-funded, under-resourced, under-staffed and will be unable to 
deal effectively with opposition from Western governments, notably Britain. 
Unfortunately, this 'representation' turned out to be somewhat prophetic. 
Considering the problems notdd above, it is not surprising that it was almost a year* 
later, in the autumn of 1994, that the prosecution of the first suspected war criminal 
began at the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. This fact was reported in The 
Guardian by Jon Henley in a very short (one hundred and fifty-word) article which 
outlined the crimes of which he was accused. Henley's article gives the reader the 
following information on the suspect: 
Dusko Tadic, aged 39, a reserve militiaman who was arrested 
earlier this year in Germany, is accused of the torture, murder 
and rape of Muslim prisoners at the Omarska and TrnopoIje 
camps in Serb-held north-west Bosnia ... One witness statement describes Mr. Tadic as "beating and torturing prisoners on a 
daily basis, and personally responsible for the murder of more 
than 10 prisoners ... using truncheons, iron bars, rifle buts, wire 
cables and knives". "' 
However, although the article gives the impression that the prosecution was due to 
begin immediately, towards the end of. the article Henley mentions that Richard 
Goldstone, the judge heading the tribunal, would not begin to prepare a formal 
indictment until the following month. Nevertheless, although the administrative 
wheels of the war crimes tribunal do appear to have begun to turn, and are still 
turning, albeit extremely slowly, the overall representation is positive with the 
appearance that justice is being done. 
127ibid. 
12sibid. 
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A further call for increased resolution and commitment toward the War Crimes 
Tribunal came from the then Shadow Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, who wrote an 
article in The Guardian two months later. The article was entitled Bosnia: what 
Labour would do' and set out Cook's own 'six-point plan for peace'. The only 
reference to rape and the War Crimes Tribunal came in 'point sixof the plan which 
Robin Cook details in the following way: 
Sixthly, we must inject some urgency into the War Crimes 
Tribunal established in response to the horrors of ethnic 
cleansing and mass rape. It is grotesque that three years on only 
one person has been indicted. The dilatory proceedings of the 
tribunal is one more signal to the combatants that the world 
community will acquiesce in whatever outcome is achieved by 
the force of arms. "' 
Point six, like the previous five points, portrays an emphatic, almost zealous 
commitment to 'sorting Bosnia out'. Were it not for the fact that Cook appeared, on 
occasion, to be lapsing into a party political broadcast, the reader could be quite 
heartened by his apparent dynamism and dedication in the fight for 'truth and justice'. 
However, at the time Cook held no more than potential power, therefore, his policies, 
his prescriptions and his six-point plan came across as little more than political 
posturing, albeit well-meaning. 
The following article, which digresses slightly from the main issue of this section, was 
published in The Guardian in August 1993 and was written by Veronica Horwell. It is 
simply called 'Called to account' and was an account of a Channel Four documentary 
called Frontline' - in the Bloody Bosnia' series - and describes the attempts of the 
Guardian reporter, Maggieý -OKane, to find and interview two Serbian 'War-lords 
active in the name of Serbian nationalism'. They were 'Arlan (wanted pre-war across 
Europe for murderous criminality) and Sese1j, a separatist, Belgrade demagogue ... 
And Milosevic, but he wasnI available for confrontation'. ` OKane's reasons for 
meeting the 'War-lords' was reasonably simple - she wanted to ask them about the 
rapes and killings in Bosnia and whether or not they had ordered them. And in 
13 ýRobin Cook, "Bosnia: what Labour would do? " The Guardian, 10 December 1994, sec. FEA, p. 26. 
13 'Veronica Hor-well, "Called to account, " The Guardian, 2 August 1993, sec. G2T, p. 4. 0 
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Horwell's words, O'Kane was there to deten-nine 'who is the guilty party [and] 
document what they are guilty of. "' At this stage of the article Horwell neither 
challenges OKane's reasons, nor comments on the enormity of the task, but merely 
continues to recount the manner in which OKane meets her impromptu interviewees. 
Prior to OKane's encounter with Arkan, "' her first target, Horwell first insists on 
giving the reader a little background information on the 'warlord'by stating that he's 
after becoming the [Serbian] representative for Kosovo state' and his promotion video 
shows him 'urgent in cam-cream, planning, in his words, 'a mopping-up process where 
you go into a village and throw a bomb in each cellar'. "" O'Kane's confrontation with 
Arkan does not prove to be very productive, as Hor-well states: 
OKane asked if he had Mil osevic's endorsement. He looked 
down at her, and said smoothly "I don't know what he thinks ... 
do you know what is in the head of President Milosevic or in my 
head? You canI know it ... " And he walked off, 
his support 
escort rolling their shoulder- blades almost into the C4 lens. The C., 
information was mostly in that last image, the footage any news 
bulletin would have cut, in which the self-certainty of Arkan and 
his boys got shoved in your face. They controlled their world. "' 
OWane's second interviewee, Sese1j, who was referred to by Hor-well as 'an attested 
monster', was tracked down in a Sarajevo occupied zone. Horwell states that Seselj 
'was so confident, so contemptuous [that] he charges 800 deutschmarks for an 
appearance'. "' Horwell then explains how OKane handled the interview: 
She behaved almost embarrassed at the obviousness of what she 
must ask. She testified to what she knew of his men's killings 
and rapes in Bosnia: "What do you have to say to that? " ... He 
remarked that the West would have to defeat him on the 
battlefield - and that wouldn't be easy - before he would be 
accountable. He sneered th4t his devotees wobld have had to 
have been supermen to rape as many women as had been 
claimed. "' 
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This article, although not directly related to the issue of the War Crimes Tribunal, 
nevertheless, illustrates the problem the War Crimes Commission has in tracking 
down possible war criminals and bringing them to trial, particularly as the former- 
Yugoslavia adamantly refuses to co-operate with extradition orders. "' If the Varlords' 
mentioned above ivere indicted for war crimes by the Commission, would the tribunal 
simply wait until some time in the future when the men might choose to leave their 
country before arresting them? Generally, this would not be the case: as although 
NATO may have the resources to arrest suspected war criminals, it could prove to be 
too volatile an issue politically. 
The last article covered in this section was written in the summer of 1995 and was 
primarily concerned with debating the possibility of mass graves in Bosnia, following 
the publication of US satellite pictures. As well as discussing the possibility that the 
graves may contain the bodies of Ihousands of missing Bosnian Muslim men'. the 
article also goes on to comment on the type of evidence which has been documented 
at the War Crimes Commission in The Hague. Moreover, the article makes the point 
that all of the warring factions are guilty of war crimes, thus, the article continues in 
the following manner: 
The Serbs are not alone in committing war crimes. Documents 
now being filed in The Hague to the international war crimes 
tribunal have scores of allegations of killings by the Croats of 
Serbs held in death camps, and atrocities of electrocution, 
starvation, rape and of men being forced to cat sliced-off ears. "' 
After detailing these and other wartime atrocities committed by all sides and 
commenting on the comparisons between them and other war crimes committed by 
the Nazis during the Second World War and Stalin's massacres in the Katyn Forest, 
the article continues to defend the need for the War Crimes Tribunal to be as effective 
as Nuremberg. However, in its closing passage the article's reserve turns to 
despondency when it states that the chances of 'General Mladic ever appearing before 
a tribunal are minimal; as after Katyn, realpolitik is poised to win the day'. "' 
"'No byline, "Rape and other war crimes, " Newsweek, 8 July 1996, p. 17. 
. 39Leadincy Article, "Buried bodies, " The Times, 12 August 1995, p. 17. 
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Furthermore, subsequent developments have proved this to be the case - so far. 
The majority of these articles have had an air of resignation and/or despondency about 
them. Moreover, the general representation has been that although the War Crime 
Tribunal was a necessary move on behalf of the European com munity, its ability to 
indict and bring to trial possible war criminals has been called into question. And in 
particular the problem of indicting war criminals on a charge of rape has been 
primarily represented as one of a lack of 'tri al-grade' evidence. In practical terms, then, 
rape as an indictable war crime appears to have progressed little from the days of 
Tokyo and Nuremberg. It remains an issue that, while attracting some positive and 
hopeful statements, both verbal and written, still appears to lack the political will and 
the means to bring those responsible to justice. By the *summer of 1998, however, a 
decision had been made to establish a permanent International Criminal Court, which 
represents a considerable step forward, although it should also be noted that, to date, 
the US have failed to sign up. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined a series of articles that discussed various aspects of the 
Western response' to the wars in the Balkans. That is, the journalists recorded the 
responses of governments, NGOs, 'women's rights organisations' , and so on, to the 
initial reports of mass rape in the Balkans. Those newspaper articles were 
subsequently analysed in this chapter and the differing responses that were discussed 
by various quarters were noted and analysed. 
The first section, which dealt primarily with the responses of Western political elites 
revealed few surprises, in that, although politicians and EC/EU representatives 
showed verbal suppor t for the rape victims and their plight, there was little practical 
help forthcoming from their 'posturing'. Even when governmental reports had been 
commissioned and considerable time and money spent on gathering first-hand data on 
the extent of the problem, there still appeared to be reticence on the part of the 
political elites to follow through with 'action'to support the rape victims. 
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On the other hand, the organisations which have been lobbying for the recognition of 
rape as a single crime of war in its own right and have even called for military 
intervention to halt the sexual violence against women (and the violence in general), 
have been represented as having translated their verbal and written support into 
practical aid. The Marie Stopes team, in particular, have been represented-as having 
helped the rape victims within the Balkans in sensitive, yet pragmatic ways. Although, 
generally supportive of these measures, the press were by no means partial, with some 
of the methods employed by the Marie Stopes team criticised. Generally though, 
women's groups were portrayed as doing their utmost to help the rape victims of the 
Balkan War, with their main handicap being the bureaucracy and lack of conviction 
on the part of the political elites. 
The press, having lost interest in the 'stories' of the rape victims, once again found an 
issue that would breathe new life into the Balkans' story' - that of the 'rape babies'. 
One could probably argue that there were signs of a slight drop in (broadsheet) 
journalistic standards where this issue was concerned - in that the journalists tended to 
sensationalise the issue - which came across in the representations, and was 
highlighted by some of the journalists themselves: for example, Linda Grant. 
However, the preoccupation by the press with the potential 'rape babies', albeit 
temporary, does emphasise the ease at which the actual rape, victims and their 
suffering are relegated by the press when a more 'newsworthy"story'is discovered. 
The final section in this chapter looked at the representations of the instigation and the 
viability of the War Crimes Tribunal set up in The Hague to try those indicted of war 
crimes in the former-Yugoslavia. In general, while not taking an overtly critical 
position, the journalists tended to write their reports from a negative angle: the articles 
had an overall air of submission about them and tended to concentrate on the 
seemingly insurmountable problems that were besetting the Tribunal. For the rape 
victims, one of the main obstacles in achieving any convictions against the wartime 41. ) 
rapists was given as the lack of Irial-grade' evidence, which would be admissible and 
provable in court. This immediately prejudices any case involving rape, as procuring a z: - 
conviction for rape during 'peacetime'. as has been mentioned before, is extremely 
difficult, therefore, to achieve a conviction at a war crimes tribunal, with all the 
logistical and cultural problems to overcome, appears to be almost impossible. Once 
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again, women, and the crimes that are almost exclusively aimed at them, whether 
purposely or by the established structural forces, are silenced. 
A very complicated picture emerges from Part Two, but one which confirms that the 
age-old phenomenon of mass rape in war occurred on a massive scale in the Balkans 
(and also that it happened to men, although this was reported on a lesser scale). 
Analysis of the articles has highlighted the main contemporary explanations for rape 
in war, which provides insights into Western society and to the possible impact of 
feminist theories. To develop our understanding of the explanations and that 
relationship to feminist thought further, we will now turn to the final part of the thesis. 
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